* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
+/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2024 */
/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
-/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
/* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
#include "exim.h"
+#ifndef MACRO_PREDEF
/* Default callout timeout */
#define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
+/* Default quota cache TTLs */
+
+#define QUOTA_POS_DEFAULT (5*60)
+#define QUOTA_NEG_DEFAULT (60*60)
+
+
/* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
[ACL_WARN] = BIT(OK)
};
-/* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
-follows.
-down. */
+#endif
+
+/* ACL condition and modifier codes */
enum { ACLC_ACL,
ACLC_ADD_HEADER,
ACLC_REGEX,
#endif
ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER,
+ ACLC_SEEN,
ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS,
ACLC_SENDERS,
ACLC_SET,
ACLC_SPF_GUESS,
#endif
ACLC_UDPSEND,
- ACLC_VERIFY };
+ ACLC_VERIFY,
+};
/* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
"message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", "queue" and "set" are
typedef struct condition_def {
uschar *name;
-/* Flag to indicate the condition/modifier has a string expansion done
-at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
-checking functions. */
- BOOL expand_at_top:1;
+ /* Flags for actions or checks to do during readconf for this condition */
+ unsigned flags;
+#define ACD_EXP BIT(0) /* do expansion at outer level*/
+#define ACD_MOD BIT(1) /* is a modifier */
+#define ACD_LOAD BIT(2) /* supported by a dynamic-load module */
- BOOL is_modifier:1;
-
-/* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
-times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
-For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
-times. */
+ /* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
+ times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
+ For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
+ times. */
unsigned forbids;
+#define FORBIDDEN(times) (times)
+#define PERMITTED(times) ((unsigned) ~(times))
} condition_def;
static condition_def conditions[] = {
- [ACLC_ACL] = { US"acl", FALSE, FALSE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_ACL] = { US"acl", 0,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
- [ACLC_ADD_HEADER] = { US"add_header", TRUE, TRUE,
- (unsigned int)
- ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ [ACLC_ADD_HEADER] = { US"add_header", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_PRDR |
ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
},
- [ACLC_AUTHENTICATED] = { US"authenticated", FALSE, FALSE,
- ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
- ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO,
+ [ACLC_AUTHENTICATED] = { US"authenticated", 0,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
+ ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO),
},
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- [ACLC_BMI_OPTIN] = { US"bmi_optin", TRUE, TRUE,
- ACL_BIT_AUTH |
+ [ACLC_BMI_OPTIN] = { US"bmi_optin", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH |
ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO |
ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_MIME |
# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_STARTTLS |
ACL_BIT_VRFY | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
- ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
},
#endif
- [ACLC_CONDITION] = { US"condition", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
- [ACLC_CONTINUE] = { US"continue", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_CONDITION] = { US"condition", ACD_EXP,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
+ [ACLC_CONTINUE] = { US"continue", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
/* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
always and check in the control processing itself. */
- [ACLC_CONTROL] = { US"control", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_CONTROL] = { US"control", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
- [ACLC_DCC] = { US"dcc", TRUE, FALSE,
- (unsigned int)
- ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+ [ACLC_DCC] = { US"dcc", ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_PRDR |
# endif
},
#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- [ACLC_DECODE] = { US"decode", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
+ [ACLC_DECODE] = { US"decode", ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MIME) },
#endif
- [ACLC_DELAY] = { US"delay", TRUE, TRUE, ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT },
+ [ACLC_DELAY] = { US"delay", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT) },
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
- [ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER] = { US"dkim_signers", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
- [ACLC_DKIM_STATUS] = { US"dkim_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
+ [ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER] = { US"dkim_signers",
+# if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
+ ACD_LOAD |
+# endif
+ ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DKIM) },
+ [ACLC_DKIM_STATUS] = { US"dkim_status",
+# if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
+ ACD_LOAD |
+# endif
+ ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DKIM | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_MIME
+# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
+ | ACL_BIT_PRDR
+# endif
+ ),
+ },
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
- [ACLC_DMARC_STATUS] = { US"dmarc_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DATA },
+ [ACLC_DMARC_STATUS] = { US"dmarc_status",
+# if SUPPORT_DMARC==2
+ ACD_LOAD |
+# endif
+ ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA) },
#endif
/* Explicit key lookups can be made in non-smtp ACLs so pass
always and check in the verify processing itself. */
- [ACLC_DNSLISTS] = { US"dnslists", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_DNSLISTS] = { US"dnslists", ACD_EXP,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
- [ACLC_DOMAINS] = { US"domains", FALSE, FALSE,
- (unsigned int)
- ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
+ [ACLC_DOMAINS] = { US"domains", 0,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
- |ACL_BIT_PRDR
+ | ACL_BIT_PRDR
#endif
),
},
- [ACLC_ENCRYPTED] = { US"encrypted", FALSE, FALSE,
- ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
- ACL_BIT_HELO,
+ [ACLC_ENCRYPTED] = { US"encrypted", 0,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START | ACL_BIT_CONNECT)
},
- [ACLC_ENDPASS] = { US"endpass", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_ENDPASS] = { US"endpass", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
- [ACLC_HOSTS] = { US"hosts", FALSE, FALSE,
- ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ [ACLC_HOSTS] = { US"hosts", 0,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
},
- [ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS] = { US"local_parts", FALSE, FALSE,
- (unsigned int)
- ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
+ [ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS] = { US"local_parts", 0,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
| ACL_BIT_PRDR
#endif
),
},
- [ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE] = { US"log_message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
- [ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET] = { US"log_reject_target", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
- [ACLC_LOGWRITE] = { US"logwrite", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE] = { US"log_message", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
+ [ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET] = { US"log_reject_target", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
+ [ACLC_LOGWRITE] = { US"logwrite", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- [ACLC_MALWARE] = { US"malware", TRUE, FALSE,
- (unsigned int)
- ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+ [ACLC_MALWARE] = { US"malware", ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_PRDR |
# endif
},
#endif
- [ACLC_MESSAGE] = { US"message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_MESSAGE] = { US"message", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- [ACLC_MIME_REGEX] = { US"mime_regex", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
+ [ACLC_MIME_REGEX] = { US"mime_regex", ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MIME) },
#endif
- [ACLC_QUEUE] = { US"queue", TRUE, TRUE,
- ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
+ [ACLC_QUEUE] = { US"queue", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_PRDR |
#endif
- ACL_BIT_DATA,
+ ACL_BIT_DATA),
},
- [ACLC_RATELIMIT] = { US"ratelimit", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
- [ACLC_RECIPIENTS] = { US"recipients", FALSE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
+ [ACLC_RATELIMIT] = { US"ratelimit", ACD_EXP,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
+ [ACLC_RECIPIENTS] = { US"recipients", 0,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_RCPT) },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- [ACLC_REGEX] = { US"regex", TRUE, FALSE,
- (unsigned int)
- ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+ [ACLC_REGEX] = { US"regex", ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_PRDR |
# endif
},
#endif
- [ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER] = { US"remove_header", TRUE, TRUE,
- (unsigned int)
- ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL|ACL_BIT_RCPT |
+ [ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER] = { US"remove_header", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_MAIL|ACL_BIT_RCPT |
ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_PRDR |
ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
},
- [ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS] = { US"sender_domains", FALSE, FALSE,
- ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ [ACLC_SEEN] = { US"seen", ACD_EXP,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
+ [ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS] = { US"sender_domains", 0,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
ACL_BIT_HELO |
ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
- ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
+ ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY),
},
- [ACLC_SENDERS] = { US"senders", FALSE, FALSE,
- ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ [ACLC_SENDERS] = { US"senders", 0,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
ACL_BIT_HELO |
ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
- ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
+ ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY),
},
- [ACLC_SET] = { US"set", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_SET] = { US"set", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- [ACLC_SPAM] = { US"spam", TRUE, FALSE,
- (unsigned int) ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
+ [ACLC_SPAM] = { US"spam", ACD_EXP,
+ PERMITTED(ACL_BIT_DATA |
# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
ACL_BIT_PRDR |
# endif
},
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_SPF
- [ACLC_SPF] = { US"spf", TRUE, FALSE,
- ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ [ACLC_SPF] = { US"spf",
+# if SUPPORT_SPF==2
+ ACD_LOAD |
+# endif
+ ACD_EXP,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
- ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
},
- [ACLC_SPF_GUESS] = { US"spf_guess", TRUE, FALSE,
- ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
+ [ACLC_SPF_GUESS] = { US"spf_guess",
+# if SUPPORT_SPF==2
+ ACD_LOAD |
+# endif
+ ACD_EXP,
+ FORBIDDEN(ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
- ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
+ ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
},
#endif
- [ACLC_UDPSEND] = { US"udpsend", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_UDPSEND] = { US"udpsend", ACD_EXP | ACD_MOD,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
/* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
always and check in the verify function itself */
- [ACLC_VERIFY] = { US"verify", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
+ [ACLC_VERIFY] = { US"verify", ACD_EXP,
+ FORBIDDEN(0) },
+};
+
+
+#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF
+# include "macro_predef.h"
+void
+features_acl(void)
+{
+for (condition_def * c = conditions; c < conditions + nelem(conditions); c++)
+ {
+ uschar buf[64], * p, * s;
+ int n = sprintf(CS buf, "_ACL_%s_", c->flags & ACD_MOD ? "MOD" : "COND");
+ for (p = buf + n, s = c->name; *s; s++) *p++ = toupper(*s);
+ *p = '\0';
+ builtin_macro_create(buf);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef MACRO_PREDEF
+
+/* These tables support loading of dynamic modules triggered by an ACL
+condition use, spotted during readconf. See acl_read(). */
+
+# ifdef LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR
+typedef struct condition_module {
+ const uschar * mod_name; /* module for the givien conditions */
+ misc_module_info * info; /* NULL when not loaded */
+ const int * conditions; /* array of ACLC_*, -1 terminated */
+} condition_module;
+
+# if SUPPORT_SPF==2
+static int spf_condx[] = { ACLC_SPF, ACLC_SPF_GUESS, -1 };
+# endif
+# if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
+static int dkim_condx[] = { ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER, ACLC_DKIM_STATUS, -1 };
+# endif
+# if SUPPORT_DMARC==2
+static int dmarc_condx[] = { ACLC_DMARC_STATUS, -1 };
+# endif
+
+/* These are modules which can be loaded on seeing an ACL condition
+during readconf, The "arc" module is handled by custom coding. */
+
+static condition_module condition_modules[] = {
+# if SUPPORT_SPF==2
+ {.mod_name = US"spf", .conditions = spf_condx},
+# endif
+# if SUPPORT_DKIM==2
+ {.mod_name = US"dkim", .conditions = dkim_condx},
+# endif
+# if SUPPORT_DMARC==2
+ {.mod_name = US"dmarc", .conditions = dmarc_condx},
+# endif
};
+# endif /*LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR*/
+/****************************/
-/* Return values from decode_control(); used as index so keep in step
-with the controls_list table that follows! */
+/* Return values from decode_control() */
enum {
CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT,
#endif
+#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
+ CONTROL_WELLKNOWN,
+#endif
};
{ US"no_delay_flush", FALSE,
ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
},
-
+
[CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
{ US"no_enforce_sync", FALSE,
ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
[CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT] =
{ US"utf8_downconvert", TRUE, (unsigned) ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY)
- }
+ },
+#endif
+#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
+[CONTROL_WELLKNOWN] =
+ { US"wellknown", TRUE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_WELLKNOWN
+ },
#endif
};
static int acl_check_wargs(int, address_item *, const uschar *, uschar **,
uschar **);
+static acl_block * acl_current = NULL;
+
/*************************************************
* Find control in list *
}
+static BOOL
+acl_varname_to_cond(const uschar ** sp, acl_condition_block * cond, uschar ** error)
+{
+const uschar * s = *sp, * endptr;
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+if ( Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_status", 18) == 0
+ || Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_reason", 18) == 0)
+ {
+ endptr = s+18;
+ if (isalnum(*endptr))
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
+ "modifier \"set %s\" "
+ "(only \"dkim_verify_status\" or \"dkim_verify_reason\" permitted)",
+ s);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s, 18);
+ }
+else
+#endif
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 && Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
+ "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ endptr = s + 5;
+ if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
+ "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
+ s);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ for ( ; *endptr && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr); endptr++)
+ if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
+ "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
+ }
+s = endptr;
+Uskip_whitespace(&s);
+*sp = s;
+return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+static BOOL
+acl_data_to_cond(const uschar * s, acl_condition_block * cond,
+ const uschar * name, BOOL taint, uschar ** error)
+{
+if (*s++ != '=')
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
+ conditions[cond->type].flags & ACD_MOD ? US"modifier" : US"condition");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+Uskip_whitespace(&s);
+cond->arg = taint ? string_copy_taint(s, GET_TAINTED) : string_copy(s);
+return TRUE;
+}
+
+
/*************************************************
* Read and parse one ACL *
*************************************************/
acl_block *this = NULL;
acl_condition_block *cond;
acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
-uschar * s;
+const uschar * s;
*error = NULL;
{
int v, c;
BOOL negated = FALSE;
- uschar *saveline = s;
- uschar name[64];
+ const uschar * saveline = s;
+ uschar name[EXIM_DRIVERNAME_MAX];
/* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
exclamation mark. */
if ((v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, nelem(verbs))) < 0)
{
- if (!this)
+ if (!this) /* not handling a verb right now */
{
*error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
saveline);
*error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
return NULL;
}
- this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block), FALSE);
- *lastp = this;
- lastp = &(this->next);
+ *lastp = this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block), GET_UNTAINTED);
+ lastp = &this->next;
this->next = NULL;
this->condition = NULL;
this->verb = v;
this->srcline = config_lineno; /* for debug output */
this->srcfile = config_filename; /**/
- condp = &(this->condition);
- if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
+ condp = &this->condition;
+ if (!*s) continue; /* No condition on this line */
if (*s == '!')
{
negated = TRUE;
/* The modifiers may not be negated */
- if (negated && conditions[c].is_modifier)
+ if (negated && conditions[c].flags & ACD_MOD)
{
*error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
"\"%s\"", conditions[c].name);
return NULL;
}
- cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), FALSE);
+#ifdef LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR
+ if (conditions[c].flags & ACD_LOAD)
+ { /* a loadable module supports this condition */
+ condition_module * cm;
+ uschar * s = NULL;
+
+ /* Over the list of modules we support, check the list of ACL conditions
+ each supports. This assumes no duplicates. */
+
+ for (cm = condition_modules;
+ cm < condition_modules + nelem(condition_modules); cm++)
+ for (const int * cond = cm->conditions; *cond != -1; cond++)
+ if (*cond == c) goto found;
+ found:
+
+ if (cm >= condition_modules + nelem(condition_modules))
+ { /* shouldn't happen */
+ *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: failed to locate support for '%s'",
+ conditions[c].name);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ( !cm->info /* module not loaded */
+ && !(cm->info = misc_mod_find(cm->mod_name, &s)))
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: failed to find module for '%s': %s",
+ conditions[c].name, s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
+ else if (c == ACLC_VERIFY) /* Special handling for verify=arc; */
+ { /* not invented a more general method yet- flag in verify_type_list? */
+ const uschar * t = s;
+ uschar * e;
+ if ( *t++ == '=' && Uskip_whitespace(&t) && Ustrncmp(t, "arc", 3) == 0
+ && !misc_mod_find(US"arc", &e))
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: failed to find module for '%s': %s",
+ conditions[c].name, e);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+#endif /*LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR*/
+
+ cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), GET_UNTAINTED);
cond->next = NULL;
cond->type = c;
cond->u.negated = negated;
*condp = cond;
- condp = &(cond->next);
+ condp = &cond->next;
/* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
compatibility. */
if (c == ACLC_SET)
-#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
- if ( Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_status", 18) == 0
- || Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_reason", 18) == 0)
- {
- uschar * endptr = s+18;
-
- if (isalnum(*endptr))
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
- "modifier \"set %s\" "
- "(only \"dkim_verify_status\" or \"dkim_verify_reason\" permitted)",
- s);
- return NULL;
- }
- cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s, 18);
- s = endptr;
- Uskip_whitespace(&s);
- }
- else
-#endif
- {
- uschar *endptr;
-
- if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 && Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
- "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- endptr = s + 5;
- if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
- "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
- s);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- while (*endptr && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
- {
- if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
- "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
- return NULL;
- }
- endptr++;
- }
-
- cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
- s = endptr;
- Uskip_whitespace(&s);
- }
+ if (!acl_varname_to_cond(&s, cond, error)) return NULL;
/* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
"endpass" has no data */
if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
- {
- if (*s++ != '=')
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
- conditions[c].is_modifier ? US"modifier" : US"condition");
- return NULL;
- }
- Uskip_whitespace(&s);
- cond->arg = string_copy(s);
- }
+ if (!acl_data_to_cond(s, cond, name, FALSE, error)) return NULL;
}
return yield;
{
/* The header_line struct itself is not tainted, though it points to
possibly tainted data. */
- header_line * h = store_get(sizeof(header_line), FALSE);
+ header_line * h = store_get(sizeof(header_line), GET_UNTAINTED);
h->text = hdr;
h->next = NULL;
h->type = newtype;
g = string_append_listele_n(g, '\n', h->text, i);
}
-return g ? g->s : NULL;
+return string_from_gstring(g);
}
*/
static void
-acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
+acl_warn(int where, uschar * user_message, uschar * log_message)
{
-if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
+if (log_message && log_message != user_message)
{
uschar *text;
string_item *logged;
/* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
failed", add the failure message. */
- if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
- sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
- strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
+ if ( sender_verified_failed
+ && sender_verified_failed->message
+ && strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
/* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
{
int rc;
-user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
-
/* Previous success */
-if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
+if (sender_host_name) return OK;
/* Previous failure */
tree_node *t;
const uschar *found;
int priority, weight, port;
-dns_answer * dnsa = store_get_dns_answer();
+dns_answer * dnsa;
dns_scan dnss;
dns_record *rr;
-int rc, type;
-uschar target[256];
+int rc, type, yield;
+#define TARGET_SIZE 256
+uschar * target = store_get(TARGET_SIZE, GET_TAINTED);
/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
-while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
+while (isspace(*domain) && *domain) ++domain;
if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
-if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
-if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+if (!domain) domain = sender_host_address;
+if (!sender_host_address) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
we return from this function. */
-t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
-if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
+if ((t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain)))
+ return t->data.val;
-t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain), is_tainted(domain));
+t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain), domain);
Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
found = domain;
+dnsa = store_get_dns_answer();
switch (dns_special_lookup(dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
{
/* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
default:
- return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+ yield = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+ goto out;
/* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
case DNS_NOMATCH:
case DNS_NODATA:
- return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ yield = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
/* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
case DNS_SUCCEED:
- break;
+ break;
}
/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
/* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
+ if (rr_bad_size(rr, 3 * sizeof(uint16_t))) continue;
GETSHORT(priority, p);
GETSHORT(weight, p);
GETSHORT(port, p);
SRV records of their own. */
if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
- return t->data.val = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ {
+ yield = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
greater than 3 are undefined. */
- if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
+ if (weight < 2)
+ {
+ yield = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (weight > 2) continue;
target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
(void)dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, p,
- (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
+ (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, TARGET_SIZE);
DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target is %s\n", target);
/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
-if (!rr) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+if (!rr)
+ {
+ yield = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
-if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0)
+ {
+ yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
-if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR)
+ {
+ yield = rc;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
/* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
default:
- return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
+ yield = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
+ break;
/* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
case DNS_SUCCEED:
rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
- if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+ if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR)
+ {
+ yield = rc;
+ break;
+ }
/* else fall through */
/* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
case DNS_NOMATCH:
case DNS_NODATA:
- return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+ yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+ break;
}
+
+out:
+
+store_free_dns_answer(dnsa);
+return t->data.val = yield;
}
{ US"certificate", VERIFY_CERT, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
{ US"helo", VERIFY_HELO, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
{ US"csa", VERIFY_CSA, (unsigned)~0, FALSE, 0 },
- { US"header_syntax", VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
- { US"not_blind", VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, FALSE, 0 },
- { US"header_sender", VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, FALSE, 0 },
+ { US"header_syntax", VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, TRUE, 0 },
+ { US"not_blind", VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, FALSE, 0 },
+ { US"header_sender", VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, FALSE, 0 },
{ US"sender", VERIFY_SNDR, ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT
- |ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP,
+ | ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP,
FALSE, 6 },
{ US"recipient", VERIFY_RCPT, ACL_BIT_RCPT, FALSE, 0 },
- { US"header_names_ascii", VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
+ { US"header_names_ascii", VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, ACL_BITS_HAVEDATA, TRUE, 0 },
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
{ US"arc", VERIFY_ARC, ACL_BIT_DATA, FALSE , 0 },
#endif
+static int
+v_period(const uschar * s, const uschar * arg, uschar ** log_msgptr)
+{
+int period;
+if ((period = readconf_readtime(s, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
+ "\"verify %s\"", arg);
+ }
+return period;
+}
+
+
+
+static BOOL
+sender_helo_verified_internal(void)
+{
+/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
+occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
+
+if (!f.helo_verified && !f.helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
+return f.helo_verified;
+}
+
+static int
+sender_helo_verified_cond(void)
+{
+return sender_helo_verified_internal() ? OK : FAIL;
+}
+
+uschar *
+sender_helo_verified_boolstr(void)
+{
+return sender_helo_verified_internal() ? US"yes" : US"no";
+}
+
+
+
/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
BOOL no_details = FALSE;
BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
-address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
-uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
-uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
-uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
+BOOL quota = FALSE;
+int quota_pos_cache = QUOTA_POS_DEFAULT, quota_neg_cache = QUOTA_NEG_DEFAULT;
+address_item * sender_vaddr = NULL;
+const uschar * verify_sender_address = NULL;
+uschar * pm_mailfrom = NULL;
+uschar * se_mailfrom = NULL;
/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
an error if options are given for items that don't expect them.
return FAIL;
case VERIFY_HELO:
- /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
- occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
-
- if (!f.helo_verified && !f.helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
- return f.helo_verified ? OK : FAIL;
+ return sender_helo_verified_cond();
case VERIFY_CSA:
/* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
case VERIFY_ARC:
- { /* Do Authenticated Received Chain checks in a separate function. */
- const uschar * condlist = CUS string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
- int csep = 0;
- uschar * cond;
-
- if (!(arc_state = acl_verify_arc())) return DEFER;
- DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ARC verify result %s %s%s%s\n", arc_state,
- arc_state_reason ? "(":"", arc_state_reason, arc_state_reason ? ")":"");
-
- if (!condlist) condlist = US"none:pass";
- while ((cond = string_nextinlist(&condlist, &csep, NULL, 0)))
- if (Ustrcmp(arc_state, cond) == 0) return OK;
- return FAIL;
+ {
+ const misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_findonly(US"arc");
+ typedef int (*fn_t)(const uschar *);
+ if (mi) return (((fn_t *) mi->functions)[ARC_VERIFY])
+ (CUS string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0));
}
#endif
in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
{
uschar *s = ss + 6;
- if (*s == 0)
+ if (!*s)
verify_sender_address = sender_address;
else
{
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
- if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
+ if (Uskip_whitespace(&s) != '=')
+ goto BAD_VERIFY;
+ s++;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&s);
verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
}
}
/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
verification, including "header sender" verification. */
-while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
+while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
{
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
{
callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
- ss += 7;
- if (*ss != 0)
+ if (*(ss += 7))
{
- while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&ss);
if (*ss++ == '=')
{
const uschar * sublist = ss;
int optsep = ',';
- uschar buffer[256];
- uschar * opt;
- while (isspace(*sublist)) sublist++;
- while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer))))
+ Uskip_whitespace(&sublist);
+ for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, NULL, 0); )
{
callout_opt_t * op;
double period = 1.0F;
if (op->has_option)
{
opt += Ustrlen(op->name);
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&opt);
if (*opt++ != '=')
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
"\"%s\" in ACL verify condition \"%s\"", op->name, arg);
return ERROR;
}
- while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&opt);
}
- if (op->timeval && (period = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
- "\"verify %s\"", arg);
+ if (op->timeval && (period = v_period(opt, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
return ERROR;
- }
switch(op->value)
{
}
}
+ /* The quota option has sub-options, comma-separated */
+
+ else if (strncmpic(ss, US"quota", 5) == 0)
+ {
+ quota = TRUE;
+ if (*(ss += 5))
+ {
+ Uskip_whitespace(&ss);
+ if (*ss++ == '=')
+ {
+ const uschar * sublist = ss;
+ int optsep = ',';
+ int period;
+
+ Uskip_whitespace(&sublist);
+ for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, NULL, 0); )
+ if (Ustrncmp(opt, "cachepos=", 9) == 0)
+ if ((period = v_period(opt += 9, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
+ return ERROR;
+ else
+ quota_pos_cache = period;
+ else if (Ustrncmp(opt, "cacheneg=", 9) == 0)
+ if ((period = v_period(opt += 9, arg, log_msgptr)) < 0)
+ return ERROR;
+ else
+ quota_neg_cache = period;
+ else if (Ustrcmp(opt, "no_cache") == 0)
+ quota_pos_cache = quota_neg_cache = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* Option not recognized */
else
return ERROR;
}
+/* Handle quota verification */
+if (quota)
+ {
+ if (vp->value != VERIFY_RCPT)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"can only verify quota of recipient";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((rc = verify_quota_call(addr->address,
+ quota_pos_cache, quota_neg_cache, log_msgptr)) != OK)
+ {
+ *basic_errno = errno;
+ if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ {
+ if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after %s: %s",
+ smtp_names[smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index)]],
+ *log_msgptr);
+ if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+
/* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
message if giving out verification details. */
}
sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
- if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
- callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
+ if ( sender_vaddr /* Previously checked */
+ && callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
{
/* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
*basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
else
DEBUG(D_acl)
- {
if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
else
debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok\n",
verify_sender_address);
- }
}
else
rc = OK; /* Null sender */
*basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
*log_msgptr = addr2.message;
- *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
- addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
+ *user_msgptr = addr2.user_message ? addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
/* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
/* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
-if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
- (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
+if ( rc == DEFER
+ && ( defer_ok
+ || callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
+ ) )
{
HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
/* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
-if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
+if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address)
{
if (rc != DEFER)
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
/* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
-if (addr != NULL)
+if (addr)
{
deliver_domain = addr->domain;
deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
anchor = NULL; /* silence an "unused" complaint */
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
"internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
+ /*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */
-if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
+if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR|O_CREAT, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
{
store_pool = old_pool;
sender_rate = NULL;
/* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
- dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
+ dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, GET_UNTAINTED);
}
else
{
extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
- dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
+ dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, GET_UNTAINTED);
dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);
/* Store the result in the tree for future reference. Take the taint status
from the key for consistency even though it's unlikely we'll ever expand this. */
-t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key), is_tainted(key));
+t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key), key);
t->data.ptr = dbd;
Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
(void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
+/*************************************************
+* Handle a check for previously-seen *
+*************************************************/
+
+/*
+ACL clauses like: seen = -5m / key=$foo / readonly
+
+Return is true for condition-true - but the semantics
+depend heavily on the actual use-case.
+
+Negative times test for seen-before, positive for seen-more-recently-than
+(the given interval before current time).
+
+All are subject to history not having been cleaned from the DB.
+
+Default for seen-before is to create if not present, and to
+update if older than 10d (with the seen-test time).
+Default for seen-since is to always create or update.
+
+Options:
+ key=value. Default key is $sender_host_address
+ readonly
+ write
+ refresh=<interval>: update an existing DB entry older than given
+ amount. Default refresh lacking this option is 10d.
+ The update sets the record timestamp to the seen-test time.
+
+XXX do we need separate nocreate, noupdate controls?
+
+Arguments:
+ arg the option string for seen=
+ where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+
+Returns: OK - Condition is true
+ FAIL - Condition is false
+ DEFER - Problem opening history database
+ ERROR - Syntax error in options
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_seen(const uschar * arg, int where, uschar ** log_msgptr)
+{
+enum { SEEN_DEFAULT, SEEN_READONLY, SEEN_WRITE };
+
+const uschar * list = arg;
+int slash = '/', interval, mode = SEEN_DEFAULT, yield = FAIL;
+BOOL before;
+int refresh = 10 * 24 * 60 * 60; /* 10 days */
+const uschar * ele, * key = sender_host_address;
+open_db dbblock, * dbm;
+dbdata_seen * dbd;
+time_t now;
+
+/* Parse the first element, the time-relation. */
+
+if (!(ele = string_nextinlist(&list, &slash, NULL, 0)))
+ goto badparse;
+if ((before = *ele == '-'))
+ ele++;
+if ((interval = readconf_readtime(ele, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
+ goto badparse;
+
+/* Remaining elements are options */
+
+while ((ele = string_nextinlist(&list, &slash, NULL, 0)))
+ if (Ustrncmp(ele, "key=", 4) == 0)
+ key = ele + 4;
+ else if (Ustrcmp(ele, "readonly") == 0)
+ mode = SEEN_READONLY;
+ else if (Ustrcmp(ele, "write") == 0)
+ mode = SEEN_WRITE;
+ else if (Ustrncmp(ele, "refresh=", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ if ((refresh = readconf_readtime(ele + 8, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
+ goto badparse;
+ }
+ else
+ goto badopt;
+
+if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"seen", O_RDWR|O_CREAT, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("database for 'seen' not available\n");
+ *log_msgptr = US"database for 'seen' not available";
+ return DEFER;
+ }
+
+dbd = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, NULL);
+now = time(NULL);
+if (dbd) /* an existing record */
+ {
+ time_t diff = now - dbd->time_stamp; /* time since the record was written */
+
+ if (before ? diff >= interval : diff < interval)
+ yield = OK;
+
+ if (mode == SEEN_READONLY)
+ { HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db not written (readonly)\n"); }
+ else if (mode == SEEN_WRITE || !before)
+ {
+ dbd->time_stamp = now;
+ dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(*dbd));
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db written (update)\n");
+ }
+ else if (diff >= refresh)
+ {
+ dbd->time_stamp = now - interval;
+ dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(*dbd));
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db written (refresh)\n");
+ }
+ }
+else
+ { /* No record found, yield always FAIL */
+ if (mode != SEEN_READONLY)
+ {
+ dbdata_seen d = {.time_stamp = now};
+ dbfn_write(dbm, key, &d, sizeof(*dbd));
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db written (create)\n");
+ }
+ else
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("seen db not written (readonly)\n");
+ }
+
+dbfn_close(dbm);
+return yield;
+
+
+badparse:
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to parse '%s'", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+badopt:
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised option '%s' in '%s'", ele, arg);
+ return ERROR;
+}
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* The udpsend ACL modifier *
*************************************************/
}
/* Make a single-item host list. */
-h = store_get(sizeof(host_item), FALSE);
+h = store_get(sizeof(host_item), GET_UNTAINTED);
memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item));
h->name = hostname;
h->port = portnum;
+#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
+/*************************************************
+* The "wellknown" ACL modifier *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called by acl_check_condition() below.
+
+Retrieve the given file and encode content as xtext.
+Prefix with a summary line giving the length of plaintext.
+Leave a global pointer to the whole, for output by
+the smtp verb handler code (smtp_in.c).
+
+Arguments:
+ arg the option string for wellknown=
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+
+Returns: OK/FAIL
+*/
+
+static int
+wellknown_process(const uschar * arg, uschar ** log_msgptr)
+{
+struct stat statbuf;
+FILE * rf;
+gstring * g;
+
+wellknown_response = NULL;
+if (f.no_multiline_responses) return FAIL;
+
+/* Check for file existence */
+
+if (!*arg) return FAIL;
+if (Ustat(arg, &statbuf) != 0)
+ { *log_msgptr = US"stat"; goto fail; }
+
+/*XXX perhaps refuse to serve a group- or world-writeable file? */
+
+if (!(rf = Ufopen(arg, "r")))
+ { *log_msgptr = US"open"; goto fail; }
+
+/* Set up summary line for output */
+
+g = string_fmt_append(NULL, "SIZE=%lu\n", (long) statbuf.st_size);
+
+#define LINE_LIM 75
+for (int n = 0, ch; (ch = fgetc(rf)) != EOF; )
+ {
+ /* Xtext-encode, adding output linebreaks for input linebreaks
+ or when the line gets long enough */
+
+ if (ch == '\n')
+ { g = string_fmt_append(g, "+%02X", ch); n = LINE_LIM; }
+ else if (ch < 33 || ch > 126 || ch == '+' || ch == '=')
+ { g = string_fmt_append(g, "+%02X", ch); n += 3; }
+ else
+ { g = string_fmt_append(g, "%c", ch); n++; }
+
+ if (n >= LINE_LIM)
+ { g = string_catn(g, US"\n", 1); n = 0; }
+ }
+#undef LINE_LIM
+
+gstring_release_unused(g);
+wellknown_response = string_from_gstring(g);
+return OK;
+
+fail:
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("wellknown: failed to %s file \"%s\": %s",
+ *log_msgptr, arg, strerror(errno));
+ return FAIL;
+}
+#endif
+
+
/*************************************************
* Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
*************************************************/
address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
{
-uschar *user_message = NULL;
-uschar *log_message = NULL;
+uschar * user_message = NULL;
+uschar * log_message = NULL;
int rc = OK;
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
-int sep = -'/';
-#endif
for (; cb; cb = cb->next)
{
- const uschar *arg;
+ const uschar * arg;
int control_type;
+ BOOL textonly = FALSE;
/* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
checking functions in some cases. */
- if (!conditions[cb->type].expand_at_top)
+ if (!(conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_EXP))
arg = cb->arg;
- else if (!(arg = expand_string(cb->arg)))
+
+ else if (!(arg = expand_string_2(cb->arg, &textonly)))
{
if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
{
int lhswidth = 0;
debug_printf_indent("check %s%s %n",
- (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
+ (!(conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_MOD) && cb->u.negated) ? "!":"",
conditions[cb->type].name, &lhswidth);
if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
if ((conditions[cb->type].forbids & (1 << where)) != 0)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
- conditions[cb->type].is_modifier ? "use" : "test",
+ conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_MOD ? "use" : "test",
conditions[cb->type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
return ERROR;
}
switch(cb->type)
{
case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
- setup_header(arg);
- break;
+ setup_header(arg);
+ break;
/* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
"discard" verb. */
verbs[verb]);
return ERROR;
}
- break;
+ break;
case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
rc = sender_host_authenticated ? match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated,
&arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL) : FAIL;
- break;
+ break;
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
/* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
- if (*arg == '-'
- ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */
- : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
- rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
- else
- rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
- strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
- (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
- strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
- if (rc == DEFER)
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
- break;
+ if (*arg == '-'
+ ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */
+ : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
+ rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
+ else
+ rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
+ strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
+ (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
+ strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
+ if (rc == DEFER)
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
+ break;
case ACLC_CONTINUE: /* Always succeeds */
- break;
+ break;
case ACLC_CONTROL:
{
- const uschar *p = NULL;
+ const uschar * p = NULL;
control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
/* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
return ERROR;
}
+ /*XXX ought to sort these, just for sanity */
switch(control_type)
{
case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"fakereject");
- case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
- fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
+ case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
+ fake_response = control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER ? DEFER : FAIL;
if (*p == '/')
{
const uschar *pp = p + 1;
while (*pp) pp++;
- fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
+ /* The entire control= line was expanded at top so no need to expand
+ the part after the / */
+ fake_response_text = string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1);
p = pp;
}
else /* Explicitly reset to default string */
{
const uschar *pp = p + 6;
while (*pp) pp++;
- submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
- big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
+ submission_name = parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6);
p = pp;
}
else break;
case CONTROL_DEBUG:
{
- uschar * debug_tag = NULL;
- uschar * debug_opts = NULL;
- BOOL kill = FALSE;
+ uschar * debug_tag = NULL, * debug_opts = NULL;
+ BOOL kill = FALSE, stop = FALSE;
while (*p == '/')
{
}
else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "kill", 4) == 0)
{
- for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
+ pp += 4;
kill = TRUE;
}
- else
- while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "stop", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ pp += 4;
+ stop = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pretrigger=", 11) == 0)
+ debug_pretrigger_setup(pp+11);
+ else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "trigger=", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp(pp += 8, "now", 3) == 0)
+ {
+ pp += 3;
+ debug_trigger_fire();
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "paniclog", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ pp += 8;
+ dtrigger_selector |= BIT(DTi_panictrigger);
+ }
+ }
+ while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
p = pp;
}
- if (kill)
- debug_logging_stop();
- else
- debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
+ if (kill)
+ debug_logging_stop(TRUE);
+ else if (stop)
+ debug_logging_stop(FALSE);
+ else if (debug_tag || debug_opts)
+ debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
break;
}
the case where both sides handle prdr and this-node prdr acl
is "accept" */
ignored = US"PRDR active";
+ else if (f.deliver_freeze)
+ ignored = US"frozen";
+ else if (f.queue_only_policy)
+ ignored = US"queue-only";
+ else if (fake_response == FAIL)
+ ignored = US"fakereject";
+ else if (rcpt_count != 1)
+ ignored = US"nonfirst rcpt";
+ else if (cutthrough.delivery)
+ ignored = US"repeated";
+ else if (cutthrough.callout_hold_only)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf_indent(" cutthrough request upgrades callout hold\n");
+ cutthrough.callout_hold_only = FALSE;
+ cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
+ }
else
{
- if (f.deliver_freeze)
- ignored = US"frozen";
- else if (f.queue_only_policy)
- ignored = US"queue-only";
- else if (fake_response == FAIL)
- ignored = US"fakereject";
- else
+ cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
+ while (*p == '/')
{
- if (rcpt_count == 1)
+ const uschar * pp = p+1;
+ if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
{
- cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
- while (*p == '/')
- {
- const uschar * pp = p+1;
- if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
- {
- pp += 6;
- if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
- /* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool") == 0) ; default */
- }
- else
- while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
- p = pp;
- }
+ pp += 6;
+ if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
+ /* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool") == 0) ; default */
}
else
- ignored = US"nonfirst rcpt";
+ while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ p = pp;
}
}
+
DEBUG(D_acl) if (ignored)
debug_printf(" cutthrough request ignored on %s item\n", ignored);
}
break;
}
return ERROR;
-#endif
+#endif /*I18N*/
+#ifndef DISABLE_WELLKNOWN
+ case CONTROL_WELLKNOWN:
+ rc = *p == '/' ? wellknown_process(p+1, log_msgptr) : FAIL;
+ break;
+#endif
}
break;
}
- #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
case ACLC_DCC:
{
/* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
const uschar * list = arg;
- uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
+ int sep = -'/';
+ uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
/* Run the dcc backend. */
rc = dcc_process(&ss);
/* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
- while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
+ break;
}
- break;
- #endif
+#endif
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_DECODE:
- rc = mime_decode(&arg);
- break;
- #endif
+ rc = mime_decode(&arg);
+ break;
+#endif
case ACLC_DELAY:
{
#endif
}
}
+ break;
}
- break;
- #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
- if (dkim_cur_signer)
- rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
- &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
- else
- rc = FAIL;
- break;
-
case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
- rc = match_isinlist(dkim_verify_status,
- &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
- break;
- #endif
+ /* See comment on ACLC_SPF wrt. coding issues */
+ {
+ misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_find(US"dkim", &log_message);
+ typedef int (*fn_t)(const uschar *);
+ rc = mi
+ ? (((fn_t *) mi->functions)
+ [cb->type == ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER
+ ? DKIM_SIGNER_ISINLIST
+ : DKIM_STATUS_LISTMATCH]) (arg)
+ : DEFER;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS:
- if (!f.dmarc_has_been_checked)
- dmarc_process();
- f.dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
- /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
- * view into the process in the future. */
- rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS),
- &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
- break;
+ /* See comment on ACLC_SPF wrt. coding issues */
+ {
+ misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_find(US"dmarc", &log_message);
+ typedef uschar * (*efn_t)(int);
+ uschar * expanded_query;
+
+ if (!mi)
+ { rc = DEFER; break; } /* shouldn't happen */
+
+ if (!f.dmarc_has_been_checked)
+ {
+ typedef int (*pfn_t)(void);
+ (void) (((pfn_t *) mi->functions)[DMARC_PROCESS]) ();
+ f.dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
+ view into the process in the future. */
+
+ /*XXX is this call used with any other arg? */
+ expanded_query = (((efn_t *) mi->functions)[DMARC_EXPAND_QUERY])
+ (DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS);
+ rc = match_isinlist(expanded_query,
+ &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
+ }
+ break;
#endif
case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
- rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, &arg, log_msgptr);
- break;
+ rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, &arg, log_msgptr);
+ break;
case ACLC_DOMAINS:
- rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
- addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
- break;
+ rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
+ addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
+ break;
/* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
writing is poorly documented. */
case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
- if (tls_in.cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
- {
- uschar *endcipher = NULL;
- uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':');
- if (!cipher) cipher = tls_in.cipher; else
- {
- endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
- if (endcipher) *endcipher = 0;
- }
- rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
- if (endcipher) *endcipher = ':';
- }
- break;
+ if (!tls_in.cipher) rc = FAIL;
+ else
+ {
+ uschar *endcipher = NULL;
+ uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':');
+ if (!cipher) cipher = tls_in.cipher; else
+ {
+ endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
+ if (endcipher) *endcipher = 0;
+ }
+ rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
+ if (endcipher) *endcipher = ':';
+ }
+ break;
/* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
message in the same SMTP connection. */
case ACLC_HOSTS:
- rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
- sender_host_address ? sender_host_address : US"", CUSS &host_data);
- if (rc == DEFER) *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
- if (host_data) host_data = string_copy_perm(host_data, TRUE);
- break;
+ rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
+ sender_host_address ? sender_host_address : US"", CUSS &host_data);
+ if (rc == DEFER) *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
+ if (host_data) host_data = string_copy_perm(host_data, TRUE);
+ break;
case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
- rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
- &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
- CUSS &deliver_localpart_data);
- break;
+ rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
+ &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
+ CUSS &deliver_localpart_data);
+ break;
case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
{
- int logbits = 0;
- int sep = 0;
- const uschar *s = arg;
- uschar * ss;
- while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
+ int logbits = 0, sep = 0;
+ const uschar * s = arg;
+
+ for (uschar * ss; ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, NULL, 0); )
{
if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
}
}
log_reject_target = logbits;
+ break;
}
- break;
case ACLC_LOGWRITE:
{
}
s++;
}
- while (isspace(*s)) s++;
+ Uskip_whitespace(&s);
if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
+ break;
}
- break;
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_MALWARE: /* Run the malware backend. */
{
/* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
const uschar * list = arg;
- uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
- uschar * opt;
BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
- int timeout = 0;
+ int timeout = 0, sep = -'/';
+ uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
- while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
+ for (uschar * opt; opt = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0); )
if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0)
defer_ok = TRUE;
else if ( strncmpic(opt, US"tmo=", 4) == 0
return ERROR;
}
- rc = malware(ss, timeout);
+ rc = malware(ss, textonly, timeout);
if (rc == DEFER && defer_ok)
rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
+ break;
}
- break;
case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
- rc = mime_regex(&arg);
- break;
- #endif
+ rc = mime_regex(&arg, textonly);
+ break;
+#endif
case ACLC_QUEUE:
- if (is_tainted(arg))
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted",
- arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
- "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
- return ERROR;
- }
- queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE);
- break;
+ if (is_tainted(arg))
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted",
+ arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ if (Ustrchr(arg, '/'))
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
+ "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE);
+ break;
case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
- rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
- break;
+ rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
+ break;
case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
- rc = match_address_list(CUS addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
- CUSS &recipient_data);
- break;
+ rc = match_address_list(CUS addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
+ CUSS &recipient_data);
+ break;
- #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_REGEX:
- rc = regex(&arg);
- break;
- #endif
+ rc = regex(&arg, textonly);
+ break;
+#endif
case ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER:
- setup_remove_header(arg);
- break;
+ setup_remove_header(arg);
+ break;
+
+ case ACLC_SEEN:
+ rc = acl_seen(arg, where, log_msgptr);
+ break;
case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
{
sdomain = sdomain ? sdomain + 1 : US"";
rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
+ break;
}
- break;
case ACLC_SENDERS:
- rc = match_address_list(CUS sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
- sender_address_cache, -1, 0, CUSS &sender_data);
- break;
+ rc = match_address_list(CUS sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
+ sender_address_cache, -1, 0, CUSS &sender_data);
+ break;
/* Connection variables must persist forever; message variables not */
#endif
)
store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM /* Overwriteable dkim result variables */
- if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0)
- dkim_verify_status = string_copy(arg);
- else if (Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
- dkim_verify_reason = string_copy(arg);
+ if ( Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0
+ || Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0
+ )
+ {
+ misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_findonly(US"dkim");
+ typedef void (*fn_t)(const uschar *, void *);
+
+ if (mi)
+ (((fn_t *) mi->functions)[DKIM_SETVAR])
+ (cb->u.varname, string_copy(arg));
+ }
else
#endif
acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
store_pool = old_pool;
+ break;
}
- break;
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_SPAM:
{
/* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
const uschar * list = arg;
- uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
+ int sep = -'/';
+ uschar * ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
rc = spam(CUSS &ss);
/* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
- while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
+ break;
}
- break;
#endif
#ifdef SUPPORT_SPF
case ACLC_SPF:
- rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL);
- break;
case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
- rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
- break;
+ /* We have hardwired function-call numbers, and also prototypes for the
+ functions. We could do a function name table search or (simpler)
+ a module include file with defines for the numbers
+ but I can't see how to deal with prototypes. Is a K&R non-prototyped
+ function still usable with today's compilers (but we would lose on
+ type-checking)? We could macroize the typedef, and even the function
+ table access - but it obscures how it works rather. */
+ {
+ misc_module_info * mi = misc_mod_find(US"spf", &log_message);
+ typedef int (*fn_t)(const uschar **, const uschar *, int);
+ fn_t fn;
+
+ if (!mi)
+ { rc = DEFER; break; } /* shouldn't happen */
+
+ fn = ((fn_t *) mi->functions)[SPF_PROCESS];
+
+ rc = fn(&arg, sender_address,
+ cb->type == ACLC_SPF ? SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL : SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
+ break;
+ }
#endif
case ACLC_UDPSEND:
- rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr);
- break;
+ rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr);
+ break;
/* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
(until something changes it). */
case ACLC_VERIFY:
- rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
- if (*user_msgptr)
- acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
- if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
- break;
+ rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
+ if (*user_msgptr)
+ acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
+ if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
+ break;
default:
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
- "condition %d", cb->type);
- break;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
+ "condition %d", cb->type);
+ break;
}
/* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
- if (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)
+ if (!(conditions[cb->type].flags & ACD_MOD) && cb->u.negated)
if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
+/************************************************/
+/* For error messages, a string describing the config location
+associated with current processing. NULL if not in an ACL. */
+
+uschar *
+acl_current_verb(void)
+{
+if (acl_current) return string_sprintf(" (ACL %s, %s %d)",
+ verbs[acl_current->verb], acl_current->srcfile, acl_current->srcline);
+return NULL;
+}
+
/*************************************************
* Check access using an ACL *
*************************************************/
/* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
been expanded as part of condition processing. */
-if (acl_level == 0)
+if (acl_level != 0)
+ ss = s;
+else if (!(ss = expand_string(s)))
{
- if (!(ss = expand_string(s)))
- {
- if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
- expand_string_message);
- return ERROR;
- }
+ if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
+ expand_string_message);
+ return ERROR;
}
-else ss = s;
-while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
+Uskip_whitespace(&ss);
/* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
(Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
acl_text = ss;
+if (is_tainted(acl_text) && !f.running_in_test_harness)
+ {
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
+ "attempt to use tainted ACL text \"%s\"", acl_text);
+ /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
+ *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+
/* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
else if (*ss == '/')
{
struct stat statbuf;
- if (is_tainted(ss))
- {
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
- "attempt to open tainted ACL file name \"%s\"", ss);
- /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */
- *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error";
- return ERROR;
- }
if ((fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
}
/* If the string being used as a filename is tainted, so is the file content */
- acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1, is_tainted(ss));
+ acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1, ss);
acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
if (!acl && *log_msgptr) return ERROR;
if (fd >= 0)
{
- tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss), is_tainted(ss));
+ tree_node * t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss), ss);
Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
t->data.ptr = acl;
(void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
/* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
-while (acl)
+while ((acl_current = acl))
{
int cond;
int basic_errno = 0;
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
f.acl_temp_details = FALSE;
+ config_filename = acl->srcfile;
+ config_lineno = acl->srcline;
+
HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("processing \"%s\" (%s %d)\n",
- verbs[acl->verb], acl->srcfile, acl->srcline);
+ verbs[acl->verb], config_filename, config_lineno);
/* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
this condition. */
verbs[acl->verb], acl_name);
if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
{
- if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
+ if (search_error_message && *search_error_message)
*log_msgptr = search_error_message;
if (smtp_return_error_details) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
}
else if (cond == DEFER && LOGGING(acl_warn_skipped))
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
"condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
- (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
- (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
+ *log_msgptr ? US": " : US"",
+ *log_msgptr ? *log_msgptr : US"");
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
break;
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++)
{
- while (*s && isspace(*s)) s++;
- if (!*s) break;
+ if (!Uskip_whitespace(&s))
+ break;
if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(tmp_arg[i] = expand_string(tmp)))
{
tmp = name;
acl_level++;
ret = acl_check_internal(where, addr, name, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
acl_level--;
+config_lineno = 0;
acl_narg = sav_narg;
for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) acl_arg[i] = sav_arg[i];
acl_level++;
rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
acl_level--;
+config_lineno = 0;
return rc;
}
DEFER can't tell at the moment
ERROR disaster
*/
-int acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
int
-acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
- uschar **log_msgptr)
+acl_check(int where, const uschar * recipient, uschar * s,
+ uschar ** user_msgptr, uschar ** log_msgptr)
{
int rc;
address_item adb;
rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
acl_level = 0;
acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN;
+config_lineno = 0;
/* Cutthrough - if requested,
and WHERE_RCPT and not yet opened conn as result of recipient-verify,
/* Drop cutthrough conns, and drop heldopen verify conns if
the previous was not DATA */
{
- uschar prev = smtp_connection_had[smtp_ch_index-2];
+ uschar prev =
+ smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index))];
BOOL dropverify = !(prev == SCH_DATA || prev == SCH_BDAT);
cancel_cutthrough_connection(dropverify, US"quit or conndrop");
tree_node * node, ** root = name[0] == 'c' ? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
if (!(node = tree_search(*root, name)))
{
- node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name), is_tainted(name));
+ node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name), name);
Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
(void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
}
*/
void
-acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx)
+acl_var_write(uschar * name, uschar * value, void * ctx)
+{
+FILE * f = (FILE *)ctx;
+putc('-', f);
+if (is_tainted(value))
+ {
+ const uschar * quoter_name;
+ putc('-', f);
+ (void) quoter_for_address(value, "er_name);
+ if (quoter_name)
+ fprintf(f, "(%s)", quoter_name);
+ }
+fprintf(f, "acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);
+}
+
+
+
+
+uschar *
+acl_standalone_setvar(const uschar * s, BOOL taint)
{
-FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx;
-if (is_tainted(value)) putc('-', f);
-fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);
+acl_condition_block * cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), GET_UNTAINTED);
+uschar * errstr = NULL, * log_msg = NULL;
+BOOL endpass_seen;
+int e;
+
+cond->next = NULL;
+cond->type = ACLC_SET;
+if (!acl_varname_to_cond(&s, cond, &errstr)) return errstr;
+if (!acl_data_to_cond(s, cond, US"'-be'", taint, &errstr)) return errstr;
+
+if (acl_check_condition(ACL_WARN, cond, ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN,
+ NULL, 0, &endpass_seen, &errstr, &log_msg, &e) != OK)
+ return string_sprintf("oops: %s", errstr);
+return string_sprintf("variable %s set", cond->u.varname);
}
+
+#endif /* !MACRO_PREDEF */
/* vi: aw ai sw=2
*/
/* End of acl.c */
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff