/* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
default:
- return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+ return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
/* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
case DNS_NOMATCH:
case DNS_NODATA:
- return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
/* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
case DNS_SUCCEED:
- break;
+ break;
}
/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
{
if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
*user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after %s: %s",
- smtp_names[smtp_connection_had[smtp_ch_index-1]], *log_msgptr);
+ smtp_names[smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index)]],
+ *log_msgptr);
if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
}
}
{
const uschar *pp = p + 6;
while (*pp) pp++;
- submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
- big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
+ submission_name = parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6);
p = pp;
}
else break;
case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
if (dkim_cur_signer)
rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
- &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
else
rc = FAIL;
break;
case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
rc = match_isinlist(dkim_verify_status,
- &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
break;
#endif
/* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
* view into the process in the future. */
rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS),
- &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
break;
#endif
/* Drop cutthrough conns, and drop heldopen verify conns if
the previous was not DATA */
{
- uschar prev = smtp_connection_had[smtp_ch_index-2];
+ uschar prev =
+ smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index))];
BOOL dropverify = !(prev == SCH_DATA || prev == SCH_BDAT);
cancel_cutthrough_connection(dropverify, US"quit or conndrop");