X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/438257ba19880f95172493e5f6fede1e1517c309..4e0983dcef8dd8630fc77aad39f7606e2ed32199:/src/src/acl.c diff --git a/src/src/acl.c b/src/src/acl.c index 3cafd8184..270a2f2c0 100644 --- a/src/src/acl.c +++ b/src/src/acl.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * *************************************************/ -/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2009 */ +/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */ /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */ @@ -21,8 +21,13 @@ enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE, /* ACL verbs */ -static uschar *verbs[] = - { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require", +static uschar *verbs[] = { + US"accept", + US"defer", + US"deny", + US"discard", + US"drop", + US"require", US"warn" }; /* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used @@ -66,6 +71,9 @@ enum { ACLC_ACL, #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER, ACLC_DKIM_STATUS, +#endif +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + ACLC_DMARC_STATUS, #endif ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, @@ -88,6 +96,7 @@ enum { ACLC_ACL, #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN ACLC_REGEX, #endif + ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER, ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET, @@ -98,6 +107,7 @@ enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_SPF, ACLC_SPF_GUESS, #endif + ACLC_UDPSEND, ACLC_VERIFY }; /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass", @@ -128,6 +138,9 @@ static uschar *conditions[] = { #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM US"dkim_signers", US"dkim_status", +#endif +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + US"dmarc_status", #endif US"dnslists", US"domains", @@ -150,6 +163,7 @@ static uschar *conditions[] = { #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN US"regex", #endif + US"remove_header", US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set", #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN US"spam", @@ -158,6 +172,7 @@ static uschar *conditions[] = { US"spf", US"spf_guess", #endif + US"udpsend", US"verify" }; @@ -173,9 +188,15 @@ enum { #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY, #endif + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY, + CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC, + #endif + CONTROL_DSCP, CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, + CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY, CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE, @@ -207,9 +228,15 @@ static uschar *controls[] = { #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM US"dkim_disable_verify", #endif + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + US"dmarc_disable_verify", + US"dmarc_enable_forensic", + #endif + US"dscp", US"error", US"caseful_local_part", US"caselower_local_part", + US"cutthrough_delivery", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze", @@ -232,7 +259,7 @@ at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the checking functions. */ static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = { - TRUE, /* acl */ + FALSE, /* acl */ TRUE, /* add_header */ FALSE, /* authenticated */ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL @@ -254,6 +281,9 @@ static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = { #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM TRUE, /* dkim_signers */ TRUE, /* dkim_status */ +#endif +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + TRUE, /* dmarc_status */ #endif TRUE, /* dnslists */ FALSE, /* domains */ @@ -276,6 +306,7 @@ static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = { #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN TRUE, /* regex */ #endif + TRUE, /* remove_header */ FALSE, /* sender_domains */ FALSE, /* senders */ TRUE, /* set */ @@ -286,6 +317,7 @@ static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = { TRUE, /* spf */ TRUE, /* spf_guess */ #endif + TRUE, /* udpsend */ TRUE /* verify */ }; @@ -314,6 +346,9 @@ static uschar cond_modifiers[] = { #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM FALSE, /* dkim_signers */ FALSE, /* dkim_status */ +#endif +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + FALSE, /* dmarc_status */ #endif FALSE, /* dnslists */ FALSE, /* domains */ @@ -336,6 +371,7 @@ static uschar cond_modifiers[] = { #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN FALSE, /* regex */ #endif + TRUE, /* remove_header */ FALSE, /* sender_domains */ FALSE, /* senders */ TRUE, /* set */ @@ -346,6 +382,7 @@ static uschar cond_modifiers[] = { FALSE, /* spf */ FALSE, /* spf_guess */ #endif + TRUE, /* udpsend */ FALSE /* verify */ }; @@ -360,6 +397,9 @@ static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = { (unsigned int) ~((1<text; + while ((cp = Ustrchr(s, '\n')) != NULL) + { + if (cp[1] == '\0') break; + + /* contains embedded newline; needs doubling */ + ret = string_cat(ret, &size, &ptr, s, cp-s+1); + ret = string_cat(ret, &size, &ptr, US"\n", 1); + s = cp+1; + } + /* last bit of header */ + + ret = string_cat(ret, &size, &ptr, s, cp-s+1); /* newline-sep list */ + } +while((h = h->next)); + +ret[ptr-1] = '\0'; /* overwrite last newline */ +return ret; +} + + +/************************************************* +* Set up removed header line(s) * +*************************************************/ + +/* This function is called by the remove_header modifier. The argument is +treated as a sequence of header names which are added to a colon separated +list, provided there isn't an identical one already there. + +Argument: string of header names +Returns: nothing +*/ + +static void +setup_remove_header(uschar *hnames) +{ +if (*hnames != 0) + { + if (acl_removed_headers == NULL) + acl_removed_headers = hnames; + else + acl_removed_headers = string_sprintf("%s : %s", acl_removed_headers, hnames); + } +} + + /************************************************* * Handle warnings * @@ -1429,6 +1614,7 @@ else DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN: #endif +lookup_dnssec_authenticated = NULL; switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL)) { /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */ @@ -1465,7 +1651,8 @@ switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL)) *************************************************/ enum { VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, VERIFY_CERT, VERIFY_HELO, VERIFY_CSA, VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, - VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT + VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT, + VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII }; typedef struct { uschar * name; @@ -1485,7 +1672,8 @@ static verify_type_t verify_type_list[] = { { US"sender", VERIFY_SNDR, (1<value) test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */ - if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK; + if (tls_in.certificate_verified) return OK; *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate"; return FAIL; @@ -1635,6 +1823,15 @@ switch(vp->value) *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); return rc; + case VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII: + /* Check that all header names are true 7 bit strings + See RFC 5322, 2.2. and RFC 6532, 3. */ + + rc = verify_check_header_names_ascii(log_msgptr); + if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL) + *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); + return rc; + case VERIFY_NOT_BLIND: /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */ @@ -2017,8 +2214,8 @@ return rc; BAD_VERIFY: *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", " - "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or " - "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition " + "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\", \"header_names_ascii\" " + "or \"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition " "\"verify %s\"", arg); return ERROR; } @@ -2093,7 +2290,7 @@ uschar buffer[STRING_SPRINTF_BUFFER_SIZE]; va_start(ap, format); if (!string_vformat(buffer, sizeof(buffer), format, ap)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, - "string_sprintf expansion was longer than %ld", sizeof(buffer)); + "string_sprintf expansion was longer than " SIZE_T_FMT, sizeof(buffer)); va_end(ap); *log_msgptr = string_sprintf( "error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: %s", buffer); @@ -2637,6 +2834,110 @@ return rc; +/************************************************* +* The udpsend ACL modifier * +*************************************************/ + +/* Called by acl_check_condition() below. + +Arguments: + arg the option string for udpsend= + log_msgptr for error messages + +Returns: OK - Completed. + DEFER - Problem with DNS lookup. + ERROR - Syntax error in options. +*/ + +static int +acl_udpsend(uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr) +{ +int sep = 0; +uschar *hostname; +uschar *portstr; +uschar *portend; +host_item *h; +int portnum; +int len; +int r, s; +uschar * errstr; + +hostname = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0); +portstr = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0); + +if (hostname == NULL) + { + *log_msgptr = US"missing destination host in \"udpsend\" modifier"; + return ERROR; + } +if (portstr == NULL) + { + *log_msgptr = US"missing destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier"; + return ERROR; + } +if (arg == NULL) + { + *log_msgptr = US"missing datagram payload in \"udpsend\" modifier"; + return ERROR; + } +portnum = Ustrtol(portstr, &portend, 10); +if (*portend != '\0') + { + *log_msgptr = US"bad destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier"; + return ERROR; + } + +/* Make a single-item host list. */ +h = store_get(sizeof(host_item)); +memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item)); +h->name = hostname; +h->port = portnum; +h->mx = MX_NONE; + +if (string_is_ip_address(hostname, NULL)) + h->address = hostname, r = HOST_FOUND; +else + r = host_find_byname(h, NULL, 0, NULL, FALSE); +if (r == HOST_FIND_FAILED || r == HOST_FIND_AGAIN) + { + *log_msgptr = US"DNS lookup failed in \"udpsend\" modifier"; + return DEFER; + } + +HDEBUG(D_acl) + debug_printf("udpsend [%s]:%d %s\n", h->address, portnum, arg); + +r = s = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_DGRAM, h->address, portnum, portnum, + 1, NULL, &errstr); +if (r < 0) goto defer; +len = Ustrlen(arg); +r = send(s, arg, len, 0); +if (r < 0) + { + errstr = US strerror(errno); + close(s); + goto defer; + } +close(s); +if (r < len) + { + *log_msgptr = + string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" truncated from %d to %d octets", len, r); + return DEFER; + } + +HDEBUG(D_acl) + debug_printf("udpsend %d bytes\n", r); + +return OK; + +defer: +*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" failed: %s", errstr); +return DEFER; +} + + + /************************************************* * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item * *************************************************/ @@ -2772,14 +3073,14 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) "discard" verb. */ case ACLC_ACL: - rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); - if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD) - { - *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for " - "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")", - verbs[verb]); - return ERROR; - } + rc = acl_check_wargs(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); + if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for " + "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")", + verbs[verb]); + return ERROR; + } break; case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED: @@ -2803,7 +3104,9 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many different definitions of what can be a boolean. */ - if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */ + if (*arg == '-' + ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */ + : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */ rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK; else rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 || @@ -2844,9 +3147,64 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY: dkim_disable_verify = TRUE; + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + /* Since DKIM was blocked, skip DMARC too */ + dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE; + dmarc_enable_forensic = FALSE; + #endif break; #endif + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + case CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY: + dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE; + break; + + case CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC: + dmarc_enable_forensic = TRUE; + break; + #endif + + case CONTROL_DSCP: + if (*p == '/') + { + int fd, af, level, optname, value; + /* If we are acting on stdin, the setsockopt may fail if stdin is not + a socket; we can accept that, we'll just debug-log failures anyway. */ + fd = fileno(smtp_in); + af = ip_get_address_family(fd); + if (af < 0) + { + HDEBUG(D_acl) + debug_printf("smtp input is probably not a socket [%s], not setting DSCP\n", + strerror(errno)); + break; + } + if (dscp_lookup(p+1, af, &level, &optname, &value)) + { + if (setsockopt(fd, level, optname, &value, sizeof(value)) < 0) + { + HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("failed to set input DSCP[%s]: %s\n", + p+1, strerror(errno)); + } + else + { + HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("set input DSCP to \"%s\"\n", p+1); + } + } + else + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised DSCP value in \"control=%s\"", arg); + return ERROR; + } + } + else + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg); + return ERROR; + } + break; + case CONTROL_ERROR: return ERROR; @@ -2986,6 +3344,20 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS: suppress_local_fixups = TRUE; break; + + case CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY: + if (deliver_freeze) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"control=%s\" on frozen item", arg); + return ERROR; + } + if (queue_only_policy) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"control=%s\" on queue-only item", arg); + return ERROR; + } + cutthrough_delivery = TRUE; + break; } break; @@ -3083,6 +3455,18 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) break; #endif + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC + case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS: + if (!dmarc_has_been_checked) + dmarc_process(); + dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE; + /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more + * view into the process in the future. */ + rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS), + &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL); + break; + #endif + case ACLC_DNSLISTS: rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg); break; @@ -3099,11 +3483,11 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) writing is poorly documented. */ case ACLC_ENCRYPTED: - if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else + if (tls_in.cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else { uschar *endcipher = NULL; - uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':'); - if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else + uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_in.cipher, ':'); + if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_in.cipher; else { endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':'); if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0; @@ -3227,6 +3611,10 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) break; #endif + case ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER: + setup_remove_header(arg); + break; + case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS: { uschar *sdomain; @@ -3282,6 +3670,10 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) break; #endif + case ACLC_UDPSEND: + rc = acl_udpsend(arg, log_msgptr); + break; + /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into @@ -3796,10 +4188,97 @@ return FAIL; } + + +/* Same args as acl_check_internal() above, but the string s is +the name of an ACL followed optionally by up to 9 space-separated arguments. +The name and args are separately expanded. Args go into $acl_arg globals. */ +static int +acl_check_wargs(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level, + uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr) +{ +uschar * tmp; +uschar * tmp_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */ +uschar * sav_arg[9]; /* must match acl_arg[] */ +int sav_narg; +uschar * name; +int i; +int ret; + +if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(name = expand_string(tmp))) + goto bad; + +for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) + { + while (*s && isspace(*s)) s++; + if (!*s) break; + if (!(tmp = string_dequote(&s)) || !(tmp_arg[i] = expand_string(tmp))) + { + tmp = name; + goto bad; + } + } + +sav_narg = acl_narg; +acl_narg = i; +for (i = 0; i < acl_narg; i++) + { + sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i]; + acl_arg[i] = tmp_arg[i]; + } +while (i < 9) + { + sav_arg[i] = acl_arg[i]; + acl_arg[i++] = NULL; + } + +ret = acl_check_internal(where, addr, name, level, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); + +acl_narg = sav_narg; +for (i = 0; i < 9; i++) acl_arg[i] = sav_arg[i]; +return ret; + +bad: +if (expand_string_forcedfail) return ERROR; +*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", + tmp, expand_string_message); +return search_find_defer?DEFER:ERROR; +} + + + /************************************************* * Check access using an ACL * *************************************************/ +/* Alternate interface for ACL, used by expansions */ +int +acl_eval(int where, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr) +{ +address_item adb; +address_item *addr = NULL; + +*user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL; +sender_verified_failed = NULL; +ratelimiters_cmd = NULL; +log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT; + +if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT) + { + adb = address_defaults; + addr = &adb; + addr->address = expand_string(US"$local_part@$domain"); + addr->domain = deliver_domain; + addr->local_part = deliver_localpart; + addr->cc_local_part = deliver_localpart; + addr->lc_local_part = deliver_localpart; + } + +return acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); +} + + + /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls acl_check_internal() to do the actual work. @@ -3818,6 +4297,7 @@ Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb DEFER can't tell at the moment ERROR disaster */ +int acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN; int acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, @@ -3832,7 +4312,11 @@ sender_verified_failed = NULL; ratelimiters_cmd = NULL; log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT; -if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT) +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PRDR +if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where == ACL_WHERE_PRDR ) +#else +if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT ) +#endif { adb = address_defaults; addr = &adb; @@ -3846,7 +4330,56 @@ if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT) deliver_localpart = addr->local_part; } +acl_where = where; rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); +acl_where = ACL_WHERE_UNKNOWN; + +/* Cutthrough - if requested, +and WHERE_RCPT and not yet opened conn as result of recipient-verify, +and rcpt acl returned accept, +and first recipient (cancel on any subsequents) +open one now and run it up to RCPT acceptance. +A failed verify should cancel cutthrough request. + +Initial implementation: dual-write to spool. +Assume the rxd datastream is now being copied byte-for-byte to an open cutthrough connection. + +Cease cutthrough copy on rxd final dot; do not send one. + +On a data acl, if not accept and a cutthrough conn is open, hard-close it (no SMTP niceness). + +On data acl accept, terminate the dataphase on an open cutthrough conn. If accepted or +perm-rejected, reflect that to the original sender - and dump the spooled copy. +If temp-reject, close the conn (and keep the spooled copy). +If conn-failure, no action (and keep the spooled copy). +*/ +switch (where) +{ +case ACL_WHERE_RCPT: +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PRDR +case ACL_WHERE_PRDR: +#endif + if( rcpt_count > 1 ) + cancel_cutthrough_connection("more than one recipient"); + else if (rc == OK && cutthrough_delivery && cutthrough_fd < 0) + open_cutthrough_connection(addr); + break; + +case ACL_WHERE_PREDATA: + if( rc == OK ) + cutthrough_predata(); + else + cancel_cutthrough_connection("predata acl not ok"); + break; + +case ACL_WHERE_QUIT: +case ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT: + cancel_cutthrough_connection("quit or notquit"); + break; + +default: + break; +} deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL; @@ -3885,7 +4418,6 @@ return rc; } - /************************************************* * Create ACL variable * *************************************************/