X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/2009ecca3f3413925537ed5563a1409f74bcd194..777e3beace88a39457ee4a856a094e16649f333f:/src/src/tls-openssl.c diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c index 8e8f27686..fb59217da 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c +++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c @@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ We do not free the stack since it could be needed a second time for SNI handling. Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not -be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) - +be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) - But what with? We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback. And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the library does it for us anyway? */ @@ -1601,9 +1601,15 @@ if (init_options) else DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n"); -/* Disable session cache unconditionally */ - +/* We'd like to disable session cache unconditionally, but foolish Outlook +Express clients then give up the first TLS connection and make a second one +(which works). Only when there is an IMAP service on the same machine. +Presumably OE is trying to use the cache for A on B. Leave it enabled for +now, until we work out a decent way of presenting control to the config. It +will never be used because we use a new context every time. */ +#ifdef notdef (void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); +#endif /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */ /* Initialize ECDH temp key parameter selection */ @@ -1857,8 +1863,6 @@ if (expcerts && *expcerts) */ if (file) { - tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = host - ? client_static_cbinfo : server_static_cbinfo; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file); SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names); @@ -2103,7 +2107,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) */ if (!ssl_xfer_buffer) ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size); ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0; -ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0; +ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = FALSE; receive_getc = tls_getc; receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf; @@ -2302,8 +2306,23 @@ if (rc != OK) return rc; tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE; client_verify_callback_called = FALSE; -if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", - &expciphers, errstr)) +expciphers = NULL; +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +if (tlsa_dnsa) + { + /* We fall back to tls_require_ciphers if unset, empty or forced failure, but + other failures should be treated as problems. */ + if (ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers && + !expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers", + &expciphers, errstr)) + return FAIL; + if (expciphers && *expciphers == '\0') + expciphers = NULL; + } +#endif +if (!expciphers && + !expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", + &expciphers, errstr)) return FAIL; /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they @@ -2456,7 +2475,16 @@ if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout); inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim)); error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes); -alarm(0); +if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(0); + +if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */ + smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */ +if (had_command_sigterm) + smtp_command_sigterm_exit(); +if (had_data_timeout) + smtp_data_timeout_exit(); +if (had_data_sigint) + smtp_data_sigint_exit(); /* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to @@ -2498,14 +2526,14 @@ else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL) { ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring); log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring); - ssl_xfer_error = 1; + ssl_xfer_error = TRUE; return FALSE; } else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error); - ssl_xfer_error = 1; + ssl_xfer_error = TRUE; return FALSE; }