X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/a4e3111f2b200abc53c4a23133698d765e201600..1c519e07b908a314ce7bdfceb6baa9e18e302dfc:/src/src/configure.default diff --git a/src/src/configure.default b/src/src/configure.default index da3f99601..cf38305e5 100644 --- a/src/src/configure.default +++ b/src/src/configure.default @@ -1,5 +1,3 @@ -# $Cambridge: exim/src/src/configure.default,v 1.3 2005/05/10 14:48:07 ph10 Exp $ - ###################################################################### # Runtime configuration file for Exim # ###################################################################### @@ -11,7 +9,7 @@ # configuration file. There are many more than are mentioned here. The # manual is in the file doc/spec.txt in the Exim distribution as a plain # ASCII file. Other formats (PostScript, Texinfo, HTML, PDF) are available -# from the Exim ftp sites. The manual is also online at the Exim web sites. +# from the Exim ftp sites. The manual is also online at the Exim website. # This file is divided into several parts, all but the first of which are @@ -39,9 +37,22 @@ +###################################################################### +# MACROS # +###################################################################### +# + +# If you want to use a smarthost instead of sending directly to recipient +# domains, uncomment this macro definition and set a real hostname. +# An appropriately privileged user can then redirect email on the command-line +# in emergencies, via -D. +# +# ROUTER_SMARTHOST=MAIL.HOSTNAME.FOR.CENTRAL.SERVER.EXAMPLE + ###################################################################### # MAIN CONFIGURATION SETTINGS # ###################################################################### +# # Specify your host's canonical name here. This should normally be the fully # qualified "official" name of your host. If this option is not set, the @@ -58,12 +69,14 @@ domainlist local_domains = @ domainlist relay_to_domains = -hostlist relay_from_hosts = 127.0.0.1 +hostlist relay_from_hosts = localhost +# (We rely upon hostname resolution working for localhost, because the default +# uncommented configuration needs to work in IPv4-only environments.) # Most straightforward access control requirements can be obtained by -# appropriate settings of the above options. In more complicated situations, you -# may need to modify the Access Control List (ACL) which appears later in this -# file. +# appropriate settings of the above options. In more complicated situations, +# you may need to modify the Access Control Lists (ACLs) which appear later in +# this file. # The first setting specifies your local domains, for example: # @@ -93,20 +106,24 @@ hostlist relay_from_hosts = 127.0.0.1 # to any other host on the Internet. Such a setting commonly refers to a # complete local network as well as the localhost. For example: # -# hostlist relay_from_hosts = 127.0.0.1 : 192.168.0.0/16 +# hostlist relay_from_hosts = <; 127.0.0.1 ; ::1 ; 192.168.0.0/16 # # The "/16" is a bit mask (CIDR notation), not a number of hosts. Note that you # have to include 127.0.0.1 if you want to allow processes on your host to send # SMTP mail by using the loopback address. A number of MUAs use this method of -# sending mail. +# sending mail. Often, connections are made to "localhost", which might be ::1 +# on IPv6-enabled hosts. Do not forget CIDR for your IPv6 networks. # All three of these lists may contain many different kinds of item, including # wildcarded names, regular expressions, and file lookups. See the reference # manual for details. The lists above are used in the access control lists for # checking incoming messages. The names of these ACLs are defined here: -acl_smtp_rcpt = acl_check_rcpt -acl_smtp_data = acl_check_data +acl_smtp_rcpt = acl_check_rcpt +.ifdef _HAVE_PRDR +acl_smtp_data_prdr = acl_check_prdr +.endif +acl_smtp_data = acl_check_data # You should not change those settings until you understand how ACLs work. @@ -130,6 +147,43 @@ acl_smtp_data = acl_check_data # spamd_address = 127.0.0.1 783 +# If Exim is compiled with support for TLS, you may want to enable the +# following options so that Exim allows clients to make encrypted +# connections. In the authenticators section below, there are template +# configurations for plaintext username/password authentication. This kind +# of authentication is only safe when used within a TLS connection, so the +# authenticators will only work if the following TLS settings are turned on +# as well. + +# Allow any client to use TLS. + +# tls_advertise_hosts = * + +# Specify the location of the Exim server's TLS certificate and private key. +# The private key must not be encrypted (password protected). You can put +# the certificate and private key in the same file, in which case you only +# need the first setting, or in separate files, in which case you need both +# options. + +# tls_certificate = /etc/ssl/exim.crt +# tls_privatekey = /etc/ssl/exim.pem + +# For OpenSSL, prefer EC- over RSA-authenticated ciphers +# tls_require_ciphers = ECDSA:RSA:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT + +# In order to support roaming users who wish to send email from anywhere, +# you may want to make Exim listen on other ports as well as port 25, in +# case these users need to send email from a network that blocks port 25. +# The standard port for this purpose is port 587, the "message submission" +# port. See RFC 4409 for details. Microsoft MUAs cannot be configured to +# talk the message submission protocol correctly, so if you need to support +# them you should also allow TLS-on-connect on the traditional but +# non-standard port 465. + +# daemon_smtp_ports = 25 : 465 : 587 +# tls_on_connect_ports = 465 + + # Specify the domain you want to be added to all unqualified addresses # here. An unqualified address is one that does not contain an "@" character # followed by a domain. For example, "caesar@rome.example" is a fully qualified @@ -161,14 +215,15 @@ acl_smtp_data = acl_check_data # allow_domain_literals -# No deliveries will ever be run under the uids of these users (a colon- -# separated list). An attempt to do so causes a panic error to be logged, and -# the delivery to be deferred. This is a paranoic safety catch. There is an -# even stronger safety catch in the form of the FIXED_NEVER_USERS setting -# in the configuration for building Exim. The list of users that it specifies -# is built into the binary, and cannot be changed. The option below just adds -# additional users to the list. The default for FIXED_NEVER_USERS is "root", -# but just to be absolutely sure, the default here is also "root". +# No deliveries will ever be run under the uids of users specified by +# never_users (a colon-separated list). An attempt to do so causes a panic +# error to be logged, and the delivery to be deferred. This is a paranoic +# safety catch. There is an even stronger safety catch in the form of the +# FIXED_NEVER_USERS setting in the configuration for building Exim. The list of +# users that it specifies is built into the binary, and cannot be changed. The +# option below just adds additional users to the list. The default for +# FIXED_NEVER_USERS is "root", but just to be absolutely sure, the default here +# is also "root". # Note that the default setting means you cannot deliver mail addressed to root # as if it were a normal user. This isn't usually a problem, as most sites have @@ -185,17 +240,40 @@ never_users = root host_lookup = * -# The settings below, which are actually the same as the defaults in the -# code, cause Exim to make RFC 1413 (ident) callbacks for all incoming SMTP -# calls. You can limit the hosts to which these calls are made, and/or change -# the timeout that is used. If you set the timeout to zero, all RFC 1413 calls -# are disabled. RFC 1413 calls are cheap and can provide useful information -# for tracing problem messages, but some hosts and firewalls have problems -# with them. This can result in a timeout instead of an immediate refused -# connection, leading to delays on starting up an SMTP session. +# The setting below causes Exim to try to initialize the system resolver +# library with DNSSEC support. It has no effect if your library lacks +# DNSSEC support. -rfc1413_hosts = * -rfc1413_query_timeout = 30s +dns_dnssec_ok = 1 + + +# The settings below cause Exim to make RFC 1413 (ident) callbacks +# for all incoming SMTP calls. You can limit the hosts to which these +# calls are made, and/or change the timeout that is used. If you set +# the timeout to zero, all RFC 1413 calls are disabled. RFC 1413 calls +# are cheap and can provide useful information for tracing problem +# messages, but some hosts and firewalls have problems with them. +# This can result in a timeout instead of an immediate refused +# connection, leading to delays on starting up SMTP sessions. +# (The default was reduced from 30s to 5s for release 4.61. and to +# disabled for release 4.86) +# +#rfc1413_hosts = * +#rfc1413_query_timeout = 5s + + +# Enable an efficiency feature. We advertise the feature; clients +# may request to use it. For multi-recipient mails we then can +# reject or accept per-user after the message is received. +# This supports recipient-dependent content filtering; without it +# you have to temp-reject any recipients after the first that have +# incompatible filtering, and do the filtering in the data ACL. +# Even with this enabled, you must support the old style for peers +# not flagging support for PRDR (visible via $prdr_requested). +# +.ifdef _HAVE_PRDR +prdr_enable = true +.endif # By default, Exim expects all envelope addresses to be fully qualified, that @@ -211,6 +289,13 @@ rfc1413_query_timeout = 30s # and/or qualify_recipient (see above). +# Unless you run a high-volume site you probably want more logging +# detail than the default. Adjust to suit. + +log_selector = +smtp_protocol_error +smtp_syntax_error \ + +tls_certificate_verified + + # If you want Exim to support the "percent hack" for certain domains, # uncomment the following line and provide a list of domains. The "percent # hack" is the feature by which mail addressed to x%y@z (where z is one of @@ -240,6 +325,54 @@ ignore_bounce_errors_after = 2d timeout_frozen_after = 7d +# By default, messages that are waiting on Exim's queue are all held in a +# single directory called "input" which it itself within Exim's spool +# directory. (The default spool directory is specified when Exim is built, and +# is often /var/spool/exim/.) Exim works best when its queue is kept short, but +# there are circumstances where this is not always possible. If you uncomment +# the setting below, messages on the queue are held in 62 subdirectories of +# "input" instead of all in the same directory. The subdirectories are called +# 0, 1, ... A, B, ... a, b, ... z. This has two benefits: (1) If your file +# system degrades with many files in one directory, this is less likely to +# happen; (2) Exim can process the queue one subdirectory at a time instead of +# all at once, which can give better performance with large queues. + +# split_spool_directory = true + + +# If you're in a part of the world where ASCII is not sufficient for most +# text, then you're probably familiar with RFC2047 message header extensions. +# By default, Exim adheres to the specification, including a limit of 76 +# characters to a line, with encoded words fitting within a line. +# If you wish to use decoded headers in message filters in such a way +# that successful decoding of malformed messages matters, you may wish to +# configure Exim to be more lenient. +# +# check_rfc2047_length = false +# +# In particular, the Exim maintainers have had multiple reports of problems +# from Russian administrators of issues until they disable this check, +# because of some popular, yet buggy, mail composition software. + + +# If you wish to be strictly RFC compliant, or if you know you'll be +# exchanging email with systems that are not 8-bit clean, then you may +# wish to disable advertising 8BITMIME. Uncomment this option to do so. + +# accept_8bitmime = false + + +# Exim does not make use of environment variables itself. However, +# libraries that Exim uses (e.g. LDAP) depend on specific environment settings. +# There are two lists: keep_environment for the variables we trust, and +# add_environment for variables we want to set to a specific value. +# Note that TZ is handled separately by the timezone runtime option +# and TIMEZONE_DEFAULT buildtime option. + +# keep_environment = ^LDAP +# add_environment = PATH=/usr/bin::/bin + + ###################################################################### # ACL CONFIGURATION # @@ -258,6 +391,7 @@ acl_check_rcpt: # testing for an empty sending host field. accept hosts = : + control = dkim_disable_verify ############################################################################# # The following section of the ACL is concerned with local parts that contain @@ -279,21 +413,26 @@ acl_check_rcpt: # # Two different rules are used. The first one is stricter, and is applied to # messages that are addressed to one of the local domains handled by this - # host. It blocks local parts that begin with a dot or contain @ % ! / or |. - # If you have local accounts that include these characters, you will have to - # modify this rule. + # host. The line "domains = +local_domains" restricts it to domains that are + # defined by the "domainlist local_domains" setting above. The rule blocks + # local parts that begin with a dot or contain @ % ! / or |. If you have + # local accounts that include these characters, you will have to modify this + # rule. deny message = Restricted characters in address domains = +local_domains local_parts = ^[.] : ^.*[@%!/|] - # The second rule applies to all other domains, and is less strict. This - # allows your own users to send outgoing messages to sites that use slashes - # and vertical bars in their local parts. It blocks local parts that begin - # with a dot, slash, or vertical bar, but allows these characters within the - # local part. However, the sequence /../ is barred. The use of @ % and ! is - # blocked, as before. The motivation here is to prevent your users (or - # your users' viruses) from mounting certain kinds of attack on remote sites. + # The second rule applies to all other domains, and is less strict. The line + # "domains = !+local_domains" restricts it to domains that are NOT defined by + # the "domainlist local_domains" setting above. The exclamation mark is a + # negating operator. This rule allows your own users to send outgoing + # messages to sites that use slashes and vertical bars in their local parts. + # It blocks local parts that begin with a dot, slash, or vertical bar, but + # allows these characters within the local part. However, the sequence /../ + # is barred. The use of @ % and ! is blocked, as before. The motivation here + # is to prevent your users (or your users' viruses) from mounting certain + # kinds of attack on remote sites. deny message = Restricted characters in address domains = !+local_domains @@ -310,18 +449,70 @@ acl_check_rcpt: require verify = sender + # Accept if the message comes from one of the hosts for which we are an + # outgoing relay. It is assumed that such hosts are most likely to be MUAs, + # so we set control=submission to make Exim treat the message as a + # submission. It will fix up various errors in the message, for example, the + # lack of a Date: header line. If you are actually relaying out out from + # MTAs, you may want to disable this. If you are handling both relaying from + # MTAs and submissions from MUAs you should probably split them into two + # lists, and handle them differently. + + # Recipient verification is omitted here, because in many cases the clients + # are dumb MUAs that don't cope well with SMTP error responses. If you are + # actually relaying out from MTAs, you should probably add recipient + # verification here. + + # Note that, by putting this test before any DNS black list checks, you will + # always accept from these hosts, even if they end up on a black list. The + # assumption is that they are your friends, and if they get onto a black + # list, it is a mistake. + + accept hosts = +relay_from_hosts + control = submission + control = dkim_disable_verify + + # Accept if the message arrived over an authenticated connection, from + # any host. Again, these messages are usually from MUAs, so recipient + # verification is omitted, and submission mode is set. And again, we do this + # check before any black list tests. + + accept authenticated = * + control = submission + control = dkim_disable_verify + + # Insist that a HELO/EHLO was accepted. + + require message = nice hosts say HELO first + condition = ${if def:sender_helo_name} + + # Insist that any other recipient address that we accept is either in one of + # our local domains, or is in a domain for which we explicitly allow + # relaying. Any other domain is rejected as being unacceptable for relaying. + + require message = relay not permitted + domains = +local_domains : +relay_to_domains + + # We also require all accepted addresses to be verifiable. This check will + # do local part verification for local domains, but only check the domain + # for remote domains. The only way to check local parts for the remote + # relay domains is to use a callout (add /callout), but please read the + # documentation about callouts before doing this. + + require verify = recipient + ############################################################################# - # There are no checks on DNS "black" lists because the domains that contain - # these lists are changing all the time. However, here are two examples of - # how you could get Exim to perform a DNS black list lookup at this point. - # The first one denies, while the second just warns. + # There are no default checks on DNS black lists because the domains that + # contain these lists are changing all the time. However, here are two + # examples of how you can get Exim to perform a DNS black list lookup at this + # point. The first one denies, whereas the second just warns. # # deny message = rejected because $sender_host_address is in a black list at $dnslist_domain\n$dnslist_text # dnslists = black.list.example # - # warn message = X-Warning: $sender_host_address is in a black list at $dnslist_domain + # warn dnslists = black.list.example + # add_header = X-Warning: $sender_host_address is in a black list at $dnslist_domain # log_message = found in $dnslist_domain - # dnslists = black.list.example ############################################################################# ############################################################################# @@ -335,44 +526,44 @@ acl_check_rcpt: # require verify = csa ############################################################################# - # Accept if the address is in a local domain, but only if the recipient can - # be verified. Otherwise deny. The "endpass" line is the border between - # passing on to the next ACL statement (if tests above it fail) or denying - # access (if tests below it fail). - - accept domains = +local_domains - endpass - verify = recipient - - # Accept if the address is in a domain for which we are relaying, but again, - # only if the recipient can be verified. - - accept domains = +relay_to_domains - endpass - verify = recipient - - # If control reaches this point, the domain is neither in +local_domains - # nor in +relay_to_domains. + ############################################################################# + # If doing per-user content filtering then recipients with filters different + # to the first recipient must be deferred unless the sender talks PRDR. + # + # defer !condition = $prdr_requested + # condition = ${if > {0}{$receipients_count}} + # condition = ${if !eq {$acl_m_content_filter} \ + # {${lookup PER_RCPT_CONTENT_FILTER}}} + # warn !condition = $prdr_requested + # condition = ${if > {0}{$receipients_count}} + # set acl_m_content_filter = ${lookup PER_RCPT_CONTENT_FILTER} + ############################################################################# - # Accept if the message comes from one of the hosts for which we are an - # outgoing relay. Recipient verification is omitted here, because in many - # cases the clients are dumb MUAs that don't cope well with SMTP error - # responses. If you are actually relaying out from MTAs, you should probably - # add recipient verification here. + # At this point, the address has passed all the checks that have been + # configured, so we accept it unconditionally. - accept hosts = +relay_from_hosts + accept - # Accept if the message arrived over an authenticated connection, from - # any host. Again, these messages are usually from MUAs, so recipient - # verification is omitted. - accept authenticated = * +# This ACL is used once per recipient, for multi-recipient messages, if +# we advertised PRDR. It can be used to perform receipient-dependent +# header- and body- based filtering and rejections. +# We set a variable to record that PRDR was active used, so that checking +# in the data ACL can be skipped. - # Reaching the end of the ACL causes a "deny", but we might as well give - # an explicit message. +.ifdef _HAVE_PRDR +acl_check_prdr: + warn set acl_m_did_prdr = y - deny message = relay not permitted + ############################################################################# + # do lookup on filtering, with $local_part@$domain, deny on filter match + # + # deny set acl_m_content_filter = ${lookup PER_RCPT_CONTENT_FILTER} + # condition = ... + ############################################################################# + accept +.endif # This ACL is used after the contents of a message have been received. This # is the ACL in which you can test a message's headers or body, and in @@ -384,21 +575,47 @@ acl_check_rcpt: acl_check_data: + # Deny if the message contains an overlong line. Per the standards + # we should never receive one such via SMTP. + # + deny message = maximum allowed line length is 998 octets, \ + got $max_received_linelength + condition = ${if > {$max_received_linelength}{998}} + + # Deny if the headers contain badly-formed addresses. + # + deny !verify = header_syntax + message = header syntax + log_message = header syntax ($acl_verify_message) + # Deny if the message contains a virus. Before enabling this check, you # must install a virus scanner and set the av_scanner option above. # - # deny malware = * - # message = This message contains a virus ($malware_name). + # deny malware = * + # message = This message contains a virus ($malware_name). # Add headers to a message if it is judged to be spam. Before enabling this, # you must install SpamAssassin. You may also need to set the spamd_address # option above. # - # warn spam = nobody - # message = X-Spam_score: $spam_score\n\ - # X-Spam_score_int: $spam_score_int\n\ - # X-Spam_bar: $spam_bar\n\ - # X-Spam_report: $spam_report + # warn spam = nobody + # add_header = X-Spam_score: $spam_score\n\ + # X-Spam_score_int: $spam_score_int\n\ + # X-Spam_bar: $spam_bar\n\ + # X-Spam_report: $spam_report + + ############################################################################# + # No more tests if PRDR was actively used. + # accept condition = ${if def:acl_m_did_prdr} + # + # To get here, all message recipients must have identical per-user + # content filtering (enforced by RCPT ACL). Do lookup for filter + # and deny on match. + # + # deny set acl_m_content_filter = ${lookup PER_RCPT_CONTENT_FILTER} + # condition = ... + ############################################################################# + # Accept the message. @@ -431,23 +648,54 @@ begin routers # transport = remote_smtp +# This router can be used when you want to send all mail to a +# server which handles DNS lookups for you; an ISP will typically run such +# a server for their customers. The hostname in route_data comes from the +# macro defined at the top of the file. If not defined, then we'll use the +# dnslookup router below instead. +# Beware that the hostname is specified again in the Transport. + +.ifdef ROUTER_SMARTHOST + +smarthost: + driver = manualroute + domains = ! +local_domains + transport = smarthost_smtp + route_data = ROUTER_SMARTHOST + ignore_target_hosts = <; 0.0.0.0 ; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1 + no_more + +.else + # This router routes addresses that are not in local domains by doing a DNS -# lookup on the domain name. Any domain that resolves to 0.0.0.0 or to a -# loopback interface address (127.0.0.0/8) is treated as if it had no DNS -# entry. Note that 0.0.0.0 is the same as 0.0.0.0/32, which is commonly treated -# as the local host inside the network stack. It is not 0.0.0.0/0, the default -# route. If the DNS lookup fails, no further routers are tried because of -# the no_more setting, and consequently the address is unrouteable. +# lookup on the domain name. The exclamation mark that appears in "domains = ! +# +local_domains" is a negating operator, that is, it can be read as "not". The +# recipient's domain must not be one of those defined by "domainlist +# local_domains" above for this router to be used. +# +# If the router is used, any domain that resolves to 0.0.0.0 or to a loopback +# interface address (127.0.0.0/8) is treated as if it had no DNS entry. Note +# that 0.0.0.0 is the same as 0.0.0.0/32, which is commonly treated as the +# local host inside the network stack. It is not 0.0.0.0/0, the default route. +# If the DNS lookup fails, no further routers are tried because of the no_more +# setting, and consequently the address is unrouteable. dnslookup: driver = dnslookup domains = ! +local_domains transport = remote_smtp ignore_target_hosts = 0.0.0.0 : 127.0.0.0/8 +# if ipv6-enabled then instead use: +# ignore_target_hosts = <; 0.0.0.0 ; 127.0.0.0/8 ; ::1 no_more +# This closes the ROUTER_SMARTHOST ifdef around the choice of routing for +# off-site mail. +.endif + -# The remaining routers handle addresses in the local domain(s). +# The remaining routers handle addresses in the local domain(s), that is those +# domains that are defined by "domainlist local_domains" above. # This router handles aliasing using a linearly searched alias file with the @@ -485,16 +733,18 @@ system_aliases: # file starts with the string "# Exim filter" or "# Sieve filter", uncomment # the "allow_filter" option. -# If you want this router to treat local parts with suffixes introduced by "-" -# or "+" characters as if the suffixes did not exist, uncomment the two local_ -# part_suffix options. Then, for example, xxxx-foo@your.domain will be treated -# in the same way as xxxx@your.domain by this router. You probably want to make -# the same change to the localuser router. - # The no_verify setting means that this router is skipped when Exim is # verifying addresses. Similarly, no_expn means that this router is skipped if # Exim is processing an EXPN command. +# If you want this router to treat local parts with suffixes introduced by "-" +# or "+" characters as if the suffixes did not exist, uncomment the two local_ +# part_suffix options. Then, for example, xxxx-foo@your.domain will be treated +# in the same way as xxxx@your.domain by this router. Because this router is +# not used for verification, if you choose to uncomment those options, then you +# will *need* to make the same change to the localuser router. (There are +# other approaches, if this is undesirable, but they add complexity). + # The check_ancestor option means that if the forward file generates an # address that is an ancestor of the current one, the current one gets # passed on instead. This covers the case where A is aliased to B and B @@ -551,9 +801,57 @@ begin transports # This transport is used for delivering messages over SMTP connections. +# Refuse to send any message with over-long lines, which could have +# been received other than via SMTP. The use of message_size_limit to +# enforce this is a red herring. remote_smtp: driver = smtp + message_size_limit = ${if > {$max_received_linelength}{998} {1}{0}} +.ifdef _HAVE_PRDR + hosts_try_prdr = * +.endif + + +# This transport is used for delivering messages to a smarthost, if the +# smarthost router is enabled. This starts from the same basis as +# "remote_smtp" but then turns on various security options, because +# we assume that if you're told "use smarthost.example.org as the smarthost" +# then there will be TLS available, with a verifiable certificate for that +# hostname, using decent TLS. + +smarthost_smtp: + driver = smtp + message_size_limit = ${if > {$max_received_linelength}{998} {1}{0}} + multi_domain + # +.ifdef _HAVE_TLS + # Comment out any of these which you have to, then file a Support + # request with your smarthost provider to get things fixed: + hosts_require_tls = * + tls_verify_hosts = * + # As long as tls_verify_hosts is enabled, this won't matter, but if you + # have to comment it out then this will at least log whether you succeed + # or not: + tls_try_verify_hosts = * + # + # The SNI name should match the name which we'll expect to verify; + # many mail systems don't use SNI and this doesn't matter, but if it does, + # we need to send a name which the remote site will recognize. + # This _should_ be the name which the smarthost operators specified as + # the hostname for sending your mail to. + tls_sni = ROUTER_SMARTHOST + # +.ifdef _HAVE_OPENSSL + tls_require_ciphers = HIGH:!aNULL:@STRENGTH +.endif +.ifdef _HAVE_GNUTLS + tls_require_ciphers = SECURE192:-VERS-SSL3.0:-VERS-TLS1.0:-VERS-TLS1.1 +.endif +.endif +.ifdef _HAVE_PRDR + hosts_try_prdr = * +.endif # This transport is used for local delivery to user mailboxes in traditional @@ -616,6 +914,12 @@ begin retry # hours, then retries every 6 hours until 4 days have passed since the first # failed delivery. +# WARNING: If you do not have any retry rules at all (this section of the +# configuration is non-existent or empty), Exim will not do any retries of +# messages that fail to get delivered at the first attempt. The effect will +# be to treat temporary errors as permanent. Therefore, DO NOT remove this +# retry rule unless you really don't want any retries. + # Address or Domain Error Retries # ----------------- ----- ------- @@ -637,10 +941,49 @@ begin rewrite # AUTHENTICATION CONFIGURATION # ###################################################################### -# There are no authenticator specifications in this default configuration file. +# The following authenticators support plaintext username/password +# authentication using the standard PLAIN mechanism and the traditional +# but non-standard LOGIN mechanism, with Exim acting as the server. +# PLAIN and LOGIN are enough to support most MUA software. +# +# These authenticators are not complete: you need to change the +# server_condition settings to specify how passwords are verified. +# They are set up to offer authentication to the client only if the +# connection is encrypted with TLS, so you also need to add support +# for TLS. See the global configuration options section at the start +# of this file for more about TLS. +# +# The default RCPT ACL checks for successful authentication, and will accept +# messages from authenticated users from anywhere on the Internet. begin authenticators +# PLAIN authentication has no server prompts. The client sends its +# credentials in one lump, containing an authorization ID (which we do not +# use), an authentication ID, and a password. The latter two appear as +# $auth2 and $auth3 in the configuration and should be checked against a +# valid username and password. In a real configuration you would typically +# use $auth2 as a lookup key, and compare $auth3 against the result of the +# lookup, perhaps using the crypteq{}{} condition. + +#PLAIN: +# driver = plaintext +# server_set_id = $auth2 +# server_prompts = : +# server_condition = Authentication is not yet configured +# server_advertise_condition = ${if def:tls_in_cipher } + +# LOGIN authentication has traditional prompts and responses. There is no +# authorization ID in this mechanism, so unlike PLAIN the username and +# password are $auth1 and $auth2. Apart from that you can use the same +# server_condition setting for both authenticators. + +#LOGIN: +# driver = plaintext +# server_set_id = $auth1 +# server_prompts = <| Username: | Password: +# server_condition = Authentication is not yet configured +# server_advertise_condition = ${if def:tls_in_cipher } ######################################################################