X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/09fc90fb92376b385a1b1aaf2613b3b1c7191284..30a626371573c553bd3c9886b1f9f8e92a0410fd:/src/src/tls-openssl.c diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c index 391dc2695..5130455fe 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c +++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c @@ -549,23 +549,27 @@ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); *************************************************/ /* If dhparam is set, expand it, and load up the parameters for DH encryption. +Server only. Arguments: sctx The current SSL CTX (inbound or outbound) dhparam DH parameter file or fixed parameter identity string - host connected host, if client; NULL if server errstr error string pointer Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked) */ static BOOL -init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, const host_item *host, uschar ** errstr) +init_dh(SSL_CTX * sctx, uschar * dhparam, uschar ** errstr) { -BIO *bio; -DH *dh; -uschar *dhexpanded; -const char *pem; +BIO * bio; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L +DH * dh; +#else +EVP_PKEY * pkey; +#endif +uschar * dhexpanded; +const char * pem; int dh_bitsize; if (!expand_check(dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &dhexpanded, errstr)) @@ -578,7 +582,7 @@ else if (dhexpanded[0] == '/') if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r"))) { tls_error(string_sprintf("could not read dhparams file %s", dhexpanded), - host, US strerror(errno), errstr); + NULL, US strerror(errno), errstr); return FALSE; } } @@ -593,17 +597,23 @@ else if (!(pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded))) { tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown standard DH prime \"%s\"", dhexpanded), - host, US strerror(errno), errstr); + NULL, US strerror(errno), errstr); return FALSE; } bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS pem, -1); } -if (!(dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL))) +if (!( +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL) +#else + pkey = PEM_read_bio_Parameters_ex(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL) +#endif + ) ) { BIO_free(bio); tls_error(string_sprintf("Could not read tls_dhparams \"%s\"", dhexpanded), - host, NULL, errstr); + NULL, NULL, errstr); return FALSE; } @@ -612,33 +622,55 @@ an NSS limit, and the GnuTLS APIs handle bit-sizes fine, so we went with 2236. But older OpenSSL can only report in bytes (octets), not bits. If someone wants to dance at the edge, then they can raise the limit or use current libraries. */ -#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L +# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS /* Added in commit 26c79d5641d; `git describe --contains` says OpenSSL_1_1_0-pre1~1022 This predates OpenSSL_1_1_0 (before a, b, ...) so is in all 1.1.0 */ dh_bitsize = DH_bits(dh); -#else +# else dh_bitsize = 8 * DH_size(dh); +# endif +#else /* 3.0.0 + */ +dh_bitsize = EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey); #endif /* Even if it is larger, we silently return success rather than cause things to fail out, so that a too-large DH will not knock out all TLS; it's a debatable -choice. */ +choice. Likewise for a failing attempt to set one. */ if (dh_bitsize <= tls_dh_max_bits) { - SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(sctx, dh); - DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("Diffie-Hellman initialized from %s with %d-bit prime\n", - dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", dh_bitsize); + if ( +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(sctx, dh) +#else + SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(sctx, pkey) +#endif + == 0) + { + ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring)); + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (D-H param setting '%s'): %s", + dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", ssl_errstring); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L + /* EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); crashes */ +#endif + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("Diffie-Hellman initialized from %s with %d-bit prime\n", + dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", dh_bitsize); } else DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("dhparams file %d bits, is > tls_dh_max_bits limit of %d\n", - dh_bitsize, tls_dh_max_bits); + debug_printf("dhparams '%s' %d bits, is > tls_dh_max_bits limit of %d\n", + dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", dh_bitsize, tls_dh_max_bits); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L DH_free(dh); -BIO_free(bio); +#endif +/* The EVP_PKEY ownership stays with the ctx; do not free it */ +BIO_free(bio); return TRUE; } @@ -649,7 +681,7 @@ return TRUE; * Initialize for ECDH * *************************************************/ -/* Load parameters for ECDH encryption. +/* Load parameters for ECDH encryption. Server only. For now, we stick to NIST P-256 because: it's simple and easy to configure; it avoids any patent issues that might bite redistributors; despite events in @@ -667,14 +699,13 @@ Patches welcome. Arguments: sctx The current SSL CTX (inbound or outbound) - host connected host, if client; NULL if server errstr error string pointer Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked) */ static BOOL -init_ecdh(SSL_CTX * sctx, host_item * host, uschar ** errstr) +init_ecdh(SSL_CTX * sctx, uschar ** errstr) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH return TRUE; @@ -684,9 +715,6 @@ uschar * exp_curve; int nid; BOOL rv; -if (host) /* No ECDH setup for clients, only for servers */ - return TRUE; - # ifndef EXIM_HAVE_ECDH DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("No OpenSSL API to define ECDH parameters, skipping\n"); @@ -733,7 +761,7 @@ if ( (nid = OBJ_sn2nid (CCS exp_curve)) == NID_undef ) { tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown curve name tls_eccurve '%s'", exp_curve), - host, NULL, errstr); + NULL, NULL, errstr); return FALSE; } @@ -742,7 +770,7 @@ if ( (nid = OBJ_sn2nid (CCS exp_curve)) == NID_undef EC_KEY * ecdh; if (!(ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))) { - tls_error(US"Unable to create ec curve", host, NULL, errstr); + tls_error(US"Unable to create ec curve", NULL, NULL, errstr); return FALSE; } @@ -750,7 +778,7 @@ if ( (nid = OBJ_sn2nid (CCS exp_curve)) == NID_undef not to the stability of the interface. */ if ((rv = SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(sctx, ecdh) == 0)) - tls_error(string_sprintf("Error enabling '%s' curve", exp_curve), host, NULL, errstr); + tls_error(string_sprintf("Error enabling '%s' curve", exp_curve), NULL, NULL, errstr); else DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ECDH: enabled '%s' curve\n", exp_curve); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); @@ -759,7 +787,7 @@ if ( (nid = OBJ_sn2nid (CCS exp_curve)) == NID_undef #else /* v 3.0.0 + */ if ((rv = SSL_CTX_set1_groups(sctx, &nid, 1)) == 0) - tls_error(string_sprintf("Error enabling '%s' group", exp_curve), host, NULL, errstr); + tls_error(string_sprintf("Error enabling '%s' group", exp_curve), NULL, NULL, errstr); else DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ECDH: enabled '%s' group\n", exp_curve); @@ -777,6 +805,7 @@ return !rv; * Expand key and cert file specs * *************************************************/ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L /* Arguments: s SSL connection (not used) @@ -796,14 +825,14 @@ BIGNUM *bn = BN_new(); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Generating %d bit RSA key...\n", keylength); -#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_RSA_GENKEY_EX +# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_RSA_GENKEY_EX if ( !BN_set_word(bn, (unsigned long)RSA_F4) || !(rsa_key = RSA_new()) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_key, keylength, bn, NULL) ) -#else +# else if (!(rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL))) -#endif +# endif { ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring)); @@ -813,6 +842,7 @@ if (!(rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL))) } return rsa_key; } +#endif /* pre-3.0.0 */ @@ -826,7 +856,6 @@ tls_install_selfsign(SSL_CTX * sctx, uschar ** errstr) { X509 * x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY * pkey; -RSA * rsa; X509_NAME * name; uschar * where; @@ -840,12 +869,19 @@ if (!(x509 = X509_new())) goto err; where = US"generating pkey"; -if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 2048))) - goto err; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + { + RSA * rsa; + if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 2048))) + goto err; -where = US"assigning pkey"; -if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa)) - goto err; + where = US"assigning pkey"; + if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa)) + goto err; + } +#else +pkey = EVP_RSA_gen(2048); +#endif X509_set_version(x509, 2); /* N+1 - version 3 */ ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 1); @@ -973,7 +1009,7 @@ if (ev) old_cert = tlsp->peercert; tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* NB we do not bother setting peerdn */ - if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth)))) + if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth), &errno))) { log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] %s verify denied by event-action: " "depth=%d cert=%s: %s", @@ -1606,11 +1642,24 @@ return OK; * One-time init credentials for server and client * **************************************************/ +static void +normalise_ciphers(uschar ** ciphers, const uschar * pre_expansion_ciphers) +{ +uschar * s = *ciphers; + +if (!s || !Ustrchr(s, '_')) return; /* no change needed */ + +if (s == pre_expansion_ciphers) + s = string_copy(s); /* get writable copy */ + +for (uschar * t = s; *t; t++) if (*t == '_') *t = '-'; +*ciphers = s; +} + static int server_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX * ctx, exim_openssl_state_st * state, uschar * ciphers, uschar ** errstr) { -for (uschar * s = ciphers; *s; s++ ) if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", ciphers); if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS ciphers)) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL, errstr); @@ -1673,15 +1722,19 @@ state_server.lib_state.lib_ctx = ctx; if (opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_dhparam)) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading DH params for server\n"); - if (init_dh(ctx, tls_dhparam, NULL, &dummy_errstr)) + if (init_dh(ctx, tls_dhparam, &dummy_errstr)) state_server.lib_state.dh = TRUE; } +else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading DH params for server\n"); if (opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_eccurve)) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading ECDH curve for server\n"); - if (init_ecdh(ctx, NULL, &dummy_errstr)) + if (init_ecdh(ctx, &dummy_errstr)) state_server.lib_state.ecdh = TRUE; } +else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: not preloading ECDH curve for server\n"); #if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT) /* If we can, preload the server-side cert, key and ocsp */ @@ -1758,6 +1811,7 @@ else if (opt_set_and_noexpand(tls_require_ciphers)) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading cipher list for server\n"); + normalise_ciphers(&tls_require_ciphers, tls_require_ciphers); if (server_load_ciphers(ctx, &state_server, tls_require_ciphers, &dummy_errstr) == OK) state_server.lib_state.pri_string = TRUE; @@ -1793,19 +1847,6 @@ ob->tls_preload.lib_ctx = ctx; tpt_dummy_state.lib_state = ob->tls_preload; -if (opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_dhparam)) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading DH params for transport '%s'\n", t->name); - if (init_dh(ctx, tls_dhparam, NULL, &dummy_errstr)) - ob->tls_preload.dh = TRUE; - } -if (opt_unset_or_noexpand(tls_eccurve)) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: preloading ECDH curve for transport '%s'\n", t->name); - if (init_ecdh(ctx, NULL, &dummy_errstr)) - ob->tls_preload.ecdh = TRUE; - } - #if defined(EXIM_HAVE_INOTIFY) || defined(EXIM_HAVE_KEVENT) if ( opt_set_and_noexpand(ob->tls_certificate) && opt_unset_or_noexpand(ob->tls_privatekey)) @@ -1926,7 +1967,11 @@ typedef struct { /* Session ticket encryption key */ const EVP_CIPHER * aes_cipher; uschar aes_key[32]; /* size needed depends on cipher. aes_128 implies 128/8 = 16? */ +# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L const EVP_MD * hmac_hash; +# else + const uschar * hmac_hashname; +# endif uschar hmac_key[16]; time_t renew; time_t expire; @@ -1955,7 +2000,11 @@ if (RAND_bytes(exim_tk.name+1, sizeof(exim_tk.name)-1) <= 0) return; exim_tk.name[0] = 'E'; exim_tk.aes_cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); +# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L exim_tk.hmac_hash = EVP_sha256(); +# else +exim_tk.hmac_hashname = US "sha256"; +# endif exim_tk.expire = t + ssl_session_timeout; exim_tk.renew = t + ssl_session_timeout/2; } @@ -1975,10 +2024,49 @@ return memcmp(name, exim_tk.name, sizeof(exim_tk.name)) == 0 ? &exim_tk : NULL; } + +static int +tk_hmac_init( +# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + HMAC_CTX * hctx, +#else + EVP_MAC_CTX * hctx, +#endif + exim_stek * key + ) +{ +/*XXX will want these dependent on the ssl session strength */ +# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key), + key->hmac_hash, NULL); +#else + { + OSSL_PARAM params[3]; + uschar * hk = string_copy(key->hmac_hashname); /* need nonconst */ + params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string("key", key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key)); + params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("digest", CS hk, 0); + params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx, params) == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params: %s\n", + ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error())); + return 0; /* error in mac initialisation */ + } +} +#endif +return 1; +} + /* Callback for session tickets, on server */ static int ticket_key_callback(SSL * ssl, uschar key_name[16], - uschar * iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX * c_ctx, HMAC_CTX * hctx, int enc) + uschar * iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX * c_ctx, +# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L + HMAC_CTX * hctx, +#else + EVP_MAC_CTX * hctx, +#endif + int enc) { tls_support * tlsp = state_server.tlsp; exim_stek * key; @@ -1996,9 +2084,7 @@ if (enc) memcpy(key_name, key->name, 16); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - time(NULL)); - /*XXX will want these dependent on the ssl session strength */ - HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key), - key->hmac_hash, NULL); + if (tk_hmac_init(hctx, key) == 0) return 0; EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c_ctx, key->aes_cipher, NULL, key->aes_key, iv); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket created\n"); @@ -2021,8 +2107,7 @@ else return 0; } - HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key), - key->hmac_hash, NULL); + if (tk_hmac_init(hctx, key) == 0) return 0; EVP_DecryptInit_ex(c_ctx, key->aes_cipher, NULL, key->aes_key, iv); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket usable, STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - now); @@ -2035,7 +2120,7 @@ else return key->renew < now ? 2 : 1; } } -#endif +#endif /* !DISABLE_TLS_RESUME */ @@ -2115,8 +2200,8 @@ already exists. Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, state); } -if ( !init_dh(server_sni, state->dhparam, NULL, &dummy_errstr) - || !init_ecdh(server_sni, NULL, &dummy_errstr) +if ( !init_dh(server_sni, state->dhparam, &dummy_errstr) + || !init_ecdh(server_sni, &dummy_errstr) ) goto bad; @@ -2437,7 +2522,7 @@ if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp))) { tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp); - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid"); + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP dates invalid"); goto failed; } @@ -2621,15 +2706,18 @@ will never be used because we use a new context every time. */ /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */ /* Initialize ECDH temp key parameter selection */ -if (state->lib_state.dh) - { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: DH params were preloaded\n"); } -else - if (!init_dh(ctx, state->dhparam, host, errstr)) return DEFER; +if (!host) + { + if (state->lib_state.dh) + { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: DH params were preloaded\n"); } + else + if (!init_dh(ctx, state->dhparam, errstr)) return DEFER; -if (state->lib_state.ecdh) - { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: ECDH curve was preloaded\n"); } -else - if (!init_ecdh(ctx, host, errstr)) return DEFER; + if (state->lib_state.ecdh) + { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: ECDH curve was preloaded\n"); } + else + if (!init_ecdh(ctx, errstr)) return DEFER; + } /* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */ @@ -3104,9 +3192,12 @@ else if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, errstr)) return FAIL; - if ( expciphers - && (rc = server_load_ciphers(ctx, &state_server, expciphers, errstr)) != OK) - return rc; + if (expciphers) + { + normalise_ciphers(&expciphers, tls_require_ciphers); + if ((rc = server_load_ciphers(ctx, &state_server, expciphers, errstr)) != OK) + return rc; + } } /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or @@ -3144,9 +3235,15 @@ else skip_certs: ; #ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME +# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ctx, ticket_key_callback); /* despite working, appears to always return failure, so ignoring */ +# else +SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_evp_cb(ctx, ticket_key_callback); +/* despite working, appears to always return failure, so ignoring */ +# endif #endif + #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS # ifndef DISABLE_TLS_RESUME SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(ctx, tls_in.host_resumable ? 1 : 0); @@ -3214,6 +3311,7 @@ if (rc <= 0) case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n"); (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr); + (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL); if (SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) SSL_shutdown(ssl); @@ -3231,8 +3329,9 @@ if (rc <= 0) || r == SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW #endif || r == SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL || r == SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL) - s = string_sprintf("%s (%s)", s, SSL_get_version(ssl)); + s = string_sprintf("(%s)", SSL_get_version(ssl)); (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : s, errstr); + (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL); return FAIL; } @@ -3243,6 +3342,7 @@ if (rc <= 0) if (!errno) { *errstr = US"SSL_accept: TCP connection closed by peer"; + (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL); return FAIL; } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - syscall %s\n", strerror(errno)); @@ -3251,6 +3351,7 @@ if (rc <= 0) sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : ERR_peek_error() ? NULL : string_sprintf("ret %d", error), errstr); + (void) event_raise(event_action, US"tls:fail:connect", *errstr, NULL); return FAIL; } } @@ -3801,21 +3902,25 @@ if (conn_args->dane) return FALSE; if (expciphers && *expciphers == '\0') expciphers = NULL; + + normalise_ciphers(&expciphers, ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers); } #endif -if (!expciphers && - !expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", +if (!expciphers) + { + if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, errstr)) - return FALSE; + return FALSE; -/* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they -are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and -also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here. */ + /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they + are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and + also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here. */ + + normalise_ciphers(&expciphers, ob->tls_require_ciphers); + } if (expciphers) { - uschar *s = expciphers; - while (*s) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers); if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(exim_client_ctx->ctx, CS expciphers)) { @@ -4478,12 +4583,9 @@ if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, if (!(expciphers && *expciphers)) return NULL; -/* normalisation ripped from above */ -s = expciphers; -while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; } +normalise_ciphers(&expciphers, tls_require_ciphers); err = NULL; - if (lib_ctx_new(&ctx, NULL, &err) == OK) { DEBUG(D_tls)