X-Git-Url: https://git.exim.org/exim.git/blobdiff_plain/01a4a5c5cbaa40ca618d3e233991ce183b551477..047d31cbc35d5323345a135ad87ef38f8a5c4789:/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt?ds=inline diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt index 4bcfecf04..2569ad3af 100644 --- a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt +++ b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ about experimental features, all of which are unstable and liable to incompatible change. -Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) suppport +Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) support -------------------------------------------------------------- Brightmail AntiSpam is a commercial package. Please see @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ These four steps are explained in more details below. 1) Adding support for BMI at compile time To compile with BMI support, you need to link Exim against - the Brighmail client SDK, consisting of a library + the Brightmail client SDK, consisting of a library (libbmiclient_single.so) and a header file (bmi_api.h). You'll also need to explicitly set a flag in the Makefile to include BMI support in the Exim binary. Both can be achieved @@ -292,172 +292,19 @@ These four steps are explained in more details below. -Sender Policy Framework (SPF) support +SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support (using libsrs_alt) -------------------------------------------------------------- +See also below, for an alternative native support implementation. -To learn more about SPF, visit http://www.openspf.org. This -document does not explain the SPF fundamentals, you should -read and understand the implications of deploying SPF on your -system before doing so. - -SPF support is added via the libspf2 library. Visit - - http://www.libspf2.org/ - -to obtain a copy, then compile and install it. By default, -this will put headers in /usr/local/include and the static -library in /usr/local/lib. - -To compile Exim with SPF support, set these additional flags in -Local/Makefile: - -EXPERIMENTAL_SPF=yes -CFLAGS=-DSPF -I/usr/local/include -EXTRALIBS_EXIM=-L/usr/local/lib -lspf2 - -This assumes that the libspf2 files are installed in -their default locations. - -You can now run SPF checks in incoming SMTP by using the "spf" -ACL condition in either the MAIL, RCPT or DATA ACLs. When -using it in the RCPT ACL, you can make the checks dependent on -the RCPT address (or domain), so you can check SPF records -only for certain target domains. This gives you the -possibility to opt-out certain customers that do not want -their mail to be subject to SPF checking. - -The spf condition takes a list of strings on its right-hand -side. These strings describe the outcome of the SPF check for -which the spf condition should succeed. Valid strings are: - - o pass The SPF check passed, the sending host - is positively verified by SPF. - o fail The SPF check failed, the sending host - is NOT allowed to send mail for the domain - in the envelope-from address. - o softfail The SPF check failed, but the queried - domain can't absolutely confirm that this - is a forgery. - o none The queried domain does not publish SPF - records. - o neutral The SPF check returned a "neutral" state. - This means the queried domain has published - a SPF record, but wants to allow outside - servers to send mail under its domain as well. - This should be treated like "none". - o permerror This indicates a syntax error in the SPF - record of the queried domain. You may deny - messages when this occurs. (Changed in 4.83) - o temperror This indicates a temporary error during all - processing, including Exim's SPF processing. - You may defer messages when this occurs. - (Changed in 4.83) - o err_temp Same as permerror, deprecated in 4.83, will be - removed in a future release. - o err_perm Same as temperror, deprecated in 4.83, will be - removed in a future release. - -You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert -its meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but -"fail". The string list is evaluated left-to-right, in a -short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of -the SPF check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed -strings matches the outcome of the SPF check, the condition -fails. - -Here is an example to fail forgery attempts from domains that -publish SPF records: - -/* ----------------- -deny message = $sender_host_address is not allowed to send mail from ${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address_domain}{$sender_helo_name}}. \ - Please see http://www.openspf.org/Why?scope=${if def:sender_address_domain {mfrom}{helo}};identity=${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address}{$sender_helo_name}};ip=$sender_host_address - spf = fail ---------------------- */ - -You can also give special treatment to specific domains: - -/* ----------------- -deny message = AOL sender, but not from AOL-approved relay. - sender_domains = aol.com - spf = fail:neutral ---------------------- */ - -Explanation: AOL publishes SPF records, but is liberal and -still allows non-approved relays to send mail from aol.com. -This will result in a "neutral" state, while mail from genuine -AOL servers will result in "pass". The example above takes -this into account and treats "neutral" like "fail", but only -for aol.com. Please note that this violates the SPF draft. - -When the spf condition has run, it sets up several expansion -variables. - - $spf_header_comment - This contains a human-readable string describing the outcome - of the SPF check. You can add it to a custom header or use - it for logging purposes. - - $spf_received - This contains a complete Received-SPF: header that can be - added to the message. Please note that according to the SPF - draft, this header must be added at the top of the header - list. Please see section 10 on how you can do this. - - Note: in case of "Best-guess" (see below), the convention is - to put this string in a header called X-SPF-Guess: instead. - - $spf_result - This contains the outcome of the SPF check in string form, - one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, permerror or - temperror. - - $spf_smtp_comment - This contains a string that can be used in a SMTP response - to the calling party. Useful for "fail". - -In addition to SPF, you can also perform checks for so-called -"Best-guess". Strictly speaking, "Best-guess" is not standard -SPF, but it is supported by the same framework that enables SPF -capability. Refer to http://www.openspf.org/FAQ/Best_guess_record -for a description of what it means. - -To access this feature, simply use the spf_guess condition in place -of the spf one. For example: - -/* ----------------- -deny message = $sender_host_address doesn't look trustworthy to me - spf_guess = fail ---------------------- */ - -In case you decide to reject messages based on this check, you -should note that although it uses the same framework, "Best-guess" -is NOT SPF, and therefore you should not mention SPF at all in your -reject message. - -When the spf_guess condition has run, it sets up the same expansion -variables as when spf condition is run, described above. - -Additionally, since Best-guess is not standardized, you may redefine -what "Best-guess" means to you by redefining spf_guess variable in -global config. For example, the following: - -/* ----------------- -spf_guess = v=spf1 a/16 mx/16 ptr ?all ---------------------- */ - -would relax host matching rules to a broader network range. - - -SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support --------------------------------------------------------------- - -Exiscan currently includes SRS support via Miles Wilton's +Exim currently includes SRS support via Miles Wilton's libsrs_alt library. The current version of the supported -library is 0.5. +library is 0.5, there are reports of 1.0 working. In order to use SRS, you must get a copy of libsrs_alt from -http://srs.mirtol.com/ +https://opsec.eu/src/srs/ + +(not the original source, which has disappeared.) Unpack the tarball, then refer to MTAs/README.EXIM to proceed. You need to set @@ -466,9 +313,110 @@ EXPERIMENTAL_SRS=yes in your Local/Makefile. +The following main-section options become available: + srs_config string + srs_hashlength int + srs_hashmin int + srs_maxage int + srs_secrets string + srs_usehash bool + srs_usetimestamp bool + +The redirect router gains these options (all of type string, unset by default): + srs + srs_alias + srs_condition + srs_dbinsert + srs_dbselect + +The following variables become available: + $srs_db_address + $srs_db_key + $srs_orig_recipient + $srs_orig_sender + $srs_recipient + $srs_status + +The predefined feature-macro _HAVE_SRS will be present. +Additional delivery log line elements, tagged with "SRS=" will show the srs sender. +For configuration information see https://github.com/Exim/exim/wiki/SRS . + + + + +SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme) Support (native) +-------------------------------------------------------------- +This is less full-featured than the libsrs_alt version above. + +The Exim build needs to be done with this in Local/Makefile: +EXPERIMENTAL_SRS_NATIVE=yes + +The following are provided: +- an expansion item "srs_encode" + This takes three arguments: + - a site SRS secret + - the return_path + - the pre-forwarding domain + +- an expansion condition "inbound_srs" + This takes two arguments: the local_part to check, and a site SRS secret. + If the secret is zero-length, only the pattern of the local_part is checked. + The $srs_recipient variable is set as a side-effect. + +- an expansion variable $srs_recipient + This gets the original return_path encoded in the SRS'd local_part + +- predefined macros _HAVE_SRS and _HAVE_NATIVE_SRS + +Sample usage: + + #macro + SRS_SECRET = + + #routers + + outbound: + driver = dnslookup + # if outbound, and forwarding has been done, use an alternate transport + domains = ! +my_domains + transport = ${if eq {$local_part@$domain} \ + {$original_local_part@$original_domain} \ + {remote_smtp} {remote_forwarded_smtp}} + + inbound_srs: + driver = redirect + senders = : + domains = +my_domains + # detect inbound bounces which are SRS'd, and decode them + condition = ${if inbound_srs {$local_part} {SRS_SECRET}} + data = $srs_recipient + + inbound_srs_failure: + driver = redirect + senders = : + domains = +my_domains + # detect inbound bounces which look SRS'd but are invalid + condition = ${if inbound_srs {$local_part} {}} + allow_fail + data = :fail: Invalid SRS recipient address + + #... further routers here + + + # transport; should look like the non-forward outbound + # one, plus the max_rcpt and return_path options + remote_forwarded_smtp: + driver = smtp + # modify the envelope from, for mails that we forward + max_rcpt = 1 + return_path = ${srs_encode {SRS_SECRET} {$return_path} {$original_domain}} + + + DCC Support -------------------------------------------------------------- +Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse; http://www.rhyolite.com/dcc/ *) Building exim @@ -538,763 +486,326 @@ Then set something like mout-xforward.gmx.net 82.165.159.12 mout.gmx.net 212.227.15.16 -Use a reasonable IP. eg. one the sending cluster acutally uses. - -DMARC Support --------------------------------------------------------------- - -DMARC combines feedback from SPF, DKIM, and header From: in order -to attempt to provide better indicators of the authenticity of an -email. This document does not explain the fundamentals, you -should read and understand how it works by visiting the website at -http://www.dmarc.org/. - -DMARC support is added via the libopendmarc library. Visit: - - http://sourceforge.net/projects/opendmarc/ - -to obtain a copy, or find it in your favorite rpm package -repository. If building from source, this description assumes -that headers will be in /usr/local/include, and that the libraries -are in /usr/local/lib. - -1. To compile Exim with DMARC support, you must first enable SPF. -Please read the above section on enabling the EXPERIMENTAL_SPF -feature. You must also have DKIM support, so you cannot set the -DISABLE_DKIM feature. Once both of those conditions have been met -you can enable DMARC in Local/Makefile: - -EXPERIMENTAL_DMARC=yes -LDFLAGS += -lopendmarc -# CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include -# LDFLAGS += -L/usr/local/lib - -The first line sets the feature to include the correct code, and -the second line says to link the libopendmarc libraries into the -exim binary. The commented out lines should be uncommented if you -built opendmarc from source and installed in the default location. -Adjust the paths if you installed them elsewhere, but you do not -need to uncomment them if an rpm (or you) installed them in the -package controlled locations (/usr/include and /usr/lib). - - -2. Use the following global settings to configure DMARC: - -Required: -dmarc_tld_file Defines the location of a text file of valid - top level domains the opendmarc library uses - during domain parsing. Maintained by Mozilla, - the most current version can be downloaded - from a link at http://publicsuffix.org/list/. - -Optional: -dmarc_history_file Defines the location of a file to log results - of dmarc verification on inbound emails. The - contents are importable by the opendmarc tools - which will manage the data, send out DMARC - reports, and expire the data. Make sure the - directory of this file is writable by the user - exim runs as. - -dmarc_forensic_sender The email address to use when sending a - forensic report detailing alignment failures - if a sender domain's dmarc record specifies it - and you have configured Exim to send them. - Default: do-not-reply@$default_hostname - - -3. By default, the DMARC processing will run for any remote, -non-authenticated user. It makes sense to only verify DMARC -status of messages coming from remote, untrusted sources. You can -use standard conditions such as hosts, senders, etc, to decide that -DMARC verification should *not* be performed for them and disable -DMARC with a control setting: - - control = dmarc_disable_verify - -A DMARC record can also specify a "forensic address", which gives -exim an email address to submit reports about failed alignment. -Exim does not do this by default because in certain conditions it -results in unintended information leakage (what lists a user might -be subscribed to, etc). You must configure exim to submit forensic -reports to the owner of the domain. If the DMARC record contains a -forensic address and you specify the control statement below, then -exim will send these forensic emails. It's also advised that you -configure a dmarc_forensic_sender because the default sender address -construction might be inadequate. - - control = dmarc_forensic_enable - -(AGAIN: You can choose not to send these forensic reports by simply -not putting the dmarc_forensic_enable control line at any point in -your exim config. If you don't tell it to send them, it will not -send them.) - -There are no options to either control. Both must appear before -the DATA acl. - - -4. You can now run DMARC checks in incoming SMTP by using the -"dmarc_status" ACL condition in the DATA ACL. You are required to -call the spf condition first in the ACLs, then the "dmarc_status" -condition. Putting this condition in the ACLs is required in order -for a DMARC check to actually occur. All of the variables are set -up before the DATA ACL, but there is no actual DMARC check that -occurs until a "dmarc_status" condition is encountered in the ACLs. - -The dmarc_status condition takes a list of strings on its -right-hand side. These strings describe recommended action based -on the DMARC check. To understand what the policy recommendations -mean, refer to the DMARC website above. Valid strings are: - - o accept The DMARC check passed and the library recommends - accepting the email. - o reject The DMARC check failed and the library recommends - rejecting the email. - o quarantine The DMARC check failed and the library recommends - keeping it for further inspection. - o none The DMARC check passed and the library recommends - no specific action, neutral. - o norecord No policy section in the DMARC record for this - sender domain. - o nofrom Unable to determine the domain of the sender. - o temperror Library error or dns error. - o off The DMARC check was disabled for this email. - -You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert its -meaning, for example "!accept" will match all results but -"accept". The string list is evaluated left-to-right in a -short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of the -DMARC check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed -strings matches the outcome of the DMARC check, the condition -fails. - -Of course, you can also use any other lookup method that Exim -supports, including LDAP, Postgres, MySQL, etc, as long as the -result is a list of colon-separated strings. - -Several expansion variables are set before the DATA ACL is -processed, and you can use them in this ACL. The following -expansion variables are available: - - o $dmarc_status - This is a one word status indicating what the DMARC library - thinks of the email. It is a combination of the results of - DMARC record lookup and the SPF/DKIM/DMARC processing results - (if a DMARC record was found). The actual policy declared - in the DMARC record is in a separate expansion variable. - - o $dmarc_status_text - This is a slightly longer, human readable status. - - o $dmarc_used_domain - This is the domain which DMARC used to look up the DMARC - policy record. - - o $dmarc_domain_policy - This is the policy declared in the DMARC record. Valid values - are "none", "reject" and "quarantine". It is blank when there - is any error, including no DMARC record. - - o $dmarc_ar_header - This is the entire Authentication-Results header which you can - add using an add_header modifier. - - -5. How to enable DMARC advanced operation: -By default, Exim's DMARC configuration is intended to be -non-intrusive and conservative. To facilitate this, Exim will not -create any type of logging files without explicit configuration by -you, the admin. Nor will Exim send out any emails/reports about -DMARC issues without explicit configuration by you, the admin (other -than typical bounce messages that may come about due to ACL -processing or failure delivery issues). - -In order to log statistics suitable to be imported by the opendmarc -tools, you need to: -a. Configure the global setting dmarc_history_file. -b. Configure cron jobs to call the appropriate opendmarc history - import scripts and truncating the dmarc_history_file. - -In order to send forensic reports, you need to: -a. Configure the global setting dmarc_forensic_sender. -b. Configure, somewhere before the DATA ACL, the control option to - enable sending DMARC forensic reports. - - -6. Example usage: -(RCPT ACL) - warn domains = +local_domains - hosts = +local_hosts - control = dmarc_disable_verify - - warn !domains = +screwed_up_dmarc_records - control = dmarc_enable_forensic - - warn condition = (lookup if destined to mailing list) - set acl_m_mailing_list = 1 - -(DATA ACL) - warn dmarc_status = accept : none : off - !authenticated = * - log_message = DMARC DEBUG: $dmarc_status $dmarc_used_domain - add_header = $dmarc_ar_header - - warn dmarc_status = !accept - !authenticated = * - log_message = DMARC DEBUG: '$dmarc_status' for $dmarc_used_domain - - warn dmarc_status = quarantine - !authenticated = * - set $acl_m_quarantine = 1 - # Do something in a transport with this flag variable - - deny condition = ${if eq{$dmarc_domain_policy}{reject}} - condition = ${if eq{$acl_m_mailing_list}{1}} - message = Messages from $dmarc_used_domain break mailing lists - - deny dmarc_status = reject - !authenticated = * - message = Message from $domain_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT - - - -Event Actions --------------------------------------------------------------- - -(Renamed from TPDA, Transport post-delivery actions) - -An arbitrary per-transport string can be expanded upon various transport events. -Additionally a main-section configuration option can be expanded on some -per-message events. -This feature may be used, for example, to write exim internal log information -(not available otherwise) into a database. - -In order to use the feature, you must compile with - -EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT=yes - -in your Local/Makefile - -and define one or both of -- the event_action option in the transport -- the event_action main option -to be expanded when the event fires. - -A new variable, $event_name, is set to the event type when the -expansion is done. The current list of events is: - - msg:complete after main per message - msg:delivery after transport per recipient - msg:host:defer after transport per attempt - msg:fail:delivery after main per recipient - msg:fail:internal after main per recipient - tcp:connect before transport per connection - tcp:close after transport per connection - tls:cert before both per certificate in verification chain - smtp:connect after transport per connection - -The expansion is called for all event types, and should use the $event_name -value to decide when to act. The variable data is a colon-separated -list, describing an event tree. - -There is an auxilary variable, $event_data, for which the -content is event_dependent: - - msg:delivery smtp confirmation mssage - msg:host:defer error string - tls:cert verification chain depth - smtp:connect smtp banner - -The msg:host:defer event populates one extra variable, $event_defer_errno. +Use a reasonable IP. eg. one the sending cluster actually uses. -The following variables are likely to be useful depending on the event type: - router_name, transport_name - local_part, domain - host, host_address, host_port - tls_out_peercert - lookup_dnssec_authenticated, tls_out_dane - sending_ip_address, sending_port - message_exim_id, verify_mode +DSN extra information +--------------------- +If compiled with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN_INFO extra information will be added +to DSN fail messages ("bounces"), when available. The intent is to aid +tracing of specific failing messages, when presented with a "bounce" +complaint and needing to search logs. -An example might look like: -event_action = ${if eq {msg:delivery}{$event_name} \ -{${lookup pgsql {SELECT * FROM record_Delivery( \ - '${quote_pgsql:$sender_address_domain}',\ - '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$sender_address_local_part}}', \ - '${quote_pgsql:$domain}', \ - '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$local_part}}', \ - '${quote_pgsql:$host_address}', \ - '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$host}}', \ - '${quote_pgsql:$message_exim_id}')}} \ -} {}} +The remote MTA IP address, with port number if nonstandard. +Example: + Remote-MTA: X-ip; [127.0.0.1]:587 +Rationale: + Several addresses may correspond to the (already available) + dns name for the remote MTA. -The string is expanded when each of the supported events occur -and any side-effects of the expansion will happen. -Note that for complex operations an ACL expansion can be used. +The remote MTA connect-time greeting. +Example: + X-Remote-MTA-smtp-greeting: X-str; 220 the.local.host.name ESMTP Exim x.yz Tue, 2 Mar 1999 09:44:33 +0000 +Rationale: + This string sometimes presents the remote MTA's idea of its + own name, and sometimes identifies the MTA software. +The remote MTA response to HELO or EHLO. +Example: + X-Remote-MTA-helo-response: X-str; 250-the.local.host.name Hello localhost [127.0.0.1] +Limitations: + Only the first line of a multiline response is recorded. +Rationale: + This string sometimes presents the remote MTA's view of + the peer IP connecting to it. -The expansion of the event_action option should normally -return an empty string. Should it return anything else the -following will be forced: +The reporting MTA detailed diagnostic. +Example: + X-Exim-Diagnostic: X-str; SMTP error from remote mail server after RCPT TO:: 550 hard error +Rationale: + This string sometimes give extra information over the + existing (already available) Diagnostic-Code field. - msg:delivery (ignored) - msg:host:defer (ignored) - msg:fail:delivery (ignored) - tcp:connect do not connect - tcp:close (ignored) - tls:cert refuse verification - smtp:connect close connection -No other use is made of the result string. +Note that non-RFC-documented field names and data types are used. -Known issues: -- the tls:cert event is only called for the cert chain elements - received over the wire, with GnuTLS. OpenSSL gives the entire - chain including thse loaded locally. +LMDB Lookup support +------------------- +LMDB is an ultra-fast, ultra-compact, crash-proof key-value embedded data store. +It is modeled loosely on the BerkeleyDB API. You should read about the feature +set as well as operation modes at https://symas.com/products/lightning-memory-mapped-database/ +LMDB single key lookup support is provided by linking to the LMDB C library. +The current implementation does not support writing to the LMDB database. -Redis Lookup --------------------------------------------------------------- - -Redis is open source advanced key-value data store. This document -does not explain the fundamentals, you should read and understand how -it works by visiting the website at http://www.redis.io/. - -Redis lookup support is added via the hiredis library. Visit: - - https://github.com/redis/hiredis +Visit https://github.com/LMDB/lmdb to download the library or find it in your +operating systems package repository. -to obtain a copy, or find it in your operating systems package repository. If building from source, this description assumes that headers will be in /usr/local/include, and that the libraries are in /usr/local/lib. -1. In order to build exim with Redis lookup support add +1. In order to build exim with LMDB lookup support add or uncomment -EXPERIMENTAL_REDIS=yes +EXPERIMENTAL_LMDB=yes to your Local/Makefile. (Re-)build/install exim. exim -d should show -Experimental_Redis in the line "Support for:". +Experimental_LMDB in the line "Support for:". -EXPERIMENTAL_REDIS=yes -LDFLAGS += -lhiredis +EXPERIMENTAL_LMDB=yes +LDFLAGS += -llmdb # CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include # LDFLAGS += -L/usr/local/lib The first line sets the feature to include the correct code, and -the second line says to link the hiredis libraries into the +the second line says to link the LMDB libraries into the exim binary. The commented out lines should be uncommented if you -built hiredis from source and installed in the default location. +built LMDB from source and installed in the default location. Adjust the paths if you installed them elsewhere, but you do not need to uncomment them if an rpm (or you) installed them in the package controlled locations (/usr/include and /usr/lib). +2. Create your LMDB files, you can use the mdb_load utility which is +part of the LMDB distribution our your favourite language bindings. -2. Use the following global settings to configure Redis lookup support: +3. Add the single key lookups to your exim.conf file, example lookups +are below. -Required: -redis_servers This option provides a list of Redis servers - and associated connection data, to be used in - conjunction with redis lookups. The option is - only available if Exim is configured with Redis - support. +${lookup{$sender_address_domain}lmdb{/var/lib/baruwa/data/db/relaydomains.mdb}{$value}} +${lookup{$sender_address_domain}lmdb{/var/lib/baruwa/data/db/relaydomains.mdb}{$value}fail} +${lookup{$sender_address_domain}lmdb{/var/lib/baruwa/data/db/relaydomains.mdb}} -For example: -redis_servers = 127.0.0.1/10/ - using database 10 with no password -redis_servers = 127.0.0.1//password - to make use of the default database of 0 with a password -redis_servers = 127.0.0.1// - for default database of 0 with no password +Queuefile transport +------------------- +Queuefile is a pseudo transport which does not perform final delivery. +It simply copies the exim spool files out of the spool directory into +an external directory retaining the exim spool format. -3. Once you have the Redis servers defined you can then make use of the -experimental Redis lookup by specifying ${lookup redis{}} in a lookup query. +The spool files can then be processed by external processes and then +requeued into exim spool directories for final delivery. +However, note carefully the warnings in the main documentation on +qpool file formats. -4. Example usage: +The motivation/inspiration for the transport is to allow external +processes to access email queued by exim and have access to all the +information which would not be available if the messages were delivered +to the process in the standard email formats. -(Host List) -hostlist relay_from_ips = <\n ${lookup redis{SMEMBERS relay_from_ips}} +The mailscanner package is one of the processes that can take advantage +of this transport to filter email. -Where relay_from_ips is a Redis set which contains entries such as "192.168.0.0/24" "10.0.0.0/8" and so on. -The result set is returned as -192.168.0.0/24 -10.0.0.0/8 -.. -. +The transport can be used in the same way as the other existing transports, +i.e by configuring a router to route mail to a transport configured with +the queuefile driver. -(Domain list) -domainlist virtual_domains = ${lookup redis {HGET $domain domain}} +The transport only takes one option: -Where $domain is a hash which includes the key 'domain' and the value '$domain'. +* directory - This is used to specify the directory messages should be +copied to. Expanded. -(Adding or updating an existing key) -set acl_c_spammer = ${if eq{${lookup redis{SPAMMER_SET}}}{OK}} +The generic transport options (body_only, current_directory, disable_logging, +debug_print, delivery_date_add, envelope_to_add, event_action, group, +headers_add, headers_only, headers_remove, headers_rewrite, home_directory, +initgroups, max_parallel, message_size_limit, rcpt_include_affixes, +retry_use_local_part, return_path, return_path_add, shadow_condition, +shadow_transport, transport_filter, transport_filter_timeout, user) are +ignored. -Where SPAMMER_SET is a macro and it is defined as +Sample configuration: -"SET SPAMMER " +(Router) -(Getting a value from Redis) +scan: + driver = accept + transport = scan -set acl_c_spam_host = ${lookup redis{GET...}} +(Transport) +scan: + driver = queuefile + directory = /var/spool/baruwa-scanner/input -Proxy Protocol Support --------------------------------------------------------------- -Exim now has Experimental "Proxy Protocol" support. It was built on -specifications from: -http://haproxy.1wt.eu/download/1.5/doc/proxy-protocol.txt -Above URL revised May 2014 to change version 2 spec: -http://git.1wt.eu/web?p=haproxy.git;a=commitdiff;h=afb768340c9d7e50d8e - -The purpose of this function is so that an application load balancer, -such as HAProxy, can sit in front of several Exim servers and Exim -will log the IP that is connecting to the proxy server instead of -the IP of the proxy server when it connects to Exim. It resets the -$sender_address_host and $sender_address_port to the IP:port of the -connection to the proxy. It also re-queries the DNS information for -this new IP address so that the original sender's hostname and IP -get logged in the Exim logfile. There is no logging if a host passes or -fails Proxy Protocol negotiation, but it can easily be determined and -recorded in an ACL (example is below). - -1. To compile Exim with Proxy Protocol support, put this in -Local/Makefile: - -EXPERIMENTAL_PROXY=yes - -2. Global configuration settings: - -proxy_required_hosts = HOSTLIST - -The proxy_required_hosts option will require any IP in that hostlist -to use Proxy Protocol. The specification of Proxy Protocol is very -strict, and if proxy negotiation fails, Exim will not allow any SMTP -command other than QUIT. (See end of this section for an example.) -The option is expanded when used, so it can be a hostlist as well as -string of IP addresses. Since it is expanded, specifying an alternate -separator is supported for ease of use with IPv6 addresses. - -To log the IP of the proxy in the incoming logline, add: - log_selector = +proxy - -A default incoming logline (wrapped for appearance) will look like this: - - 2013-11-04 09:25:06 1VdNti-0001OY-1V <= me@example.net - H=mail.example.net [1.2.3.4] P=esmtp S=433 - -With the log selector enabled, an email that was proxied through a -Proxy Protocol server at 192.168.1.2 will look like this: - - 2013-11-04 09:25:06 1VdNti-0001OY-1V <= me@example.net - H=mail.example.net [1.2.3.4] P=esmtp PRX=192.168.1.2 S=433 - -3. In the ACL's the following expansion variables are available. - -proxy_host_address The (internal) src IP of the proxy server - making the connection to the Exim server. -proxy_host_port The (internal) src port the proxy server is - using to connect to the Exim server. -proxy_target_address The dest (public) IP of the remote host to - the proxy server. -proxy_target_port The dest port the remote host is using to - connect to the proxy server. -proxy_session Boolean, yes/no, the connected host is required - to use Proxy Protocol. - -There is no expansion for a failed proxy session, however you can detect -it by checking if $proxy_session is true but $proxy_host is empty. As -an example, in my connect ACL, I have: - - warn condition = ${if and{ {bool{$proxy_session}} \ - {eq{$proxy_host_address}{}} } } - log_message = Failed required proxy protocol negotiation \ - from $sender_host_name [$sender_host_address] - - warn condition = ${if and{ {bool{$proxy_session}} \ - {!eq{$proxy_host_address}{}} } } - # But don't log health probes from the proxy itself - condition = ${if eq{$proxy_host_address}{$sender_host_address} \ - {false}{true}} - log_message = Successfully proxied from $sender_host_name \ - [$sender_host_address] through proxy protocol \ - host $proxy_host_address - - # Possibly more clear - warn logwrite = Remote Source Address: $sender_host_address:$sender_host_port - logwrite = Proxy Target Address: $proxy_target_address:$proxy_target_port - logwrite = Proxy Internal Address: $proxy_host_address:$proxy_host_port - logwrite = Internal Server Address: $received_ip_address:$received_port - - -4. Recommended ACL additions: - - Since the real connections are all coming from your proxy, and the - per host connection tracking is done before Proxy Protocol is - evaluated, smtp_accept_max_per_host must be set high enough to - handle all of the parallel volume you expect per inbound proxy. - - With the smtp_accept_max_per_host set so high, you lose the ability - to protect your server from massive numbers of inbound connections - from one IP. In order to prevent your server from being DOS'd, you - need to add a per connection ratelimit to your connect ACL. I - suggest something like this: - - # Set max number of connections per host - LIMIT = 5 - # Or do some kind of IP lookup in a flat file or database - # LIMIT = ${lookup{$sender_host_address}iplsearch{/etc/exim/proxy_limits}} - - defer message = Too many connections from this IP right now - ratelimit = LIMIT / 5s / per_conn / strict - - -5. Runtime issues to be aware of: - - The proxy has 3 seconds (hard-coded in the source code) to send the - required Proxy Protocol header after it connects. If it does not, - the response to any commands will be: - "503 Command refused, required Proxy negotiation failed" - - If the incoming connection is configured in Exim to be a Proxy - Protocol host, but the proxy is not sending the header, the banner - does not get sent until the timeout occurs. If the sending host - sent any input (before the banner), this causes a standard Exim - synchronization error (i.e. trying to pipeline before PIPELINING - was advertised). - - This is not advised, but is mentioned for completeness if you have - a specific internal configuration that you want this: If the Exim - server only has an internal IP address and no other machines in your - organization will connect to it to try to send email, you may - simply set the hostlist to "*", however, this will prevent local - mail programs from working because that would require mail from - localhost to use Proxy Protocol. Again, not advised! - -6. Example of a refused connection because the Proxy Protocol header was -not sent from a host configured to use Proxy Protocol. In the example, -the 3 second timeout occurred (when a Proxy Protocol banner should have -been sent), the banner was displayed to the user, but all commands are -rejected except for QUIT: - -# nc mail.example.net 25 -220-mail.example.net, ESMTP Exim 4.82+proxy, Mon, 04 Nov 2013 10:45:59 -220 -0800 RFC's enforced -EHLO localhost -503 Command refused, required Proxy negotiation failed -QUIT -221 mail.example.net closing connection - - -DSN Support --------------------------------------------------------------- +In order to build exim with Queuefile transport support add or uncomment -DSN Support tries to add RFC 3461 support to Exim. It adds support for -*) the additional parameters for MAIL FROM and RCPT TO -*) RFC complient MIME DSN messages for all of - success, failure and delay notifications -*) dsn_advertise_hosts main option to select which hosts are able - to use the extension -*) dsn_lasthop router switch to end DSN processing +EXPERIMENTAL_QUEUEFILE=yes -In case of failure reports this means that the last three parts, the message body -intro, size info and final text, of the defined template are ignored since there is no -logical place to put them in the MIME message. +to your Local/Makefile. (Re-)build/install exim. exim -d should show +Experimental_QUEUEFILE in the line "Support for:". -All the other changes are made without changing any defaults -Building exim: --------------- +ARC support +----------- +Specification: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-11 +Note that this is not an RFC yet, so may change. + +[RFC 8617 was published 2019/06. Draft 11 was 2018/01. A review of the +changes has not yet been done] -Define -EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES -in your Local/Makefile. +ARC is intended to support the utility of SPF and DKIM in the presence of +intermediaries in the transmission path - forwarders and mailinglists - +by establishing a cryptographically-signed chain in headers. + +Normally one would only bother doing ARC-signing when functioning as +an intermediary. One might do verify for local destinations. + +ARC uses the notion of a "ADministrative Management Domain" (ADMD). +Described in RFC 5598 (section 2.3), this is essentially a set of +mail-handling systems that mail transits that are all under the control +of one organisation. A label should be chosen to identify the ADMD. +Messages should be ARC-verified on entry to the ADMD, and ARC-signed on exit +from it. + + +Building with ARC Support +-- +Enable using EXPERIMENTAL_ARC=yes in your Local/Makefile. +You must also have DKIM present (not disabled), and you very likely +want to have SPF enabled. + + +Verification +-- +An ACL condition is provided to perform the "verifier actions" detailed +in section 6 of the above specification. It may be called from the DATA ACL +and succeeds if the result matches any of a given list. +It also records the highest ARC instance number (the chain size) +and verification result for later use in creating an Authentication-Results: +standard header. + + verify = arc/ none:fail:pass + + add_header = :at_start:${authresults {}} -Configuration: --------------- -All DSNs are sent in MIME format if you built exim with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES -No option needed to activate it, and no way to turn it off. - -Failure and delay DSNs are triggered as usual except a sender used NOTIFY=... -to prevent them. - -Support for Success DSNs is added and activated by NOTIFY=SUCCESS by clients. - -Add -dsn_advertise_hosts = * -or a more restrictive host_list to announce DSN in EHLO answers - -Those hosts can then use NOTIFY,ENVID,RET,ORCPT options. - -If a message is relayed to a DSN aware host without changing the envelope -recipient the options are passed along and no success DSN is generated. - -A redirect router will always trigger a success DSN if requested and the DSN -options are not passed any further. - -A success DSN always contains the recipient address as submitted by the -client as required by RFC. Rewritten addresses are never exposed. - -If you used DSN patch up to 1.3 before remove all "dsn_process" switches from -your routers since you don't need them anymore. There is no way to "gag" -success DSNs anymore. Announcing DSN means answering as requested. - -You can prevent Exim from passing DSN options along to other DSN aware hosts by defining -dsn_lasthop -in a router. Exim will then send the success DSN himself if requested as if -the next hop does not support DSN. -Adding it to a redirect router makes no difference. - - - - -DANE ------------------------------------------------------------- -DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied -to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that -it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather -than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM) -operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection -you make, and make another one to the server (so both -you and the server still think you have an encrypted -connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of -Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something -which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable -certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the -Mozilla set, as your trust anchors). - -What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the -trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility -that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the -admins of the target server. The attack surface presented -by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set -of root CAs. - -It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that -connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply -fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS. - -DANE scales better than having to maintain (and -side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates -for every possible target server. It also scales -(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP -client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also -means not having to pay a CA for certificates. - -DANE requires a server operator to do three things: -1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients -that DNS lookups they do for the server have not -been tampered with. The domain MX record applying -to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and -any associated CNAME records must all be covered by -DNSSEC. -2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server -certificate for a TLS connection should be. -3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain, -in TLS connections which is traceable to the one -defined by (one of?) the TSLA records - -There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side -operation of DANE. - -The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate -usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies -the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved -is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted -during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a -single system, using a self-signed certificate. - DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA -to be used; this might be a private CA or a public, -well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just -a self-signed certificate which is used to sign -cerver certificates, but running one securely does -require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used -then either all clients must be primed with it, or -(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit -the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate. -If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it -(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is -reduced from all public CAs to that single CA. -DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or -servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record, -all of which point to a single TLSA record. - -The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1) -and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2). - -At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa -is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like - - openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout /dev/null \ - | openssl sha512 \ - | awk '{print $2}' - -are workable for 4th-field hashes. - -For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates -must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName). - -The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing -for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise -be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However, -this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the -default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff -DANE is in use, to: - - hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \ - {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \ - {*}{}} - -The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with -numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes. -The zero above means DANE was not in use, -the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were -found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the -string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to -control the OCSP request. - -This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if -it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and -those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction -with DANE in their OCSP settings. - - -For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options, -hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane. They do the obvious thing. -[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ] - -DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured -MX, A and TLSA records. - -A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match -and the host-lookup succeded using dnssec. -If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection -will be required for the host. - -(TODO: specify when fallback happens vs. when the host is not used) - -If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport -options are ignored: - hosts_require_tls - tls_verify_hosts - tls_try_verify_hosts - tls_verify_certificates - tls_crl - tls_verify_cert_hostnames - -If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored -verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set -appropriately. - -Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that) -and dnssec_require_domains is ignored. - -If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item -in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane". - -There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if -verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful -in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable -$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above). + Note that it would be wise to strip incoming messages of A-R headers + that claim to be from our own . + +There are four new variables: + + $arc_state One of pass, fail, none + $arc_state_reason (if fail, why) + $arc_domains colon-sep list of ARC chain domains, in chain order. + problematic elements may have empty list elements + $arc_oldest_pass lowest passing instance number of chain + +Example: + logwrite = oldest-p-ams: <${reduce {$lh_ARC-Authentication-Results:} \ + {} \ + {${if = {$arc_oldest_pass} \ + {${extract {i}{${extract {1}{;}{$item}}}}} \ + {$item} {$value}}} \ + }> + +Receive log lines for an ARC pass will be tagged "ARC". + + +Signing +-- +arc_sign = : : [ : ] +An option on the smtp transport, which constructs and prepends to the message +an ARC set of headers. The textually-first Authentication-Results: header +is used as a basis (you must have added one on entry to the ADMD). +Expanded as a whole; if unset, empty or forced-failure then no signing is done. +If it is set, all of the first three elements must be non-empty. + +The fourth element is optional, and if present consists of a comma-separated list +of options. The options implemented are + + timestamps Add a t= tag to the generated AMS and AS headers, with the + current time. + expire[=] Add an x= tag to the generated AMS header, with an expiry time. + If the value is an plain number it is used unchanged. + If it starts with a '+' then the following number is added + to the current time, as an offset in seconds. + If a value is not given it defaults to a one month offset. + +[As of writing, gmail insist that a t= tag on the AS is mandatory] + +Caveats: + * There must be an Authentication-Results header, presumably added by an ACL + while receiving the message, for the same ADMD, for arc_sign to succeed. + This requires careful coordination between inbound and outbound logic. + + Only one A-R header is taken account of. This is a limitation versus + the ARC spec (which says that all A-R headers from within the ADMD must + be used). + + * If passing a message to another system, such as a mailing-list manager + (MLM), between receipt and sending, be wary of manipulations to headers made + by the MLM. + + For instance, Mailman with REMOVE_DKIM_HEADERS==3 might improve + deliverability in a pre-ARC world, but that option also renames the + Authentication-Results header, which breaks signing. + + * Even if you use multiple DKIM keys for different domains, the ARC concept + should try to stick to one ADMD, so pick a primary domain and use that for + AR headers and outbound signing. + +Signing is not compatible with cutthrough delivery; any (before expansion) +value set for the option will result in cutthrough delivery not being +used via the transport in question. + + + + +TLS Session Resumption +---------------------- +TLS Session Resumption for TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 connections can be used (defined +in RFC 5077 for 1.2). The support for this can be included by building with +EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME defined. This requires GnuTLS 3.6.3 or OpenSSL 1.1.1 +(or later). + +Session resumption (this is the "stateless" variant) involves the server sending +a "session ticket" to the client on one connection, which can be stored by the +client and used for a later session. The ticket contains sufficient state for +the server to reconstruct the TLS session, avoiding some expensive crypto +calculation and one full packet roundtrip time. + +Operational cost/benefit: + The extra data being transmitted costs a minor amount, and the client has + extra costs in storing and retrieving the data. + + In the Exim/Gnutls implementation the extra cost on an initial connection + which is TLS1.2 over a loopback path is about 6ms on 2017-laptop class hardware. + The saved cost on a subsequent connection is about 4ms; three or more + connections become a net win. On longer network paths, two or more + connections will have an average lower startup time thanks to the one + saved packet roundtrip. TLS1.3 will save the crypto cpu costs but not any + packet roundtrips. + + Since a new hints DB is used, the hints DB maintenance should be updated + to additionally handle "tls". + +Security aspects: + The session ticket is encrypted, but is obviously an additional security + vulnarability surface. An attacker able to decrypt it would have access + all connections using the resumed session. + The session ticket encryption key is not committed to storage by the server + and is rotated regularly (OpenSSL: 1hr, and one previous key is used for + overlap; GnuTLS 6hr but does not specify any overlap). + Tickets have limited lifetime (2hr, and new ones issued after 1hr under + OpenSSL. GnuTLS 2hr, appears to not do overlap). + + There is a question-mark over the security of the Diffie-Helman parameters + used for session negotiation. TBD. q-value; cf bug 1895 + +Observability: + New log_selector "tls_resumption", appends an asterisk to the tls_cipher "X=" + element. + + Variables $tls_{in,out}_resumption have bits 0-4 indicating respectively + support built, client requested ticket, client offered session, + server issued ticket, resume used. A suitable decode list is provided + in the builtin macro _RESUME_DECODE for ${listextract {}{}}. + +Issues: + In a resumed session: + $tls_{in,out}_cipher will have values different to the original (under GnuTLS) + $tls_{in,out}_ocsp will be "not requested" or "no response", and + hosts_require_ocsp will fail --------------------------------------------------------------