1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
8 /* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
10 /* This module provides the TLS (aka SSL) support for Exim using the OpenSSL
11 library. It is #included into the tls.c file when that library is used. The
12 code herein is based on a patch that was originally contributed by Steve
13 Haslam. It was adapted from stunnel, a GPL program by Michal Trojnara.
15 No cryptographic code is included in Exim. All this module does is to call
16 functions from the OpenSSL library. */
21 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
22 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
23 #include <openssl/err.h>
24 #include <openssl/rand.h>
26 # include <openssl/ocsp.h>
30 # define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
31 # define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
34 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
35 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
38 #if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
39 # warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
43 /* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
45 typedef struct randstuff {
50 /* Local static variables */
52 static BOOL client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
53 static BOOL server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
54 static const uschar *sid_ctx = US"exim";
56 /* We have three different contexts to care about.
58 Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
59 As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
60 a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
61 from the SMTP Transport.
64 There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
65 Given TLS SNI, we can be using different keys, certs and various other
66 configuration settings, because they're re-expanded with $tls_sni set. This
67 allows vhosting with TLS. This SNI is sent in the handshake.
68 A client might not send SNI, so we need a fallback, and an initial setup too.
69 So as a server, we start out using `server_ctx`.
70 If SNI is sent by the client, then we as server, mid-negotiation, try to clone
71 `server_sni` from `server_ctx` and then initialise settings by re-expanding
75 static SSL_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
76 static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
77 static SSL *client_ssl = NULL;
78 static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
80 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
81 static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL;
84 static char ssl_errstring[256];
86 static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
87 static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
88 static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
90 static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
93 typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
101 uschar *file_expanded;
102 OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
105 X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
106 BOOL verify_required;
111 /* these are cached from first expand */
112 uschar *server_cipher_list;
113 /* only passed down to tls_error: */
116 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
117 uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
121 /* should figure out a cleanup of API to handle state preserved per
122 implementation, for various reasons, which can be void * in the APIs.
123 For now, we hack around it. */
124 tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
125 tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
128 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
129 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) );
132 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
133 static int tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
136 static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
140 /*************************************************
142 *************************************************/
144 /* Called from lots of places when errors occur before actually starting to do
145 the TLS handshake, that is, while the session is still in clear. Always returns
146 DEFER for a server and FAIL for a client so that most calls can use "return
147 tls_error(...)" to do this processing and then give an appropriate return. A
148 single function is used for both server and client, because it is called from
149 some shared functions.
152 prefix text to include in the logged error
153 host NULL if setting up a server;
154 the connected host if setting up a client
155 msg error message or NULL if we should ask OpenSSL
157 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
161 tls_error(uschar *prefix, host_item *host, uschar *msg)
165 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
166 msg = (uschar *)ssl_errstring;
171 uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
172 if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
174 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s): %s",
175 conn_info, prefix, msg);
180 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on connection to %s [%s] (%s): %s",
181 host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
188 /*************************************************
189 * Callback to generate RSA key *
190 *************************************************/
198 Returns: pointer to generated key
202 rsa_callback(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
205 export = export; /* Shut picky compilers up */
206 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Generating %d bit RSA key...\n", keylength);
207 rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
210 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
211 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (RSA_generate_key): %s",
223 x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
225 STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
227 static uschar name[256];
229 for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
231 X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
232 if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
234 X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
235 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
236 debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
244 /*************************************************
245 * Callback for verification *
246 *************************************************/
248 /* The SSL library does certificate verification if set up to do so. This
249 callback has the current yes/no state is in "state". If verification succeeded,
250 we set up the tls_peerdn string. If verification failed, what happens depends
251 on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate or not.
253 If verification is optional, we change the state to yes, but still log the
254 verification error. For some reason (it really would help to have proper
255 documentation of OpenSSL), this callback function then gets called again, this
256 time with state = 1. In fact, that's useful, because we can set up the peerdn
257 value, but we must take care not to set the private verified flag on the second
260 Note: this function is not called if the client fails to present a certificate
261 when asked. We get here only if a certificate has been received. Handling of
262 optional verification for this case is done when requesting SSL to verify, by
263 setting SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the non-optional case.
266 state current yes/no state as 1/0
267 x509ctx certificate information.
268 client TRUE for client startup, FALSE for server startup
270 Returns: 1 if verified, 0 if not
274 verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
275 tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
277 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
278 static uschar txt[256];
280 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
284 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
285 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx),
286 X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
288 tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
292 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
293 return 0; /* reject */
295 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
296 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
299 else if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx) != 0)
301 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n",
302 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx), txt);
304 if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
305 { /* client, wanting stapling */
306 /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
307 for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
309 if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
317 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
318 uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
322 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
324 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
325 if ( tlsp == &tls_out
326 && ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
327 /* client, wanting hostname check */
329 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010002000L
330 # ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
331 # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
335 uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
338 while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
339 if ((rc = X509_check_host(cert, name, 0,
340 X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS)))
344 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: internal error\n");
351 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
352 "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
353 return 0; /* reject */
357 if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
359 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
360 "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
361 return 0; /* reject */
366 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
367 *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
368 if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
372 return 1; /* accept */
376 verify_callback_client(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
378 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_out, &client_verify_callback_called, &client_verify_optional);
382 verify_callback_server(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
384 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_in, &server_verify_callback_called, &server_verify_optional);
389 /*************************************************
390 * Information callback *
391 *************************************************/
393 /* The SSL library functions call this from time to time to indicate what they
394 are doing. We copy the string to the debugging output when TLS debugging has
406 info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
410 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL info: %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s));
415 /*************************************************
416 * Initialize for DH *
417 *************************************************/
419 /* If dhparam is set, expand it, and load up the parameters for DH encryption.
422 dhparam DH parameter file or fixed parameter identity string
423 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
425 Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked)
429 init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, host_item *host)
436 if (!expand_check(dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &dhexpanded))
439 if (!dhexpanded || !*dhexpanded)
440 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS std_dh_prime_default(), -1);
441 else if (dhexpanded[0] == '/')
443 if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r")))
445 tls_error(string_sprintf("could not read dhparams file %s", dhexpanded),
446 host, US strerror(errno));
452 if (Ustrcmp(dhexpanded, "none") == 0)
454 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n");
458 if (!(pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded)))
460 tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown standard DH prime \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
461 host, US strerror(errno));
464 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS pem, -1);
467 if (!(dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
470 tls_error(string_sprintf("Could not read tls_dhparams \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
475 /* Even if it is larger, we silently return success rather than cause things
476 * to fail out, so that a too-large DH will not knock out all TLS; it's a
477 * debatable choice. */
478 if ((8*DH_size(dh)) > tls_dh_max_bits)
481 debug_printf("dhparams file %d bits, is > tls_dh_max_bits limit of %d",
482 8*DH_size(dh), tls_dh_max_bits);
486 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(sctx, dh);
488 debug_printf("Diffie-Hellman initialized from %s with %d-bit prime\n",
489 dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", 8*DH_size(dh));
502 /*************************************************
503 * Load OCSP information into state *
504 *************************************************/
506 /* Called to load the server OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
507 caller has determined this is needed. Checks validity. Debugs a message
510 ASSUMES: single response, for single cert.
513 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
514 cbinfo various parts of session state
515 expanded the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
520 ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
524 OCSP_BASICRESP *basic_response;
525 OCSP_SINGLERESP *single_response;
526 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
528 unsigned long verify_flags;
529 int status, reason, i;
531 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
532 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
534 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response);
535 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
538 bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb");
541 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
542 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
546 resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
550 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
554 status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
555 if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
557 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
558 OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
562 basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
566 debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
570 store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
571 verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
573 /* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
574 OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
575 OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
577 i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, NULL, store, verify_flags);
581 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
582 debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
587 /* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
588 one certificate we use, and nothing for anything else in a chain. If this
589 proves false, we need to extract a cert id from our issued cert
590 (tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the
591 right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
593 I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
594 single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0);
595 if (!single_response)
598 debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
602 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single_response, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
603 if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
605 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response bad cert status: %s (%d) %s (%d)\n",
606 OCSP_cert_status_str(status), status,
607 OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason), reason);
611 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
613 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
618 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
622 if (running_in_test_harness)
624 extern char ** environ;
626 for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
627 if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
629 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
630 goto supply_response;
635 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
640 /*************************************************
641 * Expand key and cert file specs *
642 *************************************************/
644 /* Called once during tls_init and possibly again during TLS setup, for a
645 new context, if Server Name Indication was used and tls_sni was seen in
646 the certificate string.
649 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
650 cbinfo various parts of session state
652 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
656 tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo)
660 if (cbinfo->certificate == NULL)
663 if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
664 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
665 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
667 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE;
669 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded))
672 if (expanded != NULL)
674 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file %s\n", expanded);
675 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(sctx, CS expanded))
676 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
677 "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file file=%s", expanded),
681 if (cbinfo->privatekey != NULL &&
682 !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded))
685 /* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result
686 of the expansion is an empty string, ignore it also, and assume the private
687 key is in the same file as the certificate. */
689 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
691 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file %s\n", expanded);
692 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(sctx, CS expanded, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
693 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
694 "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", expanded), cbinfo->host, NULL);
698 if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file != NULL)
700 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded))
703 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
705 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
706 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded &&
707 (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
710 debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file value unchanged, using existing values.\n");
712 ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded);
724 /*************************************************
725 * Callback to handle SNI *
726 *************************************************/
728 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if a Server Name
729 Indication extension was sent by the client.
731 API documentation is OpenSSL s_server.c implementation.
734 s SSL* of the current session
735 ad unknown (part of OpenSSL API) (unused)
736 arg Callback of "our" registered data
738 Returns: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,ALERT_WARNING,ALERT_FATAL,NOACK}
741 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
743 tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg)
745 const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
746 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
748 int old_pool = store_pool;
751 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
753 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", servername,
754 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)");
756 /* Make the extension value available for expansion */
757 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
758 tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername);
759 store_pool = old_pool;
761 if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
762 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
764 /* Can't find an SSL_CTX_clone() or equivalent, so we do it manually;
765 not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
766 Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
768 if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
770 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
771 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
772 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
775 /* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
776 already exists. Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */
778 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(server_ctx));
779 SSL_CTX_set_mode(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(server_ctx));
780 SSL_CTX_set_options(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(server_ctx));
781 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(server_ctx));
782 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
783 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
784 if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
785 SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
787 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
789 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_sni, tls_server_stapling_cb);
790 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
794 rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server);
795 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
797 /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
799 rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo);
800 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
802 if (!init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL))
803 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
805 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
806 SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
808 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
810 #endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */
817 /*************************************************
818 * Callback to handle OCSP Stapling *
819 *************************************************/
821 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if the client
822 requests OCSP information with a Certificate Status Request.
824 Documentation via openssl s_server.c and the Apache patch from the OpenSSL
830 tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
832 const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
833 uschar *response_der;
834 int response_der_len;
837 debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.",
838 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
840 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
841 if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
842 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
845 response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response,
847 if (response_der_len <= 0)
848 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
850 SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(server_ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
851 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
852 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
857 time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
859 BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
860 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
865 tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
867 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = arg;
868 const unsigned char * p;
874 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
875 len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
878 /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
879 if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required
880 && log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
881 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
883 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
884 return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
887 if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
889 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
890 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
891 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, parse error");
893 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
897 if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
899 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
900 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
901 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, error parsing response");
903 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error parsing response\n");
904 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
908 /* We'd check the nonce here if we'd put one in the request. */
909 /* However that would defeat cacheability on the server so we don't. */
911 /* This section of code reworked from OpenSSL apps source;
912 The OpenSSL Project retains copyright:
913 Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
918 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
920 DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
922 /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
924 /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
925 /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
927 if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL,
928 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
930 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
931 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
932 ERR_print_errors(bp);
933 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
937 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
940 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
941 OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
943 if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
945 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
946 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
947 "with multiple responses not handled");
948 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
951 single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
952 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
956 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
957 DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
958 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
959 EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
961 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
962 DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
963 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
964 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
968 DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
969 OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
972 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
973 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
976 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
977 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
978 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
979 reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
980 reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
981 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
982 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
985 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
986 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
987 "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
988 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
996 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
999 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
1003 /*************************************************
1004 * Initialize for TLS *
1005 *************************************************/
1007 /* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization
1008 of the library. We allocate and return a context structure.
1011 ctxp returned SSL context
1012 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
1013 dhparam DH parameter file
1014 certificate certificate file
1015 privatekey private key
1016 ocsp_file file of stapling info (server); flag for require ocsp (client)
1017 addr address if client; NULL if server (for some randomness)
1018 cbp place to put allocated callback context
1020 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1024 tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
1026 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1029 address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp)
1034 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
1036 cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
1037 cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
1038 cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
1039 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1040 if ((cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL))
1042 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
1043 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
1044 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
1047 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
1049 cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
1050 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
1051 cbinfo->host = host;
1053 SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
1054 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
1056 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
1057 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
1058 list of available digests. */
1059 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1062 /* Create a context.
1063 The OpenSSL docs in 1.0.1b have not been updated to clarify TLS variant
1064 negotiation in the different methods; as far as I can tell, the only
1065 *_{server,client}_method which allows negotiation is SSLv23, which exists even
1066 when OpenSSL is built without SSLv2 support.
1067 By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
1070 *ctxp = SSL_CTX_new((host == NULL)?
1071 SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method());
1073 if (*ctxp == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL);
1075 /* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
1076 order to get the full complement of ciphers to work. It took me roughly a day
1077 of work to discover this by experiment.
1079 On systems that have /dev/urandom, SSL may automatically seed itself from
1080 there. Otherwise, we have to make something up as best we can. Double check
1086 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
1089 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
1090 RAND_seed((uschar *)big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1091 if (addr != NULL) RAND_seed((uschar *)addr, sizeof(addr));
1094 return tls_error(US"RAND_status", host,
1095 US"unable to seed random number generator");
1098 /* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
1101 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
1103 /* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
1104 (void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(*ctxp, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
1106 /* Apply administrator-supplied work-arounds.
1107 Historically we applied just one requested option,
1108 SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS, but when bug 994 requested a second, we
1109 moved to an administrator-controlled list of options to specify and
1110 grandfathered in the first one as the default value for "openssl_options".
1112 No OpenSSL version number checks: the options we accept depend upon the
1113 availability of the option value macros from OpenSSL. */
1115 okay = tls_openssl_options_parse(openssl_options, &init_options);
1117 return tls_error(US"openssl_options parsing failed", host, NULL);
1121 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
1122 if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctxp, init_options)))
1123 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
1124 "SSL_CTX_set_option(%#lx)", init_options), host, NULL);
1127 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
1129 /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
1131 if (!init_dh(*ctxp, dhparam, host)) return DEFER;
1133 /* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */
1135 rc = tls_expand_session_files(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1136 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1138 /* If we need to handle SNI, do so */
1139 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1140 if (host == NULL) /* server */
1142 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1143 /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
1144 the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
1145 change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
1146 callback is invoked. */
1147 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
1149 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, tls_server_stapling_cb);
1150 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, cbinfo);
1153 /* We always do this, so that $tls_sni is available even if not used in
1155 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(*ctxp, tls_servername_cb);
1156 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1158 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1160 if(ocsp_file) /* wanting stapling */
1162 if (!(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = X509_STORE_new()))
1164 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
1167 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(*ctxp, tls_client_stapling_cb);
1168 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1173 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1174 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
1177 /* Set up the RSA callback */
1179 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctxp, rsa_callback);
1181 /* Finally, set the timeout, and we are done */
1183 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctxp, ssl_session_timeout);
1184 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialized TLS\n");
1194 /*************************************************
1195 * Get name of cipher in use *
1196 *************************************************/
1199 Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
1200 buffer to use for answer
1202 pointer to number of bits for cipher
1207 construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
1209 /* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
1210 yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
1211 the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
1212 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1215 ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
1217 c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
1218 SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
1220 string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
1221 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
1223 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
1230 /*************************************************
1231 * Set up for verifying certificates *
1232 *************************************************/
1234 /* Called by both client and server startup
1237 sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
1238 certs certs file or NULL
1239 crl CRL file or NULL
1240 host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
1241 optional TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts;
1242 otherwise passed as FALSE
1243 cert_vfy_cb Callback function for certificate verification
1245 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1249 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
1250 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) )
1252 uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
1254 if (!expand_check(certs, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts))
1257 if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0')
1259 struct stat statbuf;
1260 if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
1261 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
1263 if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
1265 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1266 "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
1272 if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1273 { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
1275 { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
1277 /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
1278 unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
1279 certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
1280 says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
1282 if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
1283 !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
1284 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
1288 SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file));
1292 /* Handle a certificate revocation list. */
1294 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
1296 /* This bit of code is now the version supplied by Lars Mainka. (I have
1297 * merely reformatted it into the Exim code style.)
1299 * "From here I changed the code to add support for multiple crl's
1300 * in pem format in one file or to support hashed directory entries in
1301 * pem format instead of a file. This method now uses the library function
1302 * X509_STORE_load_locations to add the CRL location to the SSL context.
1303 * OpenSSL will then handle the verify against CA certs and CRLs by
1304 * itself in the verify callback." */
1306 if (!expand_check(crl, US"tls_crl", &expcrl)) return DEFER;
1307 if (expcrl != NULL && *expcrl != 0)
1309 struct stat statbufcrl;
1310 if (Ustat(expcrl, &statbufcrl) < 0)
1312 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1313 "failed to stat %s for certificates revocation lists", expcrl);
1318 /* is it a file or directory? */
1320 X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
1321 if ((statbufcrl.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1325 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a directory %s\n", dir);
1331 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a file %s\n", file);
1333 if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, CS file, CS dir) == 0)
1334 return tls_error(US"X509_STORE_load_locations", host, NULL);
1336 /* setting the flags to check against the complete crl chain */
1338 X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
1339 X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
1343 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
1345 /* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */
1347 SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
1348 SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
1357 /*************************************************
1358 * Start a TLS session in a server *
1359 *************************************************/
1361 /* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received
1362 the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate
1366 require_ciphers allowed ciphers
1368 Returns: OK on success
1369 DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
1370 FAIL for errors during the negotation; the server can't
1375 tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers)
1379 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
1380 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1382 /* Check for previous activation */
1384 if (tls_in.active >= 0)
1386 tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"");
1387 smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n");
1391 /* Initialize the SSL library. If it fails, it will already have logged
1394 rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
1395 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1398 NULL, &server_static_cbinfo);
1399 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1400 cbinfo = server_static_cbinfo;
1402 if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
1405 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1406 were historically separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my
1407 tests, and also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here.
1410 if (expciphers != NULL)
1412 uschar *s = expciphers;
1413 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1414 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1415 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_ctx, CS expciphers))
1416 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL);
1417 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = expciphers;
1420 /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
1421 optional, set up appropriately. */
1423 tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1424 server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1426 if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
1428 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1429 FALSE, verify_callback_server);
1430 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1431 server_verify_optional = FALSE;
1433 else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
1435 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1436 TRUE, verify_callback_server);
1437 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1438 server_verify_optional = TRUE;
1441 /* Prepare for new connection */
1443 if ((server_ssl = SSL_new(server_ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL);
1445 /* Warning: we used to SSL_clear(ssl) here, it was removed.
1447 * With the SSL_clear(), we get strange interoperability bugs with
1448 * OpenSSL 1.0.1b and TLS1.1/1.2. It looks as though this may be a bug in
1449 * OpenSSL itself, as a clear should not lead to inability to follow protocols.
1451 * The SSL_clear() call is to let an existing SSL* be reused, typically after
1452 * session shutdown. In this case, we have a brand new object and there's no
1453 * obvious reason to immediately clear it. I'm guessing that this was
1454 * originally added because of incomplete initialisation which the clear fixed,
1455 * in some historic release.
1458 /* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
1459 on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
1460 make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out
1461 the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
1462 mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
1464 SSL_set_session_id_context(server_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1465 if (!tls_in.on_connect)
1467 smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n");
1471 /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
1472 that the OpenSSL library doesn't. */
1474 SSL_set_wfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_out));
1475 SSL_set_rfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_in));
1476 SSL_set_accept_state(server_ssl);
1478 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
1480 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1481 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
1482 rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
1487 tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1488 if (ERR_get_error() == 0)
1489 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1490 "TLS client disconnected cleanly (rejected our certificate?)");
1494 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n");
1496 /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
1497 and initialize things. */
1499 construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
1500 tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
1505 if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
1506 debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
1509 /* Record the certificate we presented */
1511 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(server_ssl);
1512 tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
1515 /* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
1516 Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
1517 smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
1518 Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
1520 ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1521 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
1522 ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
1524 receive_getc = tls_getc;
1525 receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
1526 receive_feof = tls_feof;
1527 receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
1528 receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
1530 tls_in.active = fileno(smtp_out);
1538 tls_client_basic_ctx_init(SSL_CTX * ctx,
1539 host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob
1540 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1541 , tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo
1546 /* stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
1547 set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts is not set. Check only
1548 the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
1550 if ((!ob->tls_verify_hosts && !ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) ||
1551 (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts) == OK))
1553 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
1554 ob->tls_crl, host, FALSE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
1556 client_verify_optional = FALSE;
1558 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1559 if (ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames)
1561 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames,
1562 US"tls_verify_cert_hostnames",
1563 &cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames))
1565 if (cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)
1566 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
1567 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
1571 else if (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
1573 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
1574 ob->tls_crl, host, TRUE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
1576 client_verify_optional = TRUE;
1582 /*************************************************
1583 * Start a TLS session in a client *
1584 *************************************************/
1586 /* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted.
1589 fd the fd of the connection
1590 host connected host (for messages)
1591 addr the first address
1592 ob smtp transport options
1594 Returns: OK on success
1595 FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
1596 because this is not a server
1600 tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
1603 smtp_transport_options_block * ob = v_ob;
1604 static uschar txt[256];
1605 uschar * expciphers;
1608 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1610 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1611 BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
1612 BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
1614 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1615 dns_answer tlsa_dnsa;
1620 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1621 dane_required = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_dane, NULL,
1622 host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1624 if (host->dnssec == DS_YES)
1627 || verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_try_dane, NULL,
1628 host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK
1631 /* move this out to host.c given the similarity to dns_lookup() ? */
1633 uschar * fullname = buffer;
1635 /* TLSA lookup string */
1636 (void)sprintf(CS buffer, "_%d._tcp.%.256s", host->port,
1639 switch (rc = dns_lookup(&tlsa_dnsa, buffer, T_TLSA, &fullname))
1642 return DEFER; /* just defer this TLS'd conn */
1648 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup failed");
1654 if (!dns_is_secure(&tlsa_dnsa))
1656 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup not DNSSEC");
1664 else if (dane_required)
1666 /* Hmm - what lookup, precisely? */
1667 /*XXX a shame we only find this after making tcp & smtp connection */
1668 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: previous lookup not DNSSEC");
1672 if (!dane) /*XXX todo: enable ocsp with dane */
1675 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1677 require_ocsp = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp,
1678 NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1679 request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE
1680 : verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp,
1681 NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1685 rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
1686 ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
1687 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1688 (void *)(long)request_ocsp,
1690 addr, &client_static_cbinfo);
1691 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1693 tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1694 client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1696 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
1700 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1701 are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and
1702 also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here. */
1704 if (expciphers != NULL)
1706 uschar *s = expciphers;
1707 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1708 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1709 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(client_ctx, CS expciphers))
1710 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL);
1713 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1716 if (!DANESSL_library_init())
1717 return tls_error(US"library init", host, US"DANE library error");
1718 if (DANESSL_CTX_init(client_ctx) <= 0)
1719 return tls_error(US"context init", host, US"DANE library error");
1725 if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob
1726 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1727 , client_static_cbinfo
1732 if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
1733 return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL);
1734 SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1735 SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
1736 SSL_set_connect_state(client_ssl);
1740 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_out.sni))
1742 if (tls_out.sni == NULL)
1744 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
1746 else if (!Ustrlen(tls_out.sni))
1750 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1751 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_out.sni);
1752 SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client_ssl, tls_out.sni);
1755 debug_printf("OpenSSL at build-time lacked SNI support, ignoring \"%s\"\n",
1761 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1762 /* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
1763 does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
1766 SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
1767 client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
1768 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
1772 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1777 uschar * hostnames[2] = { host->name, NULL };
1779 if (DANESSL_init(client_ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
1780 return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, US"DANE library error");
1782 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1784 rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
1785 ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
1787 uschar * p = rr->data;
1788 int usage, selector, mtype;
1789 const char * mdname;
1792 GETSHORT(selector, p);
1797 default: /* log bad */ return FAIL;
1798 case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
1799 case 1: mdname = "SHA2-256"; break;
1800 case 2: mdname = "SHA2-512"; break;
1803 switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(client_ssl,
1804 (uint8_t) usage, (uint8_t) selector,
1805 mdname, p, rr->size - (p - rr->data)))
1808 case 0: /* action not taken; log error */
1817 /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
1819 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
1820 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1821 alarm(ob->command_timeout);
1822 rc = SSL_connect(client_ssl);
1825 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1827 DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl); /*XXX earliest possible callpoint. Too early? */
1831 return tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1833 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
1835 /* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
1836 /*XXX server_cert is never freed... use X509_free() */
1837 server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (client_ssl);
1840 tls_out.peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
1841 CS txt, sizeof(txt));
1842 tls_out.peerdn = txt; /*XXX a static buffer... */
1845 tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
1847 construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
1848 tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
1850 /* Record the certificate we presented */
1852 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(client_ssl);
1853 tls_out.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
1856 tls_out.active = fd;
1864 /*************************************************
1865 * TLS version of getc *
1866 *************************************************/
1868 /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty,
1869 it refills the buffer via the SSL reading function.
1872 Returns: the next character or EOF
1874 Only used by the server-side TLS.
1880 if (ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm >= ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm)
1885 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
1886 ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1888 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
1889 inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1890 error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
1893 /* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
1894 closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
1895 non-SSL handling. */
1897 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
1899 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
1901 receive_getc = smtp_getc;
1902 receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
1903 receive_feof = smtp_feof;
1904 receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
1905 receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
1907 SSL_free(server_ssl);
1911 tls_in.cipher = NULL;
1912 tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
1918 /* Handle genuine errors */
1920 else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL)
1922 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
1923 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
1928 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
1930 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
1935 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
1936 dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer, inbytes);
1938 ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = inbytes;
1939 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
1942 /* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
1944 return ssl_xfer_buffer[ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm++];
1949 /*************************************************
1950 * Read bytes from TLS channel *
1951 *************************************************/
1958 Returns: the number of bytes read
1959 -1 after a failed read
1961 Only used by the client-side TLS.
1965 tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
1967 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
1971 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
1972 buff, (unsigned int)len);
1974 inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS buff, len);
1975 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, inbytes);
1977 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
1979 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
1982 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
1994 /*************************************************
1995 * Write bytes down TLS channel *
1996 *************************************************/
2000 is_server channel specifier
2004 Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
2005 -1 after a failed write
2007 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2011 tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len)
2016 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
2018 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2021 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2022 outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
2023 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
2024 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
2028 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2029 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
2032 case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
2037 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2038 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
2041 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
2042 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
2043 sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
2047 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
2056 /*************************************************
2057 * Close down a TLS session *
2058 *************************************************/
2060 /* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
2061 daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
2062 would tamper with the SSL session in the parent process).
2064 Arguments: TRUE if SSL_shutdown is to be called
2067 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2071 tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
2073 SSL **sslp = is_server ? &server_ssl : &client_ssl;
2074 int *fdp = is_server ? &tls_in.active : &tls_out.active;
2076 if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
2080 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down SSL\n");
2081 SSL_shutdown(*sslp);
2093 /*************************************************
2094 * Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup *
2095 *************************************************/
2097 /* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the
2100 Returns: NULL on success, or error message
2104 tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
2107 uschar *s, *expciphers, *err;
2109 /* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global
2110 state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */
2112 SSL_load_error_strings();
2113 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
2114 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
2115 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
2116 list of available digests. */
2117 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
2120 if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
2123 if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
2124 return US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers";
2126 if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
2129 /* normalisation ripped from above */
2131 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
2135 ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
2138 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2139 return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);
2143 debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers);
2145 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
2147 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2148 err = string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed", expciphers);
2159 /*************************************************
2160 * Report the library versions. *
2161 *************************************************/
2163 /* There have historically been some issues with binary compatibility in
2164 OpenSSL libraries; if Exim (like many other applications) is built against
2165 one version of OpenSSL but the run-time linker picks up another version,
2166 it can result in serious failures, including crashing with a SIGSEGV. So
2167 report the version found by the compiler and the run-time version.
2169 Note: some OS vendors backport security fixes without changing the version
2170 number/string, and the version date remains unchanged. The _build_ date
2171 will change, so we can more usefully assist with version diagnosis by also
2172 reporting the build date.
2174 Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to
2179 tls_version_report(FILE *f)
2181 fprintf(f, "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
2184 OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
2185 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
2186 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
2187 /* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
2188 the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
2194 /*************************************************
2195 * Random number generation *
2196 *************************************************/
2198 /* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be
2199 cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves
2200 in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or
2201 whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork()
2202 and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us.
2206 Returns a random number in range [0, max-1]
2210 vaguely_random_number(int max)
2214 static pid_t pidlast = 0;
2217 uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
2223 if (pidnow != pidlast)
2225 /* Although OpenSSL documents that "OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state
2226 is unique for each thread", this doesn't apparently apply across processes,
2227 so our own warning from vaguely_random_number_fallback() applies here too.
2228 Fix per PostgreSQL. */
2234 /* OpenSSL auto-seeds from /dev/random, etc, but this a double-check. */
2238 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
2241 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
2243 /* We're after pseudo-random, not random; if we still don't have enough data
2244 in the internal PRNG then our options are limited. We could sleep and hope
2245 for entropy to come along (prayer technique) but if the system is so depleted
2246 in the first place then something is likely to just keep taking it. Instead,
2247 we'll just take whatever little bit of pseudo-random we can still manage to
2250 needed_len = sizeof(r);
2251 /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were
2252 asked for a number less than 10. */
2253 for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i)
2259 /* We do not care if crypto-strong */
2260 i = RAND_pseudo_bytes(smallbuf, needed_len);
2264 debug_printf("OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() not supported by RAND method, using fallback.\n");
2265 return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
2269 for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
2275 /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
2276 smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
2283 /*************************************************
2284 * OpenSSL option parse *
2285 *************************************************/
2287 /* Parse one option for tls_openssl_options_parse below
2290 name one option name
2291 value place to store a value for it
2292 Returns success or failure in parsing
2295 struct exim_openssl_option {
2299 /* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
2300 options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
2301 all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
2304 This list is current as of:
2306 Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
2308 static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
2309 /* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
2311 { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
2313 #ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
2314 { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
2316 #ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
2317 { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
2319 #ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
2320 { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
2322 #ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
2323 { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
2325 #ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
2326 { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
2328 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
2329 { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
2331 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
2332 { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
2334 #ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
2335 { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
2337 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
2338 { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
2340 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
2341 { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
2343 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
2344 { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
2346 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2347 { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
2349 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2350 { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
2352 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
2353 { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
2355 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
2356 { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
2358 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
2359 { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
2361 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
2362 #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
2363 /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
2364 #warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
2366 { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
2369 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
2370 { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
2372 #ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
2373 { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
2375 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
2376 { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
2378 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
2379 { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
2381 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
2382 { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
2384 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
2385 { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
2387 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
2388 { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
2390 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
2391 { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
2393 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
2394 { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
2397 static int exim_openssl_options_size =
2398 sizeof(exim_openssl_options)/sizeof(struct exim_openssl_option);
2402 tls_openssl_one_option_parse(uschar *name, long *value)
2405 int last = exim_openssl_options_size;
2406 while (last > first)
2408 int middle = (first + last)/2;
2409 int c = Ustrcmp(name, exim_openssl_options[middle].name);
2412 *value = exim_openssl_options[middle].value;
2426 /*************************************************
2427 * OpenSSL option parsing logic *
2428 *************************************************/
2430 /* OpenSSL has a number of compatibility options which an administrator might
2431 reasonably wish to set. Interpret a list similarly to decode_bits(), so that
2432 we look like log_selector.
2435 option_spec the administrator-supplied string of options
2436 results ptr to long storage for the options bitmap
2437 Returns success or failure
2441 tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
2446 BOOL adding, item_parsed;
2449 /* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
2450 * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
2451 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2452 result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
2455 if (option_spec == NULL)
2461 for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
2463 while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
2466 if (*s != '+' && *s != '-')
2468 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("malformed openssl option setting: "
2469 "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"\n", s);
2472 adding = *s++ == '+';
2473 for (end = s; (*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end); ++end) /**/ ;
2476 item_parsed = tls_openssl_one_option_parse(s, &item);
2479 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
2482 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s from %lx: %lx (%s)\n",
2483 adding ? "adding" : "removing", result, item, s);
2498 /* End of tls-openssl.c */