liable to incompatible change.
-PRDR support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-Per-Recipient Data Reponse is an SMTP extension proposed by Eric Hall
-in a (now-expired) IETF draft from 2007. It's not hit mainstream
-use, but has apparently been implemented in the META1 MTA.
-
-There is mention at http://mail.aegee.org/intern/sendmail.html
-of a patch to sendmail "to make it PRDR capable".
-
- ref: http://www.eric-a-hall.com/specs/draft-hall-prdr-00.txt
-
-If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_PRDR there is a new config
-boolean "prdr_enable" which controls whether PRDR is advertised
-as part of an EHLO response, a new "acl_data_smtp_prdr" ACL
-(called for each recipient, after data arrives but before the
-data ACL), and a new smtp transport option "hosts_try_prdr".
-
-PRDR may be used to support per-user content filtering. Without it
-one must defer any recipient after the first that has a different
-content-filter configuration. With PRDR, the RCPT-time check
-for this can be disabled when the MAIL-time $smtp_command included
-"PRDR". Any required difference in behaviour of the main DATA-time
-ACL should however depend on the PRDR-time ACL having run, as Exim
-will avoid doing so in some situations (eg. single-recipient mails).
-
-
-
-OCSP Stapling support
---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-X.509 PKI certificates expire and can be revoked; to handle this, the
-clients need some way to determine if a particular certificate, from a
-particular Certificate Authority (CA), is still valid. There are three
-main ways to do so.
-
-The simplest way is to serve up a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) with
-an ordinary web-server, regenerating the CRL before it expires. The
-downside is that clients have to periodically re-download a potentially
-huge file from every certificate authority it knows of.
-
-The way with most moving parts at query time is Online Certificate
-Status Protocol (OCSP), where the client verifies the certificate
-against an OCSP server run by the CA. This lets the CA track all
-usage of the certs. This requires running software with access to the
-private key of the CA, to sign the responses to the OCSP queries. OCSP
-is based on HTTP and can be proxied accordingly.
-
-The only widespread OCSP server implementation (known to this writer)
-comes as part of OpenSSL and aborts on an invalid request, such as
-connecting to the port and then disconnecting. This requires
-re-entering the passphrase each time some random client does this.
-
-The third way is OCSP Stapling; in this, the server using a certificate
-issued by the CA periodically requests an OCSP proof of validity from
-the OCSP server, then serves it up inline as part of the TLS
-negotiation. This approach adds no extra round trips, does not let the
-CA track users, scales well with number of certs issued by the CA and is
-resilient to temporary OCSP server failures, as long as the server
-starts retrying to fetch an OCSP proof some time before its current
-proof expires. The downside is that it requires server support.
-
-If Exim is built with EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and it was built with OpenSSL,
-then it gains a new global option: "tls_ocsp_file".
-
-The file specified therein is expected to be in DER format, and contain
-an OCSP proof. Exim will serve it as part of the TLS handshake. This
-option will be re-expanded for SNI, if the tls_certificate option
-contains $tls_sni, as per other TLS options.
-
-Exim does not at this time implement any support for fetching a new OCSP
-proof. The burden is on the administrator to handle this, outside of
-Exim. The file specified should be replaced atomically, so that the
-contents are always valid. Exim will expand the "tls_ocsp_file" option
-on each connection, so a new file will be handled transparently on the
-next connection.
-
-Exim will check for a valid next update timestamp in the OCSP proof;
-if not present, or if the proof has expired, it will be ignored.
-
-Also, given EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP and OpenSSL, the smtp transport gains
-a "hosts_require_ocsp" option; a host-list for which an OCSP Stapling
-is requested and required for the connection to proceed. The host(s)
-should also be in "hosts_require_tls", and "tls_verify_certificates"
-configured for the transport.
-
-For the client to be able to verify the stapled OCSP the server must
-also supply, in its stapled information, any intermediate
-certificates for the chain leading to the OCSP proof from the signer
-of the server certificate. There may be zero or one such. These
-intermediate certificates should be added to the server OCSP stapling
-file (named by tls_ocsp_file).
-
-At this point in time, we're gathering feedback on use, to determine if
-it's worth adding complexity to the Exim daemon to periodically re-fetch
-OCSP files and somehow handling multiple files.
-
- A helper script "ocsp_fetch.pl" for fetching a proof from a CA
- OCSP server is supplied. The server URL may be included in the
- server certificate, if the CA is helpful.
-
- One fail mode seen was the OCSP Signer cert expiring before the end
- of vailidity of the OCSP proof. The checking done by Exim/OpenSSL
- noted this as invalid overall, but the re-fetch script did not.
-
-
-
-
Brightmail AntiSpam (BMI) suppport
--------------------------------------------------------------
This means the queried domain has published
a SPF record, but wants to allow outside
servers to send mail under its domain as well.
- o err_perm This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
- record of the queried domain. This should be
- treated like "none".
- o err_temp This indicates a temporary error during all
+ This should be treated like "none".
+ o permerror This indicates a syntax error in the SPF
+ record of the queried domain. You may deny
+ messages when this occurs. (Changed in 4.83)
+ o temperror This indicates a temporary error during all
processing, including Exim's SPF processing.
You may defer messages when this occurs.
+ (Changed in 4.83)
+ o err_temp Same as permerror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
+ removed in a future release.
+ o err_perm Same as temperror, deprecated in 4.83, will be
+ removed in a future release.
You can prefix each string with an exclamation mark to invert
-is meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
+its meaning, for example "!fail" will match all results but
"fail". The string list is evaluated left-to-right, in a
short-circuit fashion. When a string matches the outcome of
the SPF check, the condition succeeds. If none of the listed
$spf_result
This contains the outcome of the SPF check in string form,
- one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, err_perm or
- err_temp.
+ one of pass, fail, softfail, none, neutral, permerror or
+ temperror.
$spf_smtp_comment
This contains a string that can be used in a SMTP response
Of course, you can also use any other lookup method that Exim
supports, including LDAP, Postgres, MySQL, etc, as long as the
-result is a list of colon-separated strings;
+result is a list of colon-separated strings.
Several expansion variables are set before the DATA ACL is
processed, and you can use them in this ACL. The following
o $dmarc_status
This is a one word status indicating what the DMARC library
- thinks of the email.
+ thinks of the email. It is a combination of the results of
+ DMARC record lookup and the SPF/DKIM/DMARC processing results
+ (if a DMARC record was found). The actual policy declared
+ in the DMARC record is in a separate expansion variable.
o $dmarc_status_text
This is a slightly longer, human readable status.
This is the domain which DMARC used to look up the DMARC
policy record.
+ o $dmarc_domain_policy
+ This is the policy declared in the DMARC record. Valid values
+ are "none", "reject" and "quarantine". It is blank when there
+ is any error, including no DMARC record.
+
o $dmarc_ar_header
This is the entire Authentication-Results header which you can
add using an add_header modifier.
warn !domains = +screwed_up_dmarc_records
control = dmarc_enable_forensic
+ warn condition = (lookup if destined to mailing list)
+ set acl_m_mailing_list = 1
+
(DATA ACL)
warn dmarc_status = accept : none : off
!authenticated = *
set $acl_m_quarantine = 1
# Do something in a transport with this flag variable
+ deny condition = ${if eq{$dmarc_domain_policy}{reject}}
+ condition = ${if eq{$acl_m_mailing_list}{1}}
+ message = Messages from $dmarc_used_domain break mailing lists
+
deny dmarc_status = reject
!authenticated = *
message = Message from $domain_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT
Exim now has Experimental "Proxy Protocol" support. It was built on
specifications from:
http://haproxy.1wt.eu/download/1.5/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
+Above URL revised May 2014 to change version 2 spec:
+http://git.1wt.eu/web?p=haproxy.git;a=commitdiff;h=afb768340c9d7e50d8e
The purpose of this function is so that an application load balancer,
such as HAProxy, can sit in front of several Exim servers and Exim
3. In the ACL's the following expansion variables are available.
-proxy_host The src IP of the proxy server making the connection
-proxy_port The src port the proxy server is using
-proxy_session Boolean, yes/no, the connected host is required to use
- Proxy Protocol.
+proxy_host_address The (internal) src IP of the proxy server
+ making the connection to the Exim server.
+proxy_host_port The (internal) src port the proxy server is
+ using to connect to the Exim server.
+proxy_target_address The dest (public) IP of the remote host to
+ the proxy server.
+proxy_target_port The dest port the remote host is using to
+ connect to the proxy server.
+proxy_session Boolean, yes/no, the connected host is required
+ to use Proxy Protocol.
There is no expansion for a failed proxy session, however you can detect
it by checking if $proxy_session is true but $proxy_host is empty. As
an example, in my connect ACL, I have:
warn condition = ${if and{ {bool{$proxy_session}} \
- {eq{$proxy_host}{}} } }
+ {eq{$proxy_host_address}{}} } }
log_message = Failed required proxy protocol negotiation \
from $sender_host_name [$sender_host_address]
warn condition = ${if and{ {bool{$proxy_session}} \
- {!eq{$proxy_host}{}} } }
+ {!eq{$proxy_host_address}{}} } }
# But don't log health probes from the proxy itself
- condition = ${if eq{$proxy_host}{$sender_host_address} \
+ condition = ${if eq{$proxy_host_address}{$sender_host_address} \
{false}{true}}
log_message = Successfully proxied from $sender_host_name \
[$sender_host_address] through proxy protocol \
- host $proxy_host
+ host $proxy_host_address
-4. Runtime issues to be aware of:
+ # Possibly more clear
+ warn logwrite = Remote Source Address: $sender_host_address:$sender_host_port
+ logwrite = Proxy Target Address: $proxy_target_address:$proxy_target_port
+ logwrite = Proxy Internal Address: $proxy_host_address:$proxy_host_port
+ logwrite = Internal Server Address: $received_ip_address:$received_port
+
+
+4. Recommended ACL additions:
- Since the real connections are all coming from your proxy, and the
per host connection tracking is done before Proxy Protocol is
evaluated, smtp_accept_max_per_host must be set high enough to
handle all of the parallel volume you expect per inbound proxy.
+ - With the smtp_accept_max_per_host set so high, you lose the ability
+ to protect your server from massive numbers of inbound connections
+ from one IP. In order to prevent your server from being DOS'd, you
+ need to add a per connection ratelimit to your connect ACL. I
+ suggest something like this:
+
+ # Set max number of connections per host
+ LIMIT = 5
+ # Or do some kind of IP lookup in a flat file or database
+ # LIMIT = ${lookup{$sender_host_address}iplsearch{/etc/exim/proxy_limits}}
+
+ defer message = Too many connections from this IP right now
+ ratelimit = LIMIT / 5s / per_conn / strict
+
+
+5. Runtime issues to be aware of:
- The proxy has 3 seconds (hard-coded in the source code) to send the
required Proxy Protocol header after it connects. If it does not,
the response to any commands will be:
mail programs from working because that would require mail from
localhost to use Proxy Protocol. Again, not advised!
-5. Example of a refused connection because the Proxy Protocol header was
+6. Example of a refused connection because the Proxy Protocol header was
not sent from a host configured to use Proxy Protocol. In the example,
the 3 second timeout occurred (when a Proxy Protocol banner should have
been sent), the banner was displayed to the user, but all commands are
221 mail.example.net closing connection
+DSN Support
+--------------------------------------------------------------
+
+DSN Support tries to add RFC 3461 support to Exim. It adds support for
+*) the additional parameters for MAIL FROM and RCPT TO
+*) RFC complient MIME DSN messages for all of
+ success, failure and delay notifications
+*) dsn_advertise_hosts main option to select which hosts are able
+ to use the extension
+*) dsn_lasthop router switch to end DSN processing
+
+In case of failure reports this means that the last three parts, the message body
+intro, size info and final text, of the defined template are ignored since there is no
+logical place to put them in the MIME message.
+
+All the other changes are made without changing any defaults
+
+Building exim:
+--------------
+
+Define
+EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES
+in your Local/Makefile.
+
+Configuration:
+--------------
+All DSNs are sent in MIME format if you built exim with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES
+No option needed to activate it, and no way to turn it off.
+
+Failure and delay DSNs are triggered as usual except a sender used NOTIFY=...
+to prevent them.
+
+Support for Success DSNs is added and activated by NOTIFY=SUCCESS by clients.
+
+Add
+dsn_advertise_hosts = *
+or a more restrictive host_list to announce DSN in EHLO answers
+
+Those hosts can then use NOTIFY,ENVID,RET,ORCPT options.
+
+If a message is relayed to a DSN aware host without changing the envelope
+recipient the options are passed along and no success DSN is generated.
+
+A redirect router will always trigger a success DSN if requested and the DSN
+options are not passed any further.
+
+A success DSN always contains the recipient address as submitted by the
+client as required by RFC. Rewritten addresses are never exposed.
+
+If you used DSN patch up to 1.3 before remove all "dsn_process" switches from
+your routers since you don't need them anymore. There is no way to "gag"
+success DSNs anymore. Announcing DSN means answering as requested.
+
+You can prevent Exim from passing DSN options along to other DSN aware hosts by defining
+dsn_lasthop
+in a router. Exim will then send the success DSN himself if requested as if
+the next hop does not support DSN.
+Adding it to a redirect router makes no difference.
+
+Certificate name checking
+--------------------------------------------------------------
+The X509 certificates used for TLS are supposed be verified
+that they are owned by the expected host. The coding of TLS
+support to date has not made these checks.
+
+If built with EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES defined, code is
+included to do so, and a new smtp transport option
+"tls_verify_cert_hostname" supported which takes a list of
+names for which the checks must be made. The host must
+also be in "tls_verify_hosts".
+
+Both Subject and Subject-Alternate-Name certificate fields
+are supported, as are wildcard certificates (limited to
+a single wildcard being the initial component of a 3-or-more
+component FQDN).
+
+
--------------------------------------------------------------
End of file
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff