Expansions: extract methods for JSON objects and arrays. Bug 2282

[exim.git] / doc / doc-docbook / spec.xfpt

diff --git a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
index a93b3947470ad5b8da421f4a3658a896b9e35d0c..1dfa55228b0dcf8f3ce8c7e485e4a91893a99dec 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
+++ b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
@@ -9374,6 +9374,27 @@ ${extract{Z}{A=... B=...}{$value} fail }
 This forces an expansion failure (see section &<<SECTforexpfai>>&);
 {<&'string2'&>} must be present for &"fail"& to be recognized.
 
+.new
+.vitem "&*${extract json{*&<&'key'&>&*}{*&<&'string1'&>&*}{*&<&'string2'&>&*}&&&
+       {*&<&'string3'&>&*}}*&"
+.cindex "expansion" "extracting from JSON object"
+.cindex JSON expansions
+The key and <&'string1'&> are first expanded separately. Leading and trailing
+white space is removed from the key (but not from any of the strings). The key
+must not be empty and must not consist entirely of digits.
+The expanded <&'string1'&> must be of the form:
+.display
+{ <&'"key1"'&> : <&'value1'&> ,  <&'"key2"'&> , <&'value2'&> ... }
+.endd
+.vindex "&$value$&"
+The braces, commas and colons, and the quoting of the member name are required;
+the spaces are optional.
+Matching of the key against the member names is done case-sensitively.
+. XXX should be a UTF-8 compare
+
+The results of matching are handled as above.
+.wen
+
 
 .vitem "&*${extract{*&<&'number'&>&*}{*&<&'separators'&>&*}&&&
         {*&<&'string1'&>&*}{*&<&'string2'&>&*}{*&<&'string3'&>&*}}*&"
@@ -9406,6 +9427,19 @@ yields &"99"&. Two successive separators mean that the field between them is
 empty (for example, the fifth field above).
 
 
+.new
+.vitem "&*${extract json{*&<&'number'&>&*}}&&&
+        {*&<&'string1'&>&*}{*&<&'string2'&>&*}{*&<&'string3'&>&*}}*&"
+.cindex "expansion" "extracting from JSON array"
+.cindex JSON expansions
+The <&'number'&> argument must consist entirely of decimal digits,
+apart from leading and trailing white space, which is ignored.
+
+Field selection and result handling is as above;
+there is no choice of field separator.
+.wen
+
+
 .vitem &*${filter{*&<&'string'&>&*}{*&<&'condition'&>&*}}*&
 .cindex "list" "selecting by condition"
 .cindex "expansion" "selecting from list by condition"
@@ -27773,7 +27807,7 @@ session with a client, you must set either &%tls_verify_hosts%& or
 apply to all TLS connections. For any host that matches one of these options,
 Exim requests a certificate as part of the setup of the TLS session. The
 contents of the certificate are verified by comparing it with a list of
-expected certificates.
+expected trust-anchors or certificates.
 These may be the system default set (depending on library version),
 an explicit file or,
 depending on library version, a directory, identified by
@@ -27790,6 +27824,9 @@ openssl x509 -hash -noout -in /cert/file
 .endd
 where &_/cert/file_& contains a single certificate.
 
+There is no checking of names of the client against the certificate
+Subject Name or Subject Alternate Names.
+
 The difference between &%tls_verify_hosts%& and &%tls_try_verify_hosts%& is
 what happens if the client does not supply a certificate, or if the certificate
 does not match any of the certificates in the collection named by
@@ -27951,6 +27988,11 @@ The &%tls_verify_hosts%& and &%tls_try_verify_hosts%& options restrict
 certificate verification to the listed servers.  Verification either must
 or need not succeed respectively.
 
+The &%tls_verify_cert_hostnames%& option lists hosts for which additional
+checks are made: that the host name (the one in the DNS A record)
+is valid for the certificate.
+The option defaults to always checking.
+
 The &(smtp)& transport has two OCSP-related options:
 &%hosts_require_ocsp%&; a host-list for which a Certificate Status
 is requested and required for the connection to proceed.  The default
@@ -28256,7 +28298,7 @@ this is appropriate for a single system, using a self-signed certificate.
 DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA to be used; this might be a private CA or a public,
 well-known one.
 A private CA at simplest is just a self-signed certificate (with certain
-attributes) which is used to sign cerver certificates, but running one securely
+attributes) which is used to sign server certificates, but running one securely
 does require careful arrangement.
 With DANE-TA, as implemented in Exim and commonly in other MTAs,
 the server TLS handshake must transmit the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate.