X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/76d5098363019ec2c5a9b0f584c78a15a92e3bab..9aa512a1898155484e00ee089057d28f2432b30e:/src/src/tls-gnu.c diff --git a/src/src/tls-gnu.c b/src/src/tls-gnu.c index 0ac72ad25..3c926c0d4 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-gnu.c +++ b/src/src/tls-gnu.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * *************************************************/ -/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */ +/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */ /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ /* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */ @@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ require current GnuTLS, then we'll drop support for the ancient libraries). #include /* man-page is incorrect, gnutls_rnd() is not in gnutls.h: */ #include +/* needed to disable PKCS11 autoload unless requested */ +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00 +# include +#endif +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP +# include +#endif /* GnuTLS 2 vs 3 @@ -63,24 +70,24 @@ Some of these correspond to variables in globals.c; those variables will be set to point to content in one of these instances, as appropriate for the stage of the process lifetime. -Not handled here: globals tls_active, tls_bits, tls_cipher, tls_peerdn, -tls_certificate_verified, tls_channelbinding_b64, tls_sni. +Not handled here: global tls_channelbinding_b64. */ typedef struct exim_gnutls_state { - gnutls_session_t session; + gnutls_session_t session; gnutls_certificate_credentials_t x509_cred; - gnutls_priority_t priority_cache; + gnutls_priority_t priority_cache; enum peer_verify_requirement verify_requirement; - int fd_in; - int fd_out; - BOOL peer_cert_verified; - BOOL trigger_sni_changes; - BOOL have_set_peerdn; + int fd_in; + int fd_out; + BOOL peer_cert_verified; + BOOL trigger_sni_changes; + BOOL have_set_peerdn; const struct host_item *host; - uschar *peerdn; - uschar *ciphersuite; - uschar *received_sni; + gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert; + uschar *peerdn; + uschar *ciphersuite; + uschar *received_sni; const uschar *tls_certificate; const uschar *tls_privatekey; @@ -94,6 +101,9 @@ typedef struct exim_gnutls_state { uschar *exp_tls_verify_certificates; uschar *exp_tls_crl; uschar *exp_tls_require_ciphers; + uschar *exp_tls_ocsp_file; + + tls_support *tlsp; /* set in tls_init() */ uschar *xfer_buffer; int xfer_buffer_lwm; @@ -106,7 +116,8 @@ static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = { NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, }; @@ -120,7 +131,6 @@ there's no way for heart-beats to be responded to, for the duration of the second connection. */ static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server, state_client; -static exim_gnutls_state_st *current_global_tls_state; /* dh_params are initialised once within the lifetime of a process using TLS; if we used TLS in a long-lived daemon, we'd have to reconsider this. But we @@ -171,6 +181,15 @@ before, for now. */ #define HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING #define HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS #define HAVE_GNUTLS_RND +/* The security fix we provide with the gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11 option + * (4.82 PP/09) introduces a compatibility regression. The symbol simply + * isn't available sometimes, so this needs to become a conditional + * compilation; the sanest way to deal with this being a problem on + * older OSes is to block it in the Local/Makefile with this compiler + * definition */ +#ifndef AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 +#define HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11 +#endif /* AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 */ #endif @@ -185,6 +204,10 @@ static void exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message); static int exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session); +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP +static int server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr, + gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response); +#endif @@ -271,12 +294,34 @@ tls_error(when, msg, state->host); * Set various Exim expansion vars * *************************************************/ +#define exim_gnutls_cert_err(Label) do { \ + if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { \ + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert problem: %s: %s\n", (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \ + return rc; } } while (0) + +static int +import_cert(const gnutls_datum * cert, gnutls_x509_crt_t * crtp) +{ +int rc; + +rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(crtp); +exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"gnutls_x509_crt_init (crt)"); + +rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(*crtp, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); +exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"failed to import certificate [gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert)]"); + +return rc; +} + +#undef exim_gnutls_cert_err + + /* We set various Exim global variables from the state, once a session has been established. With TLS callouts, may need to change this to stack variables, or just re-call it with the server state after client callout has finished. -Make sure anything set here is inset in tls_getc(). +Make sure anything set here is unset in tls_getc(). Sets: tls_active fd @@ -284,17 +329,17 @@ Sets: tls_certificate_verified bool indicator tls_channelbinding_b64 for some SASL mechanisms tls_cipher a string + tls_peercert pointer to library internal tls_peerdn a string tls_sni a (UTF-8) string -Also: - current_global_tls_state for API limitations + tls_ourcert pointer to library internal Argument: state the relevant exim_gnutls_state_st * */ static void -extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st *state) +extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st * state) { gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher; #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING @@ -302,20 +347,19 @@ int old_pool; int rc; gnutls_datum_t channel; #endif +tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; -current_global_tls_state = state; - -tls_active = state->fd_out; +tlsp->active = state->fd_out; cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session); /* returns size in "bytes" */ -tls_bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8; +tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8; -tls_cipher = state->ciphersuite; +tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite; -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", tls_cipher); +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", state->ciphersuite); -tls_certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified; +tlsp->certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified; /* note that tls_channelbinding_b64 is not saved to the spool file, since it's only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */ @@ -336,9 +380,17 @@ if (rc) { } #endif -tls_peerdn = state->peerdn; +/* peercert is set in peer_status() */ +tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; +tlsp->sni = state->received_sni; + +/* record our certificate */ + { + const gnutls_datum * cert = gnutls_certificate_get_ours(state->session); + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; -tls_sni = state->received_sni; + tlsp->ourcert = cert && import_cert(cert, &crt)==0 ? crt : NULL; + } } @@ -358,9 +410,6 @@ file is never present. If two processes both compute some new parameters, you waste a bit of effort, but it doesn't seem worth messing around with locking to prevent this. -Argument: - host NULL for server, server for client (for error handling) - Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ @@ -370,8 +419,12 @@ init_server_dh(void) int fd, rc; unsigned int dh_bits; gnutls_datum m; -uschar filename[PATH_MAX]; +uschar filename_buf[PATH_MAX]; +uschar *filename = NULL; size_t sz; +uschar *exp_tls_dhparam; +BOOL use_file_in_spool = FALSE; +BOOL use_fixed_file = FALSE; host_item *host = NULL; /* dummy for macros */ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n"); @@ -379,6 +432,46 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n"); rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params); exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_init"); +m.data = NULL; +m.size = 0; + +if (!expand_check(tls_dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &exp_tls_dhparam)) + return DEFER; + +if (!exp_tls_dhparam) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loading default hard-coded DH params\n"); + m.data = US std_dh_prime_default(); + m.size = Ustrlen(m.data); + } +else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "historic") == 0) + use_file_in_spool = TRUE; +else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "none") == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n"); + return OK; + } +else if (exp_tls_dhparam[0] != '/') + { + m.data = US std_dh_prime_named(exp_tls_dhparam); + if (m.data == NULL) + return tls_error(US"No standard prime named", CS exp_tls_dhparam, NULL); + m.size = Ustrlen(m.data); + } +else + { + use_fixed_file = TRUE; + filename = exp_tls_dhparam; + } + +if (m.data) + { + rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); + exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3"); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loaded fixed standard D-H parameters\n"); + return OK; + } + #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS /* If you change this constant, also change dh_param_fn_ext so that we can use a different filename and ensure we have sufficient bits. */ @@ -404,9 +497,13 @@ if (dh_bits > tls_dh_max_bits) dh_bits = tls_dh_max_bits; } -if (!string_format(filename, sizeof(filename), - "%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits)) - return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL); +if (use_file_in_spool) + { + if (!string_format(filename_buf, sizeof(filename_buf), + "%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits)) + return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL); + filename = filename_buf; + } /* Open the cache file for reading and if successful, read it and set up the parameters. */ @@ -483,6 +580,7 @@ case. */ if (rc < 0) { uschar *temp_fn; + unsigned int dh_bits_gen = dh_bits; if ((PATH_MAX - Ustrlen(filename)) < 10) return tls_error(US"Filename too long to generate replacement", @@ -494,8 +592,26 @@ if (rc < 0) return tls_error(US"Unable to open temp file", strerror(errno), NULL); (void)fchown(fd, exim_uid, exim_gid); /* Probably not necessary */ - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("generating %d bits Diffie-Hellman key ...\n", dh_bits); - rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits); + /* GnuTLS overshoots! + * If we ask for 2236, we might get 2237 or more. + * But there's no way to ask GnuTLS how many bits there really are. + * We can ask how many bits were used in a TLS session, but that's it! + * The prime itself is hidden behind too much abstraction. + * So we ask for less, and proceed on a wing and a prayer. + * First attempt, subtracted 3 for 2233 and got 2240. + */ + if (dh_bits >= EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS + 10) + { + dh_bits_gen = dh_bits - 10; + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("being paranoid about DH generation, make it '%d' bits'\n", + dh_bits_gen); + } + + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("requesting generation of %d bit Diffie-Hellman prime ...\n", + dh_bits_gen); + rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits_gen); exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2"); /* gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() will tell us the exact size, every time, @@ -514,12 +630,13 @@ if (rc < 0) return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", strerror(errno), NULL); /* this will return a size 1 less than the allocation size above */ rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, - m.data, &m.size); + m.data, &sz); if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { free(m.data); exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real"); } + m.size = sz; /* shrink by 1, probably */ sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, m.data, (size_t) m.size); if (sz != m.size) @@ -584,11 +701,15 @@ uschar *saved_tls_crl = NULL; int cert_count; /* We check for tls_sni *before* expansion. */ -if (!state->host) +if (!host) /* server */ { if (!state->received_sni) { - if (state->tls_certificate && Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni")) + if (state->tls_certificate && + (Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni") || + Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni") || + Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni") + )) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI.\n"); state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE; @@ -622,7 +743,7 @@ if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate)) if ((state->exp_tls_certificate == NULL) || (*state->exp_tls_certificate == '\0')) { - if (state->host == NULL) + if (!host) return tls_error(US"no TLS server certificate is specified", NULL, NULL); else DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no client certificate specified; okay\n"); @@ -667,6 +788,30 @@ if (state->exp_tls_certificate && *state->exp_tls_certificate) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n"); } /* tls_certificate */ + +/* Set the OCSP stapling server info */ + +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP +if ( !host /* server */ + && tls_ocsp_file + ) + { + if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", + &state->exp_tls_ocsp_file)) + return DEFER; + + /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get observability. + More efficient would be to read the file once only, if it never changed + (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update, or watch datestamp. */ + + gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function(state->x509_cred, + server_ocsp_stapling_cb, state->exp_tls_ocsp_file); + + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Set OCSP response file %s\n", &state->exp_tls_ocsp_file); + } +#endif + + /* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is provided. Experiment shows that, if the certificate file is empty, an unhelpful error message is provided. However, if we just refrain from setting anything up @@ -819,6 +964,7 @@ Arguments: cas CA certs file crl CRL file require_ciphers tls_require_ciphers setting + caller_state returned state-info structure Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ @@ -845,6 +991,19 @@ if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS global init required.\n"); +#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11 + /* By default, gnutls_global_init will init PKCS11 support in auto mode, + which loads modules from a config file, which sounds good and may be wanted + by some sysadmin, but also means in common configurations that GNOME keyring + environment variables are used and so breaks for users calling mailq. + To prevent this, we init PKCS11 first, which is the documented approach. */ + if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11) + { + rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL); + exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init"); + } +#endif + rc = gnutls_global_init(); exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_global_init"); @@ -864,6 +1023,7 @@ if (host) { state = &state_client; memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); + state->tlsp = &tls_out; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS client session\n"); rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT); } @@ -871,6 +1031,7 @@ else { state = &state_server; memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); + state->tlsp = &tls_in; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n"); rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER); } @@ -902,7 +1063,7 @@ if (rc != OK) return rc; /* set SNI in client, only */ if (host) { - if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_sni)) + if (!expand_check(state->tlsp->sni, US"tls_out_sni", &state->exp_tls_sni)) return DEFER; if (state->exp_tls_sni && *state->exp_tls_sni) { @@ -919,7 +1080,7 @@ else if (state->tls_sni) "have an SNI set for a client [%s]\n", state->tls_sni); /* This is the priority string support, -http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html +http://www.gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html and replaces gnutls_require_kx, gnutls_require_mac & gnutls_require_protocols. This was backwards incompatible, but means Exim no longer needs to track all algorithms and provide string forms for them. */ @@ -973,14 +1134,11 @@ if (gnutls_compat_mode) } *caller_state = state; -/* needs to happen before callbacks during handshake */ -current_global_tls_state = state; return OK; } - /************************************************* * Extract peer information * *************************************************/ @@ -1053,7 +1211,7 @@ old_pool = store_pool; store_pool = POOL_PERM; state->ciphersuite = string_copy(cipherbuf); store_pool = old_pool; -tls_cipher = state->ciphersuite; +state->tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite; /* tls_peerdn */ cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &cert_list_size); @@ -1086,11 +1244,11 @@ if (ct != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED) { return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host); } \ return OK; } } while (0) -rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt); -exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"gnutls_x509_crt_init (crt)"); +rc = import_cert(&cert_list[0], &crt); +exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"cert 0"); + +state->tlsp->peercert = state->peercert = crt; -rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); -exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to import certificate [gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert 0)]"); sz = 0; rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, NULL, &sz); if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) @@ -1101,6 +1259,7 @@ if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) dn_buf = store_get_perm(sz); rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, CS dn_buf, &sz); exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to extract certificate DN [gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert 0)]"); + state->peerdn = dn_buf; return OK; @@ -1136,25 +1295,23 @@ unsigned int verify; *error = NULL; -rc = peer_status(state); -if (rc != OK) +if ((rc = peer_status(state)) != OK) { verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; - *error = "not supplied"; + *error = "certificate not supplied"; } else - { rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify); - } /* Handle the result of verification. INVALID seems to be set as well as REVOKED, but leave the test for both. */ -if ((rc < 0) || (verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) != 0) +if (rc < 0 || verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) { state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE; - if (*error == NULL) - *error = ((verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) != 0) ? "revoked" : "invalid"; + if (!*error) + *error = verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED + ? "certificate revoked" : "certificate invalid"; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=%s\n", @@ -1166,7 +1323,7 @@ if ((rc < 0) || (verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) != 0) return FALSE; } DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS verify failure overriden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); + debug_printf("TLS verify failure overridden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); } else { @@ -1175,7 +1332,7 @@ else state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US""); } -tls_peerdn = state->peerdn; +state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; return TRUE; } @@ -1219,6 +1376,7 @@ handshake.". For inability to get SNI information, we return 0. We only return non-zero if re-setup failed. +Only used for server-side TLS. */ static int @@ -1226,7 +1384,7 @@ exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session) { char sni_name[MAX_HOST_LEN]; size_t data_len = MAX_HOST_LEN; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server; unsigned int sni_type; int rc, old_pool; @@ -1256,7 +1414,7 @@ state->received_sni = string_copyn(US sni_name, data_len); store_pool = old_pool; /* We set this one now so that variable expansions below will work */ -tls_sni = state->received_sni; +state->tlsp->sni = state->received_sni; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", sni_name, state->trigger_sni_changes ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)"); @@ -1280,6 +1438,31 @@ return 0; +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP + +static int +server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr, + gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response) +{ +int ret; + +if ((ret = gnutls_load_file(ptr, ocsp_response)) < 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to load ocsp stapling file %s\n", + (char *)ptr); + tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; + return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + } + +tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED; +return 0; +} + +#endif + + + + /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ /* Exported functions */ @@ -1312,9 +1495,7 @@ const char *error; exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL; /* Check for previous activation */ -/* nb: this will not be TLS callout safe, needs reworking as part of that. */ - -if (tls_active >= 0) +if (tls_in.active >= 0) { tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", "", NULL); smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n"); @@ -1365,7 +1546,7 @@ make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */ -if (!tls_on_connect) +if (!state->tlsp->on_connect) { smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n"); fflush(smtp_out); @@ -1375,8 +1556,8 @@ if (!tls_on_connect) that the GnuTLS library doesn't. */ gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(state->session, - (gnutls_transport_ptr)fileno(smtp_in), - (gnutls_transport_ptr)fileno(smtp_out)); + (gnutls_transport_ptr)(long) fileno(smtp_in), + (gnutls_transport_ptr)(long) fileno(smtp_out)); state->fd_in = fileno(smtp_in); state->fd_out = fileno(smtp_out); @@ -1410,22 +1591,17 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n"); /* Verify after the fact */ -if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE) +if ( state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE + && !verify_certificate(state, &error)) { - if (!verify_certificate(state, &error)) + if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { - if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_OPTIONAL) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n", - error); - } - else - { - tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, NULL); - return FAIL; - } + tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, NULL); + return FAIL; } + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n", + error); } /* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */ @@ -1464,14 +1640,7 @@ Arguments: fd the fd of the connection host connected host (for messages) addr the first address (not used) - dhparam DH parameter file (ignored, we're a client) - certificate certificate file - privatekey private key file - sni TLS SNI to send to remote host - verify_certs file for certificate verify - verify_crl CRL for verify - require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL - timeout startup timeout + ob smtp transport options Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL (because using common functions), but for a client, DEFER and FAIL have the same meaning @@ -1479,45 +1648,95 @@ Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL (because using common functions), int tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, - address_item *addr ARG_UNUSED, uschar *dhparam ARG_UNUSED, - uschar *certificate, uschar *privatekey, uschar *sni, - uschar *verify_certs, uschar *verify_crl, - uschar *require_ciphers, int timeout) + address_item *addr ARG_UNUSED, + void *v_ob) { +smtp_transport_options_block *ob = v_ob; int rc; const char *error; exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL; +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP +BOOL require_ocsp = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, + NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK; +BOOL request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE + : verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, + NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK; +#endif DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", fd); -rc = tls_init(host, certificate, privatekey, - sni, verify_certs, verify_crl, require_ciphers, &state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; +if ((rc = tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey, + ob->tls_sni, ob->tls_verify_certificates, ob->tls_crl, + ob->tls_require_ciphers, &state)) != OK) + return rc; + + { + int dh_min_bits = ob->tls_dh_min_bits; + if (dh_min_bits < EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("WARNING: tls_dh_min_bits far too low," + " clamping %d up to %d\n", + dh_min_bits, EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS); + dh_min_bits = EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS; + } -gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(state->session, EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting D-H prime minimum" + " acceptable bits to %d\n", + dh_min_bits); + gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(state->session, dh_min_bits); + } -if (verify_certs == NULL) +/* Stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is +set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts are unset. Check only +the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */ + +if (( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates + && !ob->tls_verify_hosts + && !ob->tls_try_verify_hosts + ) + || + verify_check_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts) == OK + ) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification not required\n"); - state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE; - /* we still ask for it, to log it, etc */ + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification required.\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; + gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); + } +else if (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification optional.\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL; gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST); } else { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification required\n"); - state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; - gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification not required.\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE; + gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE); } -gnutls_transport_set_ptr(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr)fd); +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP /* since GnuTLS 3.1.3 */ +if (request_ocsp) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: will request OCSP stapling\n"); + if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session, + NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK) + return tls_error(US"cert-status-req", + gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host); + tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; + } +#endif + +gnutls_transport_set_ptr(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr)(long) fd); state->fd_in = fd; state->fd_out = fd; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("about to gnutls_handshake\n"); /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */ sigalrm_seen = FALSE; -alarm(timeout); +alarm(ob->command_timeout); do { rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session); @@ -1537,10 +1756,41 @@ if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE && !verify_certificate(state, &error)) return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, state->host); +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP +if (require_ocsp) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + { + gnutls_datum_t stapling; + gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp; + gnutls_datum_t printed; + if ( (rc= gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(state->session, &stapling)) == 0 + && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp)) == 0 + && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, &stapling)) == 0 + && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_print(resp, GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_FULL, &printed)) == 0 + ) + { + debug_printf("%.4096s", printed.data); + gnutls_free(printed.data); + } + else + (void) tls_error(US"ocsp decode", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host); + } + + if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0) + { + tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; + return tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host); + } + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n"); + tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED; + } +#endif + /* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */ -rc = peer_status(state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; +if ((rc = peer_status(state)) != OK) + return rc; /* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */ @@ -1565,11 +1815,11 @@ Returns: nothing */ void -tls_close(BOOL shutdown) +tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client; -if (tls_active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ +if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ if (shutdown) { @@ -1579,6 +1829,7 @@ if (shutdown) gnutls_deinit(state->session); +state->tlsp->active = -1; memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); if ((state_server.session == NULL) && (state_client.session == NULL)) @@ -1587,7 +1838,6 @@ if ((state_server.session == NULL) && (state_client.session == NULL)) exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE; } -tls_active = -1; } @@ -1599,6 +1849,7 @@ tls_active = -1; /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty, it refills the buffer via the GnuTLS reading function. +Only used by the server-side TLS. This feeds DKIM and should be used for all message-body reads. @@ -1609,7 +1860,7 @@ Returns: the next character or EOF int tls_getc(void) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server; if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) { ssize_t inbytes; @@ -1638,12 +1889,13 @@ if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) gnutls_deinit(state->session); state->session = NULL; - tls_active = -1; - tls_bits = 0; - tls_certificate_verified = FALSE; + state->tlsp->active = -1; + state->tlsp->bits = 0; + state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE; tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL; - tls_cipher = NULL; - tls_peerdn = NULL; + state->tlsp->cipher = NULL; + state->tlsp->peercert = NULL; + state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL; return smtp_getc(); } @@ -1677,6 +1929,7 @@ return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++]; /* This does not feed DKIM, so if the caller uses this for reading message body, then the caller must feed DKIM. + Arguments: buff buffer of data len size of buffer @@ -1686,9 +1939,9 @@ Returns: the number of bytes read */ int -tls_read(uschar *buff, size_t len) +tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client; ssize_t inbytes; if (len > INT_MAX) @@ -1724,6 +1977,7 @@ return -1; /* Arguments: + is_server channel specifier buff buffer of data len number of bytes @@ -1732,11 +1986,11 @@ Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write, */ int -tls_write(const uschar *buff, size_t len) +tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len) { ssize_t outbytes; size_t left = len; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", buff, left); while (left > 0) @@ -1866,6 +2120,13 @@ if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "already initialised GnuTLS, Exim developer bug"); +#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11 +if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11) + { + rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL); + validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init"); + } +#endif rc = gnutls_global_init(); validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_global_init()"); exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE; @@ -1916,4 +2177,6 @@ fprintf(f, "Library version: GnuTLS: Compile: %s\n" gnutls_check_version(NULL)); } +/* vi: aw ai sw=2 +*/ /* End of tls-gnu.c */