X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/1365611d62f130d0a096b322656b5b790628d2c7..a85c067ba6c6940512cf57ec213277a370d87e70:/src/src/tls-gnu.c diff --git a/src/src/tls-gnu.c b/src/src/tls-gnu.c index a0a35b447..c98760202 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-gnu.c +++ b/src/src/tls-gnu.c @@ -2,10 +2,11 @@ * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * *************************************************/ -/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2012 */ -/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ - +/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 - 2022 */ +/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */ /* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */ +/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* This file provides TLS/SSL support for Exim using the GnuTLS library, one of the available supported implementations. This file is #included into @@ -13,7 +14,7 @@ tls.c when USE_GNUTLS has been set. The code herein is a revamp of GnuTLS integration using the current APIs; the original tls-gnu.c was based on a patch which was contributed by Nikos -Mavroyanopoulos. The revamp is partially a rewrite, partially cut&paste as +Mavrogiannopoulos. The revamp is partially a rewrite, partially cut&paste as appropriate. APIs current as of GnuTLS 2.12.18; note that the GnuTLS manual is for GnuTLS 3, @@ -40,6 +41,127 @@ require current GnuTLS, then we'll drop support for the ancient libraries). /* man-page is incorrect, gnutls_rnd() is not in gnutls.h: */ #include +/* needed to disable PKCS11 autoload unless requested */ +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00 +# include +# define SUPPORT_PARAM_TO_PK_BITS +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030103 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) +# warning "GnuTLS library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile" +# define DISABLE_OCSP +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x020a00 && !defined(DISABLE_EVENT) +# warning "GnuTLS library version too old; tls:cert event unsupported" +# define DISABLE_EVENT +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000 +# define SUPPORT_SELFSIGN /* Uncertain what version is first usable but 2.12.23 is not */ +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030306 +# define SUPPORT_CA_DIR +#else +# undef SUPPORT_CA_DIR +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030014 +# define SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030104 +# define GNUTLS_CERT_VFY_STATUS_PRINT +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030109 +# define SUPPORT_CORK +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03010a +# define SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030300 +# define GNUTLS_AUTO_GLOBAL_INIT +# define GNUTLS_AUTO_PKCS11_MANUAL +#endif +#if (GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030404) \ + || (GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030311) && (GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER & 0xffff00 == 0x030300) +# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +# define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP +# endif +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030500 +# define SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030506 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) +# define SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030603 +# define EXIM_HAVE_TLS1_3 +# define SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE +# define GNUTLS_OCSP_STATUS_REQUEST_GET2 +#endif + +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000 +# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA 2 +# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE 3 +# else +# error GnuTLS version too early for DANE +# endif +# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x999999 +# define GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME +# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030603 +# define EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +# else +# warning "GnuTLS library version too old; resumption unsupported" +# endif +#endif + +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030200 +# ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE +# define EXIM_HAVE_ALPN +# endif +#endif + +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030702 +# define HAVE_GNUTLS_EXPORTER +#endif + +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +# include +#endif +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +# include +#endif + +#include "tls-cipher-stdname.c" + + +#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF +void +options_tls(void) +{ +# ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME +builtin_macro_create_var(US"_RESUME_DECODE", RESUME_DECODE_STRING ); +# endif +# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS1_3 +builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS1_3"); +# endif +# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP +builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_OCSP"); +# endif +# ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK +builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_OCSP_LIST"); +# endif +#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT) +builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_CA_CACHE"); +# endif +# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN +builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_ALPN"); +# endif +} +#else + + /* GnuTLS 2 vs 3 GnuTLS 3 only: @@ -53,7 +175,8 @@ Changes: /* Values for verify_requirement */ -enum peer_verify_requirement { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED }; +enum peer_verify_requirement + { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED, VERIFY_DANE }; /* This holds most state for server or client; with this, we can set up an outbound TLS-enabled connection in an ACL callout, while not stomping all @@ -63,22 +186,35 @@ Some of these correspond to variables in globals.c; those variables will be set to point to content in one of these instances, as appropriate for the stage of the process lifetime. -Not handled here: globals tls_active, tls_bits, tls_cipher, tls_peerdn, -tls_certificate_verified, tls_channelbinding_b64, tls_sni. +Not handled here: global tlsp->tls_channelbinding. */ typedef struct exim_gnutls_state { - gnutls_session_t session; - gnutls_certificate_credentials_t x509_cred; - gnutls_priority_t priority_cache; + gnutls_session_t session; + + exim_tlslib_state lib_state; +#define x509_cred libdata0 +#define pri_cache libdata1 + enum peer_verify_requirement verify_requirement; - int fd_in; - int fd_out; - BOOL peer_cert_verified; - BOOL trigger_sni_changes; - const struct host_item *host; - uschar *peerdn; - uschar *received_sni; + int fd_in; + int fd_out; + + BOOL peer_cert_verified:1; + BOOL peer_dane_verified:1; + BOOL trigger_sni_changes:1; + BOOL have_set_peerdn:1; + BOOL xfer_eof:1; /*XXX never gets set! */ + BOOL xfer_error:1; +#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK + BOOL corked:1; +#endif + + const struct host_item *host; /* NULL if server */ + gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert; + uschar *peerdn; + uschar *ciphersuite; + uschar *received_sni; const uschar *tls_certificate; const uschar *tls_privatekey; @@ -86,29 +222,32 @@ typedef struct exim_gnutls_state { const uschar *tls_verify_certificates; const uschar *tls_crl; const uschar *tls_require_ciphers; + uschar *exp_tls_certificate; uschar *exp_tls_privatekey; - uschar *exp_tls_sni; uschar *exp_tls_verify_certificates; uschar *exp_tls_crl; uschar *exp_tls_require_ciphers; + const uschar *exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames; +#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT + uschar *event_action; +#endif +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE + char * const * dane_data; + const int * dane_data_len; +#endif + + tls_support *tlsp; /* set in tls_init() */ uschar *xfer_buffer; int xfer_buffer_lwm; int xfer_buffer_hwm; - int xfer_eof; - int xfer_error; - - uschar cipherbuf[256]; } exim_gnutls_state_st; static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = { - NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE, - NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, - "" + /* all elements not explicitly intialised here get 0/NULL/FALSE */ + .fd_in = -1, + .fd_out = -1, }; /* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming @@ -118,10 +257,15 @@ context we're currently dealing with" pointer and rely upon being single-threaded to keep from processing data on an inbound TLS connection while talking to another TLS connection for an outbound check. This does mean that there's no way for heart-beats to be responded to, for the duration of the -second connection. */ +second connection. +XXX But see gnutls_session_get_ptr() +*/ -static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server, state_client; -static exim_gnutls_state_st *current_global_tls_state; +static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server = { + /* all elements not explicitly intialised here get 0/NULL/FALSE */ + .fd_in = -1, + .fd_out = -1, +}; /* dh_params are initialised once within the lifetime of a process using TLS; if we used TLS in a long-lived daemon, we'd have to reconsider this. But we @@ -129,16 +273,26 @@ don't want to repeat this. */ static gnutls_dh_params_t dh_server_params = NULL; -/* No idea how this value was chosen; preserving it. Default is 3600. */ +static int ssl_session_timeout = 7200; /* Two hours */ -static const int ssl_session_timeout = 200; - -static const char * const exim_default_gnutls_priority = "NORMAL"; +static const uschar * const exim_default_gnutls_priority = US"NORMAL"; /* Guard library core initialisation */ static BOOL exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE; +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +static BOOL gnutls_buggy_ocsp = FALSE; +static BOOL exim_testharness_disable_ocsp_validity_check = FALSE; +#endif + +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN +static int server_seen_alpn = -1; /* count of names */ +#endif +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +static gnutls_datum_t server_sessticket_key; +#endif + /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ /* macros */ @@ -147,27 +301,46 @@ static BOOL exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE; /* Set this to control gnutls_global_set_log_level(); values 0 to 9 will setup the library logging; a value less than 0 disables the calls to set up logging -callbacks. */ -#define EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL -1 +callbacks. GNuTLS also looks for an environment variable - except not for +setuid binaries, making it useless - "GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL". +Allegedly the testscript line "GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL=9 sudo exim ..." would work, +but the env var must be added to /etc/sudoers too. */ +#ifndef EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL +# define EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL -1 +#endif -#define EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS 1024 +#ifndef EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS +# define EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS 1024 +#endif /* With GnuTLS 2.12.x+ we have gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() with which we can ask for a bit-strength. Without that, we stick to the constant we had before, for now. */ -#define EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 1024 - -#define exim_gnutls_err_check(Label) do { \ - if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), host); } } while (0) +#ifndef EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 +# define EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 1024 +#endif -#define expand_check_tlsvar(Varname) expand_check(state->Varname, US #Varname, &state->exp_##Varname) +#define Expand_check_tlsvar(Varname, errstr) \ + expand_check(state->Varname, US #Varname, &state->exp_##Varname, errstr) #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00 -#define HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING -#define HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS -#define HAVE_GNUTLS_RND +# define HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING +# define HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS +# define HAVE_GNUTLS_RND +/* The security fix we provide with the gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11 option + * (4.82 PP/09) introduces a compatibility regression. The symbol simply + * isn't available sometimes, so this needs to become a conditional + * compilation; the sanest way to deal with this being a problem on + * older OSes is to block it in the Local/Makefile with this compiler + * definition */ +# ifndef AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 +# define HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11 +# endif /* AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 */ #endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030404 +# define HAVE_GNUTLS_PRF_RFC5705 +#endif @@ -180,12 +353,13 @@ static void exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message); static int exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session); +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +static int +tls_server_ticket_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, u_int htype, unsigned when, + unsigned incoming, const gnutls_datum_t * msg); +#endif - -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ -/* Static functions */ - /************************************************* * Handle TLS error * *************************************************/ @@ -203,32 +377,155 @@ Argument: usually obtained from gnutls_strerror() host NULL if setting up a server; the connected host if setting up a client + errstr pointer to returned error string Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ static int -tls_error(const uschar *prefix, const char *msg, const host_item *host) +tls_error(const uschar *prefix, const uschar *msg, const host_item *host, + uschar ** errstr) { -if (host) +if (errstr) + *errstr = string_sprintf("(%s)%s%s", prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : US""); +return host ? FAIL : DEFER; +} + + +static int +tls_error_gnu(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const uschar *prefix, int err, + uschar ** errstr) +{ +return tls_error(prefix, + state && err == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED + ? US gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(state->session)) + : US gnutls_strerror(err), + state ? state->host : NULL, + errstr); +} + +static int +tls_error_sys(const uschar *prefix, int err, const host_item *host, + uschar ** errstr) +{ +return tls_error(prefix, US strerror(err), host, errstr); +} + + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* Initialisation */ + +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + +static BOOL +tls_is_buggy_ocsp(void) +{ +const uschar * s; +uschar maj, mid, mic; + +s = CUS gnutls_check_version(NULL); +maj = atoi(CCS s); +if (maj == 3) { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on connection to %s [%s] (%s)%s%s", - host->name, host->address, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : ""); - return FAIL; + while (*s && *s != '.') s++; + mid = atoi(CCS ++s); + if (mid <= 2) + return TRUE; + else if (mid >= 5) + return FALSE; + else + { + while (*s && *s != '.') s++; + mic = atoi(CCS ++s); + return mic <= (mid == 3 ? 16 : 3); + } } -else +return FALSE; +} + +#endif + + +static int +tls_g_init(uschar ** errstr) +{ +int rc; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS global init required\n"); + +#if defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11) && !defined(GNUTLS_AUTO_PKCS11_MANUAL) +/* By default, gnutls_global_init will init PKCS11 support in auto mode, +which loads modules from a config file, which sounds good and may be wanted +by some sysadmin, but also means in common configurations that GNOME keyring +environment variables are used and so breaks for users calling mailq. +To prevent this, we init PKCS11 first, which is the documented approach. */ + +if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11) + if ((rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL))) + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_pkcs11_init", rc, errstr); +#endif + +#ifndef GNUTLS_AUTO_GLOBAL_INIT +if ((rc = gnutls_global_init())) + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_global_init", rc, errstr); +#endif + +#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 +DEBUG(D_tls) { - uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info(); - if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0) - conn_info += 5; - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s)%s%s", - conn_info, prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : ""); - return DEFER; + gnutls_global_set_log_function(exim_gnutls_logger_cb); + /* arbitrarily chosen level; bump up to 9 for more */ + gnutls_global_set_log_level(EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL); } +#endif + +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +if (tls_ocsp_file && (gnutls_buggy_ocsp = tls_is_buggy_ocsp())) + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP unusable with this GnuTLS library version"); +#endif + +exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE; +return OK; +} + + + +/* Daemon-call before each connection. Nothing to do for GnuTLS. */ + +static void +tls_per_lib_daemon_tick(void) +{ } +/* Daemon one-time initialisation */ + +static void +tls_per_lib_daemon_init(void) +{ +uschar * dummy_errstr; +static BOOL once = FALSE; + +if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done) + tls_g_init(&dummy_errstr); + +if (!once) + { + once = TRUE; + +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME + /* We are dependent on the GnuTLS implementation of the Session Ticket + encryption; both the strength and the key rotation period. We hope that + the strength at least matches that of the ciphersuite (but GnuTLS does not + document this). */ + + gnutls_session_ticket_key_generate(&server_sessticket_key); /* >= 2.10.0 */ + if (f.running_in_test_harness) ssl_session_timeout = 6; +#endif + tls_daemon_creds_reload(); + } +} +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ /************************************************* * Deal with logging errors during I/O * @@ -240,7 +537,7 @@ Argument: state the current GnuTLS exim state container rc the GnuTLS error code, or 0 if it's a local error when text identifying read or write - text local error text when ec is 0 + text local error text when rc is 0 Returns: nothing */ @@ -248,15 +545,30 @@ Returns: nothing static void record_io_error(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, int rc, uschar *when, uschar *text) { -const char *msg; +const uschar * msg; +uschar * errstr; + +msg = rc == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED + ? string_sprintf("A TLS fatal alert has been received: %s", + US gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(state->session))) +#ifdef GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION + : rc == GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION && errno + ? string_sprintf("%s: syscall: %s", US gnutls_strerror(rc), strerror(errno)) +#endif + : US gnutls_strerror(rc); -if (rc == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED) - msg = CS string_sprintf("%s: %s", US gnutls_strerror(rc), - US gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(state->session))); -else - msg = gnutls_strerror(rc); +(void) tls_error(when, msg, state->host, &errstr); -tls_error(when, msg, state->host); +if (state->host) + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection %s", + state->host->name, state->host->address, errstr); +else + { + uschar * conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info(); + if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0) conn_info += 5; + /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */ + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s %s", conn_info, errstr); + } } @@ -266,97 +578,134 @@ tls_error(when, msg, state->host); * Set various Exim expansion vars * *************************************************/ +#define exim_gnutls_cert_err(Label) \ + do \ + { \ + if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \ + { \ + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert problem: %s: %s\n", \ + (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \ + return rc; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +static int +import_cert(const gnutls_datum_t * cert, gnutls_x509_crt_t * crtp) +{ +int rc; + +rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(crtp); +exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"gnutls_x509_crt_init (crt)"); + +rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(*crtp, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); +exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"failed to import certificate [gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert)]"); + +return rc; +} + +#undef exim_gnutls_cert_err + + /* We set various Exim global variables from the state, once a session has been established. With TLS callouts, may need to change this to stack variables, or just re-call it with the server state after client callout has finished. -Make sure anything set here is inset in tls_getc(). +Make sure anything set here is unset in tls_getc(). Sets: tls_active fd tls_bits strength indicator tls_certificate_verified bool indicator - tls_channelbinding_b64 for some SASL mechanisms + tls_channelbinding for some SASL mechanisms + tls_ver a string tls_cipher a string + tls_peercert pointer to library internal tls_peerdn a string tls_sni a (UTF-8) string -Also: - current_global_tls_state for API limitations + tls_ourcert pointer to library internal Argument: state the relevant exim_gnutls_state_st * */ static void -extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st *state) +extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st * state) { -gnutls_protocol_t protocol; -gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher; -gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx; -gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac; -uschar *p; -#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING -int old_pool; -int rc; -gnutls_datum_t channel; -#endif +tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; -current_global_tls_state = state; +tlsp->active.sock = state->fd_out; +tlsp->active.tls_ctx = state; -tls_active = state->fd_out; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", state->ciphersuite); + +tlsp->certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified; +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +tlsp->dane_verified = state->peer_dane_verified; +#endif -cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session); -/* returns size in "bytes" */ -tls_bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8; +/* note that tls_channelbinding is not saved to the spool file, since it's +only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */ -if (!*state->cipherbuf) +tlsp->channelbinding = NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING { - protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session); - mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session); - kx = gnutls_kx_get(state->session); + gnutls_datum_t channel = {.data = NULL, .size = 0}; + int rc; - string_format(state->cipherbuf, sizeof(state->cipherbuf), - "%s:%s:%u", - gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol), - gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac), - tls_bits); +# ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_EXPORTER + if (gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session) >= GNUTLS_TLS1_3) + { + rc = gnutls_session_channel_binding(state->session, GNUTLS_CB_TLS_EXPORTER, &channel); + tlsp->channelbind_exporter = TRUE; + } + else +# elif defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_PRF_RFC5705) + /* Older libraries may not have GNUTLS_TLS1_3 defined! */ + if (gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session) > GNUTLS_TLS1_2) + { + uschar * buf = store_get(32, state->host ? GET_TAINTED : GET_UNTAINTED); + rc = gnutls_prf_rfc5705(state->session, + (size_t)24, "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding", (size_t)0, "", + 32, CS buf); + channel.data = buf; + channel.size = 32; + } + else +# endif + rc = gnutls_session_channel_binding(state->session, GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE, &channel); - /* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS - code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS - releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */ - for (p = state->cipherbuf; *p != '\0'; ++p) - if (isspace(*p)) - *p = '-'; + if (rc) + { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("extracting channel binding: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(rc)); } + else + { + int old_pool = store_pool; + /* Declare the taintedness of the binding info. On server, untainted; on + client, tainted if we used the Finish msg from the server. */ + + store_pool = POOL_PERM; + tlsp->channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS channel.data, (int)channel.size, + !tlsp->channelbind_exporter && state->host ? GET_TAINTED : GET_UNTAINTED); + store_pool = old_pool; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage\n"); + } } -tls_cipher = state->cipherbuf; - -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", tls_cipher); - -tls_certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified; +#endif -/* note that tls_channelbinding_b64 is not saved to the spool file, since it's -only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */ +/* peercert is set in peer_status() */ +tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; -tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL; -#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING -channel.data = NULL; -channel.size = 0; -rc = gnutls_session_channel_binding(state->session, GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE, &channel); -if (rc) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Channel binding error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(rc)); -} else { - old_pool = store_pool; - store_pool = POOL_PERM; - tls_channelbinding_b64 = auth_b64encode(channel.data, (int)channel.size); - store_pool = old_pool; - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage.\n"); -} -#endif +/* do not corrupt sni sent by client; record sni rxd by server */ +if (!state->host) + tlsp->sni = state->received_sni; -tls_peerdn = state->peerdn; +/* record our certificate */ + { + const gnutls_datum_t * cert = gnutls_certificate_get_ours(state->session); + gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; -tls_sni = state->received_sni; + tlsp->ourcert = cert && import_cert(cert, &crt)==0 ? crt : NULL; + } } @@ -376,52 +725,100 @@ file is never present. If two processes both compute some new parameters, you waste a bit of effort, but it doesn't seem worth messing around with locking to prevent this. -Argument: - host NULL for server, server for client (for error handling) - Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ static int -init_server_dh(void) +init_server_dh(uschar ** errstr) { int fd, rc; unsigned int dh_bits; -gnutls_datum m; -uschar filename[PATH_MAX]; +gnutls_datum_t m; +uschar filename_buf[PATH_MAX]; +uschar *filename = NULL; size_t sz; +uschar *exp_tls_dhparam; +BOOL use_file_in_spool = FALSE; host_item *host = NULL; /* dummy for macros */ -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n"); +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params\n"); + +if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params))) + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_dh_params_init", rc, errstr); + +m.data = NULL; +m.size = 0; + +if (!expand_check(tls_dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &exp_tls_dhparam, errstr)) + return DEFER; + +if (!exp_tls_dhparam) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loading default hard-coded DH params\n"); + m.data = US std_dh_prime_default(); + m.size = Ustrlen(m.data); + } +else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "historic") == 0) + use_file_in_spool = TRUE; +else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "none") == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters\n"); + return OK; + } +else if (exp_tls_dhparam[0] != '/') + { + if (!(m.data = US std_dh_prime_named(exp_tls_dhparam))) + return tls_error(US"No standard prime named", exp_tls_dhparam, NULL, errstr); + m.size = Ustrlen(m.data); + } +else + filename = exp_tls_dhparam; -rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_init"); +if (m.data) + { + if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM))) + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3", rc, errstr); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loaded fixed standard D-H parameters\n"); + return OK; + } #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS /* If you change this constant, also change dh_param_fn_ext so that we can use a different filename and ensure we have sufficient bits. */ -dh_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_DH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_NORMAL); -if (!dh_bits) - return tls_error(US"gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() failed", NULL, NULL); + +if (!(dh_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_DH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_NORMAL))) + return tls_error(US"gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() failed", NULL, NULL, errstr); DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("GnuTLS tells us that for D-H PK, NORMAL is %d bits.\n", + debug_printf("GnuTLS tells us that for D-H PK, NORMAL is %d bits\n", dh_bits); #else dh_bits = EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12; DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("GnuTLS lacks gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(), using %d bits.\n", + debug_printf("GnuTLS lacks gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(), using %d bits\n", dh_bits); #endif -if (!string_format(filename, sizeof(filename), - "%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits)) - return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL); +/* Some clients have hard-coded limits. */ +if (dh_bits > tls_dh_max_bits) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("tls_dh_max_bits clamping override, using %d bits instead\n", + tls_dh_max_bits); + dh_bits = tls_dh_max_bits; + } + +if (use_file_in_spool) + { + if (!string_format(filename_buf, sizeof(filename_buf), + "%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits)) + return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL, errstr); + filename = filename_buf; + } /* Open the cache file for reading and if successful, read it and set up the parameters. */ -fd = Uopen(filename, O_RDONLY, 0); -if (fd >= 0) +if ((fd = Uopen(filename, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0) { struct stat statbuf; FILE *fp; @@ -431,42 +828,40 @@ if (fd >= 0) { saved_errno = errno; (void)close(fd); - return tls_error(US"TLS cache stat failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL); + return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache stat failed", saved_errno, NULL, errstr); } if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) { (void)close(fd); - return tls_error(US"TLS cache not a file", NULL, NULL); + return tls_error(US"TLS cache not a file", NULL, NULL, errstr); } - fp = fdopen(fd, "rb"); - if (!fp) + if (!(fp = fdopen(fd, "rb"))) { saved_errno = errno; (void)close(fd); - return tls_error(US"fdopen(TLS cache stat fd) failed", - strerror(saved_errno), NULL); + return tls_error_sys(US"fdopen(TLS cache stat fd) failed", + saved_errno, NULL, errstr); } m.size = statbuf.st_size; - m.data = malloc(m.size); - if (m.data == NULL) + if (!(m.data = store_malloc(m.size))) { fclose(fp); - return tls_error(US"malloc failed", strerror(errno), NULL); + return tls_error_sys(US"malloc failed", errno, NULL, errstr); } - sz = fread(m.data, m.size, 1, fp); - if (!sz) + if (!(sz = fread(m.data, m.size, 1, fp))) { saved_errno = errno; fclose(fp); - free(m.data); - return tls_error(US"fread failed", strerror(saved_errno), NULL); + store_free(m.data); + return tls_error_sys(US"fread failed", saved_errno, NULL, errstr); } fclose(fp); rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); - free(m.data); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3"); + store_free(m.data); + if (rc) + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3", rc, errstr); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("read D-H parameters from file \"%s\"\n", filename); } @@ -480,8 +875,8 @@ else if (errno == ENOENT) debug_printf("D-H parameter cache file \"%s\" does not exist\n", filename); } else - return tls_error(string_open_failed(errno, "\"%s\" for reading", filename), - NULL, NULL); + return tls_error(string_open_failed("\"%s\" for reading", filename), + NULL, NULL, errstr); /* If ret < 0, either the cache file does not exist, or the data it contains is not useful. One particular case of this is when upgrading from an older @@ -492,20 +887,38 @@ case. */ if (rc < 0) { uschar *temp_fn; + unsigned int dh_bits_gen = dh_bits; if ((PATH_MAX - Ustrlen(filename)) < 10) return tls_error(US"Filename too long to generate replacement", - CS filename, NULL); - - temp_fn = string_copy(US "%s.XXXXXXX"); - fd = mkstemp(CS temp_fn); /* modifies temp_fn */ - if (fd < 0) - return tls_error(US"Unable to open temp file", strerror(errno), NULL); - (void)fchown(fd, exim_uid, exim_gid); /* Probably not necessary */ + filename, NULL, errstr); + + temp_fn = string_copy(US"exim-dh.XXXXXXX"); + if ((fd = mkstemp(CS temp_fn)) < 0) /* modifies temp_fn */ + return tls_error_sys(US"Unable to open temp file", errno, NULL, errstr); + (void)exim_chown(temp_fn, exim_uid, exim_gid); /* Probably not necessary */ + + /* GnuTLS overshoots! + * If we ask for 2236, we might get 2237 or more. + * But there's no way to ask GnuTLS how many bits there really are. + * We can ask how many bits were used in a TLS session, but that's it! + * The prime itself is hidden behind too much abstraction. + * So we ask for less, and proceed on a wing and a prayer. + * First attempt, subtracted 3 for 2233 and got 2240. + */ + if (dh_bits >= EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS + 10) + { + dh_bits_gen = dh_bits - 10; + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("being paranoid about DH generation, make it '%d' bits'\n", + dh_bits_gen); + } - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("generating %d bits Diffie-Hellman key ...\n", dh_bits); - rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2"); + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("requesting generation of %d bit Diffie-Hellman prime ...\n", + dh_bits_gen); + if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits_gen))) + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2", rc, errstr); /* gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() will tell us the exact size, every time, and I confirmed that a NULL call to get the size first is how the GnuTLS @@ -513,43 +926,41 @@ if (rc < 0) sz = 0; m.data = NULL; - rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, - m.data, &sz); - if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing"); + if ( (rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, + GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, m.data, &sz)) + && rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing", + rc, errstr); m.size = sz; - m.data = malloc(m.size); - if (m.data == NULL) - return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", strerror(errno), NULL); - rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, - m.data, &sz); - if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + if (!(m.data = store_malloc(m.size))) + return tls_error_sys(US"memory allocation failed", errno, NULL, errstr); + + /* this will return a size 1 less than the allocation size above */ + if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, + m.data, &sz))) { - free(m.data); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real"); + store_free(m.data); + return tls_error_gnu(NULL, US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real", rc, errstr); } + m.size = sz; /* shrink by 1, probably */ - sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, m.data, (size_t) m.size); - if (sz != m.size) + if ((sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, m.data, (size_t) m.size)) != m.size) { - free(m.data); - return tls_error(US"TLS cache write D-H params failed", - strerror(errno), NULL); + store_free(m.data); + return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write D-H params failed", + errno, NULL, errstr); } - free(m.data); - sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, US"\n", 1); - if (sz != 1) - return tls_error(US"TLS cache write D-H params final newline failed", - strerror(errno), NULL); + store_free(m.data); + if ((sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, US"\n", 1)) != 1) + return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write D-H params final newline failed", + errno, NULL, errstr); - rc = close(fd); - if (rc) - return tls_error(US"TLS cache write close() failed", - strerror(errno), NULL); + if ((rc = close(fd))) + return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write close() failed", errno, NULL, errstr); if (Urename(temp_fn, filename) < 0) - return tls_error(string_sprintf("failed to rename \"%s\" as \"%s\"", - temp_fn, filename), strerror(errno), NULL); + return tls_error_sys(string_sprintf("failed to rename \"%s\" as \"%s\"", + temp_fn, filename), errno, NULL, errstr); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote D-H parameters to file \"%s\"\n", filename); } @@ -561,1049 +972,2984 @@ return OK; -/************************************************* -* Variables re-expanded post-SNI * -*************************************************/ +/* Create and install a selfsigned certificate, for use in server mode. */ -/* Called from both server and client code, via tls_init(), and also from -the SNI callback after receiving an SNI, if tls_certificate includes "tls_sni". +static int +tls_install_selfsign(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) +{ +gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL; +time_t now; +gnutls_x509_privkey_t pkey = NULL; +const uschar * where; +int rc; -We can tell the two apart by state->received_sni being non-NULL in callback. +#ifndef SUPPORT_SELFSIGN +where = US"library too old"; +rc = GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND; +if (TRUE) goto err; +#endif -The callback should not call us unless state->trigger_sni_changes is true, -which we are responsible for setting on the first pass through. +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: generating selfsigned server cert\n"); +where = US"initialising pkey"; +if ((rc = gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&pkey))) goto err; -Arguments: - state exim_gnutls_state_st * +where = US"initialising cert"; +if ((rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert))) goto err; -Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL +where = US"generating pkey"; /* Hangs on 2.12.23 */ +if ((rc = gnutls_x509_privkey_generate(pkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, +#ifdef SUPPORT_PARAM_TO_PK_BITS +# ifndef GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM +# define GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_HIGH +# endif + gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM), +#else + 2048, +#endif + 0))) + goto err; + +where = US"configuring cert"; +now = 1; +if ( (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_version(cert, 3)) + || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_serial(cert, &now, sizeof(now))) + || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_activation_time(cert, now = time(NULL))) + || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_expiration_time(cert, (long)2 * 60 * 60)) /* 2 hour */ + || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_key(cert, pkey)) + + || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert, + GNUTLS_OID_X520_COUNTRY_NAME, 0, "UK", 2)) + || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert, + GNUTLS_OID_X520_ORGANIZATION_NAME, 0, "Exim Developers", 15)) + || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert, + GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, 0, + smtp_active_hostname, Ustrlen(smtp_active_hostname))) + ) + goto err; + +where = US"signing cert"; +if ((rc = gnutls_x509_crt_sign(cert, cert, pkey))) goto err; + +where = US"installing selfsign cert"; + /* Since: 2.4.0 */ +if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key(state->lib_state.x509_cred, + &cert, 1, pkey))) + goto err; + +rc = OK; + +out: + if (cert) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert); + if (pkey) gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(pkey); + return rc; + +err: + rc = tls_error_gnu(state, where, rc, errstr); + goto out; +} + + + + +/* Add certificate and key, from files. + +Return: + Zero or negative: good. Negate value for certificate index if < 0. + Greater than zero: FAIL or DEFER code. */ static int -tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st *state) +tls_add_certfile(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const host_item * host, + const uschar * certfile, const uschar * keyfile, uschar ** errstr) { -struct stat statbuf; -int rc; -const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */ -uschar *saved_tls_certificate = NULL; -uschar *saved_tls_privatekey = NULL; -uschar *saved_tls_verify_certificates = NULL; -uschar *saved_tls_crl = NULL; -int cert_count; +int rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->lib_state.x509_cred, + CCS certfile, CCS keyfile, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); +if (rc < 0) + return tls_error_gnu(state, + string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s", certfile, keyfile), + rc, errstr); +return -rc; +} -/* We check for tls_sni *before* expansion. */ -if (!state->host) + +#if !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) && !defined(SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE) +/* Load an OCSP proof from file for sending by the server. Called +on getting a status-request handshake message, for earlier versions +of GnuTLS. */ + +static int +server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr, + gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response) +{ +int ret; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP stapling callback: %s\n", US ptr); + +if ((ret = gnutls_load_file(ptr, ocsp_response)) < 0) { - if (!state->received_sni) - { - if (Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni")) + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to load ocsp stapling file %s\n", + CS ptr); + tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; + return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + } + +tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED; +return 0; +} +#endif + + +#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE +/* Make a note that we saw a status-request */ +static int +tls_server_clienthello_ext(void * ctx, unsigned tls_id, + const uschar * data, unsigned size) +{ +/* The values for tls_id are documented here: +https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml */ +switch (tls_id) + { + case 5: /* Status Request */ + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Seen status_request extension from client\n"); + tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; + break; +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN + case 16: /* Application Layer Protocol Notification */ + /* The format of "data" here doesn't seem to be documented, but appears + to be a 2-byte field with a (redundant, given the "size" arg) total length + then a sequence of one-byte size then string (not nul-term) names. The + latter is as described in OpenSSL documentation. */ + + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Seen ALPN extension from client (s=%u):", size); + for (const uschar * s = data+2; s-data < size-1; s += *s + 1) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI.\n"); - state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE; + server_seen_alpn++; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" '%.*s'", (int)*s, s+1); } - } - else - { - /* useful for debugging */ - saved_tls_certificate = state->exp_tls_certificate; - saved_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_privatekey; - saved_tls_verify_certificates = state->exp_tls_verify_certificates; - saved_tls_crl = state->exp_tls_crl; - } + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("\n"); + if (server_seen_alpn > 1) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: too many ALPNs presented in handshake\n"); + return GNUTLS_E_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; + } + break; +#endif } +return 0; +} -rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&state->x509_cred); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials"); +/* Callback for client-hello, on server, if we think we might serve stapled-OCSP */ +static int +tls_server_clienthello_cb(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype, + unsigned when, unsigned int incoming, const gnutls_datum_t * msg) +{ +/* Call fn for each extension seen. 3.6.3 onwards */ +int rc = gnutls_ext_raw_parse(NULL, tls_server_clienthello_ext, msg, + GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_FLAG_TLS_CLIENT_HELLO); +return rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE ? 0 : rc; +} -/* remember: expand_check_tlsvar() is expand_check() but fiddling with -state members, assuming consistent naming; and expand_check() returns -false if expansion failed, unless expansion was forced to fail. */ -/* check if we at least have a certificate, before doing expensive -D-H generation. */ +# ifdef notdef_crashes +/* Make a note that we saw a status-response */ +static int +tls_server_servercerts_ext(void * ctx, unsigned tls_id, + const unsigned char *data, unsigned size) +{ +/* debug_printf("%s %u\n", __FUNCTION__, tls_id); */ +/* https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml */ +if (FALSE && tls_id == 5) /* status_request */ + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Seen status_request extension\n"); + tls_in.ocsp = exim_testharness_disable_ocsp_validity_check + ? OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED : OCSP_VFIED; /* We know that GnuTLS verifies responses */ + } +return 0; +} +# endif -if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate)) - return DEFER; +/* Callback for certificates packet, on server, if we think we might serve stapled-OCSP */ +static int +tls_server_servercerts_cb(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype, + unsigned when, unsigned int incoming, const gnutls_datum_t * msg) +{ +/* Call fn for each extension seen. 3.6.3 onwards */ +# ifdef notdef_crashes + /*XXX crashes */ +return gnutls_ext_raw_parse(NULL, tls_server_servercerts_ext, msg, 0); +# endif +} +#endif /*SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE*/ + +/*XXX in tls1.3 the cert-status travel as an extension next to the cert, in the + "Handshake Protocol: Certificate" record. +So we need to spot the Certificate handshake message, parse it and spot any status_request extension(s) + +This is different to tls1.2 - where it is a separate record (wireshark term) / handshake message (gnutls term). +*/ -/* certificate is mandatory in server, optional in client */ +#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME) || defined(SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE) +/* Callback for certificate-status, on server. We sent stapled OCSP. */ +static int +tls_server_certstatus_cb(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype, + unsigned when, unsigned int incoming, const gnutls_datum_t * msg) +{ +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Sending certificate-status\n"); /*XXX we get this for tls1.2 but not for 1.3 */ +# ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK +tls_in.ocsp = exim_testharness_disable_ocsp_validity_check + ? OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED : OCSP_VFIED; /* We know that GnuTLS verifies responses */ +# else +tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED; +# endif +return 0; +} -if ((state->exp_tls_certificate == NULL) || - (*state->exp_tls_certificate == '\0')) +/* Callback for handshake messages, on server */ +static int +tls_server_hook_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, u_int htype, unsigned when, + unsigned incoming, const gnutls_datum_t * msg) +{ +/* debug_printf("%s: htype %u\n", __FUNCTION__, htype); */ +switch (htype) { - if (state->host == NULL) - return tls_error(US"no TLS server certificate is specified", NULL, NULL); - else - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no client certificate specified; okay\n"); +# ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE + case GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT_HELLO: + return tls_server_clienthello_cb(sess, htype, when, incoming, msg); + case GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_PKT: + return tls_server_servercerts_cb(sess, htype, when, incoming, msg); +# endif + case GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS: + return tls_server_certstatus_cb(sess, htype, when, incoming, msg); +# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME + case GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return tls_server_ticket_cb(sess, htype, when, incoming, msg); +# endif + default: + return 0; } +} +#endif -if (state->tls_privatekey && !expand_check_tlsvar(tls_privatekey)) - return DEFER; -/* tls_privatekey is optional, defaulting to same file as certificate */ +#if !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) && defined(SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE) +static void +tls_server_testharness_ocsp_fiddle(void) +{ +extern char ** environ; +if (environ) for (uschar ** p = USS environ; *p; p++) + if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Permitting known bad OCSP response\n"); + exim_testharness_disable_ocsp_validity_check = TRUE; + } +} +#endif + +/************************************************** +* One-time init credentials for server and client * +**************************************************/ + +static void +creds_basic_init(gnutls_certificate_credentials_t x509_cred, BOOL server) +{ +#ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK +gnutls_certificate_set_flags(x509_cred, GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_API_V2); -if (state->tls_privatekey == NULL || *state->tls_privatekey == '\0') +# if !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) && defined(SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE) +if (server && tls_ocsp_file) { - state->tls_privatekey = state->tls_certificate; - state->exp_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_certificate; + if (f.running_in_test_harness) + tls_server_testharness_ocsp_fiddle(); + + if (exim_testharness_disable_ocsp_validity_check) + gnutls_certificate_set_flags(x509_cred, + GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_API_V2 | GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SKIP_OCSP_RESPONSE_CHECK); } +# endif +#endif +DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: basic cred init, %s\n", server ? "server" : "client"); +} +static int +creds_load_server_certs(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const uschar * cert, + const uschar * pkey, const uschar * ocsp, uschar ** errstr) +{ +const uschar * clist = cert; +const uschar * klist = pkey; +const uschar * olist; +int csep = 0, ksep = 0, osep = 0, cnt = 0, rc; +uschar * cfile, * kfile, * ofile; +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +# ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE +gnutls_x509_crt_fmt_t ocsp_fmt = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER; +# endif + +if (!expand_check(ocsp, US"tls_ocsp_file", &ofile, errstr)) + return DEFER; +olist = ofile; +#endif -if (state->exp_tls_certificate && *state->exp_tls_certificate) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("certificate file = %s\nkey file = %s\n", - state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey); +while (cfile = string_nextinlist(&clist, &csep, NULL, 0)) - if (state->received_sni) + if (!(kfile = string_nextinlist(&klist, &ksep, NULL, 0))) + return tls_error(US"cert/key setup: out of keys", NULL, NULL, errstr); + else if ((rc = tls_add_certfile(state, NULL, cfile, kfile, errstr)) > 0) + return rc; + else { - if ((Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_certificate, saved_tls_certificate) == 0) && - (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_privatekey, saved_tls_privatekey) == 0)) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: cert and key unchanged\n"); - } - else + int gnutls_cert_index = -rc; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key %d %s registered\n", + gnutls_cert_index, cfile); + +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + if (ocsp) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: have a changed cert/key pair.\n"); + /* Set the OCSP stapling server info */ + if (gnutls_buggy_ocsp) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("GnuTLS library is buggy for OCSP; avoiding\n"); + } + else if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0))) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response file %d = %s\n", + gnutls_cert_index, ofile); +# ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE + if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"PEM ", 4) == 0) + { + ocsp_fmt = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM; + ofile += 4; + } + else if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"DER ", 4) == 0) + { + ocsp_fmt = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER; + ofile += 4; + } + + if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_file2( + state->lib_state.x509_cred, CCS ofile, gnutls_cert_index, + ocsp_fmt)) < 0) + return tls_error_gnu(state, + US"gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_file2", + rc, errstr); + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf(" %d response%s loaded\n", rc, rc>1 ? "s":""); + + /* Arrange callbacks for OCSP request observability */ + + if (state->session) + gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(state->session, + GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ANY, GNUTLS_HOOK_POST, tls_server_hook_cb); + else + state->lib_state.ocsp_hook = TRUE; + + +# else +# if defined(SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK) + if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2( + state->lib_state.x509_cred, gnutls_cert_index, + server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile))) + return tls_error_gnu(state, + US"gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2", + rc, errstr); + else +# endif + { + if (cnt++ > 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("oops; multiple OCSP files not supported\n"); + break; + } + gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function( + state->lib_state.x509_cred, server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile); + } +# endif /* SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE */ + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of OCSP response files in list\n"); } +#endif /* DISABLE_OCSP */ } +return 0; +} - rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred, - CS state->exp_tls_certificate, CS state->exp_tls_privatekey, - GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); - exim_gnutls_err_check( - string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s", - state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey)); - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n"); - } /* tls_certificate */ +static int +creds_load_client_certs(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const host_item * host, + const uschar * cert, const uschar * pkey, uschar ** errstr) +{ +int rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host, cert, pkey, errstr); +if (rc > 0) return rc; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n"); +return 0; +} -/* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is -provided. Experiment shows that, if the certificate file is empty, an unhelpful -error message is provided. However, if we just refrain from setting anything up -in that case, certificate verification fails, which seems to be the correct -behaviour. */ +static int +creds_load_cabundle(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const uschar * bundle, + const host_item * host, uschar ** errstr) +{ +int cert_count; +struct stat statbuf; -if (state->tls_verify_certificates && *state->tls_verify_certificates) +#ifdef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE +if (Ustrcmp(bundle, "system") == 0 || Ustrncmp(bundle, "system,", 7) == 0) + cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_system_trust(state->lib_state.x509_cred); +else +#endif { - if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_verify_certificates)) + if (Ustat(bundle, &statbuf) < 0) + { + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "could not stat '%s' " + "(tls_verify_certificates): %s", bundle, strerror(errno)); return DEFER; - if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl) - if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_crl)) - return DEFER; + } + +#ifndef SUPPORT_CA_DIR + /* The test suite passes in /dev/null; we could check for that path explicitly, + but who knows if someone has some weird FIFO which always dumps some certs, or + other weirdness. The thing we really want to check is that it's not a + directory, since while OpenSSL supports that, GnuTLS does not. + So s/!S_ISREG/S_ISDIR/ and change some messaging ... */ + if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) + { + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, + "tls_verify_certificates \"%s\" is a directory", bundle); + return DEFER; + } +#endif + + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify certificates = %s size=" OFF_T_FMT "\n", + bundle, statbuf.st_size); - if (!(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates && - *state->exp_tls_verify_certificates)) + if (statbuf.st_size == 0) { DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates expanded empty, ignoring\n"); - /* With no tls_verify_certificates, we ignore tls_crl too */ + debug_printf("cert file empty, no certs, no verification, ignoring any CRL\n"); return OK; } - } -if (Ustat(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, &statbuf) < 0) - { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "could not stat %s " - "(tls_verify_certificates): %s", state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, - strerror(errno)); - return DEFER; + cert_count = + +#ifdef SUPPORT_CA_DIR + (statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR + ? + gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_dir(state->lib_state.x509_cred, + CS bundle, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) + : +#endif + gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(state->lib_state.x509_cred, + CS bundle, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); + +#ifdef SUPPORT_CA_DIR + /* Mimic the behaviour with OpenSSL of not advertising a usable-cert list + when using the directory-of-certs config model. */ + + if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) + if (state->session) + gnutls_certificate_send_x509_rdn_sequence(state->session, 1); + else + state->lib_state.ca_rdn_emulate = TRUE; +#endif } -if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) +if (cert_count < 0) + return tls_error_gnu(state, US"setting certificate trust", cert_count, errstr); +DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities\n", cert_count); + +return OK; +} + + +static int +creds_load_crl(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const uschar * crl, uschar ** errstr) +{ +int cert_count; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("loading CRL file = %s\n", crl); +if ((cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(state->lib_state.x509_cred, + CS crl, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM)) < 0) + return tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file", + cert_count, errstr); + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Processed %d CRLs\n", cert_count); +return OK; +} + + +static int +creds_load_pristring(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const uschar * p, + const char ** errpos) +{ +if (!p) { + p = exim_default_gnutls_priority; DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("verify certificates path is not a file: \"%s\"\n%s\n", - state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, - S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode) - ? " it's a directory, that's OpenSSL, this is GnuTLS" - : " (not a directory either)"); - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "tls_verify_certificates \"%s\" is not a file", - state->exp_tls_verify_certificates); - return DEFER; + debug_printf("GnuTLS using default session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n", p); } +return gnutls_priority_init( (gnutls_priority_t *) &state->lib_state.pri_cache, + CCS p, errpos); +} -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify certificates = %s size=" OFF_T_FMT "\n", - state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, statbuf.st_size); +static unsigned +tls_server_creds_init(void) +{ +uschar * dummy_errstr; +unsigned lifetime = 0; -if (statbuf.st_size == 0) +state_server.lib_state = null_tls_preload; +if (gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials( + (gnutls_certificate_credentials_t *) &state_server.lib_state.x509_cred)) { - DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("cert file empty, no certs, no verification, ignoring any CRL\n"); - return OK; + state_server.lib_state.x509_cred = NULL; + return lifetime; } - -cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(state->x509_cred, - CS state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); -if (cert_count < 0) +creds_basic_init(state_server.lib_state.x509_cred, TRUE); + +#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT) +/* If tls_certificate has any $ indicating expansions, it is not good. +If tls_privatekey is set but has $, not good. Likewise for tls_ocsp_file. +If all good (and tls_certificate set), load the cert(s). */ + +if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_certificate) +# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_ocsp_file) +# endif + && opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_privatekey)) { - rc = cert_count; - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file"); + /* Set watches on the filenames. The implementation does de-duplication + so we can just blindly do them all. + */ + + if ( tls_set_watch(tls_certificate, TRUE) +# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + && tls_set_watch(tls_ocsp_file, TRUE) +# endif + && tls_set_watch(tls_privatekey, TRUE)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading server certs\n"); + if (creds_load_server_certs(&state_server, tls_certificate, + tls_privatekey && *tls_privatekey ? tls_privatekey : tls_certificate, +# ifdef DISABLE_OCSP + NULL, +# else + tls_ocsp_file, +# endif + &dummy_errstr) == 0) + state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE; + } } -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n", cert_count); +else if ( !tls_certificate && !tls_privatekey +# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + && !tls_ocsp_file +# endif + ) + { /* Generate & preload a selfsigned cert. No files to watch. */ + if ((tls_install_selfsign(&state_server, &dummy_errstr)) == OK) + { + state_server.lib_state.conn_certs = TRUE; + lifetime = f.running_in_test_harness ? 2 : 60 * 60; /* 1 hour */ + } + } +else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading server certs\n"); -if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl) +/* If tls_verify_certificates is non-empty and has no $, load CAs. +If none was configured and we can't handle "system", treat as empty. */ + +if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_verify_certificates) +#ifndef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE + && Ustrcmp(tls_verify_certificates, "system") != 0 +#endif + ) { - if (state->exp_tls_crl && *state->exp_tls_crl) + if (tls_set_watch(tls_verify_certificates, FALSE)) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("loading CRL file = %s\n", state->exp_tls_crl); - rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(state->x509_cred, - CS state->exp_tls_crl, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file"); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading CA bundle for server\n"); + if (creds_load_cabundle(&state_server, tls_verify_certificates, + NULL, &dummy_errstr) != OK) + return lifetime; + state_server.lib_state.cabundle = TRUE; + + /* If CAs loaded and tls_crl is non-empty and has no $, load it */ + + if (opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_crl)) + { + if (tls_set_watch(tls_crl, FALSE)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading CRL for server\n"); + if (creds_load_crl(&state_server, tls_crl, &dummy_errstr) != OK) + return lifetime; + state_server.lib_state.crl = TRUE; + } + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading CRL for server\n"); } } +else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading CA bundle for server\n"); +#endif /* EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY */ -return OK; +/* If tls_require_ciphers is non-empty and has no $, load the +ciphers priority cache. If unset, load with the default. +(server-only as the client one depends on non/DANE) */ + +if (!tls_require_ciphers || opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_require_ciphers)) + { + const char * dummy_errpos; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading cipher list for server: %s\n", + tls_require_ciphers); + if ( creds_load_pristring(&state_server, tls_require_ciphers, &dummy_errpos) + == OK) + state_server.lib_state.pri_string = TRUE; + } +else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading cipher list for server\n"); +return lifetime; } +/* Preload whatever creds are static, onto a transport. The client can then +just copy the pointer as it starts up. */ +/*XXX this is not called for a cmdline send. But one needing to use >1 conn would benefit, +and there seems little downside. */ -/************************************************* -* Set X.509 state variables * -*************************************************/ +static void +tls_client_creds_init(transport_instance * t, BOOL watch) +{ +smtp_transport_options_block * ob = t->options_block; +exim_gnutls_state_st tpt_dummy_state; +host_item * dummy_host = (host_item *)1; +uschar * dummy_errstr; + +if ( !exim_gnutls_base_init_done + && tls_g_init(&dummy_errstr) != OK) + return; + +ob->tls_preload = null_tls_preload; +if (gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials( + (struct gnutls_certificate_credentials_st **)&ob->tls_preload.x509_cred)) + { + ob->tls_preload.x509_cred = NULL; + return; + } +creds_basic_init(ob->tls_preload.x509_cred, FALSE); -/* In GnuTLS, the registered cert/key are not replaced by a later -set of a cert/key, so for SNI support we need a whole new x509_cred -structure. Which means various other non-re-expanded pieces of state -need to be re-set in the new struct, so the setting logic is pulled -out to this. +tpt_dummy_state.session = NULL; +tpt_dummy_state.lib_state = ob->tls_preload; -Arguments: - state exim_gnutls_state_st * +#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT) +if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(ob->tls_certificate) + && opt_unset_or_noexpand(ob->tls_privatekey)) + { + if ( !watch + || ( tls_set_watch(ob->tls_certificate, FALSE) + && tls_set_watch(ob->tls_privatekey, FALSE) + ) ) + { + const uschar * pkey = ob->tls_privatekey; -Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL -*/ + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: preloading client certs for transport '%s'\n", t->name); -static int -tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state) -{ -int rc; -const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */ + /* The state->lib_state.x509_cred is used for the certs load, and is the sole + structure element used. So we can set up a dummy. The hoat arg only + selects a retcode in case of fail, so any value */ -/* Create D-H parameters, or read them from the cache file. This function does -its own SMTP error messaging. This only happens for the server, TLS D-H ignores -client-side params. */ + if (creds_load_client_certs(&tpt_dummy_state, dummy_host, + ob->tls_certificate, pkey ? pkey : ob->tls_certificate, + &dummy_errstr) == OK) + ob->tls_preload.conn_certs = TRUE; + } + } +else + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: not preloading client certs, for transport '%s'\n", t->name); -if (!state->host) +/* If tls_verify_certificates is non-empty and has no $, load CAs. +If none was configured and we can't handle "system", treat as empty. */ + +if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(ob->tls_verify_certificates) +#ifndef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE + && Ustrcmp(ob->tls_verify_certificates, "system") != 0 +#endif + ) { - if (!dh_server_params) + if (!watch || tls_set_watch(ob->tls_verify_certificates, FALSE)) { - rc = init_server_dh(); - if (rc != OK) return rc; + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: preloading CA bundle for transport '%s'\n", t->name); + if (creds_load_cabundle(&tpt_dummy_state, ob->tls_verify_certificates, + dummy_host, &dummy_errstr) != OK) + return; + ob->tls_preload.cabundle = TRUE; + + if (opt_set_and_noexpand(ob->tls_crl)) + { + if (!watch || tls_set_watch(ob->tls_crl, FALSE)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading CRL for transport '%s'\n", t->name); + if (creds_load_crl(&tpt_dummy_state, ob->tls_crl, &dummy_errstr) != OK) + return; + ob->tls_preload.crl = TRUE; + } + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading CRL, for transport '%s'\n", t->name); } - gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->x509_cred, dh_server_params); } +else + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: not preloading CA bundle, for transport '%s'\n", t->name); -/* Link the credentials to the session. */ +/* We do not preload tls_require_ciphers to to the transport as it implicitly +depends on DANE or plain usage. */ + +#endif +} -rc = gnutls_credentials_set(state->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, state->x509_cred); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_credentials_set"); -return OK; +#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT) +/* Invalidate the creds cached, by dropping the current ones. +Call when we notice one of the source files has changed. */ + +static void +tls_server_creds_invalidate(void) +{ +if (state_server.lib_state.pri_cache) + gnutls_priority_deinit(state_server.lib_state.pri_cache); +state_server.lib_state.pri_cache = NULL; + +if (state_server.lib_state.x509_cred) + gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state_server.lib_state.x509_cred); +state_server.lib_state = null_tls_preload; +} + + +static void +tls_client_creds_invalidate(transport_instance * t) +{ +smtp_transport_options_block * ob = t->options_block; +if (ob->tls_preload.x509_cred) + gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ob->tls_preload.x509_cred); +ob->tls_preload = null_tls_preload; } +#endif + /************************************************* -* Initialize for GnuTLS * +* Variables re-expanded post-SNI * *************************************************/ -/* Called from both server and client code. In the case of a server, errors -before actual TLS negotiation return DEFER. +/* Called from both server and client code, via tls_init(), and also from +the SNI callback after receiving an SNI, if tls_certificate includes "tls_sni". + +We can tell the two apart by state->received_sni being non-NULL in callback. + +The callback should not call us unless state->trigger_sni_changes is true, +which we are responsible for setting on the first pass through. Arguments: - host connected host, if client; NULL if server - certificate certificate file - privatekey private key file - sni TLS SNI to send, sometimes when client; else NULL - cas CA certs file - crl CRL file - require_ciphers tls_require_ciphers setting + state exim_gnutls_state_st * + errstr error string pointer Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ static int -tls_init( - const host_item *host, - const uschar *certificate, - const uschar *privatekey, - const uschar *sni, - const uschar *cas, - const uschar *crl, - const uschar *require_ciphers, - exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state) -{ -exim_gnutls_state_st *state; +tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) +{ int rc; -size_t sz; -const char *errpos; -uschar *p; -BOOL want_default_priorities; - -if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS global init required.\n"); - - rc = gnutls_global_init(); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_global_init"); +const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */ +const uschar *saved_tls_certificate = NULL; +const uschar *saved_tls_privatekey = NULL; +const uschar *saved_tls_verify_certificates = NULL; +const uschar *saved_tls_crl = NULL; +int cert_count; -#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 - DEBUG(D_tls) +/* We check for tls_sni *before* expansion. */ +if (!host) /* server */ + if (!state->received_sni) { - gnutls_global_set_log_function(exim_gnutls_logger_cb); - /* arbitrarily chosen level; bump upto 9 for more */ - gnutls_global_set_log_level(EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL); + if ( state->tls_certificate + && ( Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni") + || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni") + || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni") + ) ) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI\n"); + state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE; + } + } + else /* SNI callback case */ + { + /* useful for debugging */ + saved_tls_certificate = state->exp_tls_certificate; + saved_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_privatekey; + saved_tls_verify_certificates = state->exp_tls_verify_certificates; + saved_tls_crl = state->exp_tls_crl; } -#endif - exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE; +if (!state->lib_state.x509_cred) + { + if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials( + (gnutls_certificate_credentials_t *) &state->lib_state.x509_cred))) + return tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials", + rc, errstr); + creds_basic_init(state->lib_state.x509_cred, !host); } -if (host) - { - state = &state_client; + +/* remember: Expand_check_tlsvar() is expand_check() but fiddling with +state members, assuming consistent naming; and expand_check() returns +false if expansion failed, unless expansion was forced to fail. */ + +/* check if we at least have a certificate, before doing expensive +D-H generation. */ + +if (!state->lib_state.conn_certs) + { + if (!Expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate, errstr)) + return DEFER; + + /* certificate is mandatory in server, optional in client */ + + if ( !state->exp_tls_certificate + || !*state->exp_tls_certificate + ) + if (!host) + return tls_install_selfsign(state, errstr); + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no client certificate specified; okay\n"); + + if (state->tls_privatekey && !Expand_check_tlsvar(tls_privatekey, errstr)) + return DEFER; + + /* tls_privatekey is optional, defaulting to same file as certificate */ + + if (!state->tls_privatekey || !*state->tls_privatekey) + { + state->tls_privatekey = state->tls_certificate; + state->exp_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_certificate; + } + + if (state->exp_tls_certificate && *state->exp_tls_certificate) + { + BOOL load = TRUE; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("certificate file = %s\nkey file = %s\n", + state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey); + + if (state->received_sni) + if ( Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_certificate, saved_tls_certificate) == 0 + && Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_privatekey, saved_tls_privatekey) == 0 + ) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: cert and key unchanged\n"); + load = FALSE; /* avoid re-loading the same certs */ + } + else /* unload the pre-SNI certs before loading new ones */ + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: have a changed cert/key pair\n"); + gnutls_certificate_free_keys(state->lib_state.x509_cred); + } + + if ( load + && (rc = host + ? creds_load_client_certs(state, host, state->exp_tls_certificate, + state->exp_tls_privatekey, errstr) + : creds_load_server_certs(state, state->exp_tls_certificate, + state->exp_tls_privatekey, +#ifdef DISABLE_OCSP + NULL, +#else + tls_ocsp_file, +#endif + errstr) + ) ) return rc; + } + } +else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("%s certs were preloaded\n", host ? "client" : "server"); + + if (!state->tls_privatekey) state->tls_privatekey = state->tls_certificate; + state->exp_tls_certificate = US state->tls_certificate; + state->exp_tls_privatekey = US state->tls_privatekey; + +#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_EXT_RAW_PARSE + if (state->lib_state.ocsp_hook) + gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(state->session, + GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ANY, GNUTLS_HOOK_POST, tls_server_hook_cb); +#endif + } + + +/* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is +provided. Experiment shows that, if the certificate file is empty, an unhelpful +error message is provided. However, if we just refrain from setting anything up +in that case, certificate verification fails, which seems to be the correct +behaviour. +If none was configured and we can't handle "system", treat as empty. */ + +if (!state->lib_state.cabundle) + { + if (state->tls_verify_certificates && *state->tls_verify_certificates) + { + if (!Expand_check_tlsvar(tls_verify_certificates, errstr)) + return DEFER; +#ifndef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE + if (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, "system") == 0) + state->exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL; +#endif + if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl) + if (!Expand_check_tlsvar(tls_crl, errstr)) + return DEFER; + + if (!(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates && + *state->exp_tls_verify_certificates)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates expanded empty, ignoring\n"); + /* With no tls_verify_certificates, we ignore tls_crl too */ + return OK; + } + } + else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates not set or empty, ignoring\n"); + return OK; + } + rc = creds_load_cabundle(state, state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, host, errstr); + if (rc != OK) return rc; + } +else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("%s CA bundle was preloaded\n", host ? "client" : "server"); + state->exp_tls_verify_certificates = US state->tls_verify_certificates; + +#ifdef SUPPORT_CA_DIR +/* Mimic the behaviour with OpenSSL of not advertising a usable-cert list +when using the directory-of-certs config model. */ + if (state->lib_state.ca_rdn_emulate) + gnutls_certificate_send_x509_rdn_sequence(state->session, 1); +#endif + } + + +if (!state->lib_state.crl) + { + if ( state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl + && state->exp_tls_crl && *state->exp_tls_crl) + return creds_load_crl(state, state->exp_tls_crl, errstr); + } +else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("%s CRL was preloaded\n", host ? "client" : "server"); + state->exp_tls_crl = US state->tls_crl; + } + +return OK; +} + + + + +/************************************************* +* Set X.509 state variables * +*************************************************/ + +/* In GnuTLS, the registered cert/key are not replaced by a later +set of a cert/key, so for SNI support we need a whole new x509_cred +structure. Which means various other non-re-expanded pieces of state +need to be re-set in the new struct, so the setting logic is pulled +out to this. + +Arguments: + state exim_gnutls_state_st * + errstr error string pointer + +Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL +*/ + +static int +tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr) +{ +int rc; +const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */ + +/* Create D-H parameters, or read them from the cache file. This function does +its own SMTP error messaging. This only happens for the server, TLS D-H ignores +client-side params. */ + +if (!state->host) + { + if (!dh_server_params) + if ((rc = init_server_dh(errstr)) != OK) return rc; + + /* Unnecessary & discouraged with 3.6.0 or later, according to docs. But without it, + no DHE- ciphers are advertised. */ + gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->lib_state.x509_cred, dh_server_params); + } + +/* Link the credentials to the session. */ + +if ((rc = gnutls_credentials_set(state->session, + GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, state->lib_state.x509_cred))) + return tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_credentials_set", rc, errstr); + +return OK; +} + +/************************************************* +* Initialize for GnuTLS * +*************************************************/ + + +/* Called from both server and client code. In the case of a server, errors +before actual TLS negotiation return DEFER. + +Arguments: + host connected host, if client; NULL if server + ob tranport options block, if client; NULL if server + require_ciphers tls_require_ciphers setting + caller_state returned state-info structure + errstr error string pointer + +Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL +*/ + +static int +tls_init( + const host_item *host, + smtp_transport_options_block * ob, + const uschar * require_ciphers, + exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state, + tls_support * tlsp, + uschar ** errstr) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state; +int rc; +size_t sz; + +if ( !exim_gnutls_base_init_done + && (rc = tls_g_init(errstr)) != OK) + return rc; + +if (host) + { + /* For client-side sessions we allocate a context. This lets us run + several in parallel. */ + + int old_pool = store_pool; + store_pool = POOL_PERM; + state = store_get(sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_st), GET_UNTAINTED); + store_pool = old_pool; + memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); + state->lib_state = ob->tls_preload; + state->tlsp = tlsp; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS client session\n"); rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT); + + state->tls_certificate = ob->tls_certificate; + state->tls_privatekey = ob->tls_privatekey; + state->tls_sni = ob->tls_sni; + state->tls_verify_certificates = ob->tls_verify_certificates; + state->tls_crl = ob->tls_crl; } else { + /* Server operations always use the one state_server context. It is not + shared because we have forked a fresh process for every receive. However it + can get re-used for successive TLS sessions on a single TCP connection. */ + state = &state_server; - memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); + state->tlsp = tlsp; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n"); rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER); + + state->tls_certificate = tls_certificate; + state->tls_privatekey = tls_privatekey; + state->tls_sni = NULL; + state->tls_verify_certificates = tls_verify_certificates; + state->tls_crl = tls_crl; } -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_init"); +if (rc) + return tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_init", rc, errstr); +state->tls_require_ciphers = require_ciphers; state->host = host; -state->tls_certificate = certificate; -state->tls_privatekey = privatekey; -state->tls_sni = sni; -state->tls_verify_certificates = cas; -state->tls_crl = crl; - /* This handles the variables that might get re-expanded after TLS SNI; -that's tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl */ +tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl */ DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("Expanding various TLS configuration options for session credentials.\n"); -rc = tls_expand_session_files(state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; + debug_printf("Expanding various TLS configuration options for session credentials\n"); +if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc; /* These are all other parts of the x509_cred handling, since SNI in GnuTLS requires a new structure afterwards. */ -rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; +if ((rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc; /* set SNI in client, only */ if (host) { - if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_sni)) + if (!expand_check(state->tls_sni, US"tls_out_sni", &state->tlsp->sni, errstr)) return DEFER; - if (state->exp_tls_sni && *state->exp_tls_sni) + if (state->tlsp->sni && *state->tlsp->sni) { DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("Setting TLS client SNI to \"%s\"\n", state->exp_tls_sni); - sz = Ustrlen(state->exp_tls_sni); - rc = gnutls_server_name_set(state->session, - GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, state->exp_tls_sni, sz); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_server_name_set"); + debug_printf("Setting TLS client SNI to \"%s\"\n", state->tlsp->sni); + sz = Ustrlen(state->tlsp->sni); + if ((rc = gnutls_server_name_set(state->session, + GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, state->tlsp->sni, sz))) + return tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_server_name_set", rc, errstr); } } else if (state->tls_sni) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \ - "have an SNI set for a client [%s]\n", state->tls_sni); + "have an SNI set for a server [%s]\n", state->tls_sni); + +if (!state->lib_state.pri_string) + { + const uschar * p = NULL; + const char * errpos; + + /* This is the priority string support, + http://www.gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html + and replaces gnutls_require_kx, gnutls_require_mac & gnutls_require_protocols. + This was backwards incompatible, but means Exim no longer needs to track + all algorithms and provide string forms for them. */ + + if (state->tls_require_ciphers && *state->tls_require_ciphers) + { + if (!Expand_check_tlsvar(tls_require_ciphers, errstr)) + return DEFER; + if (state->exp_tls_require_ciphers && *state->exp_tls_require_ciphers) + { + p = state->exp_tls_require_ciphers; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n", p); + } + } + + if ((rc = creds_load_pristring(state, p, &errpos))) + return tls_error_gnu(state, string_sprintf( + "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.6s..\"", + p, (long)(errpos - CS p), errpos), + rc, errstr); + } +else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher list preloaded\n"); + state->exp_tls_require_ciphers = US state->tls_require_ciphers; + } + + +if ((rc = gnutls_priority_set(state->session, state->lib_state.pri_cache))) + return tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_priority_set", rc, errstr); + +/* This also sets the server ticket expiration time to the same, and +the STEK rotation time to 3x. */ + +gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(state->session, ssl_session_timeout); + +/* Reduce security in favour of increased compatibility, if the admin +decides to make that trade-off. */ +if (gnutls_compat_mode) + { +#if LIBGNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020104 + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("lowering GnuTLS security, compatibility mode\n"); + gnutls_session_enable_compatibility_mode(state->session); +#else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Unable to set gnutls_compat_mode - GnuTLS version too old\n"); +#endif + } + +*caller_state = state; +return OK; +} + + + +/************************************************* +* Extract peer information * +*************************************************/ + +static const uschar * +cipher_stdname_kcm(gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx, gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher, + gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac) +{ +uschar cs_id[2]; +gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx_i; +gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher_i; +gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac_i; + +for (size_t i = 0; + gnutls_cipher_suite_info(i, cs_id, &kx_i, &cipher_i, &mac_i, NULL); + i++) + if (kx_i == kx && cipher_i == cipher && mac_i == mac) + return cipher_stdname(cs_id[0], cs_id[1]); +return NULL; +} + + + +/* Called from both server and client code. +Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and state->have_set_peerdn +and we use that to detect double-calls. -/* This is the priority string support, -http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html -and replaces gnutls_require_kx, gnutls_require_mac & gnutls_require_protocols. -This was backwards incompatible, but means Exim no longer needs to track -all algorithms and provide string forms for them. */ +NOTE: the state blocks last while the TLS connection is up, which is fine +for logging in the server side, but for the client side, we log after teardown +in src/deliver.c. While the session is up, we can twist about states and +repoint tls_* globals, but those variables used for logging or other variable +expansion that happens _after_ delivery need to have a longer life-time. + +So for those, we get the data from POOL_PERM; the re-invoke guard keeps us from +doing this more than once per generation of a state context. We set them in +the state context, and repoint tls_* to them. After the state goes away, the +tls_* copies of the pointers remain valid and client delivery logging is happy. + +tls_certificate_verified is a BOOL, so the tls_peerdn and tls_cipher issues +don't apply. + +Arguments: + state exim_gnutls_state_st * + errstr pointer to error string + +Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL +*/ + +static int +peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) +{ +gnutls_session_t session = state->session; +const gnutls_datum_t * cert_list; +int old_pool, rc; +unsigned int cert_list_size = 0; +gnutls_protocol_t protocol; +gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher; +gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx; +gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac; +gnutls_certificate_type_t ct; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +uschar * dn_buf; +size_t sz; + +if (state->have_set_peerdn) + return OK; +state->have_set_peerdn = TRUE; + +state->peerdn = NULL; + +/* tls_cipher */ +cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(session); +protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(session); +mac = gnutls_mac_get(session); +kx = +#ifdef GNUTLS_TLS1_3 + protocol >= GNUTLS_TLS1_3 ? 0 : +#endif + gnutls_kx_get(session); + +old_pool = store_pool; + { + tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; + store_pool = POOL_PERM; + +#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC + { + gstring * g = NULL; + uschar * s = US gnutls_session_get_desc(session), c; + + /* Nikos M suggests we use this by preference. It returns like: + (TLS1.3)-(ECDHE-SECP256R1)-(RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256)-(AES-256-GCM) + + For partial back-compat, put a colon after the TLS version, replace the + )-( grouping with __, replace in-group - with _ and append the :keysize. */ + + /* debug_printf("peer_status: gnutls_session_get_desc %s\n", s); */ + + for (s++; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, s, 1); + + tlsp->ver = string_copyn(g->s, g->ptr); + for (uschar * p = US tlsp->ver; *p; p++) + if (*p == '-') { *p = '\0'; break; } /* TLS1.0-PKIX -> TLS1.0 */ + + g = string_catn(g, US":", 1); + if (*s) s++; /* now on _ between groups */ + while ((c = *s)) + { + for (*++s && ++s; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) + g = string_catn(g, c == '-' ? US"_" : s, 1); + /* now on ) closing group */ + if ((c = *s) && *++s == '-') g = string_catn(g, US"__", 2); + /* now on _ between groups */ + } + g = string_catn(g, US":", 1); + g = string_cat(g, string_sprintf("%d", (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8)); + state->ciphersuite = string_from_gstring(g); + } +#else + state->ciphersuite = string_sprintf("%s:%s:%d", + gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol), + gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac), + (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8); + + /* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS + code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS + releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */ + + for (uschar * p = state->ciphersuite; *p; p++) if (isspace(*p)) *p = '-'; + tlsp->ver = string_copyn(state->ciphersuite, + Ustrchr(state->ciphersuite, ':') - state->ciphersuite); +#endif + +/* debug_printf("peer_status: ciphersuite %s\n", state->ciphersuite); */ + + tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite; + tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8; + + tlsp->cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_kcm(kx, cipher, mac); + } +store_pool = old_pool; + +/* tls_peerdn */ +cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size); + +if (!cert_list || cert_list_size == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no certificate from peer (%p & %d)\n", + cert_list, cert_list_size); + if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) + return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", + US"no certificate received from peer", state->host, errstr); + return OK; + } + +if ((ct = gnutls_certificate_type_get(session)) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) + { + const uschar * ctn = US gnutls_certificate_type_get_name(ct); + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: peer cert not X.509 but instead \"%s\"\n", ctn); + if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) + return tls_error(US"certificate verification not possible, unhandled type", + ctn, state->host, errstr); + return OK; + } + +#define exim_gnutls_peer_err(Label) \ + do { \ + if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \ + { \ + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: %s: %s\n", \ + (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \ + if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) \ + return tls_error_gnu(state, (Label), rc, errstr); \ + return OK; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +rc = import_cert(&cert_list[0], &crt); +exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"cert 0"); + +state->tlsp->peercert = state->peercert = crt; + +sz = 0; +rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, NULL, &sz); +if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) + { + exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"getting size for cert DN failed"); + return FAIL; /* should not happen */ + } +dn_buf = store_get_perm(sz, GET_TAINTED); +rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, CS dn_buf, &sz); +exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to extract certificate DN [gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert 0)]"); + +state->peerdn = dn_buf; + +return OK; +#undef exim_gnutls_peer_err +} + + + + +/************************************************* +* Verify peer certificate * +*************************************************/ + +/* Called from both server and client code. +*Should* be using a callback registered with +gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() to fail the handshake if we dislike +the peer information, but that's too new for some OSes. + +Arguments: + state exim_gnutls_state_st * + errstr where to put an error message + +Returns: + FALSE if the session should be rejected + TRUE if the cert is okay or we just don't care +*/ + +static BOOL +verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) +{ +int rc; +uint verify; + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: checking peer certificate\n"); +*errstr = NULL; +rc = peer_status(state, errstr); + +if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_NONE) + return TRUE; + +if (rc != OK || !state->peerdn) + { + verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; + *errstr = US"certificate not supplied"; + } +else + + { +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE + if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_DANE && state->host) + { + /* Using dane_verify_session_crt() would be easy, as it does it all for us + including talking to a DNS resolver. But we want to do that bit ourselves + as the testsuite intercepts and fakes its own DNS environment. */ + + dane_state_t s; + dane_query_t r; + uint lsize; + const gnutls_datum_t * certlist = + gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &lsize); + int usage = tls_out.tlsa_usage; + +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + /* Split the TLSA records into two sets, TA and EE selectors. Run the + dane-verification separately so that we know which selector verified; + then we know whether to do name-verification (needed for TA but not EE). */ + + if (usage == ((1<dane_data_len[nrec]; ) nrec++; + nrec++; + + dd = store_get(nrec * sizeof(uschar *), GET_UNTAINTED); + ddl = store_get(nrec * sizeof(int), GET_UNTAINTED); + nrec--; + + if ((rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0))) + goto tlsa_prob; + + for (usage = DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE; + usage >= DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA; usage--) + { /* take records with this usage */ + for (j = i = 0; i < nrec; i++) + if (state->dane_data[i][0] == usage) + { + dd[j] = state->dane_data[i]; + ddl[j++] = state->dane_data_len[i]; + } + if (j) + { + dd[j] = NULL; + ddl[j] = 0; + + if ((rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, (char * const *)dd, ddl, 1, 0))) + goto tlsa_prob; + + if ((rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize, + gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), + r, 0, + usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE + ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0, + &verify))) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLSA record problem: %s\n", dane_strerror(rc)); + } + else if (verify == 0) /* verification passed */ + { + usage = 1 << usage; + break; + } + } + } + + if (rc) goto tlsa_prob; + } + else +# endif + { + if ( (rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0)) + || (rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, state->dane_data, state->dane_data_len, + 1, 0)) + || (rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize, + gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), + r, 0, +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + usage == (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE) + ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0, +# else + 0, +# endif + &verify)) + ) + goto tlsa_prob; + } + + if (verify != 0) /* verification failed */ + { + gnutls_datum_t str; + (void) dane_verification_status_print(verify, &str, 0); + *errstr = US str.data; /* don't bother to free */ + goto badcert; + } + +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + /* If a TA-mode TLSA record was used for verification we must additionally + verify the cert name (but not the CA chain). For EE-mode, skip it. */ + + if (usage & (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)) +# endif + { + state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; + goto goodcert; + } +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + /* Assume that the name on the A-record is the one that should be matching + the cert. An alternate view is that the domain part of the email address + is also permissible. */ + + if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, + CS state->host->name)) + { + state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; + goto goodcert; + } +# endif + } +#endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/ + + rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify); + } + +/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID is set if any others are. */ + +if (rc < 0 || verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) + { + state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE; + if (!*errstr) + { +#ifdef GNUTLS_CERT_VFY_STATUS_PRINT + DEBUG(D_tls) + { + gnutls_datum_t txt; + + if (gnutls_certificate_verification_status_print(verify, + gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), &txt, 0) + == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + { + debug_printf("%s\n", txt.data); + gnutls_free(txt.data); + } + } +#endif + *errstr = verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED + ? US"certificate revoked" : US"certificate invalid"; + } + + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=\"%s\"\n", + *errstr, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US""); + + if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) + goto badcert; + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS verify failure overridden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); + } + +else + { + /* Client side, check the server's certificate name versus the name on the + A-record for the connection we made. What to do for server side - what name + to use for client? We document that there is no such checking for server + side. */ + + if ( state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames + && !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, + CS state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames) + ) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n"); + if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) + goto badcert; + return TRUE; + } + + state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=\"%s\"\n", + state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US""); + } + +goodcert: + state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; + return TRUE; + +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +tlsa_prob: + *errstr = string_sprintf("TLSA record problem: %s", + rc == DANE_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE ? "none usable" : dane_strerror(rc)); +#endif + +badcert: + gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + return FALSE; +} + + + + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* Callbacks */ + +/* Logging function which can be registered with + * gnutls_global_set_log_function() + * gnutls_global_set_log_level() 0..9 + */ +#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 +static void +exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message) +{ + size_t len = strlen(message); + if (len < 1) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d> empty debug message\n", level); + return; + } + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d>: %s%s", level, message, + message[len-1] == '\n' ? "" : "\n"); +} +#endif + + +/* Called after client hello, should handle SNI work. +This will always set tls_sni (state->received_sni) if available, +and may trigger presenting different certificates, +if state->trigger_sni_changes is TRUE. + +Should be registered with + gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function() + +"This callback must return 0 on success or a gnutls error code to terminate the +handshake.". + +For inability to get SNI information, we return 0. +We only return non-zero if re-setup failed. +Only used for server-side TLS. +*/ + +static int +exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session) +{ +char sni_name[MAX_HOST_LEN]; +size_t data_len = MAX_HOST_LEN; +exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server; +unsigned int sni_type; +int rc, old_pool; +uschar * dummy_errstr; + +rc = gnutls_server_name_get(session, sni_name, &data_len, &sni_type, 0); +if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + if (rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) + debug_printf("TLS: no SNI presented in handshake\n"); + else + debug_printf("TLS failure: gnutls_server_name_get(): %s [%d]\n", + gnutls_strerror(rc), rc); + return 0; + } + +if (sni_type != GNUTLS_NAME_DNS) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: ignoring SNI of unhandled type %u\n", sni_type); + return 0; + } + +/* We now have a UTF-8 string in sni_name */ +old_pool = store_pool; +store_pool = POOL_PERM; +state->received_sni = string_copy_taint(US sni_name, GET_TAINTED); +store_pool = old_pool; + +/* We set this one now so that variable expansions below will work */ +state->tlsp->sni = state->received_sni; + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", sni_name, + state->trigger_sni_changes ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)"); + +if (!state->trigger_sni_changes) + return 0; + +if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, &dummy_errstr)) != OK) + { + /* If the setup of certs/etc failed before handshake, TLS would not have + been offered. The best we can do now is abort. */ + return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN; + } + +rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, &dummy_errstr); +if (rc != OK) return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN; + +return 0; +} + + + +#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT +/* +We use this callback to get observability and detail-level control +for an exim TLS connection (either direction), raising a tls:cert event +for each cert in the chain presented by the peer. Any event +can deny verification. + +Return 0 for the handshake to continue or non-zero to terminate. +*/ + +static int +verify_cb(gnutls_session_t session) +{ +const gnutls_datum_t * cert_list; +unsigned int cert_list_size = 0; +gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; +int rc; +uschar * yield; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session); + +if ((cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size))) + while (cert_list_size--) + { + if ((rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt)) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: depth %d: %s\n", + cert_list_size, gnutls_strerror(rc)); + break; + } + + state->tlsp->peercert = crt; + if ((yield = event_raise(state->event_action, + US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", cert_list_size), &errno))) + { + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, + "SSL verify denied by event-action: depth=%d: %s", + cert_list_size, yield); + return 1; /* reject */ + } + state->tlsp->peercert = NULL; + } + +return 0; +} + +#endif + + +static gstring * +ddump(gnutls_datum_t * d) +{ +gstring * g = string_get((d->size+1) * 2); +uschar * s = d->data; +for (unsigned i = d->size; i > 0; i--, s++) + { + g = string_catn(g, US "0123456789abcdef" + (*s >> 4), 1); + g = string_catn(g, US "0123456789abcdef" + (*s & 0xf), 1); + } +return g; +} + +static void +post_handshake_debug(exim_gnutls_state_st * state) +{ +#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC +debug_printf("%s\n", gnutls_session_get_desc(state->session)); +#endif + +#ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG +# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS1_3 +if (gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session) < GNUTLS_TLS1_3) +# else +if (TRUE) +# endif + { + gnutls_datum_t c, s; + gstring * gc, * gs; + /* For TLS1.2 we only want the client random and the master secret */ + gnutls_session_get_random(state->session, &c, &s); + gnutls_session_get_master_secret(state->session, &s); + gc = ddump(&c); + gs = ddump(&s); + debug_printf("CLIENT_RANDOM %.*s %.*s\n", (int)gc->ptr, gc->s, (int)gs->ptr, gs->s); + } +else + debug_printf("To get keying info for TLS1.3 is hard:\n" + " Set environment variable SSLKEYLOGFILE to a filename relative to the spool directory,\n" + " and make sure it is writable by the Exim runtime user.\n" + " Add SSLKEYLOGFILE to keep_environment in the exim config.\n" + " Start Exim as root.\n" + " If using sudo, add SSLKEYLOGFILE to env_keep in /etc/sudoers\n" + " (works for TLS1.2 also, and saves cut-paste into file).\n" + " Trying to use add_environment for this will not work\n"); +#endif +} + + +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +static int +tls_server_ticket_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, u_int htype, unsigned when, + unsigned incoming, const gnutls_datum_t * msg) +{ +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("newticket cb\n"); +tls_in.resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_REQUESTED; +return 0; +} + +static void +tls_server_resume_prehandshake(exim_gnutls_state_st * state) +{ +/* Should the server offer session resumption? */ +tls_in.resumption = RESUME_SUPPORTED; +if (verify_check_host(&tls_resumption_hosts) == OK) + { + int rc; + /* GnuTLS appears to not do ticket overlap, but does emit a fresh ticket when + an offered resumption is unacceptable. We lose one resumption per ticket + lifetime, and sessions cannot be indefinitely re-used. There seems to be no + way (3.6.7) of changing the default number of 2 TLS1.3 tickets issued, but at + least they go out in a single packet. */ + + if (!(rc = gnutls_session_ticket_enable_server(state->session, + &server_sessticket_key))) + tls_in.resumption |= RESUME_SERVER_TICKET; + else + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("enabling session tickets: %s\n", US gnutls_strerror(rc)); + + /* Try to tell if we see a ticket request */ + gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(state->session, + GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ANY, GNUTLS_HOOK_POST, tls_server_hook_cb); + } +} + +static void +tls_server_resume_posthandshake(exim_gnutls_state_st * state) +{ +if (gnutls_session_resumption_requested(state->session)) + { + /* This tells us the client sent a full ticket. We use a + callback on session-ticket request, elsewhere, to tell + if a client asked for a ticket. */ + + tls_in.resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_SUGGESTED; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("client requested resumption\n"); + } +if (gnutls_session_is_resumed(state->session)) + { + tls_in.resumption |= RESUME_USED; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Session resumed\n"); + } +} +#endif /* EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME */ + + +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN +/* Expand and convert an Exim list to a gnutls_datum list. False return for fail. +NULL plist return for silent no-ALPN. +*/ + +static BOOL +tls_alpn_plist(uschar ** tls_alpn, const gnutls_datum_t ** plist, unsigned * plen, + uschar ** errstr) +{ +uschar * exp_alpn; + +if (!expand_check(*tls_alpn, US"tls_alpn", &exp_alpn, errstr)) + return FALSE; + +if (!exp_alpn) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS ALPN forced to fail, not sending\n"); + *plist = NULL; + } +else + { + const uschar * list = exp_alpn; + int sep = 0; + unsigned cnt = 0; + gnutls_datum_t * p; + uschar * s; + + while (string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)) cnt++; + + p = store_get(sizeof(gnutls_datum_t) * cnt, exp_alpn); + list = exp_alpn; + for (int i = 0; s = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0); i++) + { p[i].data = s; p[i].size = Ustrlen(s); } + *plist = (*plen = cnt) ? p : NULL; + } +return TRUE; +} + +static void +tls_server_set_acceptable_alpns(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) +{ +uschar * local_alpn = string_copy(tls_alpn); +int rc; +const gnutls_datum_t * plist; +unsigned plen; + +if (tls_alpn_plist(&local_alpn, &plist, &plen, errstr) && plist) + { + /* This seems to be only mandatory if the client sends an ALPN extension; + not trying ALPN is ok. Need to decide how to support server-side must-alpn. */ + + server_seen_alpn = 0; + if (!(rc = gnutls_alpn_set_protocols(state->session, plist, plen, + GNUTLS_ALPN_MANDATORY))) + gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(state->session, + GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ANY, GNUTLS_HOOK_POST, tls_server_hook_cb); + else + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("setting alpn protocols: %s\n", US gnutls_strerror(rc)); + } +} +#endif /* EXIM_HAVE_ALPN */ + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ +/* Exported functions */ + + + + +/************************************************* +* Start a TLS session in a server * +*************************************************/ + +/* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received +the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate +a TLS session. + +Arguments: + errstr pointer to error string + +Returns: OK on success + DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation + FAIL for errors during the negotiation; the server can't + continue running. +*/ + +int +tls_server_start(uschar ** errstr) +{ +int rc; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL; + +/* Check for previous activation */ +if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0) + { + tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", US "", NULL, errstr); + smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE); + return FAIL; + } + +/* Initialize the library. If it fails, it will already have logged the error +and sent an SMTP response. */ + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a server\n"); + + { +#ifdef MEASURE_TIMING + struct timeval t0; + gettimeofday(&t0, NULL); +#endif + + if ((rc = tls_init(NULL, NULL, + tls_require_ciphers, &state, &tls_in, errstr)) != OK) return rc; + +#ifdef MEASURE_TIMING + report_time_since(&t0, US"server tls_init (delta)"); +#endif + } + +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN +tls_server_set_acceptable_alpns(state, errstr); +#endif + +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +tls_server_resume_prehandshake(state); +#endif + +/* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or +optional, set up appropriately. */ + +if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be required\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; + gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); + } +else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be requested but not required\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL; + gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST); + } +else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will not be requested\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE; + gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE); + } + +#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT +if (event_action) + { + state->event_action = event_action; + gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state); + gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->lib_state.x509_cred, verify_cb); + } +#endif + +/* Register SNI handling; always, even if not in tls_certificate, so that the +expansion variable $tls_sni is always available. */ + +gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function(state->session, + exim_sni_handling_cb); + +/* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup +on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to +make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out +the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS +mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */ + +if (!state->tlsp->on_connect) + { + smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n", FALSE); + fflush(smtp_out); + } + +/* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems +that the GnuTLS library doesn't. +From 3.1.0 there is gnutls_handshake_set_timeout() - but it requires you +to set (and clear down afterwards) up a pull-timeout callback function that does +a select, so we're no better off unless avoiding signals becomes an issue. */ + +gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(state->session, + (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) fileno(smtp_in), + (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) fileno(smtp_out)); +state->fd_in = fileno(smtp_in); +state->fd_out = fileno(smtp_out); + +sigalrm_seen = FALSE; +if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout); +do + rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session); +while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen); +ALARM_CLR(0); + +if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error %d from gnutls_handshake: %s\n", + rc, gnutls_strerror(rc)); + + /* It seems that, except in the case of a timeout, we have to close the + connection right here; otherwise if the other end is running OpenSSL it hangs + until the server times out. */ + + if (sigalrm_seen) + { + tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", US"timed out", NULL, errstr); +#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT + (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL); +#endif + gnutls_db_remove_session(state->session); + } + else + { + tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_handshake", rc, errstr); +#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT + (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL); +#endif + (void) gnutls_alert_send_appropriate(state->session, rc); + gnutls_deinit(state->session); + millisleep(500); + shutdown(state->fd_out, SHUT_WR); + for (int i = 1024; fgetc(smtp_in) != EOF && i > 0; ) i--; /* drain skt */ + (void)fclose(smtp_out); + (void)fclose(smtp_in); + smtp_out = smtp_in = NULL; + } + + return FAIL; + } + +#ifdef GNUTLS_SFLAGS_EXT_MASTER_SECRET +if (gnutls_session_get_flags(state->session) & GNUTLS_SFLAGS_EXT_MASTER_SECRET) + tls_in.ext_master_secret = TRUE; +#endif + +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +tls_server_resume_posthandshake(state); +#endif -want_default_priorities = TRUE; +DEBUG(D_tls) post_handshake_debug(state); -if (state->tls_require_ciphers && *state->tls_require_ciphers) +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN +if (server_seen_alpn > 0) { - if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_require_ciphers)) - return DEFER; - if (state->exp_tls_require_ciphers && *state->exp_tls_require_ciphers) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n", - state->exp_tls_require_ciphers); + DEBUG(D_tls) + { /* The client offered ALPN. See what was negotiated. */ + gnutls_datum_t p = {.size = 0}; + int rc = gnutls_alpn_get_selected_protocol(state->session, &p); + if (!rc) + debug_printf("ALPN negotiated: %.*s\n", (int)p.size, p.data); + else + debug_printf("getting alpn protocol: %s\n", US gnutls_strerror(rc)); - rc = gnutls_priority_init(&state->priority_cache, - CS state->exp_tls_require_ciphers, &errpos); - want_default_priorities = FALSE; - p = state->exp_tls_require_ciphers; } } -if (want_default_priorities) - { - rc = gnutls_priority_init(&state->priority_cache, - exim_default_gnutls_priority, &errpos); - p = US exim_default_gnutls_priority; - } - -exim_gnutls_err_check(string_sprintf( - "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.6s..\"", - p, errpos - CS p, errpos)); - -rc = gnutls_priority_set(state->session, state->priority_cache); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_priority_set"); +else if (server_seen_alpn == 0) + if (verify_check_host(&hosts_require_alpn) == OK) + { + gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + tls_error(US"handshake", US"ALPN required but not negotiated", NULL, errstr); + return FAIL; + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no ALPN presented in handshake\n"); +else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: was not watching for ALPN\n"); +#endif -gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(state->session, ssl_session_timeout); +/* Verify after the fact */ -/* Reduce security in favour of increased compatibility, if the admin -decides to make that trade-off. */ -if (gnutls_compat_mode) +if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr)) { -#if LIBGNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020104 - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("lowering GnuTLS security, compatibility mode\n"); - gnutls_session_enable_compatibility_mode(state->session); -#else - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Unable to set gnutls_compat_mode - GnuTLS version too old\n"); -#endif + if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_OPTIONAL) + { + (void) tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, NULL, errstr); + return FAIL; + } + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n", + *errstr); } -*caller_state = state; -/* needs to happen before callbacks during handshake */ -current_global_tls_state = state; -return OK; -} - - - - -/************************************************* -* Extract peer information * -*************************************************/ +/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */ -/* Called from both server and client code. -Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and we use that to detect double-calls. +extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state); -Arguments: - state exim_gnutls_state_st * +/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS, +and initialize appropriately. */ -Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL -*/ +state->xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size); -static int -peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st *state) -{ -const gnutls_datum *cert_list; -int rc; -unsigned int cert_list_size = 0; -gnutls_certificate_type_t ct; -gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; -uschar *dn_buf; -size_t sz; +receive_getc = tls_getc; +receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf; +receive_get_cache = tls_get_cache; +receive_hasc = tls_hasc; +receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc; +receive_feof = tls_feof; +receive_ferror = tls_ferror; -if (state->peerdn) - return OK; +return OK; +} -state->peerdn = US"unknown"; -cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &cert_list_size); -if (cert_list == NULL || cert_list_size == 0) - { - state->peerdn = US"unknown (no certificate)"; - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no certificate from peer (%p & %d)\n", - cert_list, cert_list_size); - if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED) - return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", - "no certificate received from peer", state->host); - return OK; - } -ct = gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session); -if (ct != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) +static void +tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host_item * host, exim_gnutls_state_st * state, + smtp_transport_options_block * ob) +{ +if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK) { - const char *ctn = gnutls_certificate_type_get_name(ct); - state->peerdn = string_sprintf("unknown (type %s)", ctn); + state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = +#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N + string_domain_utf8_to_alabel(host->certname, NULL); +#else + host->certname; +#endif DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS: peer cert not X.509 but instead \"%s\"\n", ctn); - if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED) - return tls_error(US"certificate verification not possible, unhandled type", - ctn, state->host); - return OK; - } - -#define exim_gnutls_peer_err(Label) do { \ - if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { \ - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: %s: %s\n", (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \ - if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED) { return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host); } \ - return OK; } } while (0) - -rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt); -exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"gnutls_x509_crt_init (crt)"); - -rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); -exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to import certificate [gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert 0)]"); -sz = 0; -rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, NULL, &sz); -if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) - { - exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"getting size for cert DN failed"); - return FAIL; /* should not happen */ + debug_printf("TLS: server cert verification includes hostname: \"%s\"\n", + state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames); } -dn_buf = store_get_perm(sz); -rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, CS dn_buf, &sz); -exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to extract certificate DN [gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert 0)]"); -state->peerdn = dn_buf; - -return OK; -#undef exim_gnutls_peer_err } -/************************************************* -* Verify peer certificate * -*************************************************/ - -/* Called from both server and client code. -*Should* be using a callback registered with -gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() to fail the handshake if we dislike -the peer information, but that's too new for some OSes. - -Arguments: - state exim_gnutls_state_st * - error where to put an error message +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +/* Given our list of RRs from the TLSA lookup, build a lookup block in +GnuTLS-DANE's preferred format. Hang it on the state str for later +use in DANE verification. -Returns: - FALSE if the session should be rejected - TRUE if the cert is okay or we just don't care -*/ +We point at the dnsa data not copy it, so it must remain valid until +after verification is done.*/ static BOOL -verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, const char **error) +dane_tlsa_load(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, dns_answer * dnsa) { -int rc; -unsigned int verify; - -*error = NULL; - -rc = peer_status(state); -if (rc != OK) - { - verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; - *error = "not supplied"; - } -else +dns_scan dnss; +int i; +const char ** dane_data; +int * dane_data_len; + +i = 1; +for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr; + rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) + ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA) i++; + +dane_data = store_get(i * sizeof(uschar *), GET_UNTAINTED); +dane_data_len = store_get(i * sizeof(int), GET_UNTAINTED); + +i = 0; +for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr; + rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) + ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA && rr->size > 3) { - rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify); - } - -/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID seems to be set as well -as REVOKED, but leave the test for both. */ - -if ((rc < 0) || (verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) != 0) - { - state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE; - if (*error == NULL) - *error = ((verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) != 0) ? "revoked" : "invalid"; + const uschar * p = rr->data; +/*XXX need somehow to mark rr and its data as tainted. Doues this mean copying it? */ + uint8_t usage = p[0], sel = p[1], type = p[2]; DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=%s\n", - *error, state->peerdn); + debug_printf("TLSA: %d %d %d size %d\n", usage, sel, type, rr->size); - if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_REQUIRED) + if ( (usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA && usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE) + || (sel != 0 && sel != 1) + ) + continue; + switch(type) { - gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE); - return FALSE; + case 0: /* Full: cannot check at present */ + break; + case 1: if (rr->size != 3 + 256/8) continue; /* sha2-256 */ + break; + case 2: if (rr->size != 3 + 512/8) continue; /* sha2-512 */ + break; + default: continue; } - DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS verify failure overriden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); - } -else - { - state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=%s\n", state->peerdn); + + tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<size; } -tls_peerdn = state->peerdn; +if (!i) return FALSE; + +dane_data[i] = NULL; +dane_data_len[i] = 0; +state->dane_data = (char * const *)dane_data; +state->dane_data_len = dane_data_len; return TRUE; } +#endif +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +/* On the client, get any stashed session for the given IP from hints db +and apply it to the ssl-connection for attempted resumption. Although +there is a gnutls_session_ticket_enable_client() interface it is +documented as unnecessary (as of 3.6.7) as "session tickets are emabled +by deafult". There seems to be no way to disable them, so even hosts not +enabled by the transport option will be sent a ticket request. We will +however avoid storing and retrieving session information. */ -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ -/* Callbacks */ - -/* Logging function which can be registered with - * gnutls_global_set_log_function() - * gnutls_global_set_log_level() 0..9 - */ -#if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 static void -exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message) +tls_retrieve_session(tls_support * tlsp, gnutls_session_t session, + smtp_connect_args * conn_args, smtp_transport_options_block * ob) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d>: %s\n", level, message); -} -#endif +tlsp->resumption = RESUME_SUPPORTED; +if (!conn_args->have_lbserver) + { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("resumption not supported on continued-connection\n"); } +else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_resumption_hosts, conn_args->host) == OK) + { + dbdata_tls_session * dt; + int len, rc; + open_db dbblock, * dbm_file; -/* Called after client hello, should handle SNI work. -This will always set tls_sni (state->received_sni) if available, -and may trigger presenting different certificates, -if state->trigger_sni_changes is TRUE. - -Should be registered with - gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function() + tlsp->host_resumable = TRUE; + tls_client_resmption_key(tlsp, conn_args, ob); -"This callback must return 0 on success or a gnutls error code to terminate the -handshake.". + tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_REQUESTED; + if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDONLY, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE))) + { + /* We'd like to filter the retrieved session for ticket advisory expiry, + but 3.6.1 seems to give no access to that */ + + if ((dt = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm_file, tlsp->resume_index, &len))) + if (!(rc = gnutls_session_set_data(session, + CUS dt->session, (size_t)len - sizeof(dbdata_tls_session)))) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("good session\n"); + tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_SUGGESTED; + } + else DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting session resumption data: %s\n", + US gnutls_strerror(rc)); + dbfn_close(dbm_file); + } + } +} -For inability to get SNI information, we return 0. -We only return non-zero if re-setup failed. -*/ -static int -exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session) +static void +tls_save_session(tls_support * tlsp, gnutls_session_t session, const host_item * host) { -char sni_name[MAX_HOST_LEN]; -size_t data_len = MAX_HOST_LEN; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; -unsigned int sni_type; -int rc, old_pool; - -rc = gnutls_server_name_get(session, sni_name, &data_len, &sni_type, 0); -if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) { - if (rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) - debug_printf("TLS: no SNI presented in handshake.\n"); - else - debug_printf("TLS failure: gnutls_server_name_get(): %s [%d]\n", - gnutls_strerror(rc), rc); - }; - return 0; - } +/* TLS 1.2 - we get both the callback and the direct posthandshake call, +but this flag is not set until the second. TLS 1.3 it's the other way about. +Keep both calls as the session data cannot be extracted before handshake +completes. */ -if (sni_type != GNUTLS_NAME_DNS) +if (gnutls_session_get_flags(session) & GNUTLS_SFLAGS_SESSION_TICKET) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: ignoring SNI of unhandled type %u\n", sni_type); - return 0; - } + gnutls_datum_t tkt; + int rc; -/* We now have a UTF-8 string in sni_name */ -old_pool = store_pool; -store_pool = POOL_PERM; -state->received_sni = string_copyn(US sni_name, data_len); -store_pool = old_pool; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("server offered session ticket\n"); + tlsp->ticket_received = TRUE; + tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_SERVER_TICKET; -/* We set this one now so that variable expansions below will work */ -tls_sni = state->received_sni; - -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", sni_name, - state->trigger_sni_changes ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)"); + if (tlsp->host_resumable) + if (!(rc = gnutls_session_get_data2(session, &tkt))) + { + open_db dbblock, * dbm_file; + int dlen = sizeof(dbdata_tls_session) + tkt.size; + dbdata_tls_session * dt = store_get(dlen, GET_TAINTED); + + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session data size %u\n", (unsigned)tkt.size); + memcpy(dt->session, tkt.data, tkt.size); + gnutls_free(tkt.data); + + if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDWR, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE))) + { + /* key for the db is the IP */ + dbfn_write(dbm_file, tlsp->resume_index, dt, dlen); + dbfn_close(dbm_file); + + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("wrote session db (len %u)\n", (unsigned)dlen); + } + } + else DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("extract session data: %s\n", US gnutls_strerror(rc)); + } +} -if (!state->trigger_sni_changes) - return 0; -rc = tls_expand_session_files(state); -if (rc != OK) - { - /* If the setup of certs/etc failed before handshake, TLS would not have - been offered. The best we can do now is abort. */ - return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN; - } +/* With a TLS1.3 session, the ticket(s) are not seen until +the first data read is attempted. And there's often two of them. +Pick them up with this callback. We are also called for 1.2 +but we do nothing. +*/ +static int +tls_client_ticket_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, u_int htype, unsigned when, + unsigned incoming, const gnutls_datum_t * msg) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(sess); +tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; -rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state); -if (rc != OK) return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("newticket cb\n"); +if (!tlsp->ticket_received) + tls_save_session(tlsp, sess, state->host); return 0; } +static void +tls_client_resume_prehandshake(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, + tls_support * tlsp, smtp_connect_args * conn_args, + smtp_transport_options_block * ob) +{ +gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state); +gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(state->session, + GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, GNUTLS_HOOK_POST, tls_client_ticket_cb); +tls_retrieve_session(tlsp, state->session, conn_args, ob); +} -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ -/* Exported functions */ - +static void +tls_client_resume_posthandshake(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, + tls_support * tlsp, host_item * host) +{ +if (gnutls_session_is_resumed(state->session)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Session resumed\n"); + tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_USED; + } +tls_save_session(tlsp, state->session, host); +} +#endif /* !DISABLE_TLS_RESUME */ /************************************************* -* Start a TLS session in a server * +* Start a TLS session in a client * *************************************************/ -/* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received -the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate -a TLS session. +/* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted. Arguments: - require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL - -Returns: OK on success - DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation - FAIL for errors during the negotation; the server can't - continue running. + cctx connection context + conn_args connection details + cookie datum for randomness (not used) + tlsp record details of channel configuration here; must be non-NULL + errstr error string pointer + +Returns: TRUE for success with TLS session context set in smtp context, + FALSE on error */ -int -tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers) +BOOL +tls_client_start(client_conn_ctx * cctx, smtp_connect_args * conn_args, + void * cookie ARG_UNUSED, + tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr) { +host_item * host = conn_args->host; /* for msgs and option-tests */ +transport_instance * tb = conn_args->tblock; /* always smtp or NULL */ +smtp_transport_options_block * ob = tb + ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block + : &smtp_transport_option_defaults; int rc; -const char *error; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL; +uschar * cipher_list = NULL; + +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +BOOL require_ocsp = + verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK; +BOOL request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE + : verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK; +#endif -/* Check for previous activation */ -/* nb: this will not be TLS callout safe, needs reworking as part of that. */ +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", cctx->sock); + +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +/* If dane is flagged, have either request or require dane for this host, and +a TLSA record found. Therefore, dane verify required. Which implies cert must +be requested and supplied, dane verify must pass, and cert verify irrelevant +(incl. hostnames), and (caller handled) require_tls and sni=$domain */ -if (tls_active >= 0) +if (conn_args->dane && ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers) { - tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", "", NULL); - smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n"); - return FAIL; + /* not using Expand_check_tlsvar because not yet in state */ + if (!expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers", + &cipher_list, errstr)) + return FALSE; + cipher_list = cipher_list && *cipher_list + ? ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers : ob->tls_require_ciphers; } +#endif -/* Initialize the library. If it fails, it will already have logged the error -and sent an SMTP response. */ +if (!cipher_list) + cipher_list = ob->tls_require_ciphers; -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a server\n"); + { +#ifdef MEASURE_TIMING + struct timeval t0; + gettimeofday(&t0, NULL); +#endif -rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, - NULL, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, - require_ciphers, &state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; + if (tls_init(host, ob, cipher_list, &state, tlsp, errstr) != OK) + return FALSE; -/* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or -optional, set up appropriately. */ +#ifdef MEASURE_TIMING + report_time_since(&t0, US"client tls_init (delta)"); +#endif + } -if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK) +if (ob->tls_alpn) +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN + { + const gnutls_datum_t * plist; + unsigned plen; + + if (!tls_alpn_plist(&ob->tls_alpn, &plist, &plen, errstr)) + return FALSE; + if (plist) + if (gnutls_alpn_set_protocols(state->session, plist, plen, 0) != 0) + { + tls_error(US"alpn init", NULL, state->host, errstr); + return FALSE; + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS ALPN '%s'\n", ob->tls_alpn); + } +#else + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "ALPN unusable with this GnuTLS library version; ignoring \"%s\"\n", + ob->tls_alpn); +#endif + + { + int dh_min_bits = ob->tls_dh_min_bits; + if (dh_min_bits < EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("WARNING: tls_dh_min_bits far too low," + " clamping %d up to %d\n", + dh_min_bits, EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS); + dh_min_bits = EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS; + } + + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting D-H prime minimum" + " acceptable bits to %d\n", + dh_min_bits); + gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(state->session, dh_min_bits); + } + +/* Stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is +set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts are unset. Check only +the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */ + +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +if (conn_args->dane && dane_tlsa_load(state, &conn_args->tlsa_dnsa)) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be required.\n"); + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: server certificate DANE required\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_DANE; + gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); + } +else +#endif + if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates + && !ob->tls_verify_hosts + && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) + ) + || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK + ) + { + tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob); + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification required\n"); state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); } -else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK) +else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be requested but not required.\n"); + tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob); + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification optional\n"); state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL; gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST); } else { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will not be requested.\n"); + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification not required\n"); state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE; gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE); } -/* Register SNI handling; always, even if not in tls_certificate, so that the -expansion variable $tls_sni is always available. */ - -gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function(state->session, - exim_sni_handling_cb); +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + /* supported since GnuTLS 3.1.3 */ +if (request_ocsp) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: will request OCSP stapling\n"); + if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session, + NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK) + { + tls_error_gnu(state, US"cert-status-req", rc, errstr); + return FALSE; + } + tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; + } +#endif -/* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup -on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to -make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out -the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS -mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */ +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +tls_client_resume_prehandshake(state, tlsp, conn_args, ob); +#endif -if (!tls_on_connect) +#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT +if (tb && tb->event_action) { - smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n"); - fflush(smtp_out); + state->event_action = tb->event_action; + gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state); + gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->lib_state.x509_cred, verify_cb); } +#endif -/* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems -that the GnuTLS library doesn't. */ +gnutls_transport_set_ptr(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) cctx->sock); +state->fd_in = cctx->sock; +state->fd_out = cctx->sock; -gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(state->session, - (gnutls_transport_ptr)fileno(smtp_in), - (gnutls_transport_ptr)fileno(smtp_out)); -state->fd_in = fileno(smtp_in); -state->fd_out = fileno(smtp_out); +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("about to gnutls_handshake\n"); +/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */ sigalrm_seen = FALSE; -if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout); +ALARM(ob->command_timeout); do - { rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session); - } while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED)); -alarm(0); +while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen); +ALARM_CLR(0); if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { - tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", - sigalrm_seen ? "timed out" : gnutls_strerror(rc), NULL); - /* It seems that, except in the case of a timeout, we have to close the - connection right here; otherwise if the other end is running OpenSSL it hangs - until the server times out. */ - - if (!sigalrm_seen) + if (sigalrm_seen) { - (void)fclose(smtp_out); - (void)fclose(smtp_in); + gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_USER_CANCELED); + tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", US"timed out", state->host, errstr); } - - return FAIL; + else + tls_error_gnu(state, US"gnutls_handshake", rc, errstr); + return FALSE; } -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n"); +DEBUG(D_tls) post_handshake_debug(state); -/* Verify after the fact */ +/* Verify late */ + +if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr)) + { + tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr); + return FALSE; + } + +#ifdef GNUTLS_SFLAGS_EXT_MASTER_SECRET +if (gnutls_session_get_flags(state->session) & GNUTLS_SFLAGS_EXT_MASTER_SECRET) + tlsp->ext_master_secret = TRUE; +#endif -if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE) +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP +if (request_ocsp) { - if (!verify_certificate(state, &error)) + DEBUG(D_tls) { - if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_OPTIONAL) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n", - error); - } - else - { - tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, NULL); - return FAIL; - } + gnutls_datum_t stapling; + gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp; + gnutls_datum_t printed; + unsigned idx = 0; + + for (; +# ifdef GNUTLS_OCSP_STATUS_REQUEST_GET2 + (rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get2(state->session, idx, &stapling)) == 0; +#else + (rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(state->session, &stapling)) == 0; +#endif + idx++) + if ( (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp)) == 0 + && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, &stapling)) == 0 + && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_print(resp, GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_COMPACT, &printed)) == 0 + ) + { + debug_printf("%.4096s", printed.data); + gnutls_free(printed.data); + } + else + (void) tls_error_gnu(state, US"ocsp decode", rc, errstr); + if (idx == 0 && rc) + (void) tls_error_gnu(state, US"ocsp decode", rc, errstr); + } + + if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0) + { + tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; + tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr); + if (require_ocsp) + return FALSE; + } + else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n"); + tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_VFIED; } } +#endif -/* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */ +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_TLS_RESUME +tls_client_resume_posthandshake(state, tlsp, host); +#endif -rc = peer_status(state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ALPN +if (ob->tls_alpn) /* We requested. See what was negotiated. */ + { + gnutls_datum_t p = {.size = 0}; -/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */ + if (gnutls_alpn_get_selected_protocol(state->session, &p) == 0) + { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ALPN negotiated: '%.*s'\n", (int)p.size, p.data); } + else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_alpn, host) == OK) + { + gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + tls_error(US"handshake", US"ALPN required but not negotiated", state->host, errstr); + return FALSE; + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("No ALPN negotiated"); + } +#endif + +/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */ extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state); -/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS, -and initialize appropriately. */ +cctx->tls_ctx = state; +return TRUE; +} -state->xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size); -receive_getc = tls_getc; -receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc; -receive_feof = tls_feof; -receive_ferror = tls_ferror; -receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered; -return OK; -} +/* +Arguments: + ct_ctx client TLS context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context +*/ + +void +tls_shutdown_wr(void * ct_ctx) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; +tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; +if (!tlsp || tlsp->active.sock < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ +tls_write(ct_ctx, NULL, 0, FALSE); /* flush write buffer */ + +HDEBUG(D_transport|D_tls|D_acl|D_v) debug_printf_indent(" SMTP(TLS shutdown)>>\n"); +gnutls_bye(state->session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR); +} /************************************************* -* Start a TLS session in a client * +* Close down a TLS session * *************************************************/ -/* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted. +/* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the +daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which +would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process). Arguments: - fd the fd of the connection - host connected host (for messages) - addr the first address (not used) - dhparam DH parameter file (ignored, we're a client) - certificate certificate file - privatekey private key file - sni TLS SNI to send to remote host - verify_certs file for certificate verify - verify_crl CRL for verify - require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL - timeout startup timeout - -Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL (because using common functions), - but for a client, DEFER and FAIL have the same meaning + ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context + do_shutdown 0 no data-flush or TLS close-alert + 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent, + 2 if also response to be waited for (2s timeout) + +Returns: nothing */ -int -tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, - address_item *addr ARG_UNUSED, uschar *dhparam ARG_UNUSED, - uschar *certificate, uschar *privatekey, uschar *sni, - uschar *verify_certs, uschar *verify_crl, - uschar *require_ciphers, int timeout) +void +tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int do_shutdown) { -int rc; -const char *error; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL; - -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", fd); +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; +tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; -rc = tls_init(host, certificate, privatekey, - sni, verify_certs, verify_crl, require_ciphers, &state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; +if (!tlsp || tlsp->active.sock < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ -gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(state->session, EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS); - -if (verify_certs == NULL) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification not required\n"); - state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE; - /* we still ask for it, to log it, etc */ - gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST); - } -else +if (do_shutdown) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification required\n"); - state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; - gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); - } - -gnutls_transport_set_ptr(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr)fd); -state->fd_in = fd; -state->fd_out = fd; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n", + do_shutdown > TLS_SHUTDOWN_NOWAIT ? " (with response-wait)" : ""); -/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */ + tls_write(ct_ctx, NULL, 0, FALSE); /* flush write buffer */ -sigalrm_seen = FALSE; -alarm(timeout); -do - { - rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session); - } while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED)); -alarm(0); +#ifdef EXIM_TCP_CORK + if (do_shutdown == TLS_SHUTDOWN_WAIT) + (void) setsockopt(tlsp->active.sock, IPPROTO_TCP, EXIM_TCP_CORK, US &off, sizeof(off)); +#endif -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n"); + /* The library seems to have no way to only wait for a peer's + shutdown, so handle the same as TLS_SHUTDOWN_WAIT */ -/* Verify late */ + ALARM(2); + gnutls_bye(state->session, + do_shutdown > TLS_SHUTDOWN_NOWAIT ? GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR : GNUTLS_SHUT_WR); + ALARM_CLR(0); + } -if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE && - !verify_certificate(state, &error)) - return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", error, state->host); +if (!ct_ctx) /* server */ + { + receive_getc = smtp_getc; + receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf; + receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache; + receive_hasc = smtp_hasc; + receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc; + receive_feof = smtp_feof; + receive_ferror = smtp_ferror; + } -/* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */ +gnutls_deinit(state->session); +tlsp->active.sock = -1; +tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL; +/* Leave bits, peercert, cipher, peerdn, certificate_verified set, for logging */ +tlsp->channelbinding = NULL; -rc = peer_status(state); -if (rc != OK) return rc; -/* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */ +if (state->xfer_buffer) store_free(state->xfer_buffer); +} -extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state); -return OK; -} +static BOOL +tls_refill(unsigned lim) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; +ssize_t inbytes; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(session=%p, buffer=%p, buffersize=%u)\n", + state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size); -/************************************************* -* Close down a TLS session * -*************************************************/ +sigalrm_seen = FALSE; +if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout); -/* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the -daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which -would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process). +errno = 0; +do + inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer, + MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim)); +while (inbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN); -Arguments: TRUE if gnutls_bye is to be called -Returns: nothing -*/ +if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM_CLR(0); -void -tls_close(BOOL shutdown) -{ -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */ + smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */ +if (had_command_sigterm) + smtp_command_sigterm_exit(); +if (had_data_timeout) + smtp_data_timeout_exit(); +if (had_data_sigint) + smtp_data_sigint_exit(); -if (tls_active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ +/* Timeouts do not get this far. A zero-byte return appears to mean that the +TLS session has been closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed +down. Revert to non-TLS handling. */ -if (shutdown) +if (sigalrm_seen) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS\n"); - gnutls_bye(state->session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n"); + state->xfer_error = TRUE; + return FALSE; } -gnutls_deinit(state->session); +else if (inbytes == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); + tls_close(NULL, TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN); + return FALSE; + } -memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); +/* Handle genuine errors */ -if ((state_server.session == NULL) && (state_client.session == NULL)) +else if (inbytes < 0) { - gnutls_global_deinit(); - exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv\n", __FUNCTION__); + record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL); + state->xfer_error = TRUE; + return FALSE; } - -tls_active = -1; +#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM +dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes); +#endif +state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes; +state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0; +return TRUE; } - - - /************************************************* * TLS version of getc * *************************************************/ /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty, it refills the buffer via the GnuTLS reading function. +Only used by the server-side TLS. This feeds DKIM and should be used for all message-body reads. -Arguments: none +Arguments: lim Maximum amount to read/buffer Returns: the next character or EOF */ int -tls_getc(void) +tls_getc(unsigned lim) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; -if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) - { - ssize_t inbytes; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n", - state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size); +if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) + if (!tls_refill(lim)) + return state->xfer_error ? EOF : smtp_getc(lim); - if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout); - inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer, - ssl_xfer_buffer_size); - alarm(0); +/* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */ - /* A zero-byte return appears to mean that the TLS session has been - closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to - non-TLS handling. */ +return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++]; +} - if (inbytes == 0) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); +BOOL +tls_hasc(void) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; +return state->xfer_buffer_lwm < state->xfer_buffer_hwm; +} - receive_getc = smtp_getc; - receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc; - receive_feof = smtp_feof; - receive_ferror = smtp_ferror; - receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered; +uschar * +tls_getbuf(unsigned * len) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; +unsigned size; +uschar * buf; - gnutls_deinit(state->session); - state->session = NULL; - tls_active = -1; - tls_bits = 0; - tls_certificate_verified = FALSE; - tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL; - tls_cipher = NULL; - tls_peerdn = NULL; - - return smtp_getc(); +if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) + if (!tls_refill(*len)) + { + if (!state->xfer_error) return smtp_getbuf(len); + *len = 0; + return NULL; } - /* Handle genuine errors */ +if ((size = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm) > *len) + size = *len; +buf = &state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm]; +state->xfer_buffer_lwm += size; +*len = size; +return buf; +} + - else if (inbytes < 0) - { - record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL); - state->xfer_error = 1; - return EOF; - } +/* Get up to the given number of bytes from any cached data, and feed to dkim. */ +void +tls_get_cache(unsigned lim) +{ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM - dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes); +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; +int n = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm; +if (n > lim) + n = lim; +if (n > 0) + dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer+state->xfer_buffer_lwm, n); #endif - state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes; - state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0; - } - -/* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */ - -return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++]; } +BOOL +tls_could_getc(void) +{ +return state_server.xfer_buffer_lwm < state_server.xfer_buffer_hwm + || gnutls_record_check_pending(state_server.session) > 0; +} /************************************************* @@ -1612,18 +3958,20 @@ return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++]; /* This does not feed DKIM, so if the caller uses this for reading message body, then the caller must feed DKIM. + Arguments: + ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context buff buffer of data len size of buffer Returns: the number of bytes read - -1 after a failed read + -1 after a failed read, including EOF */ int -tls_read(uschar *buff, size_t len) +tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; ssize_t inbytes; if (len > INT_MAX) @@ -1636,16 +3984,24 @@ if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm < state->xfer_buffer_hwm) state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm); DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", + debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(session=%p, buffer=%p, len=" SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", state->session, buff, len); -inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, buff, len); +errno = 0; +do + inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, buff, len); +while (inbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN); + if (inbytes > 0) return inbytes; if (inbytes == 0) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); } -else record_io_error(state, (int)inbytes, US"recv", NULL); +else + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv\n", __FUNCTION__); + record_io_error(state, (int)inbytes, US"recv", NULL); + } return -1; } @@ -1659,31 +4015,69 @@ return -1; /* Arguments: + ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context buff buffer of data len number of bytes + more more data expected soon + +Calling with len zero and more unset will flush buffered writes. The buff +argument can be null for that case. Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write, -1 after a failed write */ int -tls_write(const uschar *buff, size_t len) +tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar * buff, size_t len, BOOL more) { ssize_t outbytes; size_t left = len; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = current_global_tls_state; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; + +#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK +if (more && !state->corked) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_cork(session=%p)\n", state->session); + gnutls_record_cork(state->session); + state->corked = TRUE; + } +#endif + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT "%s)\n", __FUNCTION__, + buff, left, more ? ", more" : ""); -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", buff, left); while (left > 0) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(SSL, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", - buff, left); - outbytes = gnutls_record_send(state->session, buff, left); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(session=%p, buffer=%p, left=" SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", + state->session, buff, left); + + errno = 0; + do + outbytes = gnutls_record_send(state->session, buff, left); + while (outbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=" SSIZE_T_FMT "\n", outbytes); + if (outbytes < 0) { - record_io_error(state, outbytes, US"send", NULL); +#ifdef GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION + if ( outbytes == GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION && errno == ECONNRESET + && !ct_ctx && f.smtp_in_quit + ) + { /* Outlook, dammit */ + if (LOGGING(protocol_detail)) + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] after QUIT, client reset TCP before" + " SMTP response and TLS close\n", sender_host_address); + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("[%s] SSL_write: after QUIT," + " client reset TCP before TLS close\n", sender_host_address); + } + else +#endif + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: gnutls_record_send err\n", __FUNCTION__); + record_io_error(state, outbytes, US"send", NULL); + } return -1; } if (outbytes == 0) @@ -1704,6 +4098,29 @@ if (len > INT_MAX) len = INT_MAX; } +#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK +if (!more && state->corked) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_uncork(session=%p)\n", state->session); + do + /* We can't use GNUTLS_RECORD_WAIT here, as it retries on + GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || GNUTLS_E_INTR, which would break our timeout set by alarm(). + The GNUTLS_E_AGAIN should not happen ever, as our sockets are blocking anyway. + But who knows. (That all relies on the fact that GNUTLS_E_INTR and GNUTLS_E_AGAIN + match the EINTR and EAGAIN errno values.) */ + outbytes = gnutls_record_uncork(state->session, 0); + while (outbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN); + + if (outbytes < 0) + { + record_io_error(state, len, US"uncork", NULL); + return -1; + } + + state->corked = FALSE; + } +#endif + return (int) len; } @@ -1731,7 +4148,6 @@ vaguely_random_number(int max) { unsigned int r; int i, needed_len; -uschar *p; uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)]; if (max <= 1) @@ -1739,7 +4155,8 @@ if (max <= 1) needed_len = sizeof(r); /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were - * asked for a number less than 10. */ +asked for a number less than 10. */ + for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i) r >>= 1; i = (i + 7) / 8; @@ -1749,15 +4166,12 @@ if (i < needed_len) i = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, smallbuf, needed_len); if (i < 0) { - DEBUG(D_all) debug_printf("gnutls_rnd() failed, using fallback.\n"); + DEBUG(D_all) debug_printf("gnutls_rnd() failed, using fallback\n"); return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max); } r = 0; -for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p) - { - r *= 256; - r += *p; - } +for (uschar * p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p) + r = r * 256 + *p; /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants * smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */ @@ -1774,23 +4188,105 @@ vaguely_random_number(int max) +/************************************************* +* Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup * +*************************************************/ + +/* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the +library can parse. + +Returns: NULL on success, or error message +*/ + +uschar * +tls_validate_require_cipher(void) +{ +int rc; +uschar *expciphers = NULL; +gnutls_priority_t priority_cache; +const char *errpos; +uschar * dummy_errstr; + +#ifdef GNUTLS_AUTO_GLOBAL_INIT +# define validate_check_rc(Label) do { \ + if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) \ + return string_sprintf("%s failed: %s", (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); } } while (0) +# define return_deinit(Label) do { return (Label); } while (0) +#else +# define validate_check_rc(Label) do { \ + if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) gnutls_global_deinit(); \ + return string_sprintf("%s failed: %s", (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); } } while (0) +# define return_deinit(Label) do { gnutls_global_deinit(); return (Label); } while (0) +#endif + +if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, + "already initialised GnuTLS, Exim developer bug"); + +#if defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11) && !defined(GNUTLS_AUTO_PKCS11_MANUAL) +if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11) + { + rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL); + validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init"); + } +#endif +#ifndef GNUTLS_AUTO_GLOBAL_INIT +rc = gnutls_global_init(); +validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_global_init()"); +#endif +exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE; + +if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers)) + return_deinit(NULL); + +if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, + &dummy_errstr)) + return_deinit(US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers"); + +if (!(expciphers && *expciphers)) + return_deinit(NULL); + +DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers); + +rc = gnutls_priority_init(&priority_cache, CS expciphers, &errpos); +validate_check_rc(string_sprintf( + "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.8s..\"", + expciphers, (long)(errpos - CS expciphers), errpos)); + +#undef return_deinit +#undef validate_check_rc +#ifndef GNUTLS_AUTO_GLOBAL_INIT +gnutls_global_deinit(); +#endif + +return NULL; +} + + + + /************************************************* * Report the library versions. * *************************************************/ /* See a description in tls-openssl.c for an explanation of why this exists. -Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to -Returns: nothing +Arguments: string to append to +Returns: string */ -void -tls_version_report(FILE *f) +gstring * +tls_version_report(gstring * g) { -fprintf(f, "Library version: GnuTLS: Compile: %s\n" - " Runtime: %s\n", - LIBGNUTLS_VERSION, - gnutls_check_version(NULL)); +return string_fmt_append(g, + "Library version: GnuTLS: Compile: %s\n" + " Runtime: %s\n", + LIBGNUTLS_VERSION, + gnutls_check_version(NULL)); } +#endif /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/ +/* vi: aw ai sw=2 +*/ /* End of tls-gnu.c */