# TLSv1.1:AES256-SHA:256
# TLSv1.2:AES256-GCM-SHA384:256
# TLSv1.2:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:256
+ # TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256
# TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128
# We also need to handle the ciphersuite without the TLS part present, for
# client-ssl's output. We also see some older forced ciphersuites, but
#
# Retain the authentication algorith field as we want to test that.
- s/( (?: (?:\b|\s) [\(=] ) | \s )TLSv1\.[12]:/$1TLSv1:/xg;
+ s/( (?: (?:\b|\s) [\(=] ) | \s )TLSv1\.[123]:/$1TLSv1:/xg;
s/((EC)?DHE-)?(RSA|ECDSA)-AES(128|256)-(GCM-SHA(256|384)|SHA)(?!:)/ke-$3-AES256-SHA/g;
s/((EC)?DHE-)?(RSA|ECDSA)-AES(128|256)-(GCM-SHA(256|384)|SHA):(128|256)/ke-$3-AES256-SHA:xxx/g;
+ # OpenSSL TLSv1.3 - unsure what to do about the authentication-variant testcases now,
+ # as it seems the protocol no longer supports a user choice.
+ s/TLS_AES(_256)_GCM_SHA384:256/TLS-AES256-SHA:xxx/g;
+
# LibreSSL
# TLSv1:AES256-GCM-SHA384:256
# TLSv1:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:256
s/(DKIM: validation error: )error:[0-9A-F]{8}:rsa routines:(?:(?i)int_rsa_verify|CRYPTO_internal):(?:bad signature|algorithm mismatch)$/$1Public key signature verification has failed./;
# DKIM timestamps
- s/(DKIM: d=.*) t=([0-9]*) x=([0-9]*)(?{ return $3 - $2; }) /$1 t=T x=T+$^R /;
+ if ( /(DKIM: d=.*) t=([0-9]*) x=([0-9]*) / )
+ {
+ my ($prefix, $t_diff) = ($1, $3 - $2);
+ s/DKIM: d=.* t=[0-9]* x=[0-9]* /${prefix} t=T x=T+${t_diff} /;
+ }
}
# ======== mail ========
elsif ($is_mail)
{
- # DKIM timestamps
- if ( /^\s+t=[0-9]*; x=[0-9]*; b=[A-Za-z0-9+\/]+$/ ) {
- s/^(\s+)t=([0-9]*); x=([0-9]*);(?{ return $3 - $2; }) b=[A-Za-z0-9+\/]+$/$1t=T; x=T+$^R; b=bbbb;/;
+ # DKIM timestamps, and signatures depending thereon
+ if ( /^(\s+)t=([0-9]*); x=([0-9]*); b=[A-Za-z0-9+\/]+$/ )
+ {
+ my ($indent, $t_diff) = ($1, $3 - $2);
+ s/.*/${indent}t=T; x=T+${t_diff}; b=bbbb;/;
<IN>;
<IN>;
}