- auth_dovecot_options_block *ob =
- (auth_dovecot_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
- struct sockaddr_un sa;
- char buffer[4096];
- char *args[8];
- uschar *auth_command;
- uschar *auth_extra_data = US"";
- int nargs, tmp;
- int cuid = 0, cont = 1, found = 0, fd, ret = DEFER;
- FILE *f;
-
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot authentication\n");
-
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-
- /* This was the original code here: it is nonsense because strncpy()
- does not return an integer. I have converted this to use the function
- that formats and checks length. PH */
-
- /*
- if (strncpy(sa.sun_path, ob->server_socket, sizeof(sa.sun_path)) < 0) {
- */
-
- if (!string_format(US sa.sun_path, sizeof(sa.sun_path), "%s",
- ob->server_socket)) {
- auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket path too long";
- return DEFER;
- }
-
- auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket connection error";
-
- fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (fd < 0)
- return DEFER;
-
- if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0)
- goto out;
-
- f = fdopen(fd, "a+");
- if (f == NULL)
- goto out;
-
- auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket protocol error";
-
- while (cont) {
- if (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), f) == NULL)
- OUT("authentication socket read error or premature eof");
-
- buffer[strlen(buffer) - 1] = 0;
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer);
- nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]));
-
- switch (toupper(*args[0])) {
- case 'C':
- CHECK_COMMAND("CUID", 1, 1);
- cuid = atoi(args[1]);
- break;
-
- case 'D':
- CHECK_COMMAND("DONE", 0, 0);
- cont = 0;
- break;
-
- case 'M':
- CHECK_COMMAND("MECH", 1, INT_MAX);
- if (strcmpic(US args[1], ablock->public_name) == 0)
- found = 1;
- break;
-
- case 'S':
- CHECK_COMMAND("SPID", 1, 1);
- break;
-
- case 'V':
- CHECK_COMMAND("VERSION", 2, 2);
- if (atoi(args[1]) != VERSION_MAJOR)
- OUT("authentication socket protocol version mismatch");
- break;
-
- default:
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- if (!found)
- goto out;
-
- /* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is
- b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */
-
- if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL) {
- ret = FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* Added by PH: extra fields when TLS is in use or if the TCP/IP
- connection is local. */
-
- if (tls_cipher != NULL)
- auth_extra_data = string_sprintf("secured\t%s%s",
- tls_certificate_verified? "valid-client-cert" : "",
- tls_certificate_verified? "\t" : "");
- else if (Ustrcmp(sender_host_address, interface_address) == 0)
- auth_extra_data = US"secured\t";
+int p = 0;
+int count = 0;
+
+for (;;)
+ {
+ if (socket_buffer_left == 0)
+ {
+ if ((socket_buffer_left =
+#ifndef DISABLE_TLS
+ cctx->tls_ctx ? tls_read(cctx->tls_ctx, sbuffer, sizeof(sbuffer)) :
+#endif
+ read(cctx->sock, sbuffer, sizeof(sbuffer))) <= 0)
+ if (count == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ break;
+ p = 0;
+ }
+
+ while (p < socket_buffer_left)
+ {
+ if (count >= n - 1) break;
+ s[count++] = sbuffer[p];
+ if (sbuffer[p++] == '\n') break;
+ }
+
+ memmove(sbuffer, sbuffer + p, socket_buffer_left - p);
+ socket_buffer_left -= p;
+
+ if (s[count-1] == '\n' || count >= n - 1) break;
+ }
+
+s[count] = '\0';
+return s;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Server entry point *
+*************************************************/
+
+int
+auth_dovecot_server(auth_instance * ablock, uschar * data)
+{
+auth_dovecot_options_block *ob =
+ (auth_dovecot_options_block *) ablock->options_block;
+uschar buffer[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXLINELEN];
+uschar *args[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXFIELDCOUNT];
+uschar *auth_command;
+uschar *auth_extra_data = US"";
+uschar *p;
+int nargs, tmp;
+int crequid = 1, ret = DEFER;
+host_item host;
+client_conn_ctx cctx = {.sock = -1, .tls_ctx = NULL};
+BOOL found = FALSE, have_mech_line = FALSE;
+
+HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot authentication\n");
+
+if (!data)
+ {
+ ret = FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+/*XXX timeout? */
+cctx.sock = ip_streamsocket(ob->server_socket, &auth_defer_msg, 5, &host);
+if (cctx.sock < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef notdef
+# ifndef DISABLE_TLS
+if (ob->server_tls)
+ {
+ uschar * s;
+ smtp_connect_args conn_args = { .host = &host };
+ tls_support tls_dummy = {.sni=NULL};
+ uschar * errstr;
+
+ if (!tls_client_start(&cctx, &conn_args, NULL, &tls_dummy, &errstr))
+ {
+ auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf("TLS connect failed: %s", errstr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+#endif
+
+auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket protocol error";
+
+socket_buffer_left = 0; /* Global, used to read more than a line but return by line */
+for (;;)
+ {
+debug_printf("%s %d\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
+ if (!dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), &cctx))
+ OUT("authentication socket read error or premature eof");
+debug_printf("%s %d\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
+ p = buffer + Ustrlen(buffer) - 1;
+ if (*p != '\n')
+ OUT("authentication socket protocol line too long");
+
+ *p = '\0';
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: '%s'\n", buffer);
+
+ nargs = strcut(buffer, args, nelem(args));
+
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_strcut(args, nargs, nelem(args));
+
+ /* Code below rewritten by Kirill Miazine (km@krot.org). Only check commands that
+ Exim will need. Original code also failed if Dovecot server sent unknown
+ command. E.g. COOKIE in version 1.1 of the protocol would cause troubles. */
+ /* pdp: note that CUID is a per-connection identifier sent by the server,
+ which increments at server discretion.
+ By contrast, the "id" field of the protocol is a connection-specific request
+ identifier, which needs to be unique per request from the client and is not
+ connected to the CUID value, so we ignore CUID from server. It's purely for
+ diagnostics. */
+
+ if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"VERSION") == 0)
+ {
+ CHECK_COMMAND("VERSION", 2, 2);
+ if (Uatoi(args[1]) != VERSION_MAJOR)
+ OUT("authentication socket protocol version mismatch");
+ }
+ else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"MECH") == 0)
+ {
+ CHECK_COMMAND("MECH", 1, INT_MAX);
+ have_mech_line = TRUE;
+ if (strcmpic(US args[1], ablock->public_name) == 0)
+ found = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"SPID") == 0)
+ {
+ /* Unfortunately the auth protocol handshake wasn't designed well
+ to differentiate between auth-client/userdb/master. auth-userdb
+ and auth-master send VERSION + SPID lines only and nothing
+ afterwards, while auth-client sends VERSION + MECH + SPID +
+ CUID + more. The simplest way that we can determine if we've
+ connected to the correct socket is to see if MECH line exists or
+ not (alternatively we'd have to have a small timeout after SPID
+ to see if CUID is sent or not). */
+
+ if (!have_mech_line)
+ OUT("authentication socket type mismatch"
+ " (connected to auth-master instead of auth-client)");
+ }
+ else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"DONE") == 0)
+ {
+ CHECK_COMMAND("DONE", 0, 0);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+if (!found)
+ {
+ auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf(
+ "Dovecot did not advertise mechanism \"%s\" to us", ablock->public_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+/* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is
+b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */
+
+if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+/* Added by PH: extra fields when TLS is in use or if the TCP/IP
+connection is local. */
+
+if (tls_in.cipher)
+ auth_extra_data = string_sprintf("secured\t%s%s",
+ tls_in.certificate_verified ? "valid-client-cert" : "",
+ tls_in.certificate_verified ? "\t" : "");
+
+else if ( interface_address
+ && Ustrcmp(sender_host_address, interface_address) == 0)
+ auth_extra_data = US"secured\t";
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff