1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
8 /* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
10 /* This module provides the TLS (aka SSL) support for Exim using the OpenSSL
11 library. It is #included into the tls.c file when that library is used. The
12 code herein is based on a patch that was originally contributed by Steve
13 Haslam. It was adapted from stunnel, a GPL program by Michal Trojnara.
15 No cryptographic code is included in Exim. All this module does is to call
16 functions from the OpenSSL library. */
21 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
22 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
23 #include <openssl/err.h>
24 #include <openssl/rand.h>
26 # include <openssl/ocsp.h>
30 # define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
31 # define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
34 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
35 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
38 #if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
39 # warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
43 /* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
45 typedef struct randstuff {
50 /* Local static variables */
52 static BOOL client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
53 static BOOL server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
54 static const uschar *sid_ctx = US"exim";
56 /* We have three different contexts to care about.
58 Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
59 As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
60 a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
61 from the SMTP Transport.
64 There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
65 Given TLS SNI, we can be using different keys, certs and various other
66 configuration settings, because they're re-expanded with $tls_sni set. This
67 allows vhosting with TLS. This SNI is sent in the handshake.
68 A client might not send SNI, so we need a fallback, and an initial setup too.
69 So as a server, we start out using `server_ctx`.
70 If SNI is sent by the client, then we as server, mid-negotiation, try to clone
71 `server_sni` from `server_ctx` and then initialise settings by re-expanding
75 static SSL_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
76 static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
77 static SSL *client_ssl = NULL;
78 static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
80 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
81 static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL;
84 static char ssl_errstring[256];
86 static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
87 static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
88 static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
90 static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
93 typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
101 uschar *file_expanded;
102 OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
105 X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
106 BOOL verify_required;
111 /* these are cached from first expand */
112 uschar *server_cipher_list;
113 /* only passed down to tls_error: */
116 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
117 uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
121 /* should figure out a cleanup of API to handle state preserved per
122 implementation, for various reasons, which can be void * in the APIs.
123 For now, we hack around it. */
124 tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
125 tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
128 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
129 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) );
132 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
133 static int tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
136 static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
140 /*************************************************
142 *************************************************/
144 /* Called from lots of places when errors occur before actually starting to do
145 the TLS handshake, that is, while the session is still in clear. Always returns
146 DEFER for a server and FAIL for a client so that most calls can use "return
147 tls_error(...)" to do this processing and then give an appropriate return. A
148 single function is used for both server and client, because it is called from
149 some shared functions.
152 prefix text to include in the logged error
153 host NULL if setting up a server;
154 the connected host if setting up a client
155 msg error message or NULL if we should ask OpenSSL
157 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
161 tls_error(uschar *prefix, host_item *host, uschar *msg)
165 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
166 msg = (uschar *)ssl_errstring;
171 uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
172 if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
174 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s): %s",
175 conn_info, prefix, msg);
180 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on connection to %s [%s] (%s): %s",
181 host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
188 /*************************************************
189 * Callback to generate RSA key *
190 *************************************************/
198 Returns: pointer to generated key
202 rsa_callback(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
205 export = export; /* Shut picky compilers up */
206 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Generating %d bit RSA key...\n", keylength);
207 rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
210 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
211 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (RSA_generate_key): %s",
223 x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
225 STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
227 static uschar name[256];
229 for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
231 X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
232 if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
234 X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
235 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
236 debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
244 /*************************************************
245 * Callback for verification *
246 *************************************************/
248 /* The SSL library does certificate verification if set up to do so. This
249 callback has the current yes/no state is in "state". If verification succeeded,
250 we set up the tls_peerdn string. If verification failed, what happens depends
251 on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate or not.
253 If verification is optional, we change the state to yes, but still log the
254 verification error. For some reason (it really would help to have proper
255 documentation of OpenSSL), this callback function then gets called again, this
256 time with state = 1. In fact, that's useful, because we can set up the peerdn
257 value, but we must take care not to set the private verified flag on the second
260 Note: this function is not called if the client fails to present a certificate
261 when asked. We get here only if a certificate has been received. Handling of
262 optional verification for this case is done when requesting SSL to verify, by
263 setting SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the non-optional case.
266 state current yes/no state as 1/0
267 x509ctx certificate information.
268 client TRUE for client startup, FALSE for server startup
270 Returns: 1 if verified, 0 if not
274 verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
275 tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
277 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
278 static uschar txt[256];
280 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
284 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
285 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx),
286 X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
288 tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
292 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
293 return 0; /* reject */
295 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
296 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
299 else if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx) != 0)
301 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n",
302 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx), txt);
304 if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
305 { /* client, wanting stapling */
306 /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
307 for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
309 if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
317 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
318 uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
322 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
324 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
325 if ( tlsp == &tls_out
326 && ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
327 /* client, wanting hostname check */
329 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010002000L
330 # ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
331 # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
335 uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
338 while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
339 if ((rc = X509_check_host(cert, name, 0,
340 X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS)))
344 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: internal error\n");
351 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
352 "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
353 return 0; /* reject */
357 if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
359 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
360 "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
361 return 0; /* reject */
364 #endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES*/
366 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
367 *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
368 if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
372 return 1; /* accept */
376 verify_callback_client(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
378 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_out, &client_verify_callback_called, &client_verify_optional);
382 verify_callback_server(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
384 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_in, &server_verify_callback_called, &server_verify_optional);
388 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
390 /* This gets called *by* the dane library verify callback, which interposes
394 verify_callback_client_dane(int state, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx)
396 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
397 static uschar txt[256];
399 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
401 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", txt);
402 tls_out.peerdn = txt;
403 tls_out.peercert = X509_dup(cert);
406 tls_out.dane_verified =
407 tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
411 #endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
414 /*************************************************
415 * Information callback *
416 *************************************************/
418 /* The SSL library functions call this from time to time to indicate what they
419 are doing. We copy the string to the debugging output when TLS debugging has
431 info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
435 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL info: %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s));
440 /*************************************************
441 * Initialize for DH *
442 *************************************************/
444 /* If dhparam is set, expand it, and load up the parameters for DH encryption.
447 dhparam DH parameter file or fixed parameter identity string
448 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
450 Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked)
454 init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, host_item *host)
461 if (!expand_check(dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &dhexpanded))
464 if (!dhexpanded || !*dhexpanded)
465 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS std_dh_prime_default(), -1);
466 else if (dhexpanded[0] == '/')
468 if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r")))
470 tls_error(string_sprintf("could not read dhparams file %s", dhexpanded),
471 host, US strerror(errno));
477 if (Ustrcmp(dhexpanded, "none") == 0)
479 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n");
483 if (!(pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded)))
485 tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown standard DH prime \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
486 host, US strerror(errno));
489 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS pem, -1);
492 if (!(dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
495 tls_error(string_sprintf("Could not read tls_dhparams \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
500 /* Even if it is larger, we silently return success rather than cause things
501 * to fail out, so that a too-large DH will not knock out all TLS; it's a
502 * debatable choice. */
503 if ((8*DH_size(dh)) > tls_dh_max_bits)
506 debug_printf("dhparams file %d bits, is > tls_dh_max_bits limit of %d",
507 8*DH_size(dh), tls_dh_max_bits);
511 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(sctx, dh);
513 debug_printf("Diffie-Hellman initialized from %s with %d-bit prime\n",
514 dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", 8*DH_size(dh));
527 /*************************************************
528 * Load OCSP information into state *
529 *************************************************/
531 /* Called to load the server OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
532 caller has determined this is needed. Checks validity. Debugs a message
535 ASSUMES: single response, for single cert.
538 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
539 cbinfo various parts of session state
540 expanded the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
545 ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
549 OCSP_BASICRESP *basic_response;
550 OCSP_SINGLERESP *single_response;
551 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
553 unsigned long verify_flags;
554 int status, reason, i;
556 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
557 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
559 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response);
560 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
563 bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb");
566 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
567 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
571 resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
575 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
579 status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
580 if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
582 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
583 OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
587 basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
591 debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
595 store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
596 verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
598 /* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
599 OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
600 OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
602 i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, NULL, store, verify_flags);
606 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
607 debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
612 /* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
613 one certificate we use, and nothing for anything else in a chain. If this
614 proves false, we need to extract a cert id from our issued cert
615 (tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the
616 right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
618 I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
619 single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0);
620 if (!single_response)
623 debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
627 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single_response, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
628 if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
630 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response bad cert status: %s (%d) %s (%d)\n",
631 OCSP_cert_status_str(status), status,
632 OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason), reason);
636 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
638 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
643 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
647 if (running_in_test_harness)
649 extern char ** environ;
651 for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
652 if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
654 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
655 goto supply_response;
660 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
665 /*************************************************
666 * Expand key and cert file specs *
667 *************************************************/
669 /* Called once during tls_init and possibly again during TLS setup, for a
670 new context, if Server Name Indication was used and tls_sni was seen in
671 the certificate string.
674 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
675 cbinfo various parts of session state
677 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
681 tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo)
685 if (cbinfo->certificate == NULL)
688 if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
689 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
690 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
692 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE;
694 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded))
697 if (expanded != NULL)
699 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file %s\n", expanded);
700 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(sctx, CS expanded))
701 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
702 "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file file=%s", expanded),
706 if (cbinfo->privatekey != NULL &&
707 !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded))
710 /* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result
711 of the expansion is an empty string, ignore it also, and assume the private
712 key is in the same file as the certificate. */
714 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
716 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file %s\n", expanded);
717 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(sctx, CS expanded, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
718 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
719 "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", expanded), cbinfo->host, NULL);
723 if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file != NULL)
725 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded))
728 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
730 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
731 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded &&
732 (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
735 debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file value unchanged, using existing values.\n");
737 ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded);
749 /*************************************************
750 * Callback to handle SNI *
751 *************************************************/
753 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if a Server Name
754 Indication extension was sent by the client.
756 API documentation is OpenSSL s_server.c implementation.
759 s SSL* of the current session
760 ad unknown (part of OpenSSL API) (unused)
761 arg Callback of "our" registered data
763 Returns: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,ALERT_WARNING,ALERT_FATAL,NOACK}
766 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
768 tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg)
770 const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
771 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
773 int old_pool = store_pool;
776 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
778 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", servername,
779 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)");
781 /* Make the extension value available for expansion */
782 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
783 tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername);
784 store_pool = old_pool;
786 if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
787 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
789 /* Can't find an SSL_CTX_clone() or equivalent, so we do it manually;
790 not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
791 Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
793 if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
795 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
796 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
797 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
800 /* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
801 already exists. Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */
803 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(server_ctx));
804 SSL_CTX_set_mode(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(server_ctx));
805 SSL_CTX_set_options(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(server_ctx));
806 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(server_ctx));
807 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
808 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
809 if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
810 SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
812 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
814 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_sni, tls_server_stapling_cb);
815 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
819 rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server);
820 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
822 /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
824 rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo);
825 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
827 if (!init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL))
828 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
830 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
831 SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
833 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
835 #endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */
842 /*************************************************
843 * Callback to handle OCSP Stapling *
844 *************************************************/
846 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if the client
847 requests OCSP information with a Certificate Status Request.
849 Documentation via openssl s_server.c and the Apache patch from the OpenSSL
855 tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
857 const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
858 uschar *response_der;
859 int response_der_len;
862 debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.",
863 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
865 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
866 if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
867 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
870 response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response,
872 if (response_der_len <= 0)
873 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
875 SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(server_ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
876 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
877 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
882 time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
884 BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
885 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
890 tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
892 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = arg;
893 const unsigned char * p;
899 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
900 len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
903 /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
904 if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required
905 && log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
906 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
908 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
909 return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
912 if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
914 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
915 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
916 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, parse error");
918 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
922 if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
924 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
925 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
926 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, error parsing response");
928 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error parsing response\n");
929 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
933 /* We'd check the nonce here if we'd put one in the request. */
934 /* However that would defeat cacheability on the server so we don't. */
936 /* This section of code reworked from OpenSSL apps source;
937 The OpenSSL Project retains copyright:
938 Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
943 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
945 DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
947 /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
949 /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
950 /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
952 if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL,
953 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
955 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
956 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
957 ERR_print_errors(bp);
958 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
962 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
965 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
966 OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
968 if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
970 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
971 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
972 "with multiple responses not handled");
973 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
976 single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
977 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
981 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
982 DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
983 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
984 EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
986 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
987 DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
988 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
989 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
993 DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
994 OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
997 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
998 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
1001 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
1002 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1003 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
1004 reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
1005 reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
1006 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
1007 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1010 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1011 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1012 "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
1013 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1021 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
1024 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
1027 /*************************************************
1028 * Initialize for TLS *
1029 *************************************************/
1031 /* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization
1032 of the library. We allocate and return a context structure.
1035 ctxp returned SSL context
1036 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
1037 dhparam DH parameter file
1038 certificate certificate file
1039 privatekey private key
1040 ocsp_file file of stapling info (server); flag for require ocsp (client)
1041 addr address if client; NULL if server (for some randomness)
1042 cbp place to put allocated callback context
1044 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1048 tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
1050 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1053 address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp)
1058 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
1060 cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
1061 cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
1062 cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
1063 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1064 if ((cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL))
1066 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
1067 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
1068 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
1071 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
1073 cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
1074 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
1075 cbinfo->host = host;
1077 SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
1078 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
1080 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
1081 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
1082 list of available digests. */
1083 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1086 /* Create a context.
1087 The OpenSSL docs in 1.0.1b have not been updated to clarify TLS variant
1088 negotiation in the different methods; as far as I can tell, the only
1089 *_{server,client}_method which allows negotiation is SSLv23, which exists even
1090 when OpenSSL is built without SSLv2 support.
1091 By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
1094 *ctxp = SSL_CTX_new((host == NULL)?
1095 SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method());
1097 if (*ctxp == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL);
1099 /* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
1100 order to get the full complement of ciphers to work. It took me roughly a day
1101 of work to discover this by experiment.
1103 On systems that have /dev/urandom, SSL may automatically seed itself from
1104 there. Otherwise, we have to make something up as best we can. Double check
1110 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
1113 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
1114 RAND_seed((uschar *)big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1115 if (addr != NULL) RAND_seed((uschar *)addr, sizeof(addr));
1118 return tls_error(US"RAND_status", host,
1119 US"unable to seed random number generator");
1122 /* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
1125 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
1127 /* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
1128 (void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(*ctxp, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
1130 /* Apply administrator-supplied work-arounds.
1131 Historically we applied just one requested option,
1132 SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS, but when bug 994 requested a second, we
1133 moved to an administrator-controlled list of options to specify and
1134 grandfathered in the first one as the default value for "openssl_options".
1136 No OpenSSL version number checks: the options we accept depend upon the
1137 availability of the option value macros from OpenSSL. */
1139 okay = tls_openssl_options_parse(openssl_options, &init_options);
1141 return tls_error(US"openssl_options parsing failed", host, NULL);
1145 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
1146 if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctxp, init_options)))
1147 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
1148 "SSL_CTX_set_option(%#lx)", init_options), host, NULL);
1151 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
1153 /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
1155 if (!init_dh(*ctxp, dhparam, host)) return DEFER;
1157 /* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */
1159 rc = tls_expand_session_files(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1160 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1162 /* If we need to handle SNI, do so */
1163 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1164 if (host == NULL) /* server */
1166 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1167 /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
1168 the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
1169 change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
1170 callback is invoked. */
1171 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
1173 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, tls_server_stapling_cb);
1174 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, cbinfo);
1177 /* We always do this, so that $tls_sni is available even if not used in
1179 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(*ctxp, tls_servername_cb);
1180 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1182 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1184 if(ocsp_file) /* wanting stapling */
1186 if (!(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = X509_STORE_new()))
1188 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
1191 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(*ctxp, tls_client_stapling_cb);
1192 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1197 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1198 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
1201 /* Set up the RSA callback */
1203 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctxp, rsa_callback);
1205 /* Finally, set the timeout, and we are done */
1207 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctxp, ssl_session_timeout);
1208 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialized TLS\n");
1218 /*************************************************
1219 * Get name of cipher in use *
1220 *************************************************/
1223 Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
1224 buffer to use for answer
1226 pointer to number of bits for cipher
1231 construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
1233 /* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
1234 yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
1235 the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
1236 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1239 ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
1241 c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
1242 SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
1244 string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
1245 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
1247 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
1254 /*************************************************
1255 * Set up for verifying certificates *
1256 *************************************************/
1258 /* Called by both client and server startup
1261 sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
1262 certs certs file or NULL
1263 crl CRL file or NULL
1264 host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
1265 optional TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts;
1266 otherwise passed as FALSE
1267 cert_vfy_cb Callback function for certificate verification
1269 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1273 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
1274 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) )
1276 uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
1278 if (!expand_check(certs, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts))
1281 if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0')
1283 struct stat statbuf;
1284 if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
1285 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
1287 if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
1289 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1290 "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
1296 if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1297 { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
1299 { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
1301 /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
1302 unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
1303 certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
1304 says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
1306 if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
1307 !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
1308 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
1312 SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file));
1316 /* Handle a certificate revocation list. */
1318 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
1320 /* This bit of code is now the version supplied by Lars Mainka. (I have
1321 * merely reformatted it into the Exim code style.)
1323 * "From here I changed the code to add support for multiple crl's
1324 * in pem format in one file or to support hashed directory entries in
1325 * pem format instead of a file. This method now uses the library function
1326 * X509_STORE_load_locations to add the CRL location to the SSL context.
1327 * OpenSSL will then handle the verify against CA certs and CRLs by
1328 * itself in the verify callback." */
1330 if (!expand_check(crl, US"tls_crl", &expcrl)) return DEFER;
1331 if (expcrl != NULL && *expcrl != 0)
1333 struct stat statbufcrl;
1334 if (Ustat(expcrl, &statbufcrl) < 0)
1336 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1337 "failed to stat %s for certificates revocation lists", expcrl);
1342 /* is it a file or directory? */
1344 X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
1345 if ((statbufcrl.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1349 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a directory %s\n", dir);
1355 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a file %s\n", file);
1357 if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, CS file, CS dir) == 0)
1358 return tls_error(US"X509_STORE_load_locations", host, NULL);
1360 /* setting the flags to check against the complete crl chain */
1362 X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
1363 X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
1367 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
1369 /* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */
1371 SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
1372 SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
1381 /*************************************************
1382 * Start a TLS session in a server *
1383 *************************************************/
1385 /* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received
1386 the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate
1390 require_ciphers allowed ciphers
1392 Returns: OK on success
1393 DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
1394 FAIL for errors during the negotation; the server can't
1399 tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers)
1403 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
1404 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1406 /* Check for previous activation */
1408 if (tls_in.active >= 0)
1410 tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"");
1411 smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n");
1415 /* Initialize the SSL library. If it fails, it will already have logged
1418 rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
1419 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1422 NULL, &server_static_cbinfo);
1423 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1424 cbinfo = server_static_cbinfo;
1426 if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
1429 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1430 were historically separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my
1431 tests, and also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here.
1434 if (expciphers != NULL)
1436 uschar *s = expciphers;
1437 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1438 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1439 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_ctx, CS expciphers))
1440 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL);
1441 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = expciphers;
1444 /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
1445 optional, set up appropriately. */
1447 tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1448 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1449 tls_in.dane_verified = FALSE;
1451 server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1453 if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
1455 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1456 FALSE, verify_callback_server);
1457 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1458 server_verify_optional = FALSE;
1460 else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
1462 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1463 TRUE, verify_callback_server);
1464 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1465 server_verify_optional = TRUE;
1468 /* Prepare for new connection */
1470 if ((server_ssl = SSL_new(server_ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL);
1472 /* Warning: we used to SSL_clear(ssl) here, it was removed.
1474 * With the SSL_clear(), we get strange interoperability bugs with
1475 * OpenSSL 1.0.1b and TLS1.1/1.2. It looks as though this may be a bug in
1476 * OpenSSL itself, as a clear should not lead to inability to follow protocols.
1478 * The SSL_clear() call is to let an existing SSL* be reused, typically after
1479 * session shutdown. In this case, we have a brand new object and there's no
1480 * obvious reason to immediately clear it. I'm guessing that this was
1481 * originally added because of incomplete initialisation which the clear fixed,
1482 * in some historic release.
1485 /* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
1486 on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
1487 make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out
1488 the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
1489 mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
1491 SSL_set_session_id_context(server_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1492 if (!tls_in.on_connect)
1494 smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n");
1498 /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
1499 that the OpenSSL library doesn't. */
1501 SSL_set_wfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_out));
1502 SSL_set_rfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_in));
1503 SSL_set_accept_state(server_ssl);
1505 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
1507 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1508 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
1509 rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
1514 tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1515 if (ERR_get_error() == 0)
1516 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1517 "TLS client disconnected cleanly (rejected our certificate?)");
1521 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n");
1523 /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
1524 and initialize things. */
1526 construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
1527 tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
1532 if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
1533 debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
1536 /* Record the certificate we presented */
1538 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(server_ssl);
1539 tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
1542 /* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
1543 Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
1544 smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
1545 Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
1547 ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1548 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
1549 ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
1551 receive_getc = tls_getc;
1552 receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
1553 receive_feof = tls_feof;
1554 receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
1555 receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
1557 tls_in.active = fileno(smtp_out);
1565 tls_client_basic_ctx_init(SSL_CTX * ctx,
1566 host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob
1567 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1568 , tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo
1573 /* stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
1574 set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts is not set. Check only
1575 the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
1577 if ((!ob->tls_verify_hosts && !ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) ||
1578 (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts) == OK))
1580 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
1581 ob->tls_crl, host, FALSE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
1583 client_verify_optional = FALSE;
1585 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1586 if (ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames)
1588 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames,
1589 US"tls_verify_cert_hostnames",
1590 &cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames))
1592 if (cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)
1593 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
1594 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
1598 else if (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
1600 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
1601 ob->tls_crl, host, TRUE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
1603 client_verify_optional = TRUE;
1609 /*************************************************
1610 * Start a TLS session in a client *
1611 *************************************************/
1613 /* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted.
1616 fd the fd of the connection
1617 host connected host (for messages)
1618 addr the first address
1619 ob smtp transport options
1621 Returns: OK on success
1622 FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
1623 because this is not a server
1627 tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
1630 smtp_transport_options_block * ob = v_ob;
1631 static uschar txt[256];
1632 uschar * expciphers;
1635 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1637 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1638 BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
1639 BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
1641 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1642 dns_answer tlsa_dnsa;
1647 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1648 dane_required = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_dane, NULL,
1649 host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1651 if (host->dnssec == DS_YES)
1654 || verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_try_dane, NULL,
1655 host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK
1658 /* move this out to host.c given the similarity to dns_lookup() ? */
1660 uschar * fullname = buffer;
1662 /* TLSA lookup string */
1663 (void)sprintf(CS buffer, "_%d._tcp.%.256s", host->port,
1666 switch (rc = dns_lookup(&tlsa_dnsa, buffer, T_TLSA, &fullname))
1669 return DEFER; /* just defer this TLS'd conn */
1675 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup failed");
1681 if (!dns_is_secure(&tlsa_dnsa))
1683 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup not DNSSEC");
1691 else if (dane_required)
1693 /*XXX a shame we only find this after making tcp & smtp connection */
1694 /* move the test earlier? */
1695 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: previous lookup not DNSSEC");
1701 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1703 require_ocsp = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp,
1704 NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1705 request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE
1706 : verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp,
1707 NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1711 rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
1712 ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
1713 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1714 (void *)(long)request_ocsp,
1716 addr, &client_static_cbinfo);
1717 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1719 tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1720 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1721 tls_out.dane_verified = FALSE;
1723 client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1725 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
1729 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1730 are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and
1731 also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here. */
1733 if (expciphers != NULL)
1735 uschar *s = expciphers;
1736 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1737 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1738 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(client_ctx, CS expciphers))
1739 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL);
1742 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1745 SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback_client_dane);
1747 if (!DANESSL_library_init())
1748 return tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL);
1749 if (DANESSL_CTX_init(client_ctx) <= 0)
1750 return tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL);
1756 if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob
1757 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1758 , client_static_cbinfo
1763 if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
1764 return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL);
1765 SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1766 SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
1767 SSL_set_connect_state(client_ssl);
1771 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_out.sni))
1773 if (tls_out.sni == NULL)
1775 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
1777 else if (!Ustrlen(tls_out.sni))
1781 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1782 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_out.sni);
1783 SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client_ssl, tls_out.sni);
1786 debug_printf("OpenSSL at build-time lacked SNI support, ignoring \"%s\"\n",
1792 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1793 /* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
1794 does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
1797 SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
1798 client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
1799 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
1803 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1808 uschar * hostnames[2] = { host->name, NULL };
1811 if (DANESSL_init(client_ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
1812 return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL);
1814 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1816 rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
1817 ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
1819 uschar * p = rr->data;
1820 int usage, selector, mtype;
1821 const char * mdname;
1831 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA record w/bad mtype 0x%x", mtype);
1833 case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
1834 case 1: mdname = "sha256"; break;
1835 case 2: mdname = "sha512"; break;
1838 switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(client_ssl,
1839 (uint8_t) usage, (uint8_t) selector,
1840 mdname, p, rr->size - (p - rr->data)))
1843 case 0: /* action not taken */
1844 return tls_error(US"tlsa load", host, NULL);
1851 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: No TLSA records");
1858 /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
1860 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
1861 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1862 alarm(ob->command_timeout);
1863 rc = SSL_connect(client_ssl);
1866 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1868 DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl); /*XXX earliest possible callpoint. Too early? */
1872 return tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1874 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
1876 /* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
1877 /*XXX server_cert is never freed... use X509_free() */
1878 server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (client_ssl);
1881 tls_out.peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
1882 CS txt, sizeof(txt));
1883 tls_out.peerdn = txt; /*XXX a static buffer... */
1886 tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
1888 construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
1889 tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
1891 /* Record the certificate we presented */
1893 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(client_ssl);
1894 tls_out.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
1897 tls_out.active = fd;
1905 /*************************************************
1906 * TLS version of getc *
1907 *************************************************/
1909 /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty,
1910 it refills the buffer via the SSL reading function.
1913 Returns: the next character or EOF
1915 Only used by the server-side TLS.
1921 if (ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm >= ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm)
1926 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
1927 ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1929 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
1930 inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1931 error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
1934 /* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
1935 closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
1936 non-SSL handling. */
1938 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
1940 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
1942 receive_getc = smtp_getc;
1943 receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
1944 receive_feof = smtp_feof;
1945 receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
1946 receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
1948 SSL_free(server_ssl);
1952 tls_in.cipher = NULL;
1953 tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
1959 /* Handle genuine errors */
1961 else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL)
1963 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
1964 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
1969 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
1971 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
1976 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
1977 dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer, inbytes);
1979 ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = inbytes;
1980 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
1983 /* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
1985 return ssl_xfer_buffer[ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm++];
1990 /*************************************************
1991 * Read bytes from TLS channel *
1992 *************************************************/
1999 Returns: the number of bytes read
2000 -1 after a failed read
2002 Only used by the client-side TLS.
2006 tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
2008 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
2012 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
2013 buff, (unsigned int)len);
2015 inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS buff, len);
2016 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, inbytes);
2018 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
2020 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
2023 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
2035 /*************************************************
2036 * Write bytes down TLS channel *
2037 *************************************************/
2041 is_server channel specifier
2045 Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
2046 -1 after a failed write
2048 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2052 tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len)
2057 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
2059 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2062 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2063 outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
2064 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
2065 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
2069 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2070 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
2073 case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
2078 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2079 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
2082 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
2083 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
2084 sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
2088 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
2097 /*************************************************
2098 * Close down a TLS session *
2099 *************************************************/
2101 /* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
2102 daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
2103 would tamper with the SSL session in the parent process).
2105 Arguments: TRUE if SSL_shutdown is to be called
2108 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2112 tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
2114 SSL **sslp = is_server ? &server_ssl : &client_ssl;
2115 int *fdp = is_server ? &tls_in.active : &tls_out.active;
2117 if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
2121 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down SSL\n");
2122 SSL_shutdown(*sslp);
2134 /*************************************************
2135 * Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup *
2136 *************************************************/
2138 /* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the
2141 Returns: NULL on success, or error message
2145 tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
2148 uschar *s, *expciphers, *err;
2150 /* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global
2151 state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */
2153 SSL_load_error_strings();
2154 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
2155 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
2156 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
2157 list of available digests. */
2158 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
2161 if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
2164 if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
2165 return US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers";
2167 if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
2170 /* normalisation ripped from above */
2172 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
2176 ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
2179 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2180 return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);
2184 debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers);
2186 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
2188 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2189 err = string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed", expciphers);
2200 /*************************************************
2201 * Report the library versions. *
2202 *************************************************/
2204 /* There have historically been some issues with binary compatibility in
2205 OpenSSL libraries; if Exim (like many other applications) is built against
2206 one version of OpenSSL but the run-time linker picks up another version,
2207 it can result in serious failures, including crashing with a SIGSEGV. So
2208 report the version found by the compiler and the run-time version.
2210 Note: some OS vendors backport security fixes without changing the version
2211 number/string, and the version date remains unchanged. The _build_ date
2212 will change, so we can more usefully assist with version diagnosis by also
2213 reporting the build date.
2215 Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to
2220 tls_version_report(FILE *f)
2222 fprintf(f, "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
2225 OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
2226 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
2227 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
2228 /* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
2229 the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
2235 /*************************************************
2236 * Random number generation *
2237 *************************************************/
2239 /* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be
2240 cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves
2241 in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or
2242 whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork()
2243 and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us.
2247 Returns a random number in range [0, max-1]
2251 vaguely_random_number(int max)
2255 static pid_t pidlast = 0;
2258 uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
2264 if (pidnow != pidlast)
2266 /* Although OpenSSL documents that "OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state
2267 is unique for each thread", this doesn't apparently apply across processes,
2268 so our own warning from vaguely_random_number_fallback() applies here too.
2269 Fix per PostgreSQL. */
2275 /* OpenSSL auto-seeds from /dev/random, etc, but this a double-check. */
2279 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
2282 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
2284 /* We're after pseudo-random, not random; if we still don't have enough data
2285 in the internal PRNG then our options are limited. We could sleep and hope
2286 for entropy to come along (prayer technique) but if the system is so depleted
2287 in the first place then something is likely to just keep taking it. Instead,
2288 we'll just take whatever little bit of pseudo-random we can still manage to
2291 needed_len = sizeof(r);
2292 /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were
2293 asked for a number less than 10. */
2294 for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i)
2300 /* We do not care if crypto-strong */
2301 i = RAND_pseudo_bytes(smallbuf, needed_len);
2305 debug_printf("OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() not supported by RAND method, using fallback.\n");
2306 return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
2310 for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
2316 /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
2317 smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
2324 /*************************************************
2325 * OpenSSL option parse *
2326 *************************************************/
2328 /* Parse one option for tls_openssl_options_parse below
2331 name one option name
2332 value place to store a value for it
2333 Returns success or failure in parsing
2336 struct exim_openssl_option {
2340 /* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
2341 options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
2342 all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
2345 This list is current as of:
2347 Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
2349 static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
2350 /* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
2352 { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
2354 #ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
2355 { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
2357 #ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
2358 { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
2360 #ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
2361 { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
2363 #ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
2364 { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
2366 #ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
2367 { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
2369 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
2370 { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
2372 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
2373 { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
2375 #ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
2376 { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
2378 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
2379 { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
2381 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
2382 { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
2384 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
2385 { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
2387 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2388 { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
2390 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2391 { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
2393 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
2394 { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
2396 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
2397 { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
2399 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
2400 { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
2402 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
2403 #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
2404 /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
2405 #warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
2407 { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
2410 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
2411 { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
2413 #ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
2414 { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
2416 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
2417 { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
2419 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
2420 { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
2422 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
2423 { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
2425 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
2426 { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
2428 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
2429 { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
2431 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
2432 { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
2434 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
2435 { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
2438 static int exim_openssl_options_size =
2439 sizeof(exim_openssl_options)/sizeof(struct exim_openssl_option);
2443 tls_openssl_one_option_parse(uschar *name, long *value)
2446 int last = exim_openssl_options_size;
2447 while (last > first)
2449 int middle = (first + last)/2;
2450 int c = Ustrcmp(name, exim_openssl_options[middle].name);
2453 *value = exim_openssl_options[middle].value;
2467 /*************************************************
2468 * OpenSSL option parsing logic *
2469 *************************************************/
2471 /* OpenSSL has a number of compatibility options which an administrator might
2472 reasonably wish to set. Interpret a list similarly to decode_bits(), so that
2473 we look like log_selector.
2476 option_spec the administrator-supplied string of options
2477 results ptr to long storage for the options bitmap
2478 Returns success or failure
2482 tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
2487 BOOL adding, item_parsed;
2490 /* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
2491 * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
2492 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2493 result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
2496 if (option_spec == NULL)
2502 for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
2504 while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
2507 if (*s != '+' && *s != '-')
2509 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("malformed openssl option setting: "
2510 "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"\n", s);
2513 adding = *s++ == '+';
2514 for (end = s; (*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end); ++end) /**/ ;
2517 item_parsed = tls_openssl_one_option_parse(s, &item);
2520 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
2523 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s from %lx: %lx (%s)\n",
2524 adding ? "adding" : "removing", result, item, s);
2539 /* End of tls-openssl.c */