X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/3c90bbcdc7cf73298156f7bcd5f5e750e7814e72..dbbc1c20b59dc10368e31a7c81f110eb40b36494:/src/src/acl.c diff --git a/src/src/acl.c b/src/src/acl.c index 185a39d5d..f47259ca0 100644 --- a/src/src/acl.c +++ b/src/src/acl.c @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static control_def controls_list[] = { { US"no_delay_flush", FALSE, ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START }, - + [CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] = { US"no_enforce_sync", FALSE, ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ while ((s = (*func)())) int v, c; BOOL negated = FALSE; uschar *saveline = s; - uschar name[64]; + uschar name[EXIM_DRIVERNAME_MAX]; /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial exclamation mark. */ @@ -1313,11 +1313,12 @@ acl_verify_csa(const uschar *domain) tree_node *t; const uschar *found; int priority, weight, port; -dns_answer * dnsa = store_get_dns_answer(); +dns_answer * dnsa; dns_scan dnss; dns_record *rr; -int rc, type; -uschar target[256]; +int rc, type, yield; +#define TARGET_SIZE 256 +uschar * target = store_get(TARGET_SIZE, TRUE); /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address @@ -1325,8 +1326,8 @@ instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */ while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain; if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name; -if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address; -if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN; +if (!domain) domain = sender_host_address; +if (!sender_host_address) return CSA_UNKNOWN; /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly @@ -1356,8 +1357,8 @@ return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when we return from this function. */ -t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain); -if (t != NULL) return t->data.val; +if ((t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain))) + return t->data.val; t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain), is_tainted(domain)); Ustrcpy(t->name, domain); @@ -1366,23 +1367,26 @@ Ustrcpy(t->name, domain); /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */ found = domain; +dnsa = store_get_dns_answer(); switch (dns_special_lookup(dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found)) { /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */ default: - return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV; + yield = CSA_DEFER_SRV; + goto out; /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */ case DNS_NOMATCH: case DNS_NODATA: - return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; + yield = CSA_UNKNOWN; + goto out; /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */ case DNS_SUCCEED: - break; + break; } /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */ @@ -1413,7 +1417,10 @@ for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); SRV records of their own. */ if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0) - return t->data.val = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN; + { + yield = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are @@ -1421,7 +1428,11 @@ for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values greater than 3 are undefined. */ - if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN; + if (weight < 2) + { + yield = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN; + goto out; + } if (weight > 2) continue; @@ -1430,7 +1441,7 @@ for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */ (void)dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, p, - (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target)); + (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, TARGET_SIZE); DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target is %s\n", target); @@ -1439,7 +1450,11 @@ for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */ -if (!rr) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; +if (!rr) + { + yield = CSA_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782. A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot @@ -1447,7 +1462,11 @@ be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */ -if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; +if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) + { + yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; + goto out; + } /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g. @@ -1455,7 +1474,11 @@ because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */ rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target); -if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc; +if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) + { + yield = rc; + goto out; + } /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */ @@ -1473,13 +1496,18 @@ switch (dns_lookup(dnsa, target, type, NULL)) /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */ default: - return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR; + yield = CSA_DEFER_ADDR; + break; /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */ case DNS_SUCCEED: rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target); - if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc; + if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) + { + yield = rc; + break; + } /* else fall through */ /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized @@ -1488,8 +1516,14 @@ switch (dns_lookup(dnsa, target, type, NULL)) case DNS_NOMATCH: case DNS_NODATA: - return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; + yield = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; + break; } + +out: + +store_free_dns_answer(dnsa); +return t->data.val = yield; } @@ -1944,7 +1978,8 @@ if (quota) { if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr) *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after %s: %s", - smtp_names[smtp_connection_had[smtp_ch_index-1]], *log_msgptr); + smtp_names[smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index)]], + *log_msgptr); if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE; } } @@ -3200,13 +3235,15 @@ for (; cb; cb = cb->next) case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT: cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"fakereject"); - case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER: + case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER: fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL; if (*p == '/') { const uschar *pp = p + 1; while (*pp) pp++; - fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1)); + /* The entire control= line was expanded at top so no need to expand + the part after the / */ + fake_response_text = string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1); p = pp; } else /* Explicitly reset to default string */ @@ -3503,20 +3540,20 @@ for (; cb; cb = cb->next) } break; - #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM +#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER: if (dkim_cur_signer) rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer, - &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL); + &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); else rc = FAIL; break; case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS: rc = match_isinlist(dkim_verify_status, - &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL); + &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); break; - #endif +#endif #ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS: @@ -3526,7 +3563,7 @@ for (; cb; cb = cb->next) /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more * view into the process in the future. */ rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS), - &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL); + &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); break; #endif @@ -3667,20 +3704,22 @@ for (; cb; cb = cb->next) #endif case ACLC_QUEUE: - if (is_tainted(arg)) - { - *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted", - arg); - return ERROR; - } - if (Ustrchr(arg, '/')) { - *log_msgptr = string_sprintf( - "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg); - return ERROR; + uschar *m; + if ((m = is_tainted2(arg, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted", arg))) + { + *log_msgptr = m; + return ERROR; + } + if (Ustrchr(arg, '/')) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf( + "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg); + return ERROR; + } + queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE); + break; } - queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE); - break; case ACLC_RATELIMIT: rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr); @@ -4053,6 +4092,15 @@ while (isspace(*ss)) ss++; acl_text = ss; +if ( !f.running_in_test_harness + && is_tainted2(acl_text, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, + "Tainted ACL text \"%s\"", acl_text)) + { + /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */ + *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error"; + return ERROR; + } + /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file. It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration @@ -4076,10 +4124,8 @@ if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL) else if (*ss == '/') { struct stat statbuf; - if (is_tainted(ss)) + if (is_tainted2(ss, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted ACL file name '%s'", ss)) { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "attempt to open tainted ACL file name \"%s\"", ss); /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */ *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error"; return ERROR; @@ -4542,7 +4588,8 @@ switch (where) /* Drop cutthrough conns, and drop heldopen verify conns if the previous was not DATA */ { - uschar prev = smtp_connection_had[smtp_ch_index-2]; + uschar prev = + smtp_connection_had[SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(SMTP_HBUFF_PREV(smtp_ch_index))]; BOOL dropverify = !(prev == SCH_DATA || prev == SCH_BDAT); cancel_cutthrough_connection(dropverify, US"quit or conndrop");