X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/users/heiko/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/ac9a0d9193d7d7ccd27aa8ebf31eb484182c3db4..7044dd8fd62e215572ecf5a2c7f1bb9581cf6628:/test/dnszones-src/db.test.ex diff --git a/test/dnszones-src/db.test.ex b/test/dnszones-src/db.test.ex index fec2a0d78..9b6684ac7 100644 --- a/test/dnszones-src/db.test.ex +++ b/test/dnszones-src/db.test.ex @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ ; This is a testing zone file for use when testing DNS handling in Exim. This -; is a fake zone of no real use - hence no SOA record. The zone name is +; is a fake zone of no real use. The zone name is ; test.ex. This file is passed through the substitution mechanism before being ; used by the fakens auxiliary program. This inserts the actual IP addresses ; of the local host into the zone. @@ -15,8 +15,12 @@ ; NOTE (3): the top-level networks for testing addresses are parameterized by ; the use of V4NET and V6NET. These networks should be such that no real ; host ever uses them. +; +; Several prefixes may be used, see the source in src/fakens.c for a complete list +; and description. test.ex. NS exim.test.ex. +test.ex. SOA exim.test.ex. hostmaster.exim.test.ex 1430683638 1200 120 604800 3000 test.ex. TXT "A TXT record for test.ex." s/lash TXT "A TXT record for s/lash.test.ex." @@ -38,15 +42,19 @@ dontqualify A V4NET.255.255.254 UpperCase A 127.0.0.1 -; A host with UTF-8 characters in its name +; A host with punycoded UTF-8 characters used for its lookup ( mx.π.test.ex ) -mx.π A V4NET.255.255.255 +mx.xn--1xa A V4NET.255.255.255 ; A non-standard name for localhost thishost A 127.0.0.1 localhost4 A 127.0.0.1 +; A localhost with short TTL + +TTL=2 shorthost A 127.0.0.1 + ; Something that gives both the IP and the loopback @@ -154,13 +162,19 @@ testsub.sub A V4NET.99.0.3 recurse.test.ex A V4NET.99.0.2 +; a CNAME pointing to a name with both ipv4 and ipv6 A-records +; and one with only ipv4 + +cname46 CNAME localhost +cname4 CNAME thishost + ; -------- Testing RBL records ------- ; V4NET.11.12.13 is deliberately not reverse-registered -13.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2 +TTL=3 13.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2 TXT "This is a test blacklisting message" -14.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2 +TTL=2 14.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2 TXT "This is a test blacklisting message" 15.12.11.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.2 TXT "This is a very long blacklisting message, continuing for ages and ages and certainly being longer than 128 characters which was a previous limit on the length that Exim was prepared to handle." @@ -187,6 +201,17 @@ recurse.test.ex A V4NET.99.0.2 2.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 127.0.0.1 A 127.0.0.2 +; Foolish return values outside 127.0/8 + +100.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 0.0.0.0 +101.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 126.255.255.255 +102.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 128.0.0.0 +103.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 255.255.255.255 +104.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 255.255.255.255 + A 127.0.0.0 +105.13.13.V4NET.rbl A 255.255.255.255 + A 255.255.255.254 + ; -------- Testing MX records -------- mxcased MX 5 ten-99.TEST.EX. @@ -358,9 +383,13 @@ mxt97 MX 1 ten-1.test.ex. mxt1c MX 1 dontqualify. -; MX with UTF-8 characters in its name +; MX with punycoded UTF-8 characters used for its lookup ( π.test.ex ) + +xn--1xa MX 0 mx.π.test.ex. -π MX 0 mx.π.test.ex. +; MX with actual UTF-8 characters in its name, for allow_utf8_domains mode test + +π MX 0 mx.xn--1xa.test.ex. ; -------- Testing SRV records -------- @@ -385,20 +414,169 @@ _client._smtp.csa2 SRV 1 1 0 csa2.test.ex. csa1 A V4NET.9.8.7 csa2 A V4NET.9.8.8 +; ------- Testing DNSSEC ---------- + +mx-unsec-a-unsec MX 5 a-unsec +mx-unsec-a-sec MX 5 a-sec +DNSSEC mx-sec-a-unsec MX 5 a-unsec +DNSSEC mx-sec-a-sec MX 5 a-sec +DNSSEC mx-sec-a-aa MX 5 a-aa +AA mx-aa-a-sec MX 5 a-sec + +a-unsec A V4NET.0.0.100 +DNSSEC a-sec A V4NET.0.0.100 +DNSSEC l-sec A 127.0.0.1 + +AA a-aa A V4NET.0.0.100 + ; ------- Testing DANE ------------ +; Since these refer to certs in the exim-ca tree, they must be regenerated any time that tree is. +; ; full suite dns chain, sha512 -DNSSEC mxdane512ee MX 1 dane512ee. -DNSSEC dane512ee A HOSTIPV4 -DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane512ee TLSA 3 1 2 3d5eb81b1dfc3f93c1fa8819e3fb3fdb41bb590441d5f3811db17772f4bc6de29bdd7c4f4b723750dda871b99379192b3f979f03db1252c4f08b03ef7176528d +; +; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \ +; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \ +; | openssl dgst -sha512 \ +; | awk '{print $2}' +; +DNSSEC mxdane512ee MX 1 dane512ee +DNSSEC dane512ee A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane512ee TLSA 3 1 2 c0c2fc12e9fe1abf0ae7b1f2ad2798a4689668db8cf7f7b771a43bf8a4f1d9741ef103bad470b1201157150fbd6182054b0170e90ce66b944a82a0a9c81281af ; A-only, sha256 -DNSSEC dane256ee A HOSTIPV4 -DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ee TLSA 3 1 1 2bb55f418bb03411a5007cecbfcd3ec1c94404312c0d53a44bb2166b32654db3 +; +; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/server1.example.com/server1.example.com.pem -noout -pubkey \ +; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \ +; | openssl dgst -sha256 \ +; | awk '{print $2}' +; +DNSSEC dane256ee A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ee TLSA 3 1 1 7230d90731ea2c94f7f5e892489cc43f842ad261974e89e4306b081401032b7a ; full MX, sha256, TA-mode -DNSSEC mxdane256ta MX 1 dane256ta. -DNSSEC dane256ta A HOSTIPV4 -DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ta TLSA 2 0 1 b2c6f27f2d16390b4f71cacc69742bf610d750534fab240516c0f2deb4042ad4 +; +; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/CA/CA.pem -fingerprint -sha256 -noout \ +; | awk -F= '{print $2}' | tr -d : | tr '[A-F]' '[a-f]' +; +DNSSEC mxdane256ta MX 1 dane256ta +DNSSEC dane256ta A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256ta TLSA 2 0 1 52a90c3571549f83cff5b6166ae3210fe6e43dd3f95694cc85c989221bdfc4c7 + + +; full MX, sha256, TA-mode, cert-key-only +; Indicates a trust-anchor for a chain involving an Authority Key ID extension +; linkage, as this excites a bug in OpenSSL 1.0.2 which the DANE code has to +; work around, while synthesizing a selfsigned parent for it. +; As it happens it is also an intermediate cert in the CA-rooted chain, as this +; was initially thought to be a factor. +; +; openssl x509 -in aux-fixed/exim-ca/example.com/CA/Signer.pem -noout -pubkey \ +; | openssl pkey -pubin -outform DER \ +; | openssl dgst -sha256 \ +; | awk '{print $2}' +; +DNSSEC mxdane256tak MX 1 dane256tak +DNSSEC dane256tak A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.dane256tak TLSA 2 1 1 535b534691f5755ae7deef6593ef73f7a34db16833d6653300c942a29877e18f + + + +; A multiple-return MX where all TLSA lookups defer +DNSSEC mxdanelazy MX 1 danelazy +DNSSEC MX 2 danelazy2 + +DNSSEC danelazy A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC danelazy2 A 127.0.0.1 + +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danelazy CNAME test.again.dns. +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danelazy2 CNAME test.again.dns. + +; hosts with no TLSA (just missing here, hence the TLSA NXDMAIN is _insecure_; a broken dane config) +; 1 for dane-required, 2 for merely requested +DNSSEC dane.no.1 A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC dane.no.2 A 127.0.0.1 + +; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA lookup fails (as opposed to there not being one) +DNSSEC danebroken1 A 127.0.0.1 +_1225._tcp.danebroken1 CNAME test.fail.dns. + +; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA record is wrong +; (127.0.0.1 for merely dane-requested, but having gotten the TLSA it is supposedly definitive) +DNSSEC danebroken2 A 127.0.0.1 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken2 TLSA 2 0 1 cb0fa60000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 + +; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the TLSA record is correct but not DNSSEC-assured +; (record copied from dane256ee above) +; 3 for dane-requested, 4 for dane-required +DNSSEC danebroken3 A 127.0.0.1 +_1225._tcp.danebroken3 TLSA 2 0 1 7230d90731ea2c94f7f5e892489cc43f842ad261974e89e4306b081401032b7a +DNSSEC danebroken4 A HOSTIPV4 +_1225._tcp.danebroken4 TLSA 2 0 1 7230d90731ea2c94f7f5e892489cc43f842ad261974e89e4306b081401032b7a + +; a broken dane config (or under attack) where the address record is correct but not DNSSEC-assured +; (TLSA record copied from dane256ee above) +; 5 for dane-requested, 6 for dane-required +danebroken5 A 127.0.0.1 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken5 TLSA 2 0 1 7230d90731ea2c94f7f5e892489cc43f842ad261974e89e4306b081401032b7a +danebroken6 A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danebroken6 TLSA 2 0 1 7230d90731ea2c94f7f5e892489cc43f842ad261974e89e4306b081401032b7a + +; a good dns config saying there is no dane support, by securely returning NOXDOMAIN for TLSA lookups +; 3 for dane-required, 4 for merely requested +; the TLSA data here is dummy; ignored +DNSSEC dane.no.3 A HOSTIPV4 +DNSSEC dane.no.4 A 127.0.0.1 + +DNSSEC NXDOMAIN _1225._tcp.dane.no.3 TLSA 2 0 1 eec923139018c540a344c5191660ecba1ac3708525a98bfc338e17f31d3fa741 +DNSSEC NXDOMAIN _1225._tcp.dane.no.4 TLSA 2 0 1 eec923139018c540a344c5191660ecba1ac3708525a98bfc338e17f31d3fa741 + +; a mixed-usage set of TLSA records, EE one failing. TA one coped from dane256ta. +DNSSEC danemixed A 127.0.0.1 +DNSSEC _1225._tcp.danemixed TLSA 2 0 1 52a90c3571549f83cff5b6166ae3210fe6e43dd3f95694cc85c989221bdfc4c7 +DNSSEC TLSA 3 1 1 8276000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 + +; ------- Testing delays ------------ + +DELAY=500 delay500 A HOSTIPV4 +DELAY=1500 delay1500 A HOSTIPV4 + +; ------- DKIM --------- + +; public key, base64 - matches private key in aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private +; openssl genrsa -out aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private 1024 +; openssl rsa -in aux-fixed/dkim/dkim.private -out /dev/stdout -pubout -outform PEM +; +; Deliberate bad version, having extra backslashes +; sha256-hash-only version.... appears to be too long, gets truncated +; +; Another, 512-bit (with a Notes field) +; 512 requiring sha1 hash +; 512 requiring sha256 hash +; +sel._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB" +sel_bad._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1\; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB" +sel_sha256._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha256; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB" + +ses._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; n=halfkilo; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ==" +ses_sha1._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha1; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ==" +ses_sha256._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; h=sha256; p=MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL6eAQxd9didJ0/+05iDwJOqT6ly826Vi8aGPecsBiYK5/tAT97fxXk+dPWMZp9kQxtknEzYjYjAydzf+HQ2yJMCAwEAAQ==" + +sel2._domainkey TXT "v=spf1 mx a include:spf.nl2go.com -all" +sel2._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDXRFf+VhT+lCgFhhSkinZKcFNeRzjYdW8vT29Rbb3NadvTFwAd+cVLPFwZL8H5tUD/7JbUPqNTCPxmpgIL+V5T4tEZMorHatvvUM2qfcpQ45IfsZ+YdhbIiAslHCpy4xNxIR3zylgqRUF4+Dtsaqy3a5LhwMiKCLrnzhXk1F1hxwIDAQAB" + +; EC signing, using Ed25519 +; - needs GnuTLS 3.6.0 (fedora rawhide has that) +; certtool --generate-privkey --key-type=ed25519 --outfile=dkim_ed25519.private +; certtool --load_privkey=dkim_ed25519.private --pubkey_info --outder | tail -c +13 | base64 + +sed._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=sPs07Vu29FpHT/80UXUcYHFOHifD4o2ZlP2+XUh9g6E=" + +; version of the above wrapped in SubjectPublicKeyInfo, in case the WG plumps in that direction +; certtool --load_privkey=aux-fixed/dkim/dkim_ed25519.private --pubkey_info +; (and grab the b64 content from between the pem headers) + +sedw._domainkey TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAsPs07Vu29FpHT/80UXUcYHFOHifD4o2ZlP2+XUh9g6E=" + ; End