X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/fc624b8cb4c3312d7450dfa86adfa3fe8dd9cbeb..f5730918ef684baafbd9e606a1d4eb06914563cc:/src/src/tls-openssl.c

diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index 576f62ba6..eabe34f31 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
 *     Exim - an Internet mail transport agent    *
 *************************************************/
 
+/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2022 */
 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2019 */
-/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2021 */
 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
 
 /* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
 
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ functions from the OpenSSL library. */
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
 # define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
 # define OPENSSL_AUTO_SHA256
+# define OPENSSL_MIN_PROTO_VERSION
 #else
 # define EXIM_HAVE_EPHEM_RSA_KEX
 # define EXIM_HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO
@@ -77,6 +79,8 @@ change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
 #  define EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
 #  define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_TRACE
 #  define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_GET0_SERIAL
+#  define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_CERTS
+#  define EXIM_HAVE_SSL_GET0_VERIFIED_CHAIN
 #  ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
 #   define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP
 #  endif
@@ -94,6 +98,11 @@ change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_GET_ID
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000000L)
+# define EXIM_HAVE_EXPORT_CHNL_BNGNG
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_ALL_CERTS
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \
     || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20010000L
 # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
@@ -111,11 +120,17 @@ change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
 #  define OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
 #  define OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
 #  define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_STD_NAME
+#  define EXIM_HAVE_EXP_CHNL_BNGNG
+#  define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_SIGNER
 # else
 #  define OPENSSL_BAD_SRVR_OURCERT
 # endif
 #endif
 
+#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010002000L)
+# define EXIM_HAVE_EXPORT_CHNL_BNGNG
+#endif
+
 #if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
 # warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
 # define DISABLE_OCSP
@@ -398,15 +413,16 @@ typedef struct exim_openssl_state {
   uschar *	privatekey;
   BOOL		is_server;
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-  STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack;		/* chain for verifying the proof */
   union {
     struct {
       uschar        *file;
       const uschar  *file_expanded;
       ocsp_resplist *olist;
+      STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack;	/* chain for verifying the proof */
     } server;
     struct {
       X509_STORE    *verify_store;	/* non-null if status requested */
+      uschar	    *verify_errstr;	/* only if _required */
       BOOL	    verify_required;
     } client;
   } u_ocsp;
@@ -429,12 +445,14 @@ exim_openssl_state_st *client_static_state = NULL;	/*XXX should not use static;
 exim_openssl_state_st state_server = {.is_server = TRUE};
 
 static int
-setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host,
-    uschar ** errstr );
+setup_certs(SSL_CTX * sctx, uschar ** certs, uschar * crl, host_item * host,
+    uschar ** errstr);
 
 /* Callbacks */
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
 static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
+static void x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(const STACK_OF(X509) * sk);
+static void x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store);
 #endif
 
 
@@ -942,36 +960,35 @@ Returns:    nothing
 */
 
 static void
-info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+info_callback(SSL * s, int where, int ret)
 {
 DEBUG(D_tls)
   {
-  const uschar * str;
-
-  if (where & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
-     str = US"SSL_connect";
-  else if (where & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
-     str = US"SSL_accept";
-  else
-     str = US"SSL info (undefined)";
+  gstring * g = NULL;
+
+  if (where & SSL_ST_CONNECT) g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"SSL_connect");
+  if (where & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)  g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"SSL_accept");
+  if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)    g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"state_chg");
+  if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT)    g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"hshake_exit");
+  if (where & SSL_CB_READ)    g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"read");
+  if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE)   g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"write");
+  if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT)   g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"alert");
+  if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"hshake_start");
+  if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)  g = string_append_listele(g, ',', US"hshake_done");
 
   if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
-     debug_printf("%s: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+     debug_printf("SSL %s: %s\n", g->s, SSL_state_string_long(s));
   else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT)
-    debug_printf("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
-	  str = where & SSL_CB_READ ? US"read" : US"write",
+    debug_printf("SSL %s %s:%s\n", g->s,
 	  SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
   else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT)
     {
-    if (ret == 0)
-      debug_printf("%s: failed in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
-    else if (ret < 0)
-      debug_printf("%s: error in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+    if (ret <= 0)
+      debug_printf("SSL %s: %s in %s\n", g->s,
+	ret == 0 ? "failed" : "error", SSL_state_string_long(s));
     }
-  else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START)
-     debug_printf("%s: hshake start: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
-  else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)
-     debug_printf("%s: hshake done: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+  else if (where & (SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START | SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE))
+     debug_printf("SSL %s: %s\n", g->s, SSL_state_string_long(s));
   }
 }
 
@@ -1108,18 +1125,6 @@ if (preverify_ok == 0)
 else if (depth != 0)
   {
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, dn);
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-  if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
-    {	/* client, wanting stapling  */
-    /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
-    for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
-
-    if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
-                             cert))
-      ERR_clear_error();
-    sk_X509_push(client_static_state->verify_stack, cert);
-    }
-#endif
 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
     if (verify_event(tlsp, cert, depth, dn, calledp, optionalp, US"SSL"))
       return 0;				/* reject, with peercert set */
@@ -1247,21 +1252,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s depth %d %s\n",
 #endif
 
 if (preverify_ok == 1)
-  {
   tls_out.dane_verified = TRUE;
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-  if (client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
-    {	/* client, wanting stapling  */
-    /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
-    for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
-
-    if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
-                             cert))
-      ERR_clear_error();
-    sk_X509_push(client_static_state->verify_stack, cert);
-    }
-#endif
-  }
 else
   {
   int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx);
@@ -1277,6 +1268,14 @@ return preverify_ok;
 
 
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+static void
+time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
+{
+BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
+ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
+BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+}
+
 /*************************************************
 *       Load OCSP information into state         *
 *************************************************/
@@ -1302,7 +1301,6 @@ OCSP_BASICRESP * basic_response;
 OCSP_SINGLERESP * single_response;
 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * rev, * thisupd, * nextupd;
 STACK_OF(X509) * sk;
-unsigned long verify_flags;
 int status, reason, i;
 
 DEBUG(D_tls)
@@ -1367,20 +1365,20 @@ if (!(basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)))
   goto bad;
   }
 
-sk = state->verify_stack;
-verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
+sk = state->u_ocsp.server.verify_stack;	/* set by setup_certs() / chain_from_pem_file() */
 
 /* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
 OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
 OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
 
-/* This does a full verify on the OCSP proof before we load it for serving
-up; possibly overkill - just date-checks might be nice enough.
+/* This does a partial verify (only the signer link, not the whole chain-to-CA)
+on the OCSP proof before we load it for serving up; possibly overkill -
+just date-checks might be nice enough.
 
 OCSP_basic_verify takes a "store" arg, but does not
-use it for the chain verification, which is all we do
-when OCSP_NOVERIFY is set.  The content from the wire
-"basic_response" and a cert-stack "sk" are all that is used.
+use it for the chain verification, when OCSP_NOVERIFY is set.
+The content from the wire "basic_response" and a cert-stack "sk" are all
+that is used.
 
 We have a stack, loaded in setup_certs() if tls_verify_certificates
 was a file (not a directory, or "system").  It is unfortunate we
@@ -1388,21 +1386,23 @@ cannot used the connection context store, as that would neatly
 handle the "system" case too, but there seems to be no library
 function for getting a stack from a store.
 [ In OpenSSL 1.1 - ?  X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) ? ]
+[ 3.0.0 - sk = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(store) ]
 We do not free the stack since it could be needed a second time for
 SNI handling.
 
 Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not
 be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
+(in 3.0.0 + is is public)
 But what with?  We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback.
 And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the
 library does it for us anyway?  */
 
-if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, sk, NULL, verify_flags)) < 0)
+if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, sk, NULL, OCSP_NOVERIFY)) < 0)
   {
   DEBUG(D_tls)
     {
     ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
-    debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
+    debug_printf("OCSP response has bad signature: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
     }
   goto bad;
   }
@@ -1436,7 +1436,16 @@ if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
 
 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
   {
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
+  DEBUG(D_tls)
+    {
+    BIO * bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    uschar * s = NULL;
+    int len;
+    time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
+    if (nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+    if ((len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s)) > 0) debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
+    debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
+    }
   goto bad;
   }
 
@@ -1446,7 +1455,7 @@ supply_response:
   ocsp_resplist ** op = &state->u_ocsp.server.olist, * oentry;
   while (oentry = *op)
     op = &oentry->next;
-  *op = oentry = store_get(sizeof(ocsp_resplist), FALSE);
+  *op = oentry = store_get(sizeof(ocsp_resplist), GET_UNTAINTED);
   oentry->next = NULL;
   oentry->resp = resp;
   }
@@ -1468,12 +1477,12 @@ return;
 
 
 static void
-ocsp_free_response_list(exim_openssl_state_st * cbinfo)
+ocsp_free_response_list(exim_openssl_state_st * state)
 {
-for (ocsp_resplist * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist; olist;
+for (ocsp_resplist * olist = state->u_ocsp.server.olist; olist;
      olist = olist->next)
   OCSP_RESPONSE_free(olist->resp);
-cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist = NULL;
+state->u_ocsp.server.olist = NULL;
 }
 #endif	/*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
 
@@ -1565,6 +1574,11 @@ else
       if (olist && !*olist)
 	olist = NULL;
 
+      /* If doing a re-expand after SNI, avoid reloading the OCSP
+      responses when the list of filenames has not changed.
+      The creds-invali on content change wipes file_expanded, so that
+      always reloads here. */
+
       if (  state->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded && olist
 	 && (Ustrcmp(olist, state->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
 	{
@@ -1737,53 +1751,10 @@ else
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading ECDH curve for server\n");
 
 #if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT)
-/* If we can, preload the server-side cert, key and ocsp */
-
-if (  opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_certificate)
-# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-   && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_ocsp_file)
-#endif
-   && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_privatekey))
-  {
-  /* Set watches on the filenames.  The implementation does de-duplication
-  so we can just blindly do them all.  */
-
-  if (  tls_set_watch(tls_certificate, TRUE)
-# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-     && tls_set_watch(tls_ocsp_file, TRUE)
-#endif
-     && tls_set_watch(tls_privatekey, TRUE))
-    {
-    state_server.certificate = tls_certificate;
-    state_server.privatekey = tls_privatekey;
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-    state_server.u_ocsp.server.file = tls_ocsp_file;
-#endif
-
-    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading server certs\n");
-    if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK)
-      state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE;
-    }
-  }
-else if (  !tls_certificate && !tls_privatekey
-# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-	&& !tls_ocsp_file
-#endif
-   )
-  {		/* Generate & preload a selfsigned cert. No files to watch. */
-  if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK)
-    {
-    state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE;
-    lifetime = f.running_in_test_harness ? 2 : 60 * 60;		/* 1 hour */
-    }
-  }
-else
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading server certs\n");
-
-
 /* If we can, preload the Authorities for checking client certs against.
 Actual choice to do verify is made (tls_{,try_}verify_hosts)
-at TLS conn startup */
+at TLS conn startup.
+Do this before the server ocsp so that its info can verify the ocsp. */
 
 if (  opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_verify_certificates)
    && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_crl))
@@ -1794,15 +1765,60 @@ if (  opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_verify_certificates)
      && tls_set_watch(tls_verify_certificates, FALSE)
      && tls_set_watch(tls_crl, FALSE))
     {
+    uschar * v_certs = tls_verify_certificates;
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading CA bundle for server\n");
 
-    if (setup_certs(ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, &dummy_errstr)
-	== OK)
+    if (setup_certs(ctx, &v_certs, tls_crl, NULL, &dummy_errstr) == OK)
       state_server.lib_state.cabundle = TRUE;
-    }
+
+    /* If we can, preload the server-side cert, key and ocsp */
+
+    if (  opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_certificate)
+# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+       && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_ocsp_file)
+# endif
+       && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_privatekey))
+      {
+      /* Set watches on the filenames.  The implementation does de-duplication
+      so we can just blindly do them all.  */
+
+      if (  tls_set_watch(tls_certificate, TRUE)
+# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+	 && tls_set_watch(tls_ocsp_file, TRUE)
+# endif
+	 && tls_set_watch(tls_privatekey, TRUE))
+	{
+	state_server.certificate = tls_certificate;
+	state_server.privatekey = tls_privatekey;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+	state_server.u_ocsp.server.file = tls_ocsp_file;
+# endif
+
+	DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading server certs\n");
+	if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK)
+	  state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE;
+	}
+      }
+    else if (  !tls_certificate && !tls_privatekey
+# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+	    && !tls_ocsp_file
+# endif
+       )
+      {		/* Generate & preload a selfsigned cert. No files to watch. */
+      if (tls_expand_session_files(ctx, &state_server, &dummy_errstr) == OK)
+	{
+	state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE;
+	lifetime = f.running_in_test_harness ? 2 : 60 * 60;		/* 1 hour */
+	}
+      }
+    else
+      DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading server certs\n");
+	}
   }
 else
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading CA bundle for server\n");
+
+
 #endif	/* EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY */
 
 
@@ -1884,10 +1900,11 @@ if (  opt_set_and_noexpand(ob->tls_verify_certificates)
 	&& tls_set_watch(ob->tls_crl, FALSE)
      )
     {
+    uschar * v_certs = ob->tls_verify_certificates;
     DEBUG(D_tls)
       debug_printf("TLS: preloading CA bundle for transport '%s'\n", t->name);
 
-    if (setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
+    if (setup_certs(ctx, &v_certs,
 	  ob->tls_crl, dummy_host, &dummy_errstr) == OK)
       ob->tls_preload.cabundle = TRUE;
     }
@@ -1903,12 +1920,15 @@ else
 #if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT)
 /* Invalidate the creds cached, by dropping the current ones.
 Call when we notice one of the source files has changed. */
- 
+
 static void
 tls_server_creds_invalidate(void)
 {
 SSL_CTX_free(state_server.lib_state.lib_ctx);
 state_server.lib_state = null_tls_preload;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+state_server.u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
+#endif
 }
 
 
@@ -1934,28 +1954,51 @@ tls_client_creds_invalidate(transport_instance * t)
 
 
 /* Extreme debug
+ * */
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-void
-x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
+static void
+debug_print_sn(const X509 * cert)
 {
-STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
+X509_NAME * sn = X509_get_subject_name((X509 *)cert);
 static uschar name[256];
+if (X509_NAME_oneline(sn, CS name, sizeof(name)))
+  {
+  name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
+  debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
+  }
+}
 
-for (int i= 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
+static void
+x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(const STACK_OF(X509) * sk)
+{
+if (!sk)
+  debug_printf(" (null)\n");
+else
   {
-  X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
-  if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
-    {
-    X509_NAME * sn = X509_get_subject_name(tmp_obj->data.x509);
-    if (X509_NAME_oneline(sn, CS name, sizeof(name)))
-      {
-      name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
-      debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
-      }
-    }
+  int idx = sk_X509_num(sk);
+  if (!idx)
+    debug_printf(" (empty)\n");
+  else
+    while (--idx >= 0) debug_print_sn(sk_X509_value(sk, idx));
   }
 }
-#endif
+
+static void
+x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
+{
+# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_ALL_CERTS
+if (!store)
+  debug_printf(" (no store)\n");
+else
+  {
+  STACK_OF(X509) * sk = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(store);
+  x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(sk);
+  sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+  }
+# endif
+}
+#endif	/*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
+/*
 */
 
 
@@ -2174,7 +2217,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", servername,
 
 /* Make the extension value available for expansion */
 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
-tls_in.sni = string_copy_taint(US servername, TRUE);
+tls_in.sni = string_copy_taint(US servername, GET_TAINTED);
 store_pool = old_pool;
 
 if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
@@ -2190,15 +2233,19 @@ if (lib_ctx_new(&server_sni, NULL, &dummy_errstr) != OK)
 /* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
 already exists.  Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */
 
-  {
+ {
   SSL_CTX * ctx = state_server.lib_state.lib_ctx;
   SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(ctx));
   SSL_CTX_set_mode(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx));
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MIN_PROTO_VERSION
+  SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(server_sni, SSL3_VERSION);
+#endif
   SSL_CTX_set_options(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx));
+  SSL_CTX_clear_options(server_sni, ~SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx));
   SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(ctx));
   SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
   SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, state);
-  }
+ }
 
 if (  !init_dh(server_sni, state->dhparam, &dummy_errstr)
    || !init_ecdh(server_sni, &dummy_errstr)
@@ -2218,14 +2265,12 @@ if (state->u_ocsp.server.file)
 #endif
 
   {
-  uschar * expcerts;
-  if (  !expand_check(tls_verify_certificates, US"tls_verify_certificates",
-		  &expcerts, &dummy_errstr)
-     || (rc = setup_certs(server_sni, expcerts, tls_crl, NULL,
+  uschar * v_certs = tls_verify_certificates;
+  if ((rc = setup_certs(server_sni, &v_certs, tls_crl, NULL,
 			&dummy_errstr)) != OK)
     goto bad;
 
-  if (expcerts && *expcerts)
+  if (v_certs && *v_certs)
     setup_cert_verify(server_sni, FALSE, verify_callback_server);
   }
 
@@ -2397,15 +2442,25 @@ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 
 
 static void
-time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
+add_chain_to_store(X509_STORE * store, STACK_OF(X509) * sk,
+  const char * debug_text)
 {
-BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
-ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
-BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+int idx;
+
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+  {
+  debug_printf("chain for %s:\n", debug_text);
+  x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(sk);
+  }
+if (sk)
+  if ((idx = sk_X509_num(sk)) > 0)
+    while (--idx >= 0)
+      X509_STORE_add_cert(store, sk_X509_value(sk, idx));
+
 }
 
 static int
-tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
+tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL * ssl, void * arg)
 {
 exim_openssl_state_st * cbinfo = arg;
 const unsigned char * p;
@@ -2415,16 +2470,26 @@ OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
 int i;
 
 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status callback (OCSP stapling):\n");
-len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
+len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, &p);
 if(!p)
- {
-  /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
+  {				/* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
+  if (SSL_session_reused(ssl) && tls_out.ocsp == OCSP_VFIED)
+    {
+    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null, but resumed; ocsp vfy stored with session is good\n");
+    return 1;
+    }
+
   if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required && LOGGING(tls_cipher))
     log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Required TLS certificate status not received");
   else
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
-  return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
- }
+
+  if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required)
+    return 1;
+  cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+			US"(SSL_connect) Required TLS certificate status not received";
+  return 0;
+  }
 
 if (!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
   {
@@ -2456,33 +2521,160 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
 */
   {
     BIO * bp = NULL;
+    X509_STORE * verify_store = NULL;
+    BOOL have_verified_OCSP_signer = FALSE;
 #ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
     STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
 #endif
 
-    DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
 
-    /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);   extreme debug: stapling content */
+    /* Use the CA & chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
+    /*XXX could we do an event here, for observability of ocsp?  What reasonable data could we give access to? */
+    /* Dates would be a start. Do we need another opaque variable type, as for certs, plus an extract expansion? */
 
-    /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
-    /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
+   {
+    /* If this routine is not available, we've avoided [in tls_client_start()]
+    asking for certificate-status under DANE, so this callback won't run for
+    that combination. It still will for non-DANE. */
 
-    if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, cbinfo->verify_stack,
-	      cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)) <= 0)
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_SIGNER
+    X509 * signer;
+
+    if (  tls_out.dane_verified
+       && (have_verified_OCSP_signer =
+	OCSP_resp_get0_signer(bs, &signer, SSL_get0_verified_chain(ssl)) == 1))
+      {
+      DEBUG(D_tls)
+	debug_printf("signer for OCSP basicres is in the verified chain;"
+		      " shortcut its verification\n");
+      }
+    else
+#endif
+      {
+      STACK_OF(X509) * verified_chain;
+
+      verify_store = X509_STORE_new();
+
+      SSL_get0_chain_certs(ssl, &verified_chain);
+      add_chain_to_store(verify_store, verified_chain,
+			      "'current cert' per SSL_get0_chain_certs()");
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SSL_GET0_VERIFIED_CHAIN
+      verified_chain = SSL_get0_verified_chain(ssl);
+      add_chain_to_store(verify_store, verified_chain,
+			      "SSL_get0_verified_chain()");
+#endif
+      }
+   }
+
+    DEBUG(D_tls)
+      {
+      debug_printf("Untrusted intermediate cert stack (from SSL_get_peer_cert_chain()):\n");
+      x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl));
+
+      debug_printf("will use this CA store for verifying basicresp:\n");
+      x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(verify_store);
+
+      /* OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);   extreme debug: stapling content */
+
+      debug_printf("certs contained in basicresp:\n");
+      x509_stack_dump_cert_s_names(
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_CERTS
+	OCSP_resp_get0_certs(bs)
+#else
+	bs->certs
+#endif
+	);
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_X509_STORE_GET1_ALL_CERTS
+/* could do via X509_STORE_get0_objects(); not worth it just for debug info */
+       {
+	X509 * signer;
+	if (OCSP_resp_get0_signer(bs, &signer, X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(verify_store)) == 1)
+	  {
+	  debug_printf("found signer for basicres:\n");
+	  debug_print_sn(signer);
+	  }
+	else
+	  {
+	  debug_printf("failed to find signer for basicres:\n");
+	  ERR_print_errors(bp);
+	  }
+       }
+#endif
+
+      }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    /* Under DANE the trust-anchor (at least in TA mode) is indicated by the TLSA
+    record in DNS, and probably is not the root of the chain of certificates. So
+    accept a partial chain for that case (and hope that anchor is visible for
+    verifying the OCSP stapling).
+    XXX for EE mode it won't even be that.  Does that make OCSP useless for EE?
+
+    Worse, for LetsEncrypt-mode (ocsp signer is leaf-signer) under DANE, the
+    data used within OpenSSL for the signer has nil pointers for signing
+    algorithms - and a crash results.  Avoid this by shortcutting verification,
+    having determined that the OCSP signer is in the (DANE-)validated set.
+    */
+
+#ifndef OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN	/* defined for 3.0.0 onwards */
+# define OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN 0
+#endif
+
+    if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl),
+		verify_store,
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+		tls_out.dane_verified
+		? have_verified_OCSP_signer
+		  ? OCSP_NOVERIFY | OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
+		  : OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN | OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
+		:
+#endif
+		OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)) <= 0)
+      {
+      DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP_basic_verify() fail: returned %d\n", i);
       if (ERR_peek_error())
 	{
 	tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
-	if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
-		"Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
-		ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
-	BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
-	ERR_print_errors(bp);
-	OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
+	if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
+	  {
+	  static uschar peerdn[256];
+	  const uschar * errstr;;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
+	  ERR_peek_error_all(NULL, NULL, NULL, CCSS &errstr, NULL);
+	  if (!errstr)
+#endif
+	    errstr = CUS ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error());
+
+	  X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)),
+						  CS peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
+	  log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+		"[%s] %s Received TLS cert (DN: '%.*s') status response, "
+		"itself unverifiable: %s",
+		deliver_host_address, deliver_host,
+		(int)sizeof(peerdn), peerdn, errstr);
+	  }
+	DEBUG(D_tls)
+	  {
+	  BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
+	  ERR_print_errors(bp);
+  {
+  uschar * s = NULL;
+  int len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s);
+  if (len > 0) debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
+  BIO_reset(bp);
+  }
+	  OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
+	  }
 	goto failed;
 	}
       else
 	DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no explicit trust for OCSP signing"
 	  " in the root CA certificate; ignoring\n");
+      }
 
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
 
@@ -2515,13 +2707,18 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
       status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
 		  &thisupd, &nextupd);
 
-      DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
-      DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+      DEBUG(D_tls)
+	{
+	time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
+	if (nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+	}
       if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
 	    EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
 	{
 	tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
 	DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
+	cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+		    US"(SSL_connect) Server certificate status is out-of-date";
 	log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP dates invalid");
 	goto failed;
 	}
@@ -2533,12 +2730,16 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
 	case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
 	  continue;	/* the idx loop */
 	case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+	  cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+			US"(SSL_connect) Server certificate revoked";
 	  log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
 	      reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
 	      reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
 	  DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
 	  break;
 	default:
+	  cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr =
+			US"(SSL_connect) Server certificate has unknown status";
 	  log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
 	      "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
 	  break;
@@ -2555,6 +2756,11 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
     tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
     i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
   good:
+    {
+    uschar * s = NULL;
+    int len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s);
+    if (len > 0) debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
+    }
     BIO_free(bp);
   }
 
@@ -2587,8 +2793,7 @@ tls_init(host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob,
   uschar *ocsp_file,
 #endif
   address_item *addr, exim_openssl_state_st ** caller_state,
-  tls_support * tlsp,
-  uschar ** errstr)
+  tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr)
 {
 SSL_CTX * ctx;
 exim_openssl_state_st * state;
@@ -2685,10 +2890,17 @@ if (init_options)
     }
 #endif
 
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
-  if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, init_options)))
-    return tls_error(string_sprintf(
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MIN_PROTO_VERSION
+  SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, SSL3_VERSION);
+#endif
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting  SSL CTX options: %016lx\n", init_options);
+  SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, init_options);
+   {
+    uint64_t readback = SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, ~init_options);
+    if (readback != init_options)
+      return tls_error(string_sprintf(
           "SSL_CTX_set_option(%#lx)", init_options), host, NULL, errstr);
+   }
   }
 else
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
@@ -2729,7 +2941,7 @@ if (state->lib_state.conn_certs)
 else
   {
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-  if (!host)
+  if (!host)					/* server */
     {
     state->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
     state->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
@@ -2743,7 +2955,7 @@ else
 
 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-  if (!(state->verify_stack = sk_X509_new_null()))
+  if (!host && !(state->u_ocsp.server.verify_stack = sk_X509_new_null()))
     {
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create stack for stapling verify\n");
     return FAIL;
@@ -2792,11 +3004,12 @@ else			/* client */
       DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
       return FAIL;
       }
+
     SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, tls_client_stapling_cb);
     SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, state);
     }
 # endif
-#endif
+#endif	/*EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT*/
 
 state->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
 
@@ -2935,7 +3148,7 @@ if (tlsp->peercert)
 *************************************************/
 
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-/* Load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
+/* In the server, load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
 
 static BOOL
 chain_from_pem_file(const uschar * file, STACK_OF(X509) ** vp)
@@ -2965,7 +3178,7 @@ repeated after a Server Name Indication.
 
 Arguments:
   sctx          SSL_CTX* to initialise
-  certs         certs file, expanded
+  certsp        certs file, returned expanded
   crl           CRL file or NULL
   host          NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
   errstr	error string pointer
@@ -2974,15 +3187,16 @@ Returns:        OK/DEFER/FAIL
 */
 
 static int
-setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host,
+setup_certs(SSL_CTX * sctx, uschar ** certsp, uschar * crl, host_item * host,
     uschar ** errstr)
 {
-uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
+uschar * expcerts, * expcrl;
 
-if (!expand_check(certs, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts, errstr))
+if (!expand_check(*certsp, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts, errstr))
   return DEFER;
 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_verify_certificates: %s\n", expcerts);
 
+*certsp = expcerts;
 if (expcerts && *expcerts)
   {
   /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
@@ -3010,19 +3224,20 @@ if (expcerts && *expcerts)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(X509) * verify_stack =
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-	  !host ? state_server.verify_stack :
+	  !host ? state_server.u_ocsp.server.verify_stack :
 #endif
 	  NULL;
 	STACK_OF(X509) ** vp = &verify_stack;
 
 	file = expcerts; dir = NULL;
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-	/* In the server if we will be offering an OCSP proof, load chain from
+	/* In the server if we will be offering an OCSP proof; load chain from
 	file for verifying the OCSP proof at load time. */
 
 /*XXX Glitch!   The file here is tls_verify_certs: the chain for verifying the client cert.
 This is inconsistent with the need to verify the OCSP proof of the server cert.
 */
+/* *debug_printf("file for checking server ocsp stapling is: %s\n", file); */
 	if (  !host
 	   && statbuf.st_size > 0
 	   && state_server.u_ocsp.server.file
@@ -3130,6 +3345,67 @@ return OK;
 
 
 
+static void
+tls_dump_keylog(SSL * ssl)
+{
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
+  BIO * bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+  uschar * s = NULL;
+  int len;
+  SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(bp, SSL_get_session(ssl));
+  len = (int) BIO_get_mem_data(bp, CSS &s);
+  if (len > 0) debug_printf("%.*s", len, s);
+  BIO_free(bp);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/* Channel-binding info for authenticators
+See description in https://paquier.xyz/postgresql-2/channel-binding-openssl/
+for pre-TLS1.3
+*/
+
+static void
+tls_get_channel_binding(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, const void * taintval)
+{
+uschar c, * s;
+size_t len;
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_EXPORT_CHNL_BNGNG
+if (SSL_version(ssl) > TLS1_2_VERSION)
+  {
+  /* It's not documented by OpenSSL how big the output buffer must be.
+  The OpenSSL testcases use 80 bytes but don't say why. The GnuTLS impl only
+  serves out 32B.  RFC 9266 says it is 32B.
+  Interop fails unless we use the same each end. */
+  len = 32;
+
+  tlsp->channelbind_exporter = TRUE;
+  taintval = GET_UNTAINTED;
+  if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl,
+	s = store_get((int)len, taintval), len,
+	"EXPORTER-Channel-Binding", (size_t) 24,
+	NULL, 0, 0) != 1)
+    len = 0;
+  }
+else
+#endif
+  {
+  len = SSL_get_peer_finished(ssl, &c, 0);
+  len = SSL_get_peer_finished(ssl, s = store_get((int)len, taintval), len);
+  }
+
+if (len > 0)
+  {
+  int old_pool = store_pool;
+  store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+    tlsp->channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS s, (int)len, taintval);
+  store_pool = old_pool;
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage %p %p\n", tlsp->channelbinding, tlsp);
+  }
+}
+
+
 /*************************************************
 *       Start a TLS session in a server          *
 *************************************************/
@@ -3187,7 +3463,7 @@ TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 
 if (state_server.lib_state.pri_string)
   { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cipher list was preloaded\n"); }
-else 
+else
   {
   if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, errstr))
     return FAIL;
@@ -3217,20 +3493,20 @@ else
   goto skip_certs;
 
  {
-  uschar * expcerts;
-  if (!expand_check(tls_verify_certificates, US"tls_verify_certificates",
-		    &expcerts, errstr))
-    return DEFER;
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_verify_certificates: %s\n", expcerts);
+  uschar * v_certs = tls_verify_certificates;
 
   if (state_server.lib_state.cabundle)
-    { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: CA bundle for server was preloaded\n"); }
+    {
+    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: CA bundle for server was preloaded\n");
+    setup_cert_verify(ctx, server_verify_optional, verify_callback_server);
+    }
   else
-    if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, expcerts, tls_crl, NULL, errstr)) != OK)
+    {
+    if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, &v_certs, tls_crl, NULL, errstr)) != OK)
       return rc;
-
-  if (expcerts && *expcerts)
-    setup_cert_verify(ctx, server_verify_optional, verify_callback_server);
+    if (v_certs && *v_certs)
+      setup_cert_verify(ctx, server_verify_optional, verify_callback_server);
+    }
  }
 skip_certs: ;
 
@@ -3311,10 +3587,11 @@ if (rc <= 0)
     case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
       DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
       (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
       (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL);
-
+#endif
       if (SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
-	    SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+	SSL_shutdown(ssl);
 
       tls_close(NULL, TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN);
       return FAIL;
@@ -3331,7 +3608,9 @@ if (rc <= 0)
          || r == SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL || r == SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL)
 	s = string_sprintf("(%s)", SSL_get_version(ssl));
       (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : s, errstr);
+#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
       (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL);
+#endif
       return FAIL;
       }
 
@@ -3342,7 +3621,9 @@ if (rc <= 0)
 	if (!errno)
 	  {
 	  *errstr = US"SSL_accept: TCP connection closed by peer";
+#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
 	  (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL);
+#endif
 	  return FAIL;
 	  }
 	DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - syscall %s\n", strerror(errno));
@@ -3351,7 +3632,9 @@ if (rc <= 0)
 		      sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out"
 		      : ERR_peek_error() ? NULL : string_sprintf("ret %d", error),
 		      errstr);
+#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
       (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL);
+#endif
       return FAIL;
     }
   }
@@ -3399,6 +3682,7 @@ else DEBUG(D_tls)
 adjust the input functions to read via TLS, and initialize things. */
 
 #ifdef SSL_get_extms_support
+/*XXX what does this return for tls1.3 ? */
 tls_in.ext_master_secret = SSL_get_extms_support(ssl) == 1;
 #endif
 peer_cert(ssl, &tls_in, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
@@ -3413,13 +3697,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls)
   if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)))
     debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
 
-#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
-  {
-  BIO * bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-  SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(bp, SSL_get_session(ssl));
-  BIO_free(bp);
-  }
-#endif
+  tls_dump_keylog(ssl);
 
 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
   {
@@ -3437,19 +3715,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls)
   tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
   }
 
-/* Channel-binding info for authenticators
-See description in https://paquier.xyz/postgresql-2/channel-binding-openssl/ */
-  {
-  uschar c, * s;
-  size_t len = SSL_get_peer_finished(ssl, &c, 0);
-  int old_pool = store_pool;
-
-  SSL_get_peer_finished(ssl, s = store_get((int)len, FALSE), len);
-  store_pool = POOL_PERM;
-    tls_in.channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS s, (int)len, FALSE);
-  store_pool = old_pool;
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage %p\n", tls_in.channelbinding);
-  }
+tls_get_channel_binding(ssl, &tls_in, GET_UNTAINTED);
 
 /* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
    Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
@@ -3503,20 +3769,20 @@ else
   return OK;
 
  {
-  uschar * expcerts;
-  if (!expand_check(ob->tls_verify_certificates, US"tls_verify_certificates",
-		    &expcerts, errstr))
-    return DEFER;
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_verify_certificates: %s\n", expcerts);
+  uschar * v_certs = ob->tls_verify_certificates;
 
   if (state->lib_state.cabundle)
-    { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: CA bundle was preloaded\n"); }
+    {
+    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: CA bundle for tpt was preloaded\n");
+    setup_cert_verify(ctx, client_verify_optional, verify_callback_client);
+    }
   else
-    if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, expcerts, ob->tls_crl, host, errstr)) != OK)
+    {
+    if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, &v_certs, ob->tls_crl, host, errstr)) != OK)
       return rc;
-
-  if (expcerts && *expcerts)
-    setup_cert_verify(ctx, client_verify_optional, verify_callback_client);
+    if (v_certs && *v_certs)
+      setup_cert_verify(ctx, client_verify_optional, verify_callback_client);
+    }
  }
 
 if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
@@ -3596,9 +3862,8 @@ return DEFER;
 and apply it to the ssl-connection for attempted resumption. */
 
 static void
-tls_retrieve_session(tls_support * tlsp, SSL * ssl, const uschar * key)
+tls_retrieve_session(tls_support * tlsp, SSL * ssl)
 {
-tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_SUPPORTED;
 if (tlsp->host_resumable)
   {
   dbdata_tls_session * dt;
@@ -3606,11 +3871,11 @@ if (tlsp->host_resumable)
   open_db dbblock, * dbm_file;
 
   tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_REQUESTED;
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("checking for resumable session for %s\n", key);
+  DEBUG(D_tls)
+    debug_printf("checking for resumable session for %s\n", tlsp->resume_index);
   if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDWR, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE)))
     {
-    /* key for the db is the IP */
-    if ((dt = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm_file, key, &len)))
+    if ((dt = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm_file, tlsp->resume_index, &len)))
       {
       SSL_SESSION * ss = NULL;
       const uschar * sess_asn1 = dt->session;
@@ -3636,24 +3901,21 @@ if (tlsp->host_resumable)
 	if (lifetime + dt->time_stamp < time(NULL))
 	  {
 	  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session expired\n");
-	  dbfn_delete(dbm_file, key);
+	  dbfn_delete(dbm_file, tlsp->resume_index);
 	  }
-	else if (!SSL_set_session(ssl, ss))
-	  {
-	  DEBUG(D_tls)
-	    {
-	    ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(),
-	      ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
-	    debug_printf("applying session to ssl: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
-	    }
-	  }
-	else
+	else if (SSL_set_session(ssl, ss))
 	  {
 	  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("good session\n");
 	  tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_SUGGESTED;
 	  tlsp->verify_override = dt->verify_override;
 	  tlsp->ocsp = dt->ocsp;
 	  }
+	else DEBUG(D_tls)
+	  {
+	  ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(),
+	    ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+	  debug_printf("applying session to ssl: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
+	  }
 	}
       }
     else
@@ -3682,7 +3944,7 @@ if (SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ss)) 	/* 1.1.1 */
   {
   int len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, NULL);
   int dlen = sizeof(dbdata_tls_session) + len;
-  dbdata_tls_session * dt = store_get(dlen, TRUE);
+  dbdata_tls_session * dt = store_get(dlen, GET_TAINTED);
   uschar * s = dt->session;
   open_db dbblock, * dbm_file;
 
@@ -3695,9 +3957,7 @@ if (SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ss)) 	/* 1.1.1 */
 
   if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDWR, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE)))
     {
-    const uschar * key = cbinfo->host->address;
-    dbfn_delete(dbm_file, key);
-    dbfn_write(dbm_file, key, dt, dlen);
+    dbfn_write(dbm_file, tlsp->resume_index, dt, dlen);
     dbfn_close(dbm_file);
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote session (len %u) to db\n",
 		  (unsigned)dlen);
@@ -3707,21 +3967,20 @@ return 1;
 }
 
 
+/* Construct a key for session DB lookup, and setup the SSL_CTX for resumption */
+
 static void
 tls_client_ctx_resume_prehandshake(
-  exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * exim_client_ctx, tls_support * tlsp,
-  smtp_transport_options_block * ob, host_item * host)
+  exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * exim_client_ctx, smtp_connect_args * conn_args,
+  tls_support * tlsp, smtp_transport_options_block * ob)
 {
-/* Should the client request a session resumption ticket? */
-if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_resumption_hosts, host) == OK)
-  {
-  tlsp->host_resumable = TRUE;
+tlsp->host_resumable = TRUE;
+tls_client_resmption_key(tlsp, conn_args, ob);
 
-  SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(exim_client_ctx->ctx,
-	SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
-	| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
-  SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(exim_client_ctx->ctx, tls_save_session_cb);
-  }
+SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(exim_client_ctx->ctx,
+      SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
+      | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
+SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(exim_client_ctx->ctx, tls_save_session_cb);
 }
 
 static BOOL
@@ -3745,7 +4004,7 @@ if (tlsp->host_resumable)
 
 tlsp->resumption = RESUME_SUPPORTED;
 /* Pick up a previous session, saved on an old ticket */
-tls_retrieve_session(tlsp, ssl, host->address);
+tls_retrieve_session(tlsp, ssl);
 return TRUE;
 }
 
@@ -3765,16 +4024,19 @@ if (SSL_session_reused(exim_client_ctx->ssl))
 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN
 /* Expand and convert an Exim list to an ALPN list.  False return for fail.
 NULL plist return for silent no-ALPN.
+
+Overwite the passed-in list with the expanded version.
 */
 
 static BOOL
-tls_alpn_plist(const uschar * tls_alpn, const uschar ** plist, unsigned * plen,
+tls_alpn_plist(uschar ** tls_alpn, const uschar ** plist, unsigned * plen,
   uschar ** errstr)
 {
 uschar * exp_alpn;
 
-if (!expand_check(tls_alpn, US"tls_alpn", &exp_alpn, errstr))
+if (!expand_check(*tls_alpn, US"tls_alpn", &exp_alpn, errstr))
   return FALSE;
+*tls_alpn = exp_alpn;
 
 if (!exp_alpn)
   {
@@ -3787,7 +4049,7 @@ else
   but it's little extra code complexity in the client. */
 
   const uschar * list = exp_alpn;
-  uschar * p = store_get(Ustrlen(exp_alpn), is_tainted(exp_alpn)), * s, * t;
+  uschar * p = store_get(Ustrlen(exp_alpn), exp_alpn), * s, * t;
   int sep = 0;
   uschar len;
 
@@ -3841,7 +4103,7 @@ BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
 
 rc = store_pool;
 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
-exim_client_ctx = store_get(sizeof(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx), FALSE);
+exim_client_ctx = store_get(sizeof(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx), GET_UNTAINTED);
 exim_client_ctx->corked = NULL;
 store_pool = rc;
 
@@ -3852,7 +4114,6 @@ tlsp->tlsa_usage = 0;
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
   {
 # ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
-  /*XXX this should be moved to caller, to be common across gnutls/openssl */
   if (  conn_args->dane
      && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
      && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
@@ -3875,6 +4136,15 @@ tlsp->tlsa_usage = 0;
 # endif
       request_ocsp =
 	verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+
+# if defined(SUPPORT_DANE) && !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_RESP_GET0_SIGNER)
+  if (conn_args->dane && (require_ocsp || request_ocsp))
+    {
+    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OpenSSL version to early to combine OCSP"
+			      " and DANE; disabling OCSP\n");
+    require_ocsp = request_ocsp = FALSE;
+    }
+# endif
   }
 #endif
 
@@ -3946,6 +4216,7 @@ if (conn_args->dane)
     tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL, errstr);
     return FALSE;
     }
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("since dane-mode conn, not loading the usual CA bundle\n");
   }
 else
 
@@ -3955,39 +4226,20 @@ if (tls_client_basic_ctx_init(exim_client_ctx->ctx, host, ob,
       client_static_state, errstr) != OK)
   return FALSE;
 
-#ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME
-tls_client_ctx_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx, tlsp, ob, host);
-#endif
-
-
-if (!(exim_client_ctx->ssl = SSL_new(exim_client_ctx->ctx)))
-  {
-  tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
-  return FALSE;
-  }
-SSL_set_session_id_context(exim_client_ctx->ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
-
-SSL_set_fd(exim_client_ctx->ssl, cctx->sock);
-SSL_set_connect_state(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
-
 if (ob->tls_sni)
   {
   if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tlsp->sni, errstr))
     return FALSE;
   if (!tlsp->sni)
-    {
-    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
-    }
+    { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n"); }
   else if (!Ustrlen(tlsp->sni))
     tlsp->sni = NULL;
   else
     {
-#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
-    DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tlsp->sni);
-    SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp->sni);
-#else
+#ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
     log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SNI unusable with this OpenSSL library version; ignoring \"%s\"\n",
           tlsp->sni);
+    tlsp->sni = NULL;
 #endif
     }
   }
@@ -3998,10 +4250,10 @@ if (ob->tls_alpn)
   const uschar * plist;
   unsigned plen;
 
-  if (!tls_alpn_plist(ob->tls_alpn, &plist, &plen, errstr))
+  if (!tls_alpn_plist(&ob->tls_alpn, &plist, &plen, errstr))
     return FALSE;
   if (plist)
-    if (SSL_set_alpn_protos(exim_client_ctx->ssl, plist, plen) != 0)
+    if (SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(exim_client_ctx->ctx, plist, plen) != 0)
       {
       tls_error(US"alpn init", host, NULL, errstr);
       return FALSE;
@@ -4014,6 +4266,34 @@ if (ob->tls_alpn)
           ob->tls_alpn);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME
+/*XXX have_lbserver: another cmdline arg possibly, for continued-conn, but use
+will be very low. */
+
+if (!conn_args->have_lbserver)	/* wanted for tls_client_resmption_key() */
+  { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("resumption not supported on continued-connection\n"); }
+else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_resumption_hosts, host) == OK)
+  tls_client_ctx_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx, conn_args, tlsp, ob);
+#endif
+
+
+if (!(exim_client_ctx->ssl = SSL_new(exim_client_ctx->ctx)))
+  {
+  tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
+  return FALSE;
+  }
+SSL_set_session_id_context(exim_client_ctx->ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
+SSL_set_fd(exim_client_ctx->ssl, cctx->sock);
+SSL_set_connect_state(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
+if (tlsp->sni)
+  {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tlsp->sni);
+  SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp->sni);
+  }
+#endif
+
 #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
 if (conn_args->dane)
   if (dane_tlsa_load(exim_client_ctx->ssl, host, &conn_args->tlsa_dnsa, errstr) != OK)
@@ -4073,20 +4353,19 @@ if (conn_args->dane)
 
 if (rc <= 0)
   {
-  tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+  if (client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr)
+    { if (errstr) *errstr = client_static_state->u_ocsp.client.verify_errstr; }
+  else
+#endif
+    tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
   return FALSE;
   }
 
 DEBUG(D_tls)
   {
   debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
-#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
-  {
-  BIO * bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-  SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(bp, SSL_get_session(exim_client_ctx->ssl));
-  BIO_free(bp);
-  }
-#endif
+  tls_dump_keylog(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
   }
 
 #ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME
@@ -4127,18 +4406,7 @@ tlsp->cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_ssl(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
   }
 
 /*XXX will this work with continued-TLS? */
-/* Channel-binding info for authenticators */
-  {
-  uschar c, * s;
-  size_t len = SSL_get_finished(exim_client_ctx->ssl, &c, 0);
-  int old_pool = store_pool;
-
-  SSL_get_finished(exim_client_ctx->ssl, s = store_get((int)len, TRUE), len);
-  store_pool = POOL_PERM;
-    tlsp->channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS s, (int)len, TRUE);
-  store_pool = old_pool;
-  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage %p %p\n", tlsp->channelbinding, tlsp);
-  }
+tls_get_channel_binding(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, GET_TAINTED);
 
 tlsp->active.sock = cctx->sock;
 tlsp->active.tls_ctx = exim_client_ctx;
@@ -4277,7 +4545,6 @@ tls_get_cache(unsigned lim)
 {
 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
 int n = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm - ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm;
-debug_printf("tls_get_cache\n");
 if (n > lim)
   n = lim;
 if (n > 0)
@@ -4505,22 +4772,25 @@ int * fdp = o_ctx ? &tls_out.active.sock : &tls_in.active.sock;
 
 if (*fdp < 0) return;  /* TLS was not active */
 
-if (do_shutdown)
+if (do_shutdown > TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN)
   {
   int rc;
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n",
-    do_shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
+    do_shutdown > TLS_SHUTDOWN_NOWAIT ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
 
   tls_write(ct_ctx, NULL, 0, FALSE);	/* flush write buffer */
 
-  if (  (rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp)) == 0	/* send "close notify" alert */
-     && do_shutdown > 1)
+  if (  (  do_shutdown >= TLS_SHUTDOWN_WONLY
+	|| (rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp)) == 0	/* send "close notify" alert */
+	)
+     && do_shutdown > TLS_SHUTDOWN_NOWAIT
+     )
     {
 #ifdef EXIM_TCP_CORK
     (void) setsockopt(*fdp, IPPROTO_TCP, EXIM_TCP_CORK, US &off, sizeof(off));
 #endif
     ALARM(2);
-    rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp);		/* wait for response */
+    rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp);			/* wait for response */
     ALARM_CLR(0);
     }
 
@@ -4534,8 +4804,8 @@ if (do_shutdown)
 if (!o_ctx)		/* server side */
   {
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-  sk_X509_pop_free(state_server.verify_stack, X509_free);
-  state_server.verify_stack = NULL;
+  sk_X509_pop_free(state_server.u_ocsp.server.verify_stack, X509_free);
+  state_server.u_ocsp.server.verify_stack = NULL;
 #endif
 
   receive_getc =	smtp_getc;
@@ -4571,8 +4841,8 @@ Returns:     NULL on success, or error message
 uschar *
 tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
 {
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
-uschar *s, *expciphers, *err;
+SSL_CTX * ctx;
+uschar * expciphers, * err;
 
 tls_openssl_init();
 
@@ -4624,21 +4894,22 @@ number/string, and the version date remains unchanged.  The _build_ date
 will change, so we can more usefully assist with version diagnosis by also
 reporting the build date.
 
-Arguments:   a FILE* to print the results to
-Returns:     nothing
+Arguments:   string to append to
+Returns:     string
 */
 
-void
-tls_version_report(FILE *f)
+gstring *
+tls_version_report(gstring * g)
 {
-fprintf(f, "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
-           "                          Runtime: %s\n"
-           "                                 : %s\n",
-           OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
-           SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
-           SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
-/* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
-the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
+return string_fmt_append(g,
+    "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
+    "                          Runtime: %s\n"
+    "                                 : %s\n",
+	     OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
+	     SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
+	     SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
+  /* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
+  the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
 }