X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/2a3eea108d202b0fc2d1ad17b3069ab78e811b7b..184e88237dea64ce48076cdd0184612d057cbafd:/src/src/acl.c diff --git a/src/src/acl.c b/src/src/acl.c index 1812e0be2..73f0614af 100644 --- a/src/src/acl.c +++ b/src/src/acl.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.4 2004/10/19 13:40:39 ph10 Exp $ */ +/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.68 2007/01/08 10:50:17 ph10 Exp $ */ /************************************************* * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * *************************************************/ -/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2004 */ +/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2007 */ /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */ @@ -27,33 +27,195 @@ static uschar *verbs[] = { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require", US"warn" }; -/* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */ - -static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK }; +/* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used +are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For +"accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in +the code. */ + +static int msgcond[] = { + (1<u.varnumber = s[5] - '0'; - if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX; - s += 6; + while (*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr)) + { + if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_') + { + *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name " + "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s); + return NULL; + } + endptr++; + } + + cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4); + s = endptr; while (isspace(*s)) s++; } @@ -439,6 +895,115 @@ return yield; +/************************************************* +* Set up added header line(s) * +*************************************************/ + +/* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn() +to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a +"warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are +added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there. + +Argument: string of header lines +Returns: nothing +*/ + +static void +setup_header(uschar *hstring) +{ +uschar *p, *q; +int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring); + +/* An empty string does nothing; otherwise add a final newline if necessary. */ + +if (hlen <= 0) return; +if (hstring[hlen-1] != '\n') hstring = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring); + +/* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */ + +for (p = q = hstring; *p != 0; ) + { + uschar *s; + int newtype = htype_add_bot; + header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers; + + /* Find next header line within the string */ + + for (;;) + { + q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); + if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break; + } + + /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to + add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */ + + if (*p == ':') + { + if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0) + { + newtype = htype_add_rec; + p += 16; + } + else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0) + { + newtype = htype_add_rfc; + p += 14; + } + else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0) + { + newtype = htype_add_top; + p += 10; + } + else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0) + { + newtype = htype_add_bot; + p += 8; + } + while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++; + } + + /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn: + to the front of it. */ + + for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++) + { + if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break; + } + + s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p); + hlen = Ustrlen(s); + + /* See if this line has already been added */ + + while (*hptr != NULL) + { + if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break; + hptr = &((*hptr)->next); + } + + /* Add if not previously present */ + + if (*hptr == NULL) + { + header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line)); + h->text = s; + h->next = NULL; + h->type = newtype; + h->slen = hlen; + *hptr = h; + hptr = &(h->next); + } + + /* Advance for next header line within the string */ + + p = q; + } +} + + + + /************************************************* * Handle warnings * *************************************************/ @@ -447,6 +1012,9 @@ return yield; the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log). +** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and +its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead. + Arguments: where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is user_message message for adding to headers @@ -458,8 +1026,6 @@ Returns: nothing static void acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message) { -int hlen; - if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message) { uschar *text; @@ -476,8 +1042,8 @@ if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message) strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0) text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message); - /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc store so they - can be freed at the start of a new message. */ + /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc + store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */ for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next) if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break; @@ -509,94 +1075,10 @@ if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) return; } -/* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */ - -hlen = Ustrlen(user_message); -if (hlen > 0) - { - uschar *text, *p, *q; - - /* Add a final newline if not present */ - - text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message : - string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message); - - /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */ - - for (p = q = text; *p != 0; ) - { - uschar *s; - int newtype = htype_add_bot; - header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers; - - /* Find next header line within the string */ - - for (;;) - { - q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); - if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break; - } - - /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to - add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */ - - if (*p == ':') - { - if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0) - { - newtype = htype_add_rec; - p += 16; - } - else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0) - { - newtype = htype_add_top; - p += 10; - } - else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0) - { - newtype = htype_add_bot; - p += 8; - } - while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++; - } - - /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn: - to the front of it. */ - - for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++) - { - if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break; - } - - s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p); - hlen = Ustrlen(s); - - /* See if this line has already been added */ - - while (*hptr != NULL) - { - if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break; - hptr = &((*hptr)->next); - } - - /* Add if not previously present */ - - if (*hptr == NULL) - { - header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line)); - h->text = s; - h->next = NULL; - h->type = newtype; - h->slen = hlen; - *hptr = h; - hptr = &(h->next); - } - - /* Advance for next header line within the string */ +/* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate +function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */ - p = q; - } - } +setup_header(user_message); } @@ -659,6 +1141,304 @@ return OK; +/************************************************* +* Check client IP address matches CSA target * +*************************************************/ + +/* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS +response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section +is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS. +If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is +authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match +then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP +addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is +an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?) + +Arguments: + dnsa the DNS answer block + dnss a DNS scan block for us to use + reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above + target the target hostname to use for matching RR names + +Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized + CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched + CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found +*/ + +static int +acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset, + uschar *target) +{ +dns_record *rr; +dns_address *da; + +BOOL target_found = FALSE; + +for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset); + rr != NULL; + rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT)) + { + /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */ + + if (rr->type != T_A + #if HAVE_IPV6 + && rr->type != T_AAAA + #ifdef SUPPORT_A6 + && rr->type != T_A6 + #endif + #endif + ) continue; + + if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue; + + target_found = TRUE; + + /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan + the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */ + + for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next) + { + /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */ + + DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address); + + if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK; + } + } + +/* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is +using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP +addresses. */ + +if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH; +else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; +} + + + +/************************************************* +* Verify Client SMTP Authorization * +*************************************************/ + +/* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special() +to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or +$sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the +client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV +target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address +should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if +not we perform another DNS lookup to get it. + +Arguments: + domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa + +Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found + CSA_OK successfully authorized + CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized + CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem +*/ + +static int +acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain) +{ +tree_node *t; +uschar *found, *p; +int priority, weight, port; +dns_answer dnsa; +dns_scan dnss; +dns_record *rr; +int rc, type; +uschar target[256]; + +/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the +client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address +instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */ + +while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain; +if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name; +if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address; +if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN; + +/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it +into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly +containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */ + +if (domain[0] == '[') + { + uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':'); + if (start == NULL) start = domain; + domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2); + } + +/* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse +DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's +not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as +address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an +extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */ + +if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0) + { + if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN; + dns_build_reverse(domain, target); + domain = target; + } + +/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have, +return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure +for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when +we return from this function. */ + +t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain); +if (t != NULL) return t->data.val; + +t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain)); +Ustrcpy(t->name, domain); +(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t); + +/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */ + +found = domain; +switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found)) + { + /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */ + + default: + return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV; + + /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */ + + case DNS_NOMATCH: + case DNS_NODATA: + return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; + + /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */ + + case DNS_SUCCEED: + break; + } + +/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */ + +for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); + rr != NULL; + rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)) + { + if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue; + + /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */ + + p = rr->data; + GETSHORT(priority, p); + GETSHORT(weight, p); + GETSHORT(port, p); + + DEBUG(D_acl) + debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port); + + /* Check the CSA version number */ + + if (priority != 1) continue; + + /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain + found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check + the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one + assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA + SRV records of their own. */ + + if (found != domain) + { + if (port & 1) + return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT; + else + return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; + } + + /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value + in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are + unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP + address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values + greater than 3 are undefined. */ + + if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN; + + if (weight > 2) continue; + + /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the + client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the + target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */ + + (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p, + (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target)); + + DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target); + + break; + } + +/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */ + +if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; + +/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782. +A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot +be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is +equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the +root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */ + +if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; + +/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging +to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g. +because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup +to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */ + +rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target); +if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc; + +/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */ + +#if HAVE_IPV6 +if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL) + type = T_AAAA; +else +#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */ + type = T_A; + + +#if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6) +DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN: +#endif + +switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL)) + { + /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */ + + default: + return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR; + + /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */ + + case DNS_SUCCEED: + rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target); + if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc; + /* else fall through */ + + /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized + IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records) + we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */ + + case DNS_NOMATCH: + case DNS_NODATA: + + #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6) + if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; } + #endif + + return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; + } +} + + + /************************************************* * Handle verification (address & other) * *************************************************/ @@ -689,16 +1469,25 @@ acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg, int sep = '/'; int callout = -1; int callout_overall = -1; +int callout_connect = -1; int verify_options = 0; int rc; BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE; BOOL defer_ok = FALSE; BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE; BOOL no_details = FALSE; +BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE; address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL; uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL; uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL; uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL; + +/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose +an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has +now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day. +*/ + +uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/'); uschar *list = arg; uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size); @@ -708,6 +1497,7 @@ if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY; if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0) { + if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK; return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr); } @@ -718,49 +1508,80 @@ mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */ if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0) { + if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK; *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate"; return FAIL; } -/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */ +/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have +occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */ -if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0) return helo_verified? OK : FAIL; +if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0) + { + if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; + if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo(); + return helo_verified? OK : FAIL; + } -/* Handle header verification options - permitted only after DATA or a non-SMTP -message. */ +/* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the +result code into user-friendly strings. */ -if (strncmpic(ss, US"header_", 7) == 0) +if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0) { - if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) - { - *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s " - "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]); - return ERROR; - } + rc = acl_verify_csa(list); + *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s", + csa_reason_string[rc]); + csa_status = csa_status_string[rc]; + DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status); + return csa_return_code[rc]; + } + +/* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is +a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to +send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as +always). */ + +if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0) + { + if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; + if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL; + rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr); + if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL) + *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); + return rc; + } - /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is - a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to - send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as - always). */ +/* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope +recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */ - if (strcmpic(ss+7, US"syntax") == 0) +if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0) + { + if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; + if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL; + rc = verify_check_notblind(); + if (rc != OK) { - int rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr); - if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL) + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected"); + if (smtp_return_error_details) *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); - return rc; } + return rc; + } - /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant - header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like - sender and recipient. */ +/* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses, +either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of +slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */ - else if (strcmpic(ss+7, US"sender") == 0) verify_header_sender = TRUE; - /* Unknown verify argument starting with "header_" */ +/* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant +header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like +sender and recipient. */ - else goto BAD_VERIFY; +if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0) + { + if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL; + verify_header_sender = TRUE; } /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient". @@ -798,13 +1619,15 @@ else } } -/* Remaining items are optional */ +/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient +verification, including "header sender" verification. */ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) != NULL) { if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE; else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE; + else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE; /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */ @@ -835,6 +1658,11 @@ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) uschar *opt; uschar buffer[256]; while (isspace(*ss)) ss++; + + /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options + have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some + kind of table-driven thing. */ + while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) != NULL) { @@ -848,6 +1676,11 @@ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0) verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster; else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US""; + else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0) + { + pm_mailfrom = US""; + verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm; + } else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0) { @@ -903,6 +1736,25 @@ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) return ERROR; } } + else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0) + { + opt += 7; + while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; + if (*opt++ != '=') + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after " + "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg); + return ERROR; + } + while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; + callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE); + if (callout_connect < 0) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition " + "\"verify %s\"", arg); + return ERROR; + } + } else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */ { callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE); @@ -947,13 +1799,19 @@ message if giving out verification details. */ if (verify_header_sender) { + int verrno; rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout, - callout_overall, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options); - if (smtp_return_error_details) + callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options, + &verrno); + if (rc != OK) { - if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) - *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); - if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE; + *basic_errno = verrno; + if (smtp_return_error_details) + { + if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) + *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); + if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE; + } } } @@ -1013,7 +1871,7 @@ else if (verify_sender_address != NULL) { BOOL routed = TRUE; uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data; - + sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE); if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told); if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0) @@ -1027,11 +1885,14 @@ else if (verify_sender_address != NULL) else verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender; + if (success_on_redirect) + verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect; + /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in verify_options. */ rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout, - callout_overall, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed); + callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed); HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n"); @@ -1059,16 +1920,16 @@ else if (verify_sender_address != NULL) sender_vaddr->special_action = rc; sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list; sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr; - - /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by + + /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by the sender verification. */ - + deliver_address_data = save_address_data; } - + /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */ - sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data; + sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data; } /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle @@ -1078,15 +1939,20 @@ else { address_item addr2; + if (success_on_redirect) + verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect; + /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might get rewritten. */ addr2 = *addr; rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout, - callout_overall, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL); + callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL); HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n"); + *log_msgptr = addr2.message; - *user_msgptr = addr2.user_message; + *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)? + addr2.user_message : addr2.message; *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno; /* Make $address_data visible */ @@ -1140,9 +2006,24 @@ return rc; BAD_VERIFY: *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", " - "\"header_syntax\" or \"header_sender\" at start of ACL condition " + "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or " + "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition " "\"verify %s\"", arg); return ERROR; + +/* Options supplied when not allowed come here */ + +NO_OPTIONS: +*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" " + "(this verify item has no options)", arg); +return ERROR; + +/* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */ + +WRONG_ACL: +*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s " + "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]); +return ERROR; } @@ -1190,6 +2071,297 @@ return d->value; +/************************************************* +* Handle rate limiting * +*************************************************/ + +/* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result +of the ACL ratelimit condition. + +Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the +sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is +similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write +ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h + +Arguments: + arg the option string for ratelimit= + where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is + log_msgptr for error messages + +Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit + FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit + DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database + ERROR - Syntax error in options. +*/ + +static int +acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr) +{ +double limit, period; +uschar *ss, *key; +int sep = '/'; +BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE; +BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE; +int old_pool, rc; +tree_node **anchor, *t; +open_db dbblock, *dbm; +dbdata_ratelimit *dbd; +struct timeval tv; + +/* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion +variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative +error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */ + +/* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst +size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for +rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */ + +sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0); +if (sender_rate_limit == NULL) + limit = -1.0; +else + { + limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss); + if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; } + else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; } + else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; } + } +if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for " + "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number", + sender_rate_limit); + return ERROR; + } + +/* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the +lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data +if the period or options are different. */ + +key = arg; + +/* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time +constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to +run-time division errors. */ + +sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0); +if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0; +else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE); +if (period <= 0.0) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for " + "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value", + sender_rate_period); + return ERROR; + } + +/* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being +used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */ + +while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) + != NULL) + { + if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE; + else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE; + else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE; + else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; + else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE; + else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE; + else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */ + else have_key = TRUE; + } +if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1) + { + *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition"; + return ERROR; + } + +/* Default option values */ +if (!strict) leaky = TRUE; +if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE; + +/* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no +sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */ + +if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL) + key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address); + +HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n", + limit, period, key); + +/* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For +per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool +so that they survive across resets. */ + +anchor = NULL; +old_pool = store_pool; + +if (per_conn) + { + anchor = &ratelimiters_conn; + store_pool = POOL_PERM; + } +else if (per_mail || per_byte) + anchor = &ratelimiters_mail; +else if (per_cmd) + anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd; + +if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL) + { + dbd = t->data.ptr; + /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */ + if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL; + else rc = OK; + store_pool = old_pool; + sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate); + HDEBUG(D_acl) + debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate); + return rc; + } + +/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded +rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no +previous rate for this key, create one. */ + +dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE); +if (dbm == NULL) + { + store_pool = old_pool; + sender_rate = NULL; + HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n"); + *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available"; + return DEFER; + } +dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key); + +gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + +if (dbd == NULL) + { + HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n"); + dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit)); + dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec; + dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec; + dbd->rate = 0.0; + } +else + { + /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving + average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for + a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1) + where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value. + + Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n + samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p + is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means + that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable + sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p). + + The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly + comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous + message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample. + + It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate + to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit. + This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N + messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i + + rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0 + = k + a * rate_0 + rate_2 = k + a * rate_1 + = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0 + rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0 + rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x) + = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a) + = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N) + + When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired. + + rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N + a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i) + N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)) + N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i)) + + Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to + increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending + rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the + maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of + messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */ + + double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec + + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0; + double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp + + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0; + + /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going + backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed + rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */ + + double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9 + : this_time - prev_time; + + double i_over_p = interval / period; + double a = exp(-i_over_p); + + dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec; + dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec; + + /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the + measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size + then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate + decay as if nothing happened. */ + + if (per_byte) + dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size) + * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate; + else if (per_cmd && where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) + dbd->rate = (double)recipients_count + * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate; + else + dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate; + } + +/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This +matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets +the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should +be completely blocked). */ + +if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL; + else rc = OK; + +/* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we +are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update +the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry +rate preventing them from getting any email through. */ + +if (rc == FAIL || !leaky) + dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit)); +dbfn_close(dbm); + +/* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */ + +if (anchor != NULL) + { + t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key)); + t->data.ptr = dbd; + Ustrcpy(t->name, key); + (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t); + } + +/* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in +order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */ + +store_pool = old_pool; +sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate); + +HDEBUG(D_acl) + debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate); + +return rc; +} + + + /************************************************* * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item * *************************************************/ @@ -1226,13 +2398,16 @@ acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where, { uschar *user_message = NULL; uschar *log_message = NULL; -uschar *p; +uschar *p = NULL; int rc = OK; +#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN +int sep = '/'; +#endif for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) { uschar *arg; - int control_type; + int control_type; /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in case of rejection. They are expanded later. */ @@ -1286,11 +2461,8 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) if (cb->type == ACLC_SET) { - int n = cb->u.varnumber; - int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm'; - if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX; - debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n); - lhswidth += 7; + debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname); + lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname); } debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg); @@ -1315,6 +2487,10 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) switch(cb->type) { + case ACLC_ADD_HEADER: + setup_header(arg); + break; + /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */ @@ -1335,6 +2511,17 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) TRUE, NULL); break; + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL + case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN: + { + int old_pool = store_pool; + store_pool = POOL_PERM; + bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg); + store_pool = old_pool; + } + break; + #endif + case ACLC_CONDITION: if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */ rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK; @@ -1350,17 +2537,33 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) case ACLC_CONTROL: control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr); - /* Check this control makes sense at this time */ + /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */ if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0) { *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL", controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]); return ERROR; - } + } switch(control_type) { + case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED: + allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE; + break; + + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL + case CONTROL_BMI_RUN: + bmi_run = 1; + break; + #endif + + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS + case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY: + dk_do_verify = 1; + break; + #endif + case CONTROL_ERROR: return ERROR; @@ -1380,13 +2583,47 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE; break; + #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN + case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL: + no_mbox_unspool = TRUE; + break; + #endif + case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE: no_multiline_responses = TRUE; break; + case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER: + case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT: + fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL; + if (*p == '/') + { + uschar *pp = p + 1; + while (*pp != 0) pp++; + fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1)); + p = pp; + } + else + { + /* Explicitly reset to default string */ + fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s)."; + } + break; + case CONTROL_FREEZE: deliver_freeze = TRUE; deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL); + freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */ + if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0) + { + p += 8; + freeze_tell = NULL; + } + if (*p != 0) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg); + return ERROR; + } break; case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY: @@ -1394,33 +2631,54 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) break; case CONTROL_SUBMISSION: + originator_name = US""; submission_mode = TRUE; while (*p == '/') - { + { if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0) { p += 14; active_local_sender_retain = TRUE; - active_local_from_check = FALSE; - } + active_local_from_check = FALSE; + } else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0) { uschar *pp = p + 8; - while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++; - submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p); - p = pp; + while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++; + submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8); + p = pp; } - else break; - } + /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of + the string. */ + else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0) + { + uschar *pp = p + 6; + while (*pp != 0) pp++; + submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6, + big_buffer, big_buffer_size)); + p = pp; + } + else break; + } if (*p != 0) { *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg); return ERROR; } break; + + case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS: + suppress_local_fixups = TRUE; + break; } break; + #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN + case ACLC_DECODE: + rc = mime_decode(&arg); + break; + #endif + case ACLC_DELAY: { int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE); @@ -1439,10 +2697,127 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n"); } - else sleep(delay); + + /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has + gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten + the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover + that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection + is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its + end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the + Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we + can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case + it is not always available. + + NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be + dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections. + Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout + case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */ + + else + { + while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay); + } + } + } + break; + + #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME + case ACLC_DEMIME: + rc = demime(&arg); + break; + #endif + + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS + case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE: + if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; + /* check header source of domain against given string */ + switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) { + case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM: + rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER: + rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE: + rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + } + break; + + case ACLC_DK_POLICY: + if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; + /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */ + rc = FAIL; + if (dk_verify_block->signsall) + rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + if (dk_verify_block->testing) + rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + + case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS: + if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; + if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL) + rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor, + NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL); + else rc = FAIL; + break; + + case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS: + if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; + if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL) + rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor, + NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL); + else rc = FAIL; + break; + + case ACLC_DK_SENDERS: + if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; + if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL) + rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL); + else rc = FAIL; + break; + + case ACLC_DK_STATUS: + if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; + if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) { + switch(dk_verify_block->result) { + case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT: + rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY: + rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE: + rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED: + rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT: + rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD: + rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; + case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD: + rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL, + NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); + break; } } break; + #endif case ACLC_DNSLISTS: rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg); @@ -1493,6 +2868,29 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) &deliver_localpart_data); break; + case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET: + { + int logbits = 0; + int sep = 0; + uschar *s = arg; + uschar *ss; + while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) + != NULL) + { + if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN; + else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC; + else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT; + else + { + logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT; + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name \"%s\" in " + "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]); + } + } + log_reject_target = logbits; + } + break; + case ACLC_LOGWRITE: { int logbits = 0; @@ -1519,16 +2917,52 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) s++; } while (isspace(*s)) s++; + + if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN; log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s)); } break; + #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN + case ACLC_MALWARE: + { + /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */ + uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size); + /* Run the malware backend. */ + rc = malware(&ss); + /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */ + while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) + != NULL) { + if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER) + { + /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */ + rc = FAIL; + } + } + } + break; + + case ACLC_MIME_REGEX: + rc = mime_regex(&arg); + break; + #endif + + case ACLC_RATELIMIT: + rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr); + break; + case ACLC_RECIPIENTS: rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, &recipient_data); break; + #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN + case ACLC_REGEX: + rc = regex(&arg); + break; + #endif + case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS: { uschar *sdomain; @@ -1549,18 +2983,47 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) case ACLC_SET: { int old_pool = store_pool; - if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM; - acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg); + if (cb->u.varname[0] == 'c') store_pool = POOL_PERM; + acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg); store_pool = old_pool; } break; + #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN + case ACLC_SPAM: + { + /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */ + uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size); + /* Run the spam backend. */ + rc = spam(&ss); + /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */ + while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) + != NULL) { + if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER) + { + /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */ + rc = FAIL; + } + } + } + break; + #endif + + #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF + case ACLC_SPF: + rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address); + break; + #endif + /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come - only from explicit "message" modifiers. */ + only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into + $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers + (until something changes it). */ case ACLC_VERIFY: rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno); + acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr; if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL; break; @@ -1583,13 +3046,8 @@ for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used, -handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for -which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log -message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that -appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept" -and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb. - -These modifiers act in different ways: +handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make +it the same as the user message. "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message. @@ -1597,23 +3055,29 @@ it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message. "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user message that is already set. -If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */ +Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but +for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and +when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no +"endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is +present. */ -if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] || - (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) || - (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT)) +if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL; + +if (((1< DENY user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response) log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response) @@ -2088,21 +3553,23 @@ Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb */ int -acl_check(int where, uschar *data_string, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, +acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr) { int rc; address_item adb; -address_item *addr; +address_item *addr = NULL; *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL; sender_verified_failed = NULL; +ratelimiters_cmd = NULL; +log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT; if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT) { adb = address_defaults; addr = &adb; - addr->address = data_string; + addr->address = recipient; if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER) { *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check"; @@ -2111,16 +3578,11 @@ if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT) deliver_domain = addr->domain; deliver_localpart = addr->local_part; } -else - { - addr = NULL; - smtp_command_argument = data_string; - } rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); -smtp_command_argument = deliver_domain = - deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL; +deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = + sender_address_data = NULL; /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */ @@ -2145,10 +3607,10 @@ if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH) return ERROR; } -/* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user -message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */ +/* Before giving a response, take a look at the length of any user message, and +split it up into multiple lines if possible. */ -if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75) +if (*user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75) { uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr); uschar *ss = s; @@ -2194,4 +3656,64 @@ if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75) return rc; } + + +/************************************************* +* Create ACL variable * +*************************************************/ + +/* Create an ACL variable or reuse an existing one. ACL variables are in a +binary tree (see tree.c) with acl_var_c and acl_var_m as root nodes. + +Argument: + name pointer to the variable's name, starting with c or m + +Returns the pointer to variable's tree node +*/ + +tree_node * +acl_var_create(uschar *name) +{ +tree_node *node, **root; +root = (name[0] == 'c')? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m; +node = tree_search(*root, name); +if (node == NULL) + { + node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name)); + Ustrcpy(node->name, name); + (void)tree_insertnode(root, node); + } +node->data.ptr = NULL; +return node; +} + + + +/************************************************* +* Write an ACL variable in spool format * +*************************************************/ + +/* This function is used as a callback for tree_walk when writing variables to +the spool file. To retain spool file compatibility, what is written is -aclc or +-aclm followed by the rest of the name and the data length, space separated, +then the value itself, starting on a new line, and terminated by an additional +newline. When we had only numbered ACL variables, the first line might look +like this: "-aclc 5 20". Now it might be "-aclc foo 20" for the variable called +acl_cfoo. + +Arguments: + name of the variable + value of the variable + ctx FILE pointer (as a void pointer) + +Returns: nothing +*/ + +void +acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx) +{ +FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx; +fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value); +} + /* End of acl.c */