From a9ea625141da4f2829506717fbb6abbcbf2fea0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Harris Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 17:11:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Docs: add warning on OCSP must-staple certs vs. client-cert use. --- doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt index 7d4dfbbe7..d21a71857 100644 --- a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt +++ b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt @@ -28202,6 +28202,15 @@ checks are made: that the host name (the one in the DNS A record) is valid for the certificate. The option defaults to always checking. +.new +Do not use a client certificate that contains an "OCSP Must-Staple" extension. +TLS 1.2 and below does not support client-side OCSP stapling, and +(as of writing) the TLS libraries do not provide for it even with +TLS 1.3. +Be careful when using the same certificate for server- and +client-certificate for this reason. +.wen + The &(smtp)& transport has two OCSP-related options: &%hosts_require_ocsp%&; a host-list for which a Certificate Status is requested and required for the connection to proceed. The default -- 2.30.2