1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.38 2005/06/10 18:59:34 fanf2 Exp $ */
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2005 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
15 /* Default callout timeout */
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
26 static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
30 /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
32 static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK };
34 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
37 enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
38 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
41 ACLC_CONDITION, ACLC_CONTROL,
42 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
46 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
49 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
50 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
52 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
53 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
57 ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, ACLC_ENCRYPTED, ACLC_ENDPASS,
58 ACLC_HOSTS, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE, ACLC_LOGWRITE,
59 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
63 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
68 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
71 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET,
72 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
75 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
80 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
81 "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
82 but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
84 static uschar *conditions[] = { US"acl", US"authenticated",
85 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
90 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
94 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
97 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
100 US"dk_sender_domains",
101 US"dk_sender_local_parts",
105 US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted",
106 US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite",
107 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
111 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
116 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
119 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
120 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
123 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
128 /* ACL control names */
130 static uschar *controls[] = { US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
131 US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze",
132 US"queue_only", US"submission", US"no_multiline"};
134 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
135 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
136 checking functions. */
138 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
140 FALSE, /* authenticated */
141 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
142 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
144 TRUE, /* condition */
146 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
150 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
153 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
154 TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
155 TRUE, /* dk_policy */
156 TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
157 TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
158 TRUE, /* dk_senders */
159 TRUE, /* dk_status */
163 FALSE, /* encrypted */
166 FALSE, /* local_parts */
167 TRUE, /* log_message */
169 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
173 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
174 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
176 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
177 FALSE, /* recipients */
178 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
181 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
184 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
187 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
193 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
195 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
197 FALSE, /* authenticated */
198 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
199 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
201 FALSE, /* condition */
203 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
207 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
210 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
211 FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
212 FALSE, /* dk_policy */
213 FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
214 FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
215 FALSE, /* dk_senders */
216 FALSE, /* dk_status */
218 FALSE, /* dnslists */
220 FALSE, /* encrypted */
223 FALSE, /* local_parts */
224 TRUE, /* log_message */
226 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
230 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
231 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
233 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
234 FALSE, /* recipients */
235 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
238 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
241 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
244 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
250 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
251 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
252 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
254 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
257 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* authenticated */
260 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
261 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
262 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
263 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
264 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
265 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
266 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
267 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA),
272 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
273 always and check in the control processing itself. */
277 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
279 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
284 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
286 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
289 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
290 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
291 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
292 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
293 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
294 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
295 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
298 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
299 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
300 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
301 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
302 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
303 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
306 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
307 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
308 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
309 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
310 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
311 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
314 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
315 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
316 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
317 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
318 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
319 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
322 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
323 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
324 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
325 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
326 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
330 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
332 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
333 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
334 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
335 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */
342 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
344 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */
349 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */
352 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
358 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
360 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
365 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
367 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
373 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
375 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
377 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
378 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
381 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
383 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
384 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
387 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
389 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
390 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
391 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
395 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
397 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
400 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
401 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
404 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
405 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
408 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
409 always and check in the verify function itself */
415 /* Return values from decode_control() */
418 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
421 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
424 CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
425 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
426 CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
427 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
428 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
430 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
432 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
433 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
434 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
436 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
437 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
440 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
441 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dk_verify */
447 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
450 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
452 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* enforce_sync */
454 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_enforce_sync */
457 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
458 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
459 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
462 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
463 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
464 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
467 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
468 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
470 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
472 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
473 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
474 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
478 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
479 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
480 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
483 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
485 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) /* no_multiline */
490 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
492 typedef struct control_def {
494 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
495 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
498 static control_def controls_list[] = {
499 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
500 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE},
502 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
503 { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE},
505 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
506 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
507 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
508 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, FALSE},
509 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
510 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE},
511 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE},
512 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
513 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE},
515 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE},
516 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE},
517 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE}
520 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
521 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
522 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
523 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
525 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
527 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
528 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
530 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
531 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
532 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
533 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
534 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
535 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
536 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
538 static int csa_return_code[] = {
540 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
543 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
544 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
545 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
548 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
551 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
552 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
553 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
554 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
555 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
556 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
559 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
561 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
565 /*************************************************
566 * Pick out name from list *
567 *************************************************/
569 /* Use a binary chop method
576 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
580 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
586 int mid = (start + end)/2;
587 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
588 if (c == 0) return mid;
589 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
596 /*************************************************
597 * Read and parse one ACL *
598 *************************************************/
600 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
601 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
602 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
603 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
604 blank lines (where relevant).
607 func function to get next line of ACL
608 error where to put an error message
610 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
611 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
615 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
617 acl_block *yield = NULL;
618 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
619 acl_block *this = NULL;
620 acl_condition_block *cond;
621 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
626 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
629 BOOL negated = FALSE;
630 uschar *saveline = s;
633 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
636 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
643 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
644 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
646 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
647 if (*s == ':' || isupper(name[0] && *s == '=')) return yield;
649 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
650 continues the previous verb. */
652 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
657 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline);
668 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
671 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
673 lastp = &(this->next);
676 this->condition = NULL;
677 condp = &(this->condition);
678 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
684 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
687 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
689 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
692 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
697 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
699 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
701 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
702 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
706 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
708 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
709 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
710 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
712 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
713 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
717 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
720 cond->u.negated = negated;
723 condp = &(cond->next);
725 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
726 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
727 gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
731 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s[4] != 'c' && s[4] != 'm') ||
732 !isdigit(s[5]) || (!isspace(s[6]) && s[6] != '='))
734 *error = string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL "
735 "modifier \"set %s\"", s);
739 cond->u.varnumber = s[5] - '0';
740 if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX;
742 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
745 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
746 "endpass" has no data */
748 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
752 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
753 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
756 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
757 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
766 /*************************************************
768 *************************************************/
770 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
771 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
772 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
775 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
776 user_message message for adding to headers
777 log_message message for logging, if different
783 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
787 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
792 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
793 string_printing(log_message));
795 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
796 failed", add the failure message. */
798 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
799 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
800 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
801 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
803 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
804 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
806 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
807 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
811 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
812 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
813 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
814 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
815 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
816 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
817 acl_warn_logged = logged;
821 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
823 if (user_message == NULL) return;
825 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
828 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
830 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
831 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
832 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
836 /* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */
838 hlen = Ustrlen(user_message);
841 uschar *text, *p, *q;
843 /* Add a final newline if not present */
845 text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message :
846 string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message);
848 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
850 for (p = q = text; *p != 0; )
853 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
854 header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers;
856 /* Find next header line within the string */
860 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
861 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
864 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
865 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
869 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
871 newtype = htype_add_rec;
874 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
876 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
879 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
881 newtype = htype_add_top;
884 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
886 newtype = htype_add_bot;
889 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
892 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
893 to the front of it. */
895 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
897 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
900 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
903 /* See if this line has already been added */
905 while (*hptr != NULL)
907 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
908 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
911 /* Add if not previously present */
915 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
924 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
933 /*************************************************
934 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
935 *************************************************/
937 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
938 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
939 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
940 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
943 user_msgptr pointer for user message
944 log_msgptr pointer for log message
946 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
947 FAIL verification failed
948 DEFER there was a problem verifying
952 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
956 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
958 /* Previous success */
960 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
962 /* Previous failure */
964 if (host_lookup_failed)
966 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
970 /* Need to do a lookup */
973 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
975 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
977 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
978 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
980 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
982 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
985 host_build_sender_fullhost();
991 /*************************************************
992 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
993 *************************************************/
995 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
996 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
997 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
998 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
999 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1000 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1001 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1002 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1005 dnsa the DNS answer block
1006 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1007 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1008 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1010 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1011 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1012 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1016 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1022 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1024 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1026 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1028 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1032 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1039 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1041 target_found = TRUE;
1043 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1044 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1046 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1048 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1050 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1052 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1056 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1057 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1060 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1061 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1066 /*************************************************
1067 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1068 *************************************************/
1070 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1071 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1072 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1073 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1074 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1075 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1076 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1079 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1081 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1082 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1083 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1084 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1088 acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1092 int priority, weight, port;
1099 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1100 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1101 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1103 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1104 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1105 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1106 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1108 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1109 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1110 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1112 if (domain[0] == '[')
1114 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1115 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1116 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1119 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1120 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1121 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1122 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1123 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1125 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL))
1127 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1128 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1132 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1133 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1134 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1135 we return from this function. */
1137 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1138 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1140 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1141 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1142 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1144 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1147 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1149 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1152 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1154 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1158 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1160 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1166 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1168 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1170 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1172 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1174 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1177 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1178 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1182 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1184 /* Check the CSA version number */
1186 if (priority != 1) continue;
1188 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1189 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1190 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1191 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1192 SRV records of their own. */
1194 if (found != domain)
1197 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1199 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1202 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1203 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1204 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1205 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1206 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1208 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1210 if (weight > 2) continue;
1212 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1213 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1214 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1216 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1217 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1219 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1224 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1226 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1228 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1229 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1230 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1231 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1232 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1234 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1236 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1237 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1238 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1239 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1241 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1242 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1244 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1247 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1250 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1254 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1258 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1260 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1263 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1265 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1268 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1269 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1270 /* else fall through */
1272 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1273 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1274 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1279 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1280 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1283 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1289 /*************************************************
1290 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1291 *************************************************/
1293 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1294 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1295 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1296 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1299 where where called from
1300 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1301 arg the argument of "verify"
1302 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1303 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1304 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1306 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1307 FAIL verification failed
1308 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1313 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1314 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1318 int callout_overall = -1;
1319 int callout_connect = -1;
1320 int verify_options = 0;
1322 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1323 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1324 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1325 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1326 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1327 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1328 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1329 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1331 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1332 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1333 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1336 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1338 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1340 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1342 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1344 if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1346 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1347 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1348 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1351 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1352 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1353 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1355 if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1357 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1358 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1359 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1363 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */
1365 if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1367 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1368 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1371 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1372 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1374 if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1376 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1377 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1378 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1379 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1380 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1381 return csa_return_code[rc];
1384 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1385 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1386 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1389 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
1391 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1392 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1394 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1395 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1398 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1399 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1400 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1405 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1406 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1407 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1410 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1411 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1412 sender and recipient. */
1414 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1416 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1418 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1419 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1422 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1425 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1426 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1427 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1429 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1432 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1434 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1435 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1436 acl_wherenames[where]);
1440 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1443 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1444 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1445 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1446 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1451 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1454 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1455 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1460 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1461 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1463 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1466 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1467 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1469 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1471 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1473 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1474 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1477 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1480 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1483 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1485 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1487 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1491 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1497 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1499 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1500 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1501 kind of table-driven thing. */
1503 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1506 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1507 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1508 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1509 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1510 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1511 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1512 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1513 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1514 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1515 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
1516 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1519 verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
1522 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1524 if (!verify_header_sender)
1526 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1527 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1528 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1532 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1535 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1536 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1539 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1540 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1543 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1546 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1549 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1550 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1553 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1554 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1557 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1560 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1563 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1564 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1567 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1568 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1569 if (callout_overall < 0)
1571 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1572 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1576 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1579 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1582 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1583 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1586 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1587 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1588 if (callout_connect < 0)
1590 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1591 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1595 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1597 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1600 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1601 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1609 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1610 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1616 /* Option not recognized */
1620 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1621 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1626 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1627 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1629 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1630 "for a recipient callout";
1634 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1635 message if giving out verification details. */
1637 if (verify_header_sender)
1640 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1641 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1645 *basic_errno = verrno;
1646 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1648 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1649 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1650 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1655 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1656 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1657 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1658 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1659 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1660 during message reception.
1662 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1663 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1664 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1665 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1666 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1667 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1668 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1670 else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1672 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1675 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1676 "sender verify callout";
1680 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1681 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1682 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1684 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1685 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1686 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1687 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1689 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1691 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1692 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1694 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1697 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1698 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1699 specified (see comments above).
1701 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1702 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1703 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1704 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1705 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1710 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1712 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1713 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1714 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1716 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1717 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1718 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1720 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1721 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1723 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1725 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1728 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1729 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1731 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1735 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1737 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1738 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1742 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1743 verify_sender_address);
1746 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1748 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1750 /* Cache the result code */
1752 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1753 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1754 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1755 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1756 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
1758 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1759 the sender verification. */
1761 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
1764 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1766 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
1769 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1770 the DEFER overrides. */
1776 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1780 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
1781 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
1782 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1784 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
1785 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
1786 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
1787 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1789 /* Make $address_data visible */
1790 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1793 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1795 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1796 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1798 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1799 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1803 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1804 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1806 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1810 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1812 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1814 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1818 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1819 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
1823 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
1826 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1827 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1831 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
1832 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
1836 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1839 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
1840 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1841 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
1842 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1845 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1848 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1849 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1856 /*************************************************
1857 * Check argument for control= modifier *
1858 *************************************************/
1860 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
1863 arg the argument string for control=
1864 pptr set to point to the terminating character
1865 where which ACL we are in
1866 log_msgptr for error messages
1868 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
1872 decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
1877 for (d = controls_list;
1878 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
1881 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
1882 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
1885 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
1886 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
1888 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
1889 return CONTROL_ERROR;
1898 /*************************************************
1899 * Handle rate limiting *
1900 *************************************************/
1902 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
1903 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
1905 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
1906 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
1907 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
1908 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
1911 arg the option string for ratelimit=
1912 log_msgptr for error messages
1914 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
1915 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
1916 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
1917 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
1921 acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
1923 double limit, period;
1926 BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
1927 BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
1929 tree_node **anchor, *t;
1930 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
1931 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
1934 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
1935 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
1936 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
1938 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
1939 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
1940 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
1942 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
1943 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
1947 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
1948 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
1949 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1950 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1952 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
1954 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1955 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
1960 /* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
1961 lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
1962 if the period or options are different. */
1966 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
1967 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
1968 run-time division errors. */
1970 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
1971 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
1972 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
1975 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1976 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
1977 sender_rate_period);
1981 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
1982 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
1984 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1987 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
1988 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
1989 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
1990 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
1991 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
1992 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
1993 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
1994 else have_key = TRUE;
1996 if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
1998 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
2002 /* Default option values */
2003 if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
2004 if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
2006 /* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
2007 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2009 if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
2010 key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
2012 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2013 limit, period, key);
2015 /* If we are dealing with rate limits per connection, per message, or per byte,
2016 see if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2017 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2018 so that they survive across resets. */
2021 old_pool = store_pool;
2025 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2026 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2028 if (per_mail || per_byte)
2029 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2031 if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2034 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2035 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2037 store_pool = old_pool;
2038 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2040 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2044 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2045 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2046 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2048 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2051 store_pool = old_pool;
2053 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2054 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2057 dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2059 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2063 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2064 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2065 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2066 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2071 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2072 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2073 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2074 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2076 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2077 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2078 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2079 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2080 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2082 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2083 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2084 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2086 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2087 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2088 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2089 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2091 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2093 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2094 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2095 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2096 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2097 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2098 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2100 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2102 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2103 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2104 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2105 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2107 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2108 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2109 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2110 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2111 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2113 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2114 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2115 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2116 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2117 double interval = this_time - prev_time;
2119 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2120 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2122 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2123 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2124 rate will become bogusly huge. Clamp i/p to a very small number instead. */
2126 if (i_over_p <= 0.0) i_over_p = 1e-9;
2128 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2129 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2131 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2132 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2133 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2134 decay as if nothing happened. */
2137 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2138 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2140 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2143 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2144 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2145 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2146 be completely blocked). */
2148 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2151 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2152 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2153 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2154 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2156 if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
2157 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2160 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2164 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2166 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2167 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2170 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2171 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2173 store_pool = old_pool;
2174 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2177 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2184 /*************************************************
2185 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2186 *************************************************/
2188 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2192 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2193 where where called from
2194 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2195 level the nesting level
2196 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2197 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2198 user_msgptr user message pointer
2199 log_msgptr log message pointer
2200 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2202 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2203 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2204 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2205 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2206 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2207 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2208 but can be temporary callout problem)
2209 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2214 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2215 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2216 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2218 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2219 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2222 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2226 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2231 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2232 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2234 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2236 user_message = cb->arg;
2240 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2242 log_message = cb->arg;
2246 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2247 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2249 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2255 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2256 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2257 checking functions in some cases. */
2259 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2261 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2264 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2265 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2266 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2267 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2272 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2277 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2278 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2279 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2281 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2283 int n = cb->u.varnumber;
2284 int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm';
2285 if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX;
2286 debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
2290 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2293 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2297 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2299 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2301 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2302 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2303 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2307 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2308 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2312 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2316 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2317 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2319 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2320 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2326 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2327 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2328 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2332 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2333 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2335 int old_pool = store_pool;
2336 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2337 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2338 store_pool = old_pool;
2343 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2344 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2345 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2347 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2348 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2349 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2350 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2352 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2356 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2358 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2360 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2362 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2363 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2367 switch(control_type)
2369 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2370 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2374 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2375 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
2382 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2383 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2386 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2387 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2390 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2391 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2394 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2395 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2398 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2399 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2400 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2404 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2405 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2408 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
2409 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
2410 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
2414 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2415 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
2420 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2421 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2425 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2426 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2427 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2430 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2431 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2434 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
2435 originator_name = US"";
2436 submission_mode = TRUE;
2439 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2442 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
2443 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2445 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2448 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2449 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2452 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2455 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2456 originator_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2457 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
2464 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2471 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2473 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2479 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2482 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2483 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2488 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2493 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2496 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2497 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2498 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2499 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2500 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2501 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2502 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2503 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2504 it is not always available.
2506 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2507 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2508 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2509 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2513 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
2519 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2525 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2526 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
2527 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2528 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2529 switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
2530 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
2531 rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
2532 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2534 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
2535 rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
2536 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2538 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
2539 rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
2540 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2544 case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
2545 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2546 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2548 if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
2549 rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
2550 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2551 if (dk_verify_block->testing)
2552 rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
2553 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2555 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2556 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2557 if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
2558 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2559 NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2562 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
2563 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2564 if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
2565 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
2566 NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
2569 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
2570 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2571 if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
2572 rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
2575 case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
2576 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2577 if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
2578 switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
2579 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
2580 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
2581 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2583 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
2584 rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
2585 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2587 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
2588 rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
2589 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2591 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
2592 rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
2593 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2595 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
2596 rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
2597 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2599 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
2600 rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
2601 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2603 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
2604 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
2605 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2613 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2617 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2618 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2621 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2622 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2623 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2624 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2625 writing is poorly documented. */
2627 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2628 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2630 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2631 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2632 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2634 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2635 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2637 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2638 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2642 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2643 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2644 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2645 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2646 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2647 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2650 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2651 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2652 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2655 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2656 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2657 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2658 &deliver_localpart_data);
2670 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2671 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2672 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2673 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2674 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2675 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2678 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2679 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2680 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2686 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2687 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2688 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2692 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2695 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2696 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2697 /* Run the malware backend. */
2699 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2700 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2702 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2704 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2711 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2712 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2716 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2717 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, log_msgptr);
2720 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2721 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2725 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2731 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2734 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2735 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2736 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2737 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2742 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
2743 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
2746 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2750 int old_pool = store_pool;
2751 if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2752 acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
2753 store_pool = old_pool;
2757 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2760 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2761 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2762 /* Run the spam backend. */
2764 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2765 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2767 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2769 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2777 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2779 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
2783 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2784 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
2785 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2786 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2787 (until something changes it). */
2790 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
2791 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
2792 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
2796 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2797 "condition %d", cb->type);
2801 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2803 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
2805 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
2806 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
2809 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
2813 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
2814 handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
2815 which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
2816 message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
2817 appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
2818 and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
2820 These modifiers act in different ways:
2822 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
2823 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
2825 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
2826 message that is already set.
2828 If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
2830 if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] ||
2831 (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) ||
2832 (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT))
2836 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
2837 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
2838 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
2839 during expansions. */
2841 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2842 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
2844 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
2846 if (user_message != NULL)
2848 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
2849 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
2850 if (expmessage == NULL)
2852 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2853 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2854 user_message, expand_string_message);
2856 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
2859 if (log_message != NULL)
2861 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
2862 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
2863 if (expmessage == NULL)
2865 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2866 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2867 log_message, expand_string_message);
2869 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
2871 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
2872 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
2876 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
2878 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2881 acl_verify_message = NULL;
2889 /*************************************************
2890 * Get line from a literal ACL *
2891 *************************************************/
2893 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
2894 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
2895 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
2897 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
2898 Exim configuration file. That is:
2900 . Leading spaces are ignored.
2902 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
2903 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
2904 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
2906 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
2907 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
2909 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
2912 Returns: a pointer to the next line
2916 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
2917 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
2925 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
2929 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
2930 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
2931 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
2933 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
2935 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
2936 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
2938 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
2940 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
2941 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
2943 if (*yield != '#') break;
2946 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
2947 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
2948 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
2949 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
2954 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
2956 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
2965 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
2966 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
2971 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
2972 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
2973 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
2976 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
2977 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
2978 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
2980 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
2981 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
2983 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
2984 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
2987 /* Control does not reach here */
2994 /*************************************************
2995 * Check access using an ACL *
2996 *************************************************/
2998 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
2999 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3000 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3001 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3002 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3003 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3004 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3005 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3006 appears immediately above.
3009 where where called from
3010 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3011 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3012 level the nesting level
3013 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3014 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3016 Returns: OK access is granted
3017 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3018 FAIL access is denied
3019 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3020 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3025 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3026 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3029 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3030 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3033 /* Catch configuration loops */
3037 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3043 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3047 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3048 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3052 ss = expand_string(s);
3055 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3056 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3057 expand_string_message);
3063 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3065 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3066 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3070 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3071 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3072 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3073 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3074 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3076 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3078 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3081 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3084 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3087 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3088 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3091 else if (*ss == '/')
3093 struct stat statbuf;
3094 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3097 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3102 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3104 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3109 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3110 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3112 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3114 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3115 ss, strerror(errno));
3118 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3121 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3122 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3126 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3127 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3128 persists between multiple messages. */
3132 int old_pool = store_pool;
3133 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3134 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3135 store_pool = old_pool;
3136 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3139 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3140 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3142 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3146 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3151 int basic_errno = 0;
3152 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3154 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3155 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3157 if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
3158 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3159 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3161 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3166 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3168 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3171 search_error_message = NULL;
3172 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3173 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3175 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3176 ERROR always causes a return. */
3181 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3182 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3184 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3185 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3186 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3190 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3192 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3195 default: /* Paranoia */
3197 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3201 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3206 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3209 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3210 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3213 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3218 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3223 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3224 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3225 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3230 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
3233 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3241 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3247 if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
3251 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
3254 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3260 if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
3264 if (cond != OK) return cond;
3269 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
3270 else if (cond == DEFER)
3271 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3272 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
3273 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
3274 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
3275 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3279 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3284 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3289 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3291 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
3296 /*************************************************
3297 * Check access using an ACL *
3298 *************************************************/
3300 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3301 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3302 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3305 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3306 data_string RCPT address, or SMTP command argument, or NULL
3307 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3308 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3309 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3311 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3312 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3313 FAIL access is denied
3314 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3315 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3320 acl_check(int where, uschar *data_string, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
3321 uschar **log_msgptr)
3327 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
3328 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
3330 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
3332 adb = address_defaults;
3334 addr->address = data_string;
3335 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
3337 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3340 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
3341 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
3346 smtp_command_argument = data_string;
3349 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3351 smtp_command_argument = deliver_domain =
3352 deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL;
3354 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3355 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3359 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
3361 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3362 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3368 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3370 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
3372 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3373 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3377 /* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
3378 message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3380 if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75)
3382 uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr);
3388 while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++;
3389 if (*ss == 0) break;
3396 while (--t > s + 35)
3400 if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; }
3401 if (tt == NULL) tt = t;
3405 if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
3410 if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n')
3416 if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */