X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/979c462ed43bd4f53f61a0031ec22967dea83902..a85c067ba6c6940512cf57ec213277a370d87e70:/src/src/dns.c diff --git a/src/src/dns.c b/src/src/dns.c index 8d9ec4708..8106fb688 100644 --- a/src/src/dns.c +++ b/src/src/dns.c @@ -2,8 +2,10 @@ * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * *************************************************/ +/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2022 */ /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */ /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* Functions for interfacing with the DNS. */ @@ -60,7 +62,8 @@ if (stat(CS utilname, &statbuf) >= 0) int infd, outfd, rc; uschar *argv[5]; - DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %s (%s) using fakens\n", name, dns_text_type(type)); + DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %s (%s) using fakens\n", + name, dns_text_type(type)); argv[0] = utilname; argv[1] = config_main_directory; @@ -68,7 +71,7 @@ if (stat(CS utilname, &statbuf) >= 0) argv[3] = dns_text_type(type); argv[4] = NULL; - pid = child_open(argv, NULL, 0000, &infd, &outfd, FALSE); + pid = child_open(argv, NULL, 0000, &infd, &outfd, FALSE, US"fakens-search"); if (pid < 0) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "failed to run fakens: %s", strerror(errno)); @@ -221,16 +224,15 @@ a name that can be used to look up PTR records. Arguments: string the IP address as a string - buffer a suitable buffer, long enough to hold the result -Returns: nothing +Returns: an allocated string */ -void -dns_build_reverse(const uschar *string, uschar *buffer) +uschar * +dns_build_reverse(const uschar * string) { -const uschar *p = string + Ustrlen(string); -uschar *pp = buffer; +const uschar * p = string + Ustrlen(string); +gstring * g = NULL; /* Handle IPv4 address */ @@ -240,14 +242,13 @@ if (Ustrchr(string, ':') == NULL) { for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - const uschar *ppp = p; + const uschar * ppp = p; while (ppp > string && ppp[-1] != '.') ppp--; - Ustrncpy(pp, ppp, p - ppp); - pp += p - ppp; - *pp++ = '.'; + g = string_catn(g, ppp, p - ppp); + g = string_catn(g, US".", 1); p = ppp - 1; } - Ustrcpy(pp, US"in-addr.arpa"); + g = string_catn(g, US"in-addr.arpa", 12); } /* Handle IPv6 address; convert to binary so as to fill out any @@ -257,6 +258,8 @@ abbreviation in the textual form. */ else { int v6[4]; + + g = string_get_tainted(32, string); (void)host_aton(string, v6); /* The original specification for IPv6 reverse lookup was to invert each @@ -265,8 +268,8 @@ else for (int i = 3; i >= 0; i--) for (int j = 0; j < 32; j += 4) - pp += sprintf(CS pp, "%x.", (v6[i] >> j) & 15); - Ustrcpy(pp, US"ip6.arpa."); + g = string_fmt_append(g, "%x.", (v6[i] >> j) & 15); + g = string_catn(g, US"ip6.arpa.", 9); /* Another way of doing IPv6 reverse lookups was proposed in conjunction with A6 records. However, it fell out of favour when they did. The @@ -290,6 +293,7 @@ else } #endif +return string_from_gstring(g); } @@ -331,7 +335,6 @@ char * trace = NULL; #ifdef rr_trace # define TRACE DEBUG(D_dns) #else -trace = trace; # define TRACE if (FALSE) #endif @@ -499,6 +502,8 @@ const uschar * auth_name; const uschar * trusted; if (dnsa->answerlen < 0) return FALSE; +/* Beware that newer versions of glibc on Linux will filter out the ad bit +unless their shiny new RES_TRUSTAD bit is set for the resolver. */ if (h->ad) return TRUE; /* If the resolver we ask is authoritative for the domain in question, it may @@ -511,7 +516,7 @@ if ( !h->aa || !(trusted = expand_string(dns_trust_aa)) || !*trusted || !(auth_name = dns_extract_auth_name(dnsa)) - || OK != match_isinlist(auth_name, &trusted, 0, NULL, NULL, + || OK != match_isinlist(auth_name, &trusted, 0, &domainlist_anchor, NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL) ) return FALSE; @@ -633,7 +638,7 @@ if ((previous = tree_search(tree_dns_fails, node_name))) e = previous->data.ptr; else { - e = store_get_perm(DNS_FAILNODE_SIZE, is_tainted(name)); + e = store_get_perm(DNS_FAILNODE_SIZE, name); new = (void *)(e+1); dns_fail_tag(new->name, name, type); new->data.ptr = e; @@ -667,13 +672,10 @@ e = previous->data.ptr; val = e->data.val; rc = e->expiry && e->expiry <= time(NULL) ? -1 : val; -DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %.255s-%s: %scached value %s%s\n", +DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %.255s (%s): %scached value %s%s\n", name, dns_text_type(type), rc == -1 ? "" : "using ", - val == DNS_NOMATCH ? "DNS_NOMATCH" : - val == DNS_NODATA ? "DNS_NODATA" : - val == DNS_AGAIN ? "DNS_AGAIN" : - val == DNS_FAIL ? "DNS_FAIL" : "??", + dns_rc_names[val], rc == -1 ? " past valid time" : ""); return rc; @@ -681,17 +683,6 @@ return rc; -/* Return the TTL suitable for an NXDOMAIN result, which is given -in the SOA. We hope that one was returned in the lookup, and do not -bother doing a separate lookup; if not found return a forever TTL. -*/ - -time_t -dns_expire_from_soa(dns_answer * dnsa) -{ -const HEADER * h = (const HEADER *)dnsa->answer; -dns_scan dnss; - /* This is really gross. The successful return value from res_search() is the packet length, which is stored in dnsa->answerlen. If we get a negative DNS reply then res_search() returns -1, which causes the bounds @@ -701,44 +692,76 @@ packet length has been lost inside libresolv, so we have to guess a replacement value. (The only way to fix this properly would be to re-implement res_search() and res_query() so that they don't muddle their success and packet length return values.) For added safety we only reset -the packet length if the packet header looks plausible. */ +the packet length if the packet header looks plausible. + +Return TRUE iff it seemed ok */ + +static BOOL +fake_dnsa_len_for_fail(dns_answer * dnsa, int type) +{ +const HEADER * h = (const HEADER *)dnsa->answer; -if ( h->qr == 1 && h->opcode == QUERY && h->tc == 0 +if ( h->qr == 1 /* a response */ + && h->opcode == QUERY + && h->tc == 0 /* nmessage not truncated */ && (h->rcode == NOERROR || h->rcode == NXDOMAIN) - && (ntohs(h->qdcount) == 1 || f.running_in_test_harness) - && ntohs(h->ancount) == 0 - && ntohs(h->nscount) >= 1) - dnsa->answerlen = sizeof(dnsa->answer); - -for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_AUTHORITY); - rr; rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) - ) if (rr->type == T_SOA) + && ( ntohs(h->qdcount) == 1 /* one question record */ + || f.running_in_test_harness) + && ntohs(h->ancount) == 0 /* no answer records */ + && ntohs(h->nscount) >= 1) /* authority records */ { - const uschar * p = rr->data; - uschar discard_buf[256]; - int len; - unsigned long ttl; - - /* Skip the mname & rname strings */ - - if ((len = dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, - p, (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)discard_buf, 256)) < 0) - break; - p += len; - if ((len = dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, - p, (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)discard_buf, 256)) < 0) - break; - p += len; - - /* Skip the SOA serial, refresh, retry & expire. Grab the TTL */ - - if (p > dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen - 5 * INT32SZ) - break; - p += 4 * INT32SZ; - GETLONG(ttl, p); - - return time(NULL) + ttl; + DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("faking res_search(%s) response length as %d\n", + dns_text_type(type), (int)sizeof(dnsa->answer)); + dnsa->answerlen = sizeof(dnsa->answer); + return TRUE; } +DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS: couldn't fake dnsa len\n"); +/* Maybe we should just do a second lookup for an SOA? */ +return FALSE; +} + + +/* Return the TTL suitable for an NXDOMAIN result, which is given +in the SOA. We hope that one was returned in the lookup, and do not +bother doing a separate lookup; if not found return a forever TTL. +*/ + +time_t +dns_expire_from_soa(dns_answer * dnsa, int type) +{ +dns_scan dnss; + +if (fake_dnsa_len_for_fail(dnsa, type)) + for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_AUTHORITY); + rr; rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) + ) if (rr->type == T_SOA) + { + const uschar * p = rr->data; + uschar discard_buf[256]; + int len; + unsigned long ttl; + + /* Skip the mname & rname strings */ + + if ((len = dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, + p, (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)discard_buf, 256)) < 0) + break; + p += len; + if ((len = dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, + p, (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)discard_buf, 256)) < 0) + break; + p += len; + + /* Skip the SOA serial, refresh, retry & expire. Grab the TTL */ + + if (p > dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen - 5 * INT32SZ) + break; + p += 4 * INT32SZ; + GETLONG(ttl, p); + + return time(NULL) + ttl; + } + DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS: no SOA record found for neg-TTL\n"); return 0; } @@ -828,11 +851,8 @@ more.) */ if (check_dns_names_pattern[0] != 0 && type != T_PTR && type != T_TXT) { - int ovector[3*(EXPAND_MAXN+1)]; - dns_pattern_init(); - if (pcre_exec(regex_check_dns_names, NULL, CCS name, Ustrlen(name), - 0, PCRE_EOPT, ovector, nelem(ovector)) < 0) + if (!regex_match(regex_check_dns_names, name, -1, NULL)) { DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS name syntax check failed: %s (%s)\n", name, @@ -878,7 +898,7 @@ if (dnsa->answerlen < 0) switch (h_errno) case HOST_NOT_FOUND: DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %s (%s) gave HOST_NOT_FOUND\n" "returning DNS_NOMATCH\n", name, dns_text_type(type)); - return dns_fail_return(name, type, dns_expire_from_soa(dnsa), DNS_NOMATCH); + return dns_fail_return(name, type, dns_expire_from_soa(dnsa, type), DNS_NOMATCH); case TRY_AGAIN: DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %s (%s) gave TRY_AGAIN\n", @@ -888,8 +908,8 @@ if (dnsa->answerlen < 0) switch (h_errno) #ifndef STAND_ALONE save_domain = deliver_domain; deliver_domain = string_copy(name); /* set $domain */ - rc = match_isinlist(name, (const uschar **)&dns_again_means_nonexist, 0, NULL, NULL, - MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL); + rc = match_isinlist(name, CUSS &dns_again_means_nonexist, 0, + &domainlist_anchor, NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL); deliver_domain = save_domain; if (rc != OK) { @@ -898,7 +918,7 @@ if (dnsa->answerlen < 0) switch (h_errno) } DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("%s is in dns_again_means_nonexist: returning " "DNS_NOMATCH\n", name); - return dns_fail_return(name, type, dns_expire_from_soa(dnsa), DNS_NOMATCH); + return dns_fail_return(name, type, dns_expire_from_soa(dnsa, type), DNS_NOMATCH); #else /* For stand-alone tests */ return dns_fail_return(name, type, 0, DNS_AGAIN); @@ -912,7 +932,7 @@ if (dnsa->answerlen < 0) switch (h_errno) case NO_DATA: DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %s (%s) gave NO_DATA\n" "returning DNS_NODATA\n", name, dns_text_type(type)); - return dns_fail_return(name, type, dns_expire_from_soa(dnsa), DNS_NODATA); + return dns_fail_return(name, type, dns_expire_from_soa(dnsa, type), DNS_NODATA); default: DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("DNS lookup of %s (%s) gave unknown DNS error %d\n" @@ -1046,7 +1066,7 @@ for (int i = 0; i <= dns_cname_loops; i++) return DNS_FAIL; /* DNS data comes from the outside, hence tainted */ - data = store_get(256, TRUE); + data = store_get(256, GET_TAINTED); if (dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, cname_rr.data, (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)data, 256) < 0) return DNS_FAIL; @@ -1129,7 +1149,7 @@ switch (type) case T_CSA: { uschar *srvname, *namesuff, *tld; - int priority, weight, port; + int priority, dummy_weight, port; int limit, rc, i; BOOL ipv6; dns_record *rr; @@ -1183,34 +1203,7 @@ switch (type) If the TLD and the 2LD exist but the explicit CSA record lookup failed, then the AUTHORITY SOA will be the 2LD's or a subdomain thereof. */ - if (rc == DNS_NOMATCH) - { - /* This is really gross. The successful return value from res_search() is - the packet length, which is stored in dnsa->answerlen. If we get a - negative DNS reply then res_search() returns -1, which causes the bounds - checks for name decompression to fail when it is treated as a packet - length, which in turn causes the authority search to fail. The correct - packet length has been lost inside libresolv, so we have to guess a - replacement value. (The only way to fix this properly would be to - re-implement res_search() and res_query() so that they don't muddle their - success and packet length return values.) For added safety we only reset - the packet length if the packet header looks plausible. */ - - const HEADER * h = (const HEADER *)dnsa->answer; - if (h->qr == 1 && h->opcode == QUERY && h->tc == 0 - && (h->rcode == NOERROR || h->rcode == NXDOMAIN) - && ntohs(h->qdcount) == 1 && ntohs(h->ancount) == 0 - && ntohs(h->nscount) >= 1) - dnsa->answerlen = sizeof(dnsa->answer); - - for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_AUTHORITY); - rr; rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) - ) - if (rr->type != T_SOA) continue; - else if (strcmpic(rr->name, US"") == 0 || - strcmpic(rr->name, tld) == 0) return DNS_NOMATCH; - else break; - } + if (rc == DNS_NOMATCH) return DNS_NOMATCH; for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) { @@ -1245,7 +1238,7 @@ switch (type) /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */ GETSHORT(priority, p); - GETSHORT(weight, p); weight = weight; /* compiler quietening */ + GETSHORT(dummy_weight, p); GETSHORT(port, p); /* Check the CSA version number */ @@ -1301,7 +1294,7 @@ if (rr->type == T_A) if (p + 4 <= dnsa_lim) { /* the IP is not regarded as tainted */ - yield = store_get(sizeof(dns_address) + 20, FALSE); + yield = store_get(sizeof(dns_address) + 20, GET_UNTAINTED); (void)sprintf(CS yield->address, "%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]); yield->next = NULL; } @@ -1315,7 +1308,7 @@ else { struct in6_addr in6; for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) in6.s6_addr[i] = rr->data[i]; - yield = store_get(sizeof(dns_address) + 50, FALSE); + yield = store_get(sizeof(dns_address) + 50, GET_UNTAINTED); inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &in6, CS yield->address, 50); yield->next = NULL; } @@ -1332,7 +1325,7 @@ dns_pattern_init(void) { if (check_dns_names_pattern[0] != 0 && !regex_check_dns_names) regex_check_dns_names = - regex_must_compile(check_dns_names_pattern, FALSE, TRUE); + regex_must_compile(check_dns_names_pattern, MCS_NOFLAGS, TRUE); } /* vi: aw ai sw=2