-Exim version 4.52
------------------
-
-TF/01 Support for checking Client SMTP Authorization has been added. CSA is a
- system which allows a site to advertise which machines are and are not
- permitted to send email. This is done by placing special SRV records in
- the DNS, which are looked up using the client's HELO domain. At this
- time CSA is still an Internet-Draft.
-
- Client SMTP Authorization checks are performed by the ACL condition
- verify=csa. This will fail if the client is not authorized. If there is
- a DNS problem, or if no valid CSA SRV record is found, or if the client
- is authorized, the condition succeeds. These three cases can be
- distinguished using the expansion variable $csa_status, which can take
- one of the values "fail", "defer", "unknown", or "ok". The condition
- does not itself defer because that would be likely to cause problems
- for legitimate email.
-
- The error messages produced by the CSA code include slightly more
- detail. If $csa_status is "defer" this may be because of problems
- looking up the CSA SRV record, or problems looking up the CSA target
- address record. There are four reasons for $csa_status being "fail":
- the client's host name is explicitly not authorized; the client's IP
- address does not match any of the CSA target IP addresses; the client's
- host name is authorized but it has no valid target IP addresses (e.g.
- the target's addresses are IPv6 and the client is using IPv4); or the
- client's host name has no CSA SRV record but a parent domain has
- asserted that all subdomains must be explicitly authorized.
-
- The verify=csa condition can take an argument which is the domain to
- use for the DNS query. The default is verify=csa/$sender_helo_name.
-
- This implementation includes an extension to CSA. If the query domain
- is an address literal such as [192.0.2.95], or if it is a bare IP
- address, Exim will search for CSA SRV records in the reverse DNS as if
- the HELO domain was e.g. 95.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. Therefore it is
- meaningful to say, for example, verify=csa/$sender_host_address - in
- fact, this is the check that Exim performs if the client does not say
- HELO. This extension can be turned off by setting the main
- configuration option dns_csa_use_reverse = false.
-
- If a CSA SRV record is not found for the domain itself, then a search
- is performed through its parent domains for a record which might be
- making assertions about subdomains. The maximum depth of this search is
- limited using the main configuration option dns_csa_search_limit, which
- takes the value 5 by default. Exim does not look for CSA SRV records in
- a top level domain, so the default settings handle HELO domains as long
- as seven (hostname.five.four.three.two.one.com) which encompasses the
- vast majority of legitimate HELO domains.
-
- The dnsdb lookup also has support for CSA. Although dnsdb already
- supports SRV lookups, this is not sufficient because of the extra
- parent domain search behaviour of CSA, and (as with PTR lookups)
- dnsdb also turns IP addresses into lookups in the reverse DNS space.
- The result of ${lookup dnsdb {csa=$sender_helo_name} } has two
- space-separated fields: an authorization code and a target host name.
- The authorization code can be "Y" for yes, "N" for no, "X" for explicit
- authorization required but absent, or "?" for unknown.
-
-PH/01 The amount of output produced by the "make" process has been reduced,
- because the compile lines are often rather long, making it all pretty
- unreadable. The new style is along the lines of the 2.6 Linux kernel:
- just a short line for each module that is being compiled or linked.
- However, it is still possible to get the full output, by calling "make"
- like this:
-
- FULLECHO='' make -e
-
- The value of FULLECHO defaults to "@", the flag character that suppresses
- command reflection in "make". When you ask for the full output, it is
- given in addition to the the short output.
-
-TF/02 There have been two changes concerned with submission mode:
-
- Until now submission mode always left the return path alone, whereas
- locally-submitted messages from untrusted users have the return path
- fixed to the user's email address. Submission mode now fixes the return
- path to the same address as is used to create the Sender: header. If
- /sender_retain is specified then both the Sender: header and the return
- path are left alone.
-
- Note that the changes caused by submission mode take effect after the
- predata ACL. This means that any sender checks performed before the
- fix-ups will use the untrusted sender address specified by the user, not
- the trusted sender address specified by submission mode. Although this
- might be slightly unexpected, it does mean that you can configure ACL
- checks to spot that a user is trying to spoof another's address, for
- example.
-
- There is also a new /name= option for submission mode which allows you
- to specify the user's full name to be included in the Sender: header.
- For example:
-
- accept authenticated = *
- control = submission/name=${lookup {$authenticated_id} \
- lsearch {/etc/exim/namelist} }
-
- The namelist file contains entries like
-
- fanf: Tony Finch
-
- And the resulting Sender: header looks like
-
- Sender: Tony Finch <fanf@exim.org>
-
-TF/03 The control = fakereject ACL modifier now has a fakedefer counterpart,
- which works in exactly the same way except it causes a fake SMTP 450
- response after the message data instead of a fake SMTP 550 response.
- You must take care when using fakedefer because it will cause messages
- to be duplicated when the sender retries. Therefore you should not use
- fakedefer if the message will be delivered normally.
-
-TF/04 There is a new ratelimit ACL condition which can be used to measure
- and control the rate at which clients can send email. This is more
- powerful than the existing smtp_ratelimit_* options, because those
- options only control the rate of commands in a single SMTP session,
- whereas the new ratelimit condition works across all connections
- (concurrent and sequential) to the same host.
-
- The syntax of the ratelimit condition is:
-
- ratelimit = <m> / <p> / <options> / <key>
-
- If the average client sending rate is less than m messages per time
- period p then the condition is false, otherwise it is true.
-
- The parameter p is the smoothing time constant, in the form of an Exim
- time interval e.g. 8h for eight hours. A larger time constant means it
- takes Exim longer to forget a client's past behaviour. The parameter m is
- the maximum number of messages that a client can send in a fast burst. By
- increasing both m and p but keeping m/p constant, you can allow a client
- to send more messages in a burst without changing its overall sending
- rate limit. Conversely, if m and p are both small then messages must be
- sent at an even rate.
-
- The key is used to look up the data used to calcluate the client's
- average sending rate. This data is stored in a database maintained by
- Exim in its spool directory alongside the retry database etc. For
- example, you can limit the sending rate of each authenticated user,
- independent of the computer they are sending from, by setting the key
- to $authenticated_id. The default key is $sender_host_address.
-
- Each ratelimit condition can have up to two options. The first option
- specifies what Exim measures the rate of, and the second specifies how
- Exim handles excessively fast clients.
-
- The per_mail option means that it measures the client's rate of sending
- messages. This is the default if none of the per_* options is specified.
-
- The per_conn option means that it measures the client's connection rate.
-
- The per_byte option limits the sender's email bandwidth. Note that it
- is best to use this option in the DATA ACL; if it is used in an earlier
- ACL it relies on the SIZE parameter on the MAIL command, which may be
- inaccurate or completely missing. You can follow the limit m in the
- configuration with K, M, or G to specify limits in kilobytes,
- megabytes, or gigabytes respectively.
-
- The per_cmd option means that Exim recomputes the rate every time the
- condition is processed, which can be used to limit the SMTP command rate.
- The alias per_rcpt is provided for use in the RCPT ACL instead of per_cmd
- to make it clear that the effect is to limit the rate at which recipients
- are accepted. Note that in this case the rate limiting engine will see a
- message with many recipients as a large high-speed burst.
-
- If a client's average rate is greater than the maximum, the rate
- limiting engine can react in two possible ways, depending on the
- presence of the strict or leaky options. This is independent of the
- other counter-measures (e.g. rejecting the message) that may be
- specified by the rest of the ACL. The default mode is leaky, which
- avoids a sender's over-aggressive retry rate preventing it from getting
- any email through.
-
- The strict option means that the client's recorded rate is always
- updated. The effect of this is that Exim measures the client's average
- rate of attempts to send email, which can be much higher than the
- maximum. If the client is over the limit it will be subjected to
- counter-measures until it slows down below the maximum rate.
-
- The leaky option means that the client's recorded rate is not updated
- if it is above the limit. The effect of this is that Exim measures the
- client's average rate of successfully sent email, which cannot be
- greater than the maximum. If the client is over the limit it will
- suffer some counter-measures, but it will still be able to send email
- at the configured maximum rate, whatever the rate of its attempts.
-
- As a side-effect, the ratelimit condition will set the expansion
- variables $sender_rate containing the client's computed rate,
- $sender_rate_limit containing the configured value of m, and
- $sender_rate_period containing the configured value of p.
-
- Exim's other ACL facilities are used to define what counter-measures
- are taken when the rate limit is exceeded. This might be anything from
- logging a warning (e.g. while measuring existing sending rates in order
- to define our policy), through time delays to slow down fast senders,
- up to rejecting the message. For example,
-
- # Log all senders' rates
- warn
- ratelimit = 0 / 1h / strict
- log_message = \
- Sender rate $sender_rate > $sender_rate_limit / $sender_rate_period
-
- # Slow down fast senders
- warn
- ratelimit = 100 / 1h / per_rcpt / strict
- delay = ${eval: 10 * ($sender_rate - $sender_rate_limit) }
-
- # Keep authenticated users under control
- deny
- ratelimit = 100 / 1d / strict / $authenticated_id
-
- # System-wide rate limit
- defer
- message = Sorry, too busy. Try again later.
- ratelimit = 10 / 1s / $primary_hostname
-
- # Restrict incoming rate from each host, with a default rate limit
- # set using a macro and special cases looked up in a table.
- defer
- message = Sender rate $sender_rate exceeds \
- $sender_rate_limit messages per $sender_rate_period
- ratelimit = ${lookup {$sender_host_address} \
- cdb {DB/ratelimits.cdb} \
- {$value} {RATELIMIT} }
-
-TK/01 Added an 'spf' lookup type that will return an SPF result for a given
- email address (the key) and an IP address (the database):
-
- ${lookup {tom@duncanthrax.net} spf{217.115.139.137}}
-
- The lookup will return the same result strings as they can appear in
- $spf_result (pass,fail,softfail,neutral,none,err_perm,err_temp). The
- lookup is armored in EXPERIMENTAL_SPF. Currently, only IPv4 addresses
- are supported.
-
- Patch submitted by Chris Webb <chris@arachsys.com>.
-
-PH/02 There's a new verify callout option, "fullpostmaster", which first acts
- as "postmaster" and checks the recipient <postmaster@domain>. If that
- fails, it tries just <postmaster>, without a domain, in accordance with
- the specification in RFC 2821.
-
-PH/03 The action of the auto_thaw option has been changed. It no longer applies
- to frozen bounce messages.
-
-TK/02 There are two new expansion items to help with the implementation of
- the BATV "prvs" scheme in an Exim configuration:
-
-
- ${prvs {<ADDRESS>}{<KEY>}{[KEYNUM]}}
-
- The "prvs" expansion item takes three arguments: A qualified RFC2821
- email address, a key and an (optional) key number. All arguments are
- expanded before being used, so it is easily possible to lookup a key
- and key number using the address as the lookup key. The key number is
- optional and defaults to "0". The item will expand to a "prvs"-signed
- email address, to be typically used with the "return_path" option on
- a smtp transport. The decision if BATV should be used with a given
- sender/recipient pair should be done on router level, to avoid having
- to set "max_rcpt = 1" on the transport.
-
-
- ${prvscheck {<ADDRESS>}{<SECRET>}{<RETURN_STRING>}}
-
- The "prvscheck" expansion item takes three arguments. Argument 1 is
- expanded first. When the expansion does not yield a SYNTACTICALLY
- valid "prvs"-scheme address, the whole "prvscheck" item expands to
- the empty string. If <ADDRESS> is a "prvs"-encoded address after
- expansion, two expansion variables are set up:
-
- $prvscheck_address Contains the "prvs"-decoded version of
- the address from argument 1.
-
- $prvscheck_keynum Contains the key number extracted from
- the "prvs"-address in argument 1.
-
- These two variables can be used in the expansion code of argument 2
- to retrieve the <SECRET>. The VALIDITY of the "prvs"-signed address
- is then checked. The result is stored in yet another expansion
- variable:
-
- $prvscheck_result Contains the result of a "prvscheck"
- expansion: Unset (the empty string) for
- failure, "1" for success.
-
- The "prvscheck" expansion expands to the empty string if <ADDRESS>
- is not a SYNTACTICALLY valid "prvs"-scheme address. Otherwise,
- argument 3 defines what "prvscheck" expands to: If argument 3
- is the empty string, "prvscheck" expands to the decoded version
- of the address (no matter if it is CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY valid or not).
- If argument 3 expands to a non-empty string, "prvscheck" expands
- to that string.
-
-
- Usage example
- -------------
-
- Macro:
-
- PRVSCHECK_SQL = ${lookup mysql{SELECT secret FROM batv_prvs WHERE \
- sender='${quote_mysql:$prvscheck_address}'}{$value}}
-
+PH/01 There is a new global option called disable_ipv6, which does exactly what
+ its name implies. If set true, even if the Exim binary has IPv6 support,
+ no IPv6 activities take place. AAAA records are never looked up for host
+ names given in manual routing data or elsewhere. AAAA records that are
+ received from the DNS as additional data for MX records are ignored. Any
+ IPv6 addresses that are listed in local_interfaces, manualroute route
+ data, etc. are also ignored. If IP literals are enabled, the ipliteral
+ router declines to handle IPv6 literal addresses.
+
+PH/02 There are now 20 of each type of ACL variable by default (instead of 10).
+ It is also possible to change the numbers by setting ACL_CVARS and/or
+ ACL_MVARS in Local/Makefile. Backward compatibility is maintained if you
+ upgrade to this release with existing messages containing ACL variable
+ settings on the queue. However, going in the other direction
+ (downgrading) will not be compatible; the values of ACL variables will be
+ lost.
+
+PH/03 If quota_warn_message contains a From: header, Exim now refrains from
+ adding the default one. Similarly, if it contains a Reply-To: header, the
+ errors_reply_to option, if set, is not used.
+
+PH/04 The variables $auth1, $auth2, $auth3 are now available in authenticators,
+ containing the same values as $1, $2, $3. The new variables are provided
+ because the numerical variables can be reset during string expansions
+ (for example, during a "match" operation) and so may lose the
+ authentication data. The preferred variables are now the new ones, with
+ the use of the numerical ones being deprecated, though the support will
+ not be removed, at least, not for a long time.
+
+PH/05 The "control=freeze" ACL modifier can now be followed by /no_tell. If
+ the global option freeze_tell is set, it is ignored for the current
+ message (that is, nobody is told about the freezing), provided all the
+ "control=freeze" modifiers that are obeyed in the current message have
+ the /no_tell option.
+
+PH/06 In both GnuTLS and OpenSSL, an expansion of tls_privatekey that results
+ in an empty string is now treated as unset.
+
+PH/07 There is a new log selector called sender_verify_fail, which is set by
+ default. If it is unset, the separate log line that gives details of a
+ sender verification failure is not written. Log lines for the rejection
+ of SMTP commands (e.g. RCPT) contain just "sender verify failed", so some
+ detail is lost.
+
+PH/08 The default for dns_check_names_pattern now allows slashes within names,
+ as there are now some PTR records that contain slashes. This check is
+ only to protect against broken name servers that fall over on strange
+ characters, so the fact that it applies to all lookups doesn't matter.
+
+PH/09 The default for rfc4131_query_timeout has been changed from 30s to 5s.
+
+PH/10 When compiled on FreeBSD, NetBSD, or BSD/OS, the pipe transport has a new
+ Boolean option called use_classresources, defaulting false. If it is set
+ true, the setclassresources() function is used to set resource limits
+ when a pipe transport is run to perform a delivery. The limits for the
+ uid under which the pipe is to run are obtained from the login class
+ database.
+
+PH/11 If retry_interval_max is set greater than 24 hours, it is quietly reset
+ to 24 hours. This avoids potential overflow problems when processing G
+ and H retry rules, and it seems reasonable to require a retry at least
+ once a day.
+
+PH/12 When the plaintext authenticator is running as a client, the server
+ challenges are now checked to ensure they are valid base64 strings. The
+ default action on failure is to abort the authentication. However, if
+ client_ignore_invalid_base64 is set true, invalid responses are ignored.
+
+PH/13 When the plaintext authenticator is running as a client, the challenges
+ from the server are placed in $auth1, $auth2, etc. as they are received.
+ Thus, the challege that is received in response to sending the first
+ string (with the AUTH command) can be used in the expansion of the second
+ string, and so on. Currently, up to 3 challenge strings are available in
+ this way. If an invalid base64 string is received when client_ignore_
+ invalid_base64 is set, an empty string is put in the $auth<n> variable.
+
+PH/14 Messages created by the autoreply transport now contain a References:
+ header. This is constructed in accordance with rules that are described
+ in section 3.64 of RFC 2822, which states that replies should contain
+ such a header line, and section 3.14 of RFC 3834, which states that
+ automatic responses are not different in this respect. However, because
+ some mail processing software does not cope well with very long header
+ lines, no more than 12 message IDs are copied from the References: header
+ line in the incoming message. If there are more than 12, the first one
+ and then the final 11 are copied, before adding the message ID of the
+ incoming message.
+
+PH/15 The smtp transport has a new option called authenticated_sender_force.
+ When set true, it allows the authenticated_sender option's value to be
+ used, even if Exim has not authenticated as a client.
+
+PH/16 The expansion ${time_eval:<string>} converts an Exim time string such as
+ 2d4h1m into a number of seconds.
+
+PH/17 The ACL modifier control=allow_auth_unadvertised can be used to permit a
+ client host to use the SMTP AUTH command even when it has not been
+ advertised in response to EHLO. Furthermore, because there are apparently
+ some really broken clients that do this, Exim will even accept AUTH after
+ HELO when this control is set. It should only be used if you really need
+ it, and you should limit its use to those broken hosts that do not work
+ without it. For example:
+
+ warn hosts = 192.168.34.25
+ control = allow_auth_unadvertised
+
+ This control is permitted only in the connection and HELO ACLs.
+
+PH/18 There is a new ACL modifier called "add_header" which does what its name
+ implies. It specifies one of more header lines that are to be added to an
+ incoming message, assuming, of course, that the message is ultimately
+ accepted.
+
+ This modifier is permitted in the MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, DATA, MIME, and
+ non-SMTP ACLs (in other words, those that are concerned with accepting a
+ message). Added header lines are accumulated during the MAIL, RCPT, and
+ PREDATA ACLs, with any duplicates being discarded. They are then added to
+ the message before processing the DATA and MIME ACLs, during which
+ further added header lines are accumulated, again with duplicates
+ discarded. Thus, it is possible to add two identical header lines to an
+ SMTP message, but only if one is added before DATA and one after.
+
+ In the case of non-SMTP messages, new headers are accumulated during the
+ non-SMTP ACL, and added to the message at the end.
+
+ The add_header modifier is available for use with all ACL verbs. In the
+ case of the WARN verb, add_header supersedes the use of "message" for
+ this purpose; for the other verbs, it provides a new facility. If both
+ add_header and "message" are present on a WARN verb, both are processed
+ according to their specifications.
+
+ The add_header modifier acts immediately it is encountered during the
+ processing of an ACL. This is different to the (now-deprecated) use of
+ "message" on a WARN verb, where the action is taken only if all the
+ conditions are true. Notice the difference between these two cases on a
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff