* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2017 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
# include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
# include "danessl.h"
#endif
# define EXIM_HAVE_SHA256
#endif
-/*
- * X509_check_host provides sane certificate hostname checking, but was added
- * to OpenSSL late, after other projects forked off the code-base. So in
- * addition to guarding against the base version number, beware that LibreSSL
- * does not (at this time) support this function.
- *
- * If LibreSSL gains a different API, perhaps via libtls, then we'll probably
- * opt to disentangle and ask a LibreSSL user to provide glue for a third
- * crypto provider for libtls instead of continuing to tie the OpenSSL glue
- * into even twistier knots. If LibreSSL gains the same API, we can just
- * change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer.
- */
+/* X509_check_host provides sane certificate hostname checking, but was added
+to OpenSSL late, after other projects forked off the code-base. So in
+addition to guarding against the base version number, beware that LibreSSL
+does not (at this time) support this function.
+
+If LibreSSL gains a different API, perhaps via libtls, then we'll probably
+opt to disentangle and ask a LibreSSL user to provide glue for a third
+crypto provider for libtls instead of continuing to tie the OpenSSL glue
+into even twistier knots. If LibreSSL gains the same API, we can just
+change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
+
#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+# else
+# define EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
# endif
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \
&& (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L
# define DISABLE_OCSP
#endif
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
+# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#endif
+
+/*************************************************
+* OpenSSL option parse *
+*************************************************/
+
+typedef struct exim_openssl_option {
+ uschar *name;
+ long value;
+} exim_openssl_option;
+/* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
+options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
+all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
+to apply.
+
+This list is current as of:
+ ==> 1.0.1b <==
+Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
+Plus SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 for 1.1.2-dev
+*/
+static exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
+/* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
+ { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+ { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+ { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+ { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
+ { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+ { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
+ { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
+ { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+ { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
+ { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+ { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+ { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
+ /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
+#warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
+#else
+ { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+ { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+ { US"no_tlsv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
+ { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+ { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
+ { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+ { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+ { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
+ { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+ { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+ { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
+#endif
+};
+
+#ifndef MACRO_PREDEF
+static int exim_openssl_options_size = nelem(exim_openssl_options);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF
+void
+options_tls(void)
+{
+uschar buf[64];
+
+for (struct exim_openssl_option * o = exim_openssl_options;
+ o < exim_openssl_options + nelem(exim_openssl_options); o++)
+ {
+ /* Trailing X is workaround for problem with _OPT_OPENSSL_NO_TLSV1
+ being a ".ifdef _OPT_OPENSSL_NO_TLSV1_3" match */
+
+ spf(buf, sizeof(buf), US"_OPT_OPENSSL_%T_X", o->name);
+ builtin_macro_create(buf);
+ }
+}
+#else
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+
/* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
typedef struct randstuff {
Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
- from the SMTP Transport.
+ from the SMTP Transport. We may also concurrently want to make TLS connections
+ to utility daemons, so client-contexts are allocated and passed around in call
+ args rather than using a gobal.
Server:
There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
configuration.
*/
-static SSL_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
+typedef struct {
+ SSL_CTX * ctx;
+ SSL * ssl;
+} exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx;
+
static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
-static SSL *client_ssl = NULL;
static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
uschar *certificate;
uschar *privatekey;
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
BOOL is_server;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack; /* chain for verifying the proof */
union {
struct {
{
if (!msg)
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
msg = US ssl_errstring;
}
-if (errstr) *errstr = string_sprintf("(%s): %s", prefix, msg);
+msg = string_sprintf("(%s): %s", prefix, msg);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS error '%s'\n", msg);
+if (errstr) *errstr = msg;
return host ? FAIL : DEFER;
}
#endif
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (RSA_generate_key): %s",
ssl_errstring);
return NULL;
x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
{
STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
-int i;
static uschar name[256];
-for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
+for (int i= 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
{
X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
{
- X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
- name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
- debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
+ X509_NAME * sn = X509_get_subject_name(tmp_obj->data.x509);
+ if (X509_NAME_oneline(sn, CS name, sizeof(name)))
+ {
+ name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
+ debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
+ }
}
}
}
*/
static int
-verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
- tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
+verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx,
+ tls_support * tlsp, BOOL * calledp, BOOL * optionalp)
{
X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
uschar dn[256];
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn)))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address);
+ return 0;
+ }
dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
if (preverify_ok == 0)
if ( tlsp == &tls_out
&& ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
- /* client, wanting hostname check */
+ /* client, wanting hostname check */
{
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
/* This gets called *by* the dane library verify callback, which interposes
itself.
BOOL dummy_called, optional = FALSE;
#endif
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn)))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
+ deliver_host_address);
+ return 0;
+ }
dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s depth %d %s\n",
#endif
if (preverify_ok == 1)
- tls_out.dane_verified =
- tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
+ {
+ tls_out.dane_verified = tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ if (client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
+ { /* client, wanting stapling */
+ /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
+ for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
+ cert))
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ sk_X509_push(client_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, cert);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
else
{
int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx);
return preverify_ok;
}
-#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
+#endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/
/*************************************************
static void
info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
-where = where;
-ret = ret;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL info: %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s));
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ const uschar * str;
+
+ if (where & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ str = US"SSL_connect";
+ else if (where & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ str = US"SSL_accept";
+ else
+ str = US"SSL info (undefined)";
+
+ if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
+ debug_printf("%s: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT)
+ debug_printf("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
+ str = where & SSL_CB_READ ? US"read" : US"write",
+ SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT)
+ if (ret == 0)
+ debug_printf("%s: failed in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (ret < 0)
+ debug_printf("%s: error in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START)
+ debug_printf("%s: hshake start: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)
+ debug_printf("%s: hshake done: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ }
}
SNI handling.
Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not
-be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
+be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
But what with? We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback.
And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the
library does it for us anyway? */
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
}
goto bad;
}
supply_response:
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp; /*XXX stack?*/
return;
bad:
- if (running_in_test_harness)
+ if (f.running_in_test_harness)
{
extern char ** environ;
- uschar ** p;
- if (environ) for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
+ if (environ) for (uschar ** p = USS environ; *p; p++)
if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
goto err;
where = US"generating pkey";
-if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 1024)))
+if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 2048)))
goto err;
where = US"assigning pkey";
goto err;
X509_set_version(x509, 2); /* N+1 - version 3 */
-ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 0);
+ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 1);
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509), 0);
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509), (long)60 * 60); /* 1 hour */
X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey);
{
if (!cbinfo->is_server) /* client */
return OK;
- /* server */
+ /* server */
if (tls_install_selfsign(sctx, errstr) != OK)
return DEFER;
}
if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, expanded, errstr)))
return err;
- if (cbinfo->privatekey != NULL &&
- !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded, errstr))
+ if ( cbinfo->privatekey
+ && !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded, errstr))
return DEFER;
/* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
{
+ /*XXX stack*/
if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded, errstr))
return DEFER;
not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
+#else
if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
}
/* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
if ( !init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL, &dummy_errstr)
|| !init_ecdh(server_sni, NULL, &dummy_errstr)
)
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
+
+if ( cbinfo->server_cipher_list
+ && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list))
+ goto bad;
-if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
{
if ((rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE,
verify_callback_server, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
/* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
OCSP information. */
if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
-
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+bad: return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
#endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */
tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
{
const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
-uschar *response_der;
+uschar *response_der; /*XXX blob */
int response_der_len;
+/*XXX stack: use SSL_get_certificate() to see which cert; from that work
+out which ocsp blob to send. Unfortunately, SSL_get_certificate is known
+buggy in current OpenSSL; it returns the last cert loaded always rather than
+the one actually presented. So we can't support a stack of OCSP proofs at
+this time. */
+
DEBUG(D_tls)
debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response\n",
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
response_der = NULL;
-response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response,
+response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response, /*XXX stack*/
&response_der);
if (response_der_len <= 0)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int status, reason;
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
- DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
/*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable");
+ if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
+ ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
goto failed;
}
tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
uschar *privatekey,
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- uschar *ocsp_file,
+ uschar *ocsp_file, /*XXX stack, in server*/
#endif
address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp, uschar ** errstr)
{
cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
+cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL;
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
-if ((cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL))
+if (!host)
{
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
cbinfo->event_action = NULL;
#endif
+#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+#endif
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SHA256
/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
existing knob. */
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method())))
+#else
if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL, errstr);
/* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
-/* Disable session cache unconditionally */
-
+/* We'd like to disable session cache unconditionally, but foolish Outlook
+Express clients then give up the first TLS connection and make a second one
+(which works). Only when there is an IMAP service on the same machine.
+Presumably OE is trying to use the cache for A on B. Leave it enabled for
+now, until we work out a decent way of presenting control to the config. It
+will never be used because we use a new context every time. */
+#ifdef notdef
(void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+#endif
/* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
/* Initialize ECDH temp key parameter selection */
}
# endif
-if (host == NULL) /* server */
+if (!host) /* server */
{
# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
static void
construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
{
-/* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
+/* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, 'c' needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
-const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-const uschar *ver;
-ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
+const uschar * ver = CUS SSL_get_version(ssl);
+const SSL_CIPHER * c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
-c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
static void
-peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned bsize)
+peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned siz)
{
/*XXX we might consider a list-of-certs variable for the cert chain.
SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL*). We'd need a new variable type and support
in list-handling functions, also consider the difference between the entire
chain and the elements sent by the peer. */
+tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
+
/* Will have already noted peercert on a verify fail; possibly not the leaf */
if (!tlsp->peercert)
tlsp->peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
/* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
if (tlsp->peercert)
- {
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tlsp->peercert), CS peerdn, bsize);
- peerdn[bsize-1] = '\0';
- tlsp->peerdn = peerdn; /*XXX a static buffer... */
- }
-else
- tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
+ if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tlsp->peercert), CS peerdn, siz))
+ { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n"); }
+ else
+ {
+ peerdn[siz-1] = '\0';
+ tlsp->peerdn = peerdn; /*XXX a static buffer... */
+ }
}
* Set up for verifying certificates *
*************************************************/
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/* Load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
static BOOL
BIO * bp;
X509 * x;
+while (sk_X509_num(verify_stack) > 0)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_pop(verify_stack));
+
if (!(bp = BIO_new_file(CS file, "r"))) return FALSE;
while ((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL)))
sk_X509_push(verify_stack, x);
BIO_free(bp);
return TRUE;
}
+#endif
-/* Called by both client and server startup
+/* Called by both client and server startup; on the server possibly
+repeated after a Server Name Indication.
Arguments:
sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
- "failed to load cert hain from %s", file);
+ "failed to load cert chain from %s", file);
return DEFER;
}
#endif
/* Load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for sending
to the client. This is only for the one-file tls_verify_certificates
variant.
- If a list isn't loaded into the server, but
- some verify locations are set, the server end appears to make
- a wildcard request for client certs.
+ If a list isn't loaded into the server, but some verify locations are set,
+ the server end appears to make a wildcard request for client certs.
Meanwhile, the client library as default behaviour *ignores* the list
we send over the wire - see man SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.
Because of this, and that the dir variant is likely only used for
- the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing.
- */
+ the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing. */
+
if (file)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
}
}
}
/* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional ? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
cert_vfy_cb);
}
/* Check for previous activation */
-if (tls_in.active >= 0)
+if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0)
{
tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"", errstr);
smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE);
rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- tls_ocsp_file,
+ tls_ocsp_file, /*XXX stack*/
#endif
NULL, &server_static_cbinfo, errstr);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
/* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
were historically separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my
tests, and also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here.
+
+XXX SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() is replaced by SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites()
+for TLS 1.3 . Since we do not call it at present we get the default list:
+TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
*/
if (expciphers)
optional, set up appropriately. */
tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
tls_in.dane_verified = FALSE;
#endif
server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
{
rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
- FALSE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
+ FALSE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
server_verify_optional = FALSE;
}
else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
{
rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
- TRUE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
+ TRUE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
server_verify_optional = TRUE;
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
-if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
-alarm(0);
+ALARM_CLR(0);
if (rc <= 0)
{
smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
*/
-ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
+if (!ssl_xfer_buffer) ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
-ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
+ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = FALSE;
receive_getc = tls_getc;
receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf;
receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
-tls_in.active = fileno(smtp_out);
+tls_in.active.sock = fileno(smtp_out);
+tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL; /* not using explicit ctx for server-side */
return OK;
}
if ( ( !ob->tls_verify_hosts
&& (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
)
- || (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+ || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK
)
client_verify_optional = FALSE;
-else if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
client_verify_optional = TRUE;
else
return OK;
errstr)) != OK)
return rc;
-if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
+if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
{
cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames =
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
static int
dane_tlsa_load(SSL * ssl, host_item * host, dns_answer * dnsa, uschar ** errstr)
{
-dns_record * rr;
dns_scan dnss;
const char * hostnames[2] = { CS host->name, NULL };
int found = 0;
if (DANESSL_init(ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL, errstr);
-for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
- rr;
+for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr;
rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
- ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
+ ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA && rr->size > 3)
{
const uschar * p = rr->data;
uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: No usable TLSA records");
return DEFER;
}
-#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
+#endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/
Argument:
fd the fd of the connection
- host connected host (for messages)
- addr the first address
+ host connected host (for messages and option-tests)
+ addr the first address (for some randomness; can be NULL)
tb transport (always smtp)
tlsa_dnsa tlsa lookup, if DANE, else null
+ tlsp record details of channel configuration here; must be non-NULL
errstr error string pointer
-Returns: OK on success
- FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
- because this is not a server
+Returns: Pointer to TLS session context, or NULL on error
*/
-int
+void *
tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
transport_instance * tb,
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa,
#endif
- uschar ** errstr)
+ tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr)
{
-smtp_transport_options_block * ob =
- (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
+smtp_transport_options_block * ob = tb
+ ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block
+ : &smtp_transport_option_defaults;
+exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * exim_client_ctx;
static uschar peerdn[256];
uschar * expciphers;
int rc;
BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-tls_out.tlsa_usage = 0;
+rc = store_pool;
+store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+exim_client_ctx = store_get(sizeof(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx));
+store_pool = rc;
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+tlsp->tlsa_usage = 0;
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
{
-# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+# ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if ( tlsa_dnsa
&& ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
&& ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
# endif
if ((require_ocsp =
- verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
+ verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
request_ocsp = TRUE;
else
-# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+# ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if (!request_ocsp)
# endif
request_ocsp =
- verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
}
#endif
-rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
+rc = tls_init(&exim_client_ctx->ctx, host, NULL,
ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
(void *)(long)request_ocsp,
#endif
addr, &client_static_cbinfo, errstr);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+if (rc != OK) return NULL;
-tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
+tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
-if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
- &expciphers, errstr))
- return FAIL;
+expciphers = NULL;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
+ {
+ /* We fall back to tls_require_ciphers if unset, empty or forced failure, but
+ other failures should be treated as problems. */
+ if (ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers &&
+ !expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers",
+ &expciphers, errstr))
+ return NULL;
+ if (expciphers && *expciphers == '\0')
+ expciphers = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+if (!expciphers &&
+ !expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
+ &expciphers, errstr))
+ return NULL;
/* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and
uschar *s = expciphers;
while (*s) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(client_ctx, CS expciphers))
- return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL, errstr);
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(exim_client_ctx->ctx, CS expciphers))
+ {
+ tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if (tlsa_dnsa)
{
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(exim_client_ctx->ctx,
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
verify_callback_client_dane);
if (!DANESSL_library_init())
- return tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL, errstr);
- if (DANESSL_CTX_init(client_ctx) <= 0)
- return tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL, errstr);
+ {
+ tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (DANESSL_CTX_init(exim_client_ctx->ctx) <= 0)
+ {
+ tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
else
#endif
- if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob,
- client_static_cbinfo, errstr)) != OK)
- return rc;
+ if (tls_client_basic_ctx_init(exim_client_ctx->ctx, host, ob,
+ client_static_cbinfo, errstr) != OK)
+ return NULL;
-if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
- return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
-SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
-SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
-SSL_set_connect_state(client_ssl);
+if (!(exim_client_ctx->ssl = SSL_new(exim_client_ctx->ctx)))
+ {
+ tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+SSL_set_session_id_context(exim_client_ctx->ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
+SSL_set_fd(exim_client_ctx->ssl, fd);
+SSL_set_connect_state(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
if (ob->tls_sni)
{
- if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_out.sni, errstr))
- return FAIL;
- if (!tls_out.sni)
+ if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tlsp->sni, errstr))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!tlsp->sni)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
}
- else if (!Ustrlen(tls_out.sni))
- tls_out.sni = NULL;
+ else if (!Ustrlen(tlsp->sni))
+ tlsp->sni = NULL;
else
{
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_out.sni);
- SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client_ssl, tls_out.sni);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tlsp->sni);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp->sni);
#else
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SNI unusable with this OpenSSL library version; ignoring \"%s\"\n",
- tls_out.sni);
+ tlsp->sni);
#endif
}
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if (tlsa_dnsa)
- if ((rc = dane_tlsa_load(client_ssl, host, tlsa_dnsa, errstr)) != OK)
- return rc;
+ if (dane_tlsa_load(exim_client_ctx->ssl, host, tlsa_dnsa, errstr) != OK)
+ return NULL;
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
-# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+# ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if (request_ocsp)
{
const uschar * s;
{ /* Re-eval now $tls_out_tlsa_usage is populated. If
this means we avoid the OCSP request, we wasted the setup
cost in tls_init(). */
- require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
request_ocsp = require_ocsp
- || verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
}
}
# endif
if (request_ocsp)
{
- SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(exim_client_ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+ tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
}
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
-client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb->event_action;
+client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb ? tb->event_action : NULL;
#endif
/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
-alarm(ob->command_timeout);
-rc = SSL_connect(client_ssl);
-alarm(0);
+ALARM(ob->command_timeout);
+rc = SSL_connect(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
+ALARM_CLR(0);
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if (tlsa_dnsa)
- DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl);
+ DANESSL_cleanup(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
#endif
if (rc <= 0)
- return tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL,
- errstr);
+ {
+ tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
-peer_cert(client_ssl, &tls_out, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
+peer_cert(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
-construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
-tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
+construct_cipher_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tlsp->bits);
+tlsp->cipher = cipherbuf;
/* Record the certificate we presented */
{
- X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(client_ssl);
- tls_out.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
+ X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
+ tlsp->ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
}
-tls_out.active = fd;
-return OK;
+tlsp->active.sock = fd;
+tlsp->active.tls_ctx = exim_client_ctx;
+return exim_client_ctx;
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
-if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer,
MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim));
error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
-alarm(0);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM_CLR(0);
+
+if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */
+ smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */
+if (had_command_sigterm)
+ smtp_command_sigterm_exit();
+if (had_data_timeout)
+ smtp_data_timeout_exit();
+if (had_data_sigint)
+ smtp_data_sigint_exit();
/* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
non-SSL handling. */
-if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
+switch(error)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ break;
- receive_getc = smtp_getc;
- receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf;
- receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
- receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
- receive_feof = smtp_feof;
- receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
- receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
-
- SSL_free(server_ssl);
- server_ssl = NULL;
- tls_in.active = -1;
- tls_in.bits = 0;
- tls_in.cipher = NULL;
- tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
- tls_in.sni = NULL;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
- return FALSE;
- }
+ receive_getc = smtp_getc;
+ receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf;
+ receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
+ receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
+ receive_feof = smtp_feof;
+ receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
+ receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
-/* Handle genuine errors */
+ if (SSL_get_shutdown(server_ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ SSL_shutdown(server_ssl);
-else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL)
- {
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
- ssl_xfer_error = 1;
- return FALSE;
- }
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free);
+ server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
+#endif
+ SSL_free(server_ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx);
+ server_ctx = NULL;
+ server_ssl = NULL;
+ tls_in.active.sock = -1;
+ tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL;
+ tls_in.bits = 0;
+ tls_in.cipher = NULL;
+ tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
+ tls_in.sni = NULL;
-else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
- ssl_xfer_error = 1;
- return FALSE;
+ return FALSE;
+
+ /* Handle genuine errors */
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
+ ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
+
+ default:
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) if (error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
+ debug_printf(" - syscall %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
}
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
/*
Arguments:
+ ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
buff buffer of data
len size of buffer
Returns: the number of bytes read
- -1 after a failed read
+ -1 after a failed read, including EOF
Only used by the client-side TLS.
*/
int
-tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len)
{
-SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
+SSL * ssl = ct_ctx ? ((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->ssl : server_ssl;
int inbytes;
int error;
/*
Arguments:
- is_server channel specifier
+ ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
buff buffer of data
len number of bytes
more further data expected soon
*/
int
-tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
+tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar *buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
{
-int outbytes, error, left;
-SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
+int outbytes, error;
+SSL * ssl = ct_ctx ? ((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->ssl : server_ssl;
static gstring * corked = NULL;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, %lu%s)\n", __FUNCTION__,
"more" is notified. This hack is only ok if small amounts are involved AND only
one stream does it, in one context (i.e. no store reset). Currently it is used
for the responses to the received SMTP MAIL , RCPT, DATA sequence, only. */
+/*XXX + if PIPE_COMMAND, banner & ehlo-resp for smmtp-on-connect. Suspect there's
+a store reset there. */
-if (is_server && (more || corked))
+if (!ct_ctx && (more || corked))
{
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT
+ int save_pool = store_pool;
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+#endif
+
corked = string_catn(corked, buff, len);
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT
+ store_pool = save_pool;
+#endif
+
if (more)
return len;
buff = CUS corked->s;
corked = NULL;
}
-for (left = len; left > 0;)
+for (int left = len; left > 0;)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %p, %d)\n", buff, left);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", ssl, buff, left);
outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
switch (error)
{
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
return -1;
daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
would tamper with the SSL session in the parent process).
-Arguments: TRUE if SSL_shutdown is to be called
+Arguments:
+ ct_ctx client TLS context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
+ shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent,
+ 2 if also response to be waited for
+
Returns: nothing
Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
*/
void
-tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
+tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int shutdown)
{
-SSL **sslp = is_server ? &server_ssl : &client_ssl;
-int *fdp = is_server ? &tls_in.active : &tls_out.active;
+exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * o_ctx = ct_ctx;
+SSL_CTX **ctxp = o_ctx ? &o_ctx->ctx : &server_ctx;
+SSL **sslp = o_ctx ? &o_ctx->ssl : &server_ssl;
+int *fdp = o_ctx ? &tls_out.active.sock : &tls_in.active.sock;
if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
if (shutdown)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down SSL\n");
- SSL_shutdown(*sslp);
+ int rc;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n",
+ shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
+
+ if ( (rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp)) == 0 /* send "close notify" alert */
+ && shutdown > 1)
+ {
+ ALARM(2);
+ rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp); /* wait for response */
+ ALARM_CLR(0);
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0) DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+ debug_printf("SSL_shutdown: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
+ }
}
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+if (!o_ctx) /* server side */
+ {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free);
+ server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+SSL_CTX_free(*ctxp);
SSL_free(*sslp);
+*ctxp = NULL;
*sslp = NULL;
-
*fdp = -1;
}
/* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global
state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */
+#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
SSL_load_error_strings();
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+#endif
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
list of available digests. */
err = NULL;
-ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
-if (!ctx)
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
+#else
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);
}
if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
err = string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed: %s",
expciphers, ssl_errstring);
}
int i, needed_len;
static pid_t pidlast = 0;
pid_t pidnow;
-uschar *p;
uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
if (max <= 1)
}
r = 0;
-for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
- {
- r *= 256;
- r += *p;
- }
+for (uschar * p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
+ r = 256 * r + *p;
/* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
Returns success or failure in parsing
*/
-struct exim_openssl_option {
- uschar *name;
- long value;
-};
-/* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
-options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
-all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
-to apply.
-
-This list is current as of:
- ==> 1.0.1b <==
-Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
-*/
-static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
-/* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
-#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
- { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
- { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
- { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
- { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
- { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
- { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
- { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
- { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
- { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
- { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
- { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
- { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
- { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
- { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
- { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
- { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
- /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
-#warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
-#else
- { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
-#endif
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
- { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
- { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
- { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
- { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
- { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
- { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
- { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
- { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
- { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
-#endif
-};
-static int exim_openssl_options_size =
- sizeof(exim_openssl_options)/sizeof(struct exim_openssl_option);
static BOOL
tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
{
long result, item;
-uschar *s, *end;
+uschar *end;
uschar keep_c;
BOOL adding, item_parsed;
return TRUE;
}
-for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
+for (uschar * s = option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
{
while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
if (*s == '\0')
return TRUE;
}
+#endif /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/
/* vi: aw ai sw=2
*/
/* End of tls-openssl.c */
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff