X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/bc338899110ea22098559081f77cbd0f7a8044bd..89a80675800115043189ea51437b062d88fa51b7:/src/src/auths/dovecot.c diff --git a/src/src/auths/dovecot.c b/src/src/auths/dovecot.c index 0f4822745..4628863e0 100644 --- a/src/src/auths/dovecot.c +++ b/src/src/auths/dovecot.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2004 Andrey Panin - * Copyright (c) 2006-2013 The Exim Maintainers + * Copyright (c) 2006-2017 The Exim Maintainers * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published @@ -71,6 +71,19 @@ auth_dovecot_options_block auth_dovecot_option_defaults = { }; + + +#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF + +/* Dummy values */ +void auth_dovecot_init(auth_instance *ablock) {} +int auth_dovecot_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *data) {return 0;} +int auth_dovecot_client(auth_instance *ablock, void * sx, + int timeout, uschar *buffer, int buffsize) {return 0;} + +#else /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/ + + /* Static variables for reading from the socket */ static uschar sbuffer[256]; @@ -118,52 +131,55 @@ actual fields (so last valid offset into ptrs is one less). static int strcut(uschar *str, uschar **ptrs, int nptrs) { - uschar *last_sub_start = str; - int n; - - for (n = 0; n < nptrs; n++) - ptrs[n] = NULL; - n = 1; - - while (*str) { - if (*str == '\t') { - if (n <= nptrs) { - *ptrs++ = last_sub_start; - last_sub_start = str + 1; - *str = '\0'; - } - n++; - } - str++; - } - - /* It's acceptable for the string to end with a tab character. We see - this in AUTH PLAIN without an initial response from the client, which - causing us to send "334 " and get the data from the client. */ - if (n <= nptrs) { - *ptrs = last_sub_start; - } else { - HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot: warning: too many results from tab-splitting; saw %d fields, room for %d\n", n, nptrs); - n = nptrs; - } - - return n <= nptrs ? n : nptrs; +uschar *last_sub_start = str; +int n; + +for (n = 0; n < nptrs; n++) + ptrs[n] = NULL; +n = 1; + +while (*str) + { + if (*str == '\t') + { + if (n <= nptrs) + { + *ptrs++ = last_sub_start; + last_sub_start = str + 1; + *str = '\0'; + } + n++; + } + str++; + } + +/* It's acceptable for the string to end with a tab character. We see +this in AUTH PLAIN without an initial response from the client, which +causing us to send "334 " and get the data from the client. */ +if (n <= nptrs) + *ptrs = last_sub_start; +else + { + HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot: warning: too many results from tab-splitting; saw %d fields, room for %d\n", n, nptrs); + n = nptrs; + } + +return n <= nptrs ? n : nptrs; } static void debug_strcut(uschar **ptrs, int nlen, int alen) ARG_UNUSED; static void debug_strcut(uschar **ptrs, int nlen, int alen) { - int i; - debug_printf("%d read but unreturned bytes; strcut() gave %d results: ", - socket_buffer_left, nlen); - for (i = 0; i < nlen; i++) { - debug_printf(" {%s}", ptrs[i]); - } - if (nlen < alen) - debug_printf(" last is %s\n", ptrs[i] ? ptrs[i] : US""); - else - debug_printf(" (max for capacity)\n"); +int i; +debug_printf("%d read but unreturned bytes; strcut() gave %d results: ", + socket_buffer_left, nlen); +for (i = 0; i < nlen; i++) + debug_printf(" {%s}", ptrs[i]); +if (nlen < alen) + debug_printf(" last is %s\n", ptrs[i] ? ptrs[i] : US""); +else + debug_printf(" (max for capacity)\n"); } #define CHECK_COMMAND(str, arg_min, arg_max) do { \ @@ -199,8 +215,8 @@ for (;;) { if (socket_buffer_left == 0) { - socket_buffer_left = read(fd, sbuffer, sizeof(sbuffer)); - if (socket_buffer_left == 0) { if (count == 0) return NULL; else break; } + if ((socket_buffer_left = read(fd, sbuffer, sizeof(sbuffer))) <= 0) + if (count == 0) return NULL; else break; p = 0; } @@ -228,232 +244,273 @@ return s; * Server entry point * *************************************************/ -int auth_dovecot_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *data) +int +auth_dovecot_server(auth_instance * ablock, uschar * data) { - auth_dovecot_options_block *ob = - (auth_dovecot_options_block *)(ablock->options_block); - struct sockaddr_un sa; - uschar buffer[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXLINELEN]; - uschar *args[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXFIELDCOUNT]; - uschar *auth_command; - uschar *auth_extra_data = US""; - uschar *p; - int nargs, tmp; - int crequid = 1, cont = 1, fd, ret = DEFER; - BOOL found = FALSE; - - HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot authentication\n"); - - memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); - sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; - - /* This was the original code here: it is nonsense because strncpy() - does not return an integer. I have converted this to use the function - that formats and checks length. PH */ - - /* - if (strncpy(sa.sun_path, ob->server_socket, sizeof(sa.sun_path)) < 0) { - */ - - if (!string_format(US sa.sun_path, sizeof(sa.sun_path), "%s", - ob->server_socket)) { - auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket path too long"; - return DEFER; - } - - auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket connection error"; - - fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (fd < 0) - return DEFER; - - if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) - goto out; - - auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket protocol error"; - - socket_buffer_left = 0; /* Global, used to read more than a line but return by line */ - while (cont) { - if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL) - OUT("authentication socket read error or premature eof"); - p = buffer + Ustrlen(buffer) - 1; - if (*p != '\n') { - OUT("authentication socket protocol line too long"); - } - *p = '\0'; - HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer); - nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); - /* HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_strcut(args, nargs, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); */ - - /* Code below rewritten by Kirill Miazine (km@krot.org). Only check commands that - Exim will need. Original code also failed if Dovecot server sent unknown - command. E.g. COOKIE in version 1.1 of the protocol would cause troubles. */ - /* pdp: note that CUID is a per-connection identifier sent by the server, - which increments at server discretion. - By contrast, the "id" field of the protocol is a connection-specific request - identifier, which needs to be unique per request from the client and is not - connected to the CUID value, so we ignore CUID from server. It's purely for - diagnostics. */ - if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"VERSION") == 0) { - CHECK_COMMAND("VERSION", 2, 2); - if (Uatoi(args[1]) != VERSION_MAJOR) - OUT("authentication socket protocol version mismatch"); - } else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"MECH") == 0) { - CHECK_COMMAND("MECH", 1, INT_MAX); - if (strcmpic(US args[1], ablock->public_name) == 0) - found = TRUE; - } else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"DONE") == 0) { - CHECK_COMMAND("DONE", 0, 0); - cont = 0; - } - } - - if (!found) { - auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf("Dovecot did not advertise mechanism \"%s\" to us", ablock->public_name); - goto out; - } - - /* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is - b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */ - - if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL) { - ret = FAIL; - goto out; - } - - /* Added by PH: extra fields when TLS is in use or if the TCP/IP - connection is local. */ - - if (tls_in.cipher != NULL) - auth_extra_data = string_sprintf("secured\t%s%s", - tls_in.certificate_verified? "valid-client-cert" : "", - tls_in.certificate_verified? "\t" : ""); - else if (interface_address != NULL && - Ustrcmp(sender_host_address, interface_address) == 0) - auth_extra_data = US"secured\t"; +auth_dovecot_options_block *ob = + (auth_dovecot_options_block *) ablock->options_block; +struct sockaddr_un sa; +uschar buffer[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXLINELEN]; +uschar *args[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXFIELDCOUNT]; +uschar *auth_command; +uschar *auth_extra_data = US""; +uschar *p; +int nargs, tmp; +int crequid = 1, cont = 1, fd = -1, ret = DEFER; +BOOL found = FALSE, have_mech_line = FALSE; + +HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot authentication\n"); + +if (!data) + { + ret = FAIL; + goto out; + } + +memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); +sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + +/* This was the original code here: it is nonsense because strncpy() +does not return an integer. I have converted this to use the function +that formats and checks length. PH */ + +/* +if (strncpy(sa.sun_path, ob->server_socket, sizeof(sa.sun_path)) < 0) { +} +*/ + +if (!string_format(US sa.sun_path, sizeof(sa.sun_path), "%s", + ob->server_socket)) + { + auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket path too long"; + return DEFER; + } + +auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket connection error"; + +if ((fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) + return DEFER; + +if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) + goto out; + +auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket protocol error"; + +socket_buffer_left = 0; /* Global, used to read more than a line but return by line */ +while (cont) + { + if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL) + OUT("authentication socket read error or premature eof"); + p = buffer + Ustrlen(buffer) - 1; + if (*p != '\n') + OUT("authentication socket protocol line too long"); + + *p = '\0'; + HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer); + + nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); + + /* HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_strcut(args, nargs, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); */ + + /* Code below rewritten by Kirill Miazine (km@krot.org). Only check commands that + Exim will need. Original code also failed if Dovecot server sent unknown + command. E.g. COOKIE in version 1.1 of the protocol would cause troubles. */ + /* pdp: note that CUID is a per-connection identifier sent by the server, + which increments at server discretion. + By contrast, the "id" field of the protocol is a connection-specific request + identifier, which needs to be unique per request from the client and is not + connected to the CUID value, so we ignore CUID from server. It's purely for + diagnostics. */ + + if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"VERSION") == 0) + { + CHECK_COMMAND("VERSION", 2, 2); + if (Uatoi(args[1]) != VERSION_MAJOR) + OUT("authentication socket protocol version mismatch"); + } + else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"MECH") == 0) + { + CHECK_COMMAND("MECH", 1, INT_MAX); + have_mech_line = TRUE; + if (strcmpic(US args[1], ablock->public_name) == 0) + found = TRUE; + } + else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"SPID") == 0) + { + /* Unfortunately the auth protocol handshake wasn't designed well + to differentiate between auth-client/userdb/master. auth-userdb + and auth-master send VERSION + SPID lines only and nothing + afterwards, while auth-client sends VERSION + MECH + SPID + + CUID + more. The simplest way that we can determine if we've + connected to the correct socket is to see if MECH line exists or + not (alternatively we'd have to have a small timeout after SPID + to see if CUID is sent or not). */ + + if (!have_mech_line) + OUT("authentication socket type mismatch" + " (connected to auth-master instead of auth-client)"); + } + else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"DONE") == 0) + { + CHECK_COMMAND("DONE", 0, 0); + cont = 0; + } + } + +if (!found) + { + auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf( + "Dovecot did not advertise mechanism \"%s\" to us", ablock->public_name); + goto out; + } + +/* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is +b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */ + +if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL) + { + ret = FAIL; + goto out; + } + +/* Added by PH: extra fields when TLS is in use or if the TCP/IP +connection is local. */ + +if (tls_in.cipher != NULL) + auth_extra_data = string_sprintf("secured\t%s%s", + tls_in.certificate_verified? "valid-client-cert" : "", + tls_in.certificate_verified? "\t" : ""); + +else if ( interface_address != NULL + && Ustrcmp(sender_host_address, interface_address) == 0) + auth_extra_data = US"secured\t"; /**************************************************************************** - The code below was the original code here. It didn't work. A reading of the - file auth-protocol.txt.gz that came with Dovecot 1.0_beta8 indicated that - this was not right. Maybe something changed. I changed it to move the - service indication into the AUTH command, and it seems to be better. PH - - fprintf(f, "VERSION\t%d\t%d\r\nSERVICE\tSMTP\r\nCPID\t%d\r\n" - "AUTH\t%d\t%s\trip=%s\tlip=%s\tresp=%s\r\n", - VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), cuid, - ablock->public_name, sender_host_address, interface_address, - data ? (char *) data : ""); - - Subsequently, the command was modified to add "secured" and "valid-client- - cert" when relevant. +The code below was the original code here. It didn't work. A reading of the +file auth-protocol.txt.gz that came with Dovecot 1.0_beta8 indicated that +this was not right. Maybe something changed. I changed it to move the +service indication into the AUTH command, and it seems to be better. PH + +fprintf(f, "VERSION\t%d\t%d\r\nSERVICE\tSMTP\r\nCPID\t%d\r\n" + "AUTH\t%d\t%s\trip=%s\tlip=%s\tresp=%s\r\n", + VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), cuid, + ablock->public_name, sender_host_address, interface_address, + data ? CS data : ""); + +Subsequently, the command was modified to add "secured" and "valid-client- +cert" when relevant. ****************************************************************************/ - auth_command = string_sprintf("VERSION\t%d\t%d\nCPID\t%d\n" - "AUTH\t%d\t%s\tservice=smtp\t%srip=%s\tlip=%s\tnologin\tresp=%s\n", - VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), crequid, - ablock->public_name, auth_extra_data, sender_host_address, - interface_address, data ? (char *) data : ""); - - if (write(fd, auth_command, Ustrlen(auth_command)) < 0) - HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("error sending auth_command: %s\n", - strerror(errno)); - - HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("sent: %s", auth_command); - - while (1) { - uschar *temp; - uschar *auth_id_pre = NULL; - int i; - - if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL) { - auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket read error or premature eof"; - goto out; - } - - buffer[Ustrlen(buffer) - 1] = 0; - HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer); - nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); - - if (Uatoi(args[1]) != crequid) - OUT("authentication socket connection id mismatch"); - - switch (toupper(*args[0])) { - case 'C': - CHECK_COMMAND("CONT", 1, 2); - - tmp = auth_get_no64_data(&data, US args[2]); - if (tmp != OK) { - ret = tmp; - goto out; - } - - /* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is - b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */ - - if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL) { - ret = FAIL; - goto out; - } - - temp = string_sprintf("CONT\t%d\t%s\n", crequid, data); - if (write(fd, temp, Ustrlen(temp)) < 0) - OUT("authentication socket write error"); - break; - - case 'F': - CHECK_COMMAND("FAIL", 1, -1); - - for (i=2; (ipublic_name, auth_extra_data, sender_host_address, + interface_address, data); + +if (write(fd, auth_command, Ustrlen(auth_command)) < 0) + HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("error sending auth_command: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + +HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("sent: %s", auth_command); + +while (1) + { + uschar *temp; + uschar *auth_id_pre = NULL; + int i; + + if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL) + { + auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket read error or premature eof"; + goto out; + } + + buffer[Ustrlen(buffer) - 1] = 0; + HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer); + nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); + + if (Uatoi(args[1]) != crequid) + OUT("authentication socket connection id mismatch"); + + switch (toupper(*args[0])) + { + case 'C': + CHECK_COMMAND("CONT", 1, 2); + + if ((tmp = auth_get_no64_data(&data, US args[2])) != OK) + { + ret = tmp; + goto out; + } + + /* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is + b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */ + + if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL) + { + ret = FAIL; + goto out; + } + + temp = string_sprintf("CONT\t%d\t%s\n", crequid, data); + if (write(fd, temp, Ustrlen(temp)) < 0) + OUT("authentication socket write error"); + break; + + case 'F': + CHECK_COMMAND("FAIL", 1, -1); + + for (i=2; (i= 0) - close(fd); +/* close the socket used by dovecot */ +if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); - /* Expand server_condition as an authorization check */ - return (ret == OK)? auth_check_serv_cond(ablock) : ret; +/* Expand server_condition as an authorization check */ +return ret == OK ? auth_check_serv_cond(ablock) : ret; } + + +#endif /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/