* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2017 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2019 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
# include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
# include "danessl.h"
#endif
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
# define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
+# define OPENSSL_AUTO_SHA256
#else
# define EXIM_HAVE_EPHEM_RSA_KEX
# define EXIM_HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO
#endif
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
-# define EXIM_HAVE_SHA256 /*MMMM*/
+# define EXIM_HAVE_SHA256
#endif
-/*
- * X509_check_host provides sane certificate hostname checking, but was added
- * to OpenSSL late, after other projects forked off the code-base. So in
- * addition to guarding against the base version number, beware that LibreSSL
- * does not (at this time) support this function.
- *
- * If LibreSSL gains a different API, perhaps via libtls, then we'll probably
- * opt to disentangle and ask a LibreSSL user to provide glue for a third
- * crypto provider for libtls instead of continuing to tie the OpenSSL glue
- * into even twistier knots. If LibreSSL gains the same API, we can just
- * change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer.
- */
+/* X509_check_host provides sane certificate hostname checking, but was added
+to OpenSSL late, after other projects forked off the code-base. So in
+addition to guarding against the base version number, beware that LibreSSL
+does not (at this time) support this function.
+
+If LibreSSL gains a different API, perhaps via libtls, then we'll probably
+opt to disentangle and ask a LibreSSL user to provide glue for a third
+crypto provider for libtls instead of continuing to tie the OpenSSL glue
+into even twistier knots. If LibreSSL gains the same API, we can just
+change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */
+
#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_GET_ID
+# define EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_TRACE
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_GET0_SERIAL
+# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP
+# endif
+# else
+# define EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
# endif
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \
&& (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L
|| LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20010000L
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
-# define EXIM_HAVE_ECDH /*MMMM*/
+# define EXIM_HAVE_ECDH
# endif
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_EC_NIST2NID
# endif
#endif
+#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010101000L
+# define OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
+# define OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_STD_NAME
+# else
+# define OPENSSL_BAD_SRVR_OURCERT
+# endif
+#endif
+
#if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
# warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
# define DISABLE_OCSP
#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0101010L
+# error OpenSSL version too old for session-resumption
+# endif
+#endif
+
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#endif
+#ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_STD_NAME
+# ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_GET_ID
+# define SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) (c->id)
+# endif
+# ifndef MACRO_PREDEF
+# include "tls-cipher-stdname.c"
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*************************************************
+* OpenSSL option parse *
+*************************************************/
+
+typedef struct exim_openssl_option {
+ uschar *name;
+ long value;
+} exim_openssl_option;
+/* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
+options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
+all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
+to apply.
+
+This list is current as of:
+ ==> 1.0.1b <==
+Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
+Plus SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 for 1.1.2-dev
+Plus SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION for 1.1.1
+
+XXX could we autobuild this list, as with predefined-macros?
+Seems just parsing ssl.h for SSL_OP_.* would be enough.
+Also allow a numeric literal?
+*/
+static exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
+/* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
+ { US"all", (long) SSL_OP_ALL },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+ { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+ { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+ { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
+ { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+ { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
+ { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+ { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
+ { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+ { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+ { US"no_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
+ { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+ { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+ { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
+ /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
+#warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
+#else
+ { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+ { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+ { US"no_tlsv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
+ { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+ { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
+ { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+ { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+ { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
+ { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+ { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+ { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
+#endif
+};
+
+#ifndef MACRO_PREDEF
+static int exim_openssl_options_size = nelem(exim_openssl_options);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF
+void
+options_tls(void)
+{
+uschar buf[64];
+
+for (struct exim_openssl_option * o = exim_openssl_options;
+ o < exim_openssl_options + nelem(exim_openssl_options); o++)
+ {
+ /* Trailing X is workaround for problem with _OPT_OPENSSL_NO_TLSV1
+ being a ".ifdef _OPT_OPENSSL_NO_TLSV1_3" match */
+
+ spf(buf, sizeof(buf), US"_OPT_OPENSSL_%T_X", o->name);
+ builtin_macro_create(buf);
+ }
+
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+builtin_macro_create_var(US"_RESUME_DECODE", RESUME_DECODE_STRING );
+# endif
+# ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS1_3");
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BAD_SRVR_OURCERT
+builtin_macro_create(US"_TLS_BAD_MULTICERT_IN_OURCERT");
+# endif
+# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP
+builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_OCSP");
+builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_OCSP_LIST");
+# endif
+}
+#else
+
+/******************************************************************************/
+
/* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
typedef struct randstuff {
Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
- from the SMTP Transport.
+ from the SMTP Transport. We may also concurrently want to make TLS connections
+ to utility daemons, so client-contexts are allocated and passed around in call
+ args rather than using a gobal.
Server:
There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
configuration.
*/
-static SSL_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
+typedef struct {
+ SSL_CTX * ctx;
+ SSL * ssl;
+ gstring * corked;
+} exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx;
+
static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
-static SSL *client_ssl = NULL;
static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
static char ssl_errstring[256];
-static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
+static int ssl_session_timeout = 7200; /* Two hours */
static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
+typedef struct ocsp_resp {
+ struct ocsp_resp * next;
+ OCSP_RESPONSE * resp;
+} ocsp_resplist;
+
typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
+ tls_support * tlsp;
uschar *certificate;
uschar *privatekey;
BOOL is_server;
union {
struct {
uschar *file;
- uschar *file_expanded;
- OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
+ const uschar *file_expanded;
+ ocsp_resplist *olist;
} server;
struct {
X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
/* should figure out a cleanup of API to handle state preserved per
implementation, for various reasons, which can be void * in the APIs.
For now, we hack around it. */
-tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
+tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL; /*XXX should not use static; multiple concurrent clients! */
tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
static int
#endif
+
+/* Daemon-called, before every connection, key create/rotate */
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+static void tk_init(void);
+static int tls_exdata_idx = -1;
+#endif
+
+void
+tls_daemon_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+tk_init();
+#endif
+return;
+}
+
+
/*************************************************
* Handle TLS error *
*************************************************/
{
if (!msg)
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
msg = US ssl_errstring;
}
-if (errstr) *errstr = string_sprintf("(%s): %s", prefix, msg);
+msg = string_sprintf("(%s): %s", prefix, msg);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS error '%s'\n", msg);
+if (errstr) *errstr = msg;
return host ? FAIL : DEFER;
}
#endif
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (RSA_generate_key): %s",
ssl_errstring);
return NULL;
x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
{
STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
-int i;
static uschar name[256];
-for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
+for (int i= 0; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
{
X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
{
- X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
- name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
- debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
+ X509_NAME * sn = X509_get_subject_name(tmp_obj->data.x509);
+ if (X509_NAME_oneline(sn, CS name, sizeof(name)))
+ {
+ name[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
+ debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
+ }
}
}
}
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
"(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ tlsp->verify_override = TRUE;
}
X509_free(tlsp->peercert);
tlsp->peercert = old_cert;
*/
static int
-verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
- tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
+verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx,
+ tls_support * tlsp, BOOL * calledp, BOOL * optionalp)
{
X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
uschar dn[256];
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn)))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
+ tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address);
+ return 0;
+ }
dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
+tlsp->verify_override = FALSE;
if (preverify_ok == 0)
{
uschar * extra = verify_mode ? string_sprintf(" (during %c-verify for [%s])",
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
"tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ tlsp->verify_override = TRUE;
}
else if (depth != 0)
if ( tlsp == &tls_out
&& ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
- /* client, wanting hostname check */
+ /* client, wanting hostname check */
{
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */
return 0; /* reject */
}
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify name failure overridden (host in "
"tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
+ tlsp->verify_override = TRUE;
}
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
*calledp ? "" : " authenticated", dn);
- if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
*calledp = TRUE;
}
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
/* This gets called *by* the dane library verify callback, which interposes
itself.
BOOL dummy_called, optional = FALSE;
#endif
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn));
+if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn)))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
+ deliver_host_address);
+ return 0;
+ }
dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s depth %d %s\n",
if (preverify_ok == 1)
{
- tls_out.dane_verified = tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
+ tls_out.dane_verified = TRUE;
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
{ /* client, wanting stapling */
return preverify_ok;
}
-#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
+#endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/
/*************************************************
static void
info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
-where = where;
-ret = ret;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL info: %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s));
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ const uschar * str;
+
+ if (where & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ str = US"SSL_connect";
+ else if (where & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ str = US"SSL_accept";
+ else
+ str = US"SSL info (undefined)";
+
+ if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
+ debug_printf("%s: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT)
+ debug_printf("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
+ str = where & SSL_CB_READ ? US"read" : US"write",
+ SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT)
+ if (ret == 0)
+ debug_printf("%s: failed in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (ret < 0)
+ debug_printf("%s: error in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START)
+ debug_printf("%s: hshake start: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE)
+ debug_printf("%s: hshake done: %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
+static void
+keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
+{
+char * filename;
+FILE * fp;
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%.200s\n", line);
+if (!(filename = getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE"))) return;
+if (!(fp = fopen(filename, "a"))) return;
+fprintf(fp, "%s\n", line);
+fclose(fp);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+/* Manage the keysets used for encrypting the session tickets, on the server. */
+
+typedef struct { /* Session ticket encryption key */
+ uschar name[16];
+
+ const EVP_CIPHER * aes_cipher;
+ uschar aes_key[32]; /* size needed depends on cipher. aes_128 implies 128/8 = 16? */
+ const EVP_MD * hmac_hash;
+ uschar hmac_key[16];
+ time_t renew;
+ time_t expire;
+} exim_stek;
+
+static exim_stek exim_tk; /* current key */
+static exim_stek exim_tk_old; /* previous key */
+
+static void
+tk_init(void)
+{
+time_t t = time(NULL);
+
+if (exim_tk.name[0])
+ {
+ if (exim_tk.renew >= t) return;
+ exim_tk_old = exim_tk;
+ }
+
+if (f.running_in_test_harness) ssl_session_timeout = 6;
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OpenSSL: %s STEK\n", exim_tk.name[0] ? "rotating" : "creating");
+if (RAND_bytes(exim_tk.aes_key, sizeof(exim_tk.aes_key)) <= 0) return;
+if (RAND_bytes(exim_tk.hmac_key, sizeof(exim_tk.hmac_key)) <= 0) return;
+if (RAND_bytes(exim_tk.name+1, sizeof(exim_tk.name)-1) <= 0) return;
+
+exim_tk.name[0] = 'E';
+exim_tk.aes_cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+exim_tk.hmac_hash = EVP_sha256();
+exim_tk.expire = t + ssl_session_timeout;
+exim_tk.renew = t + ssl_session_timeout/2;
+}
+
+static exim_stek *
+tk_current(void)
+{
+if (!exim_tk.name[0]) return NULL;
+return &exim_tk;
+}
+
+static exim_stek *
+tk_find(const uschar * name)
+{
+return memcmp(name, exim_tk.name, sizeof(exim_tk.name)) == 0 ? &exim_tk
+ : memcmp(name, exim_tk_old.name, sizeof(exim_tk_old.name)) == 0 ? &exim_tk_old
+ : NULL;
+}
+
+/* Callback for session tickets, on server */
+static int
+ticket_key_callback(SSL * ssl, uschar key_name[16],
+ uschar * iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, HMAC_CTX * hctx, int enc)
+{
+tls_support * tlsp = server_static_cbinfo->tlsp;
+exim_stek * key;
+
+if (enc)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket_key_callback: create new session\n");
+ tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_REQUESTED;
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ return -1; /* insufficient random */
+
+ if (!(key = tk_current())) /* current key doesn't exist or isn't valid */
+ return 0; /* key couldn't be created */
+ memcpy(key_name, key->name, 16);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - time(NULL));
+
+ /*XXX will want these dependent on the ssl session strength */
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key),
+ key->hmac_hash, NULL);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, key->aes_cipher, NULL, key->aes_key, iv);
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket created\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+else
+ {
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket_key_callback: retrieve session\n");
+ tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_SUGGESTED;
+
+ if (!(key = tk_find(key_name)) || key->expire < now)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ debug_printf("ticket not usable (%s)\n", key ? "expired" : "not found");
+ if (key) debug_printf("STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - now);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key),
+ key->hmac_hash, NULL);
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, key->aes_cipher, NULL, key->aes_key, iv);
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket usable, STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - now);
+
+ /* The ticket lifetime and renewal are the same as the STEK lifetime and
+ renewal, which is overenthusiastic. A factor of, say, 3x longer STEK would
+ be better. To do that we'd have to encode ticket lifetime in the name as
+ we don't yet see the restored session. Could check posthandshake for TLS1.3
+ and trigger a new ticket then, but cannot do that for TLS1.2 */
+ return key->renew < now ? 2 : 1;
+ }
}
+#endif
Arguments:
sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
cbinfo various parts of session state
- expanded the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
+ filename the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
+ is_pem file is PEM format; otherwise is DER
*/
static void
-ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
+ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo,
+ const uschar * filename, BOOL is_pem)
{
BIO * bio;
OCSP_RESPONSE * resp;
unsigned long verify_flags;
int status, reason, i;
-cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
-if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
- {
- OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response);
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
- }
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file (%s) '%s'\n", is_pem ? "PEM" : "DER", filename);
-if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb")))
+if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS filename, "rb")))
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
+ filename);
return;
}
-resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
+if (is_pem)
+ {
+ uschar * data, * freep;
+ char * dummy;
+ long len;
+ if (!PEM_read_bio(bio, &dummy, &dummy, &data, &len))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to read PEM file \"%s\"\n",
+ filename);
+ return;
+ }
+debug_printf("read pem file\n");
+ freep = data;
+ resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, CUSS &data, len);
+ OPENSSL_free(freep);
+ }
+else
+ resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
+
if (!resp)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
goto bad;
}
+#ifdef notdef
+ {
+ BIO * bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, resp, 0); /* extreme debug: stapling content */
+ BIO_free(bp);
+ }
+#endif
+
if (!(basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)))
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
SNI handling.
Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not
-be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
+be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
But what with? We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback.
And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the
library does it for us anyway? */
{
DEBUG(D_tls)
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
}
goto bad;
(tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the
right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
-I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
+I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here.
+
+XXX that will change when we add support for (TLS1.3) whole-chain stapling
+*/
if (!(single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0)))
{
}
supply_response:
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp; /*XXX stack?*/
+ /* Add the resp to the list used by tls_server_stapling_cb() */
+ {
+ ocsp_resplist ** op = &cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist, * oentry;
+ while (oentry = *op)
+ op = &oentry->next;
+ *op = oentry = store_get(sizeof(ocsp_resplist), FALSE);
+ oentry->next = NULL;
+ oentry->resp = resp;
+ }
return;
bad:
- if (running_in_test_harness)
+ if (f.running_in_test_harness)
{
extern char ** environ;
- uschar ** p;
- if (environ) for (p = USS environ; *p; p++)
+ if (environ) for (uschar ** p = USS environ; *p; p++)
if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
}
return;
}
+
+
+static void
+ocsp_free_response_list(tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo)
+{
+for (ocsp_resplist * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist; olist;
+ olist = olist->next)
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(olist->resp);
+cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist = NULL;
+}
#endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
goto err;
where = US"generating pkey";
-if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 1024)))
+if (!(rsa = rsa_callback(NULL, 0, 2048)))
goto err;
where = US"assigning pkey";
goto err;
X509_set_version(x509, 2); /* N+1 - version 3 */
-ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 0);
+ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 1);
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509), 0);
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509), (long)60 * 60); /* 1 hour */
X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey);
tls_add_certfile(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, uschar * file,
uschar ** errstr)
{
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file %s\n", file);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file '%s'\n", file);
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(sctx, CS file))
return tls_error(string_sprintf(
"SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file file=%s", file),
tls_add_pkeyfile(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, uschar * file,
uschar ** errstr)
{
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file %s\n", file);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file '%s'\n", file);
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(sctx, CS file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
return tls_error(string_sprintf(
"SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", file), cbinfo->host, NULL, errstr);
*/
static int
-tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo,
+tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo,
uschar ** errstr)
{
-uschar *expanded;
+uschar * expanded;
if (!cbinfo->certificate)
{
if (!cbinfo->is_server) /* client */
return OK;
- /* server */
+ /* server */
if (tls_install_selfsign(sctx, errstr) != OK)
return DEFER;
}
{
int err;
- if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
- Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
- Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
- )
+ if ( !reexpand_tls_files_for_sni
+ && ( Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni")
+ || Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni")
+ || Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
+ ) )
reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE;
if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded, errstr))
const uschar * file_list = expanded;
int sep = 0;
uschar * file;
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ const uschar * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file;
+ int osep = 0;
+ uschar * ofile;
+ BOOL fmt_pem = FALSE;
+
+ if (olist)
+ if (!expand_check(olist, US"tls_ocsp_file", USS &olist, errstr))
+ return DEFER;
+ if (olist && !*olist)
+ olist = NULL;
+
+ if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded && olist
+ && (Ustrcmp(olist, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - value unchanged, using existing values\n");
+ olist = NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ocsp_free_response_list(cbinfo);
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = olist;
+ }
+#endif
while (file = string_nextinlist(&file_list, &sep, NULL, 0))
+ {
if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, file, errstr)))
return err;
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ if (olist)
+ if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0)))
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"PEM ", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ fmt_pem = TRUE;
+ ofile += 4;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"DER ", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ fmt_pem = FALSE;
+ ofile += 4;
+ }
+ ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, ofile, fmt_pem);
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of ocsp file list\n");
+#endif
+ }
}
else /* would there ever be a need for multiple client certs? */
if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, expanded, errstr)))
return err;
- if (cbinfo->privatekey != NULL &&
- !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded, errstr))
+ if ( cbinfo->privatekey
+ && !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded, errstr))
return DEFER;
/* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result
return err;
}
-#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
-if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
- {
- /*XXX stack*/
- if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded, errstr))
- return DEFER;
-
- if (expanded && *expanded)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
- if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded
- && (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - value unchanged, using existing values\n");
- }
- else
- ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
return OK;
}
arg Callback of "our" registered data
Returns: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,ALERT_WARNING,ALERT_FATAL,NOACK}
+
+XXX might need to change to using ClientHello callback,
+per https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_client_hello_cb_fn.html
*/
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
/* Make the extension value available for expansion */
store_pool = POOL_PERM;
-tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername);
+tls_in.sni = string_copy_taint(US servername, TRUE);
store_pool = old_pool;
if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
+#else
if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
}
/* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
if ( !init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL, &dummy_errstr)
|| !init_ecdh(server_sni, NULL, &dummy_errstr)
)
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
+
+if ( cbinfo->server_cipher_list
+ && !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list))
+ goto bad;
-if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
- SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
{
if ((rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE,
verify_callback_server, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
/* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
OCSP information. */
if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo, &dummy_errstr)) != OK)
- return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ goto bad;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
-
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+bad: return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
#endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */
static int
tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
{
-const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
-uschar *response_der; /*XXX blob */
+const tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
+ocsp_resplist * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist;
+uschar * response_der; /*XXX blob */
int response_der_len;
-/*XXX stack: use SSL_get_certificate() to see which cert; from that work
-out which ocsp blob to send. Unfortunately, SSL_get_certificate is known
-buggy in current OpenSSL; it returns the last cert loaded always rather than
-the one actually presented. So we can't support a stack of OCSP proofs at
-this time. */
-
DEBUG(D_tls)
- debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response\n",
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
+ debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response list\n",
+ olist ? "have" : "lack");
tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
-if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
+if (!olist)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_GET0_SERIAL
+ {
+ const X509 * cert_sent = SSL_get_certificate(s);
+ const ASN1_INTEGER * cert_serial = X509_get0_serialNumber(cert_sent);
+ const BIGNUM * cert_bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(cert_serial, NULL);
+ const X509_NAME * cert_issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert_sent);
+ uschar * chash;
+ uint chash_len;
+
+ for (; olist; olist = olist->next)
+ {
+ OCSP_BASICRESP * bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(olist->resp);
+ const OCSP_SINGLERESP * single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
+ const OCSP_CERTID * cid = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(single);
+ ASN1_INTEGER * res_cert_serial;
+ const BIGNUM * resp_bn;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING * res_cert_iNameHash;
+
+
+ (void) OCSP_id_get0_info(&res_cert_iNameHash, NULL, NULL, &res_cert_serial,
+ (OCSP_CERTID *) cid);
+ resp_bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(res_cert_serial, NULL);
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ debug_printf("cert serial: %s\n", BN_bn2hex(cert_bn));
+ debug_printf("resp serial: %s\n", BN_bn2hex(resp_bn));
+ }
+
+ if (BN_cmp(cert_bn, resp_bn) == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("matched serial for ocsp\n");
+
+ /*XXX TODO: check the rest of the list for duplicate matches.
+ If any, need to also check the Issuer Name hash.
+ Without this, we will provide the wrong status in the case of
+ duplicate id. */
+
+ break;
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("not match serial for ocsp\n");
+ }
+ if (!olist)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to find match for ocsp\n");
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+if (olist->next)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OpenSSL version too early to support multi-leaf OCSP\n");
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ }
+#endif
+
+/*XXX could we do the i2d earlier, rather than during the callback? */
response_der = NULL;
-response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response, /*XXX stack*/
- &response_der);
+response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(olist->resp, &response_der);
if (response_der_len <= 0)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
int i;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status callback (OCSP stapling):\n");
len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
if(!p)
{
/* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required && LOGGING(tls_cipher))
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Required TLS certificate status not received");
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
}
-if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+if (!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; /*XXX should use tlsp-> to permit concurrent outbound */
if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, parse error");
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
return 0;
- }
+ }
-if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
+if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
{
tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
*/
{
BIO * bp = NULL;
- int status, reason;
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+#ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
+#endif
DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
/* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, cbinfo->verify_stack,
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
- "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
- ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
- BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bp);
- OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
- goto failed;
- }
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)) <= 0)
+ if (ERR_peek_error())
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
+ ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
+ BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
+ goto failed;
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no explicit trust for OCSP signing"
+ " in the root CA certificate; ignoring\n");
- BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
/*XXX So we have a good stapled OCSP status. How do we know
it is for the cert of interest? OpenSSL 1.1.0 has a routine
For now, carry on blindly accepting the resp. */
- {
- OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
-
+ for (int idx =
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
- if (OCSP_resp_count(bs) != 1)
+ OCSP_resp_count(bs) - 1;
#else
- STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
- if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
+ sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) - 1;
#endif
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
- "with multiple responses not handled");
- goto failed;
- }
- single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
+ idx >= 0; idx--)
+ {
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP * single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, idx);
+ int status, reason;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * rev, * thisupd, * nextupd;
+
+ /*XXX so I can see putting a loop in here to handle a rsp with >1 singleresp
+ - but what happens with a GnuTLS-style input?
+
+ we could do with a debug label for each singleresp
+ - it has a certID with a serialNumber, but I see no API to get that
+ */
status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
&thisupd, &nextupd);
- }
- DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
- DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
- if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
- EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
- }
- else
- {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
+ EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
switch(status)
{
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
- i = 1;
- goto good;
+ continue; /* the idx loop */
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
break;
default:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
"Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
break;
}
+
+ goto failed;
}
+
+ i = 1;
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
+ goto good;
+
failed:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
good:
BIO_free(bp);
* Initialize for TLS *
*************************************************/
+static void
+tls_openssl_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
+SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
+OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_SHA256) && !defined(OPENSSL_AUTO_SHA256)
+/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
+list of available digests. */
+EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
/* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization
of the library. We allocate and return a context structure.
tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
uschar *privatekey,
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- uschar *ocsp_file, /*XXX stack, in server*/
+ uschar *ocsp_file,
#endif
- address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp, uschar ** errstr)
+ address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp,
+ tls_support * tlsp,
+ uschar ** errstr)
{
SSL_CTX * ctx;
long init_options;
tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo;
cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
+cbinfo->tlsp = tlsp;
cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL;
{
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist = NULL;
}
else
cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
cbinfo->event_action = NULL;
#endif
-SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
-OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
-
-#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SHA256
-/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
-list of available digests. */
-EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
-#endif
+tls_openssl_init();
/* Create a context.
The OpenSSL docs in 1.0.1b have not been updated to clarify TLS variant
By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
existing knob. */
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method())))
+#else
if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL, errstr);
/* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
/* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
level. */
-DEBUG(D_tls) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, (void (*)())info_callback);
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, (void (*)())info_callback);
+#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_TRACE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE)
+ /* this needs a debug build of OpenSSL */
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, (void (*)())SSL_trace);
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
+ SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ctx, (void (*)())keylog_callback);
+#endif
+ }
/* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
(void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
if (!tls_openssl_options_parse(openssl_options, &init_options))
return tls_error(US"openssl_options parsing failed", host, NULL, errstr);
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+tlsp->resumption = RESUME_SUPPORTED;
+#endif
if (init_options)
{
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+ /* Should the server offer session resumption? */
+ if (!host && verify_check_host(&tls_resumption_hosts) == OK)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_resumption_hosts overrides openssl_options\n");
+ init_options &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+ tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_SERVER_TICKET; /* server will give ticket on request */
+ tlsp->host_resumable = TRUE;
+ }
+#endif
+
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, init_options)))
return tls_error(string_sprintf(
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
-/* Disable session cache unconditionally */
-
+/* We'd like to disable session cache unconditionally, but foolish Outlook
+Express clients then give up the first TLS connection and make a second one
+(which works). Only when there is an IMAP service on the same machine.
+Presumably OE is trying to use the cache for A on B. Leave it enabled for
+now, until we work out a decent way of presenting control to the config. It
+will never be used because we use a new context every time. */
+#ifdef notdef
(void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+#endif
/* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
/* Initialize ECDH temp key parameter selection */
}
# endif
-if (host == NULL) /* server */
+if (!host) /* server */
{
# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
+ /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.olist, because we care about if
the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
callback is invoked. */
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, rsa_callback);
#endif
-/* Finally, set the timeout, and we are done */
+/* Finally, set the session cache timeout, and we are done.
+The period appears to be also used for (server-generated) session tickets */
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, ssl_session_timeout);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialized TLS\n");
/*
Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
- buffer to use for answer
- size of buffer
pointer to number of bits for cipher
-Returns: nothing
+Returns: pointer to allocated string in perm-pool
*/
-static void
-construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
+static uschar *
+construct_cipher_name(SSL * ssl, const uschar * ver, int * bits)
{
-/* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
+int pool = store_pool;
+/* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, 'c' needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
-const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-const uschar *ver;
-ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
+const SSL_CIPHER * c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
+uschar * s;
-c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
-string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
- SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
+store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+s = string_sprintf("%s:%s:%u", ver, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
+store_pool = pool;
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", s);
+return s;
+}
+
+
+/* Get IETF-standard name for ciphersuite.
+Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
+Returns: pointer to string
+*/
+
+static const uschar *
+cipher_stdname_ssl(SSL * ssl)
+{
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_STD_NAME
+return CUS SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl));
+#else
+ushort id = 0xffff & SSL_CIPHER_get_id(SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl));
+return cipher_stdname(id >> 8, id & 0xff);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static const uschar *
+tlsver_name(SSL * ssl)
+{
+uschar * s, * p;
+int pool = store_pool;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
+store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+s = string_copy(US SSL_get_version(ssl));
+store_pool = pool;
+if ((p = Ustrchr(s, 'v'))) /* TLSv1.2 -> TLS1.2 */
+ for (;; p++) if (!(*p = p[1])) break;
+return CUS s;
}
static void
-peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned bsize)
+peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned siz)
{
/*XXX we might consider a list-of-certs variable for the cert chain.
SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL*). We'd need a new variable type and support
in list-handling functions, also consider the difference between the entire
chain and the elements sent by the peer. */
+tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
+
/* Will have already noted peercert on a verify fail; possibly not the leaf */
if (!tlsp->peercert)
tlsp->peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
/* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
if (tlsp->peercert)
- {
- X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tlsp->peercert), CS peerdn, bsize);
- peerdn[bsize-1] = '\0';
- tlsp->peerdn = peerdn; /*XXX a static buffer... */
- }
-else
- tlsp->peerdn = NULL;
+ if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(tlsp->peercert), CS peerdn, siz))
+ { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n"); }
+ else
+ {
+ int oldpool = store_pool;
+
+ peerdn[siz-1] = '\0'; /* paranoia */
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ tlsp->peerdn = string_copy(peerdn);
+ store_pool = oldpool;
+
+ /* We used to set CV in the cert-verify callbacks (either plain or dane)
+ but they don't get called on session-resumption. So use the official
+ interface, which uses the resumed value. Unfortunately this claims verified
+ when it actually failed but we're in try-verify mode, due to us wanting the
+ knowlege that it failed so needing to have the callback and forcing a
+ permissive return. If we don't force it, the TLS startup is failed.
+ The extra bit of information is set in verify_override in the cb, stashed
+ for resumption next to the TLS session, and used here. */
+
+ if (!tlsp->verify_override)
+ tlsp->certificate_verified =
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+ tlsp->dane_verified ||
+#endif
+ SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK;
+ }
}
* Set up for verifying certificates *
*************************************************/
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/* Load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
static BOOL
BIO * bp;
X509 * x;
+while (sk_X509_num(verify_stack) > 0)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_pop(verify_stack));
+
if (!(bp = BIO_new_file(CS file, "r"))) return FALSE;
while ((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL)))
sk_X509_push(verify_stack, x);
BIO_free(bp);
return TRUE;
}
+#endif
-/* Called by both client and server startup
+/* Called by both client and server startup; on the server possibly
+repeated after a Server Name Indication.
Arguments:
sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
/* In the server if we will be offering an OCSP proof, load chain from
file for verifying the OCSP proof at load time. */
+/*XXX Glitch! The file here is tls_verify_certs: the chain for verifying the client cert.
+This is inconsistent with the need to verify the OCSP proof of the server cert.
+*/
+
if ( !host
&& statbuf.st_size > 0
&& server_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file
/* Load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for sending
to the client. This is only for the one-file tls_verify_certificates
variant.
- If a list isn't loaded into the server, but
- some verify locations are set, the server end appears to make
- a wildcard request for client certs.
+ If a list isn't loaded into the server, but some verify locations are set,
+ the server end appears to make a wildcard request for client certs.
Meanwhile, the client library as default behaviour *ignores* the list
we send over the wire - see man SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.
Because of this, and that the dir variant is likely only used for
- the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing.
- */
+ the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing. */
+
if (file)
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
}
}
}
/* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
- SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
+ SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional ? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
cert_vfy_cb);
}
uschar * expciphers;
tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo;
static uschar peerdn[256];
-static uschar cipherbuf[256];
/* Check for previous activation */
-if (tls_in.active >= 0)
+if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0)
{
tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"", errstr);
smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE);
rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
- tls_ocsp_file, /*XXX stack*/
+ tls_ocsp_file,
#endif
- NULL, &server_static_cbinfo, errstr);
+ NULL, &server_static_cbinfo, &tls_in, errstr);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
cbinfo = server_static_cbinfo;
/* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
were historically separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my
tests, and also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here.
+
+XXX SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() is replaced by SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites()
+for TLS 1.3 . Since we do not call it at present we get the default list:
+TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
*/
if (expciphers)
{
- uschar * s = expciphers;
- while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
+ for (uschar * s = expciphers; *s; s++ ) if (*s == '_') *s = '-';
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_ctx, CS expciphers))
return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL, errstr);
optional, set up appropriately. */
tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
tls_in.dane_verified = FALSE;
#endif
server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
{
rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
- FALSE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
+ FALSE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
server_verify_optional = FALSE;
}
else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
{
rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
- TRUE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
+ TRUE, verify_callback_server, errstr);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
server_verify_optional = TRUE;
}
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, ticket_key_callback);
+/* despite working, appears to always return failure, so ignoring */
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
+# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(server_ctx, tls_in.host_resumable ? 1 : 0);
+# else
+SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(server_ctx, 0); /* send no TLS1.3 stateful-tickets */
+# endif
+#endif
+
+
/* Prepare for new connection */
if (!(server_ssl = SSL_new(server_ctx)))
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
-if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
-alarm(0);
+ALARM_CLR(0);
if (rc <= 0)
{
- (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
- return FAIL;
+ int error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, rc);
+ switch(error)
+ {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
+ (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+
+ if (SSL_get_shutdown(server_ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ SSL_shutdown(server_ssl);
+
+ tls_close(NULL, TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN);
+ return FAIL;
+
+ /* Handle genuine errors */
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ {
+ uschar * s = US"SSL_accept";
+ unsigned long e = ERR_peek_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_REASON(e) == SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ s = string_sprintf("%s (%s)", s, SSL_get_version(server_ssl));
+ (void) tls_error(s, NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
+ if (error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
+ {
+ if (!errno)
+ {
+ *errstr = US"SSL_accept: TCP connection closed by peer";
+ return FAIL;
+ }
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - syscall %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+ return FAIL;
+ }
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n");
+ERR_clear_error(); /* Even success can leave errors in the stack. Seen with
+ anon-authentication ciphersuite negotiated. */
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+if (SSL_session_reused(server_ssl))
+ {
+ tls_in.resumption |= RESUME_USED;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Session reused\n");
+ }
+#endif
-/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
-and initialize things. */
+/* TLS has been set up. Record data for the connection,
+adjust the input functions to read via TLS, and initialize things. */
+tls_in.ext_master_secret = SSL_get_extms_support(server_ssl) == 1;
peer_cert(server_ssl, &tls_in, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
-construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
-tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
+tls_in.ver = tlsver_name(server_ssl);
+tls_in.cipher = construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, tls_in.ver, &tls_in.bits);
+tls_in.cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_ssl(server_ssl);
DEBUG(D_tls)
{
uschar buf[2048];
- if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
+ if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)))
debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
+ {
+ BIO * bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(bp, SSL_get_session(server_ssl));
+ BIO_free(bp);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION * ss = SSL_get_session(server_ssl);
+ if (SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(ss)) /* 1.1.0 */
+ debug_printf("The session has a ticket, life %lu seconds\n",
+ SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(ss));
+ }
+#endif
}
/* Record the certificate we presented */
tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
}
+/* Channel-binding info for authenticators
+See description in https://paquier.xyz/postgresql-2/channel-binding-openssl/ */
+ {
+ uschar c, * s;
+ size_t len = SSL_get_peer_finished(server_ssl, &c, 0);
+ int old_pool = store_pool;
+
+ SSL_get_peer_finished(server_ssl, s = store_get((int)len, FALSE), len);
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ tls_in.channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS s, (int)len, FALSE);
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage %p\n", tls_in.channelbinding);
+ }
+
/* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
*/
-ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
+if (!ssl_xfer_buffer) ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
-ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
+ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = FALSE;
receive_getc = tls_getc;
receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf;
receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
-tls_in.active = fileno(smtp_out);
+tls_in.active.sock = fileno(smtp_out);
+tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL; /* not using explicit ctx for server-side */
return OK;
}
if ( ( !ob->tls_verify_hosts
&& (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
)
- || (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+ || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK
)
client_verify_optional = FALSE;
-else if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
+else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
client_verify_optional = TRUE;
else
return OK;
errstr)) != OK)
return rc;
-if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
+if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
{
cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames =
#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
static int
dane_tlsa_load(SSL * ssl, host_item * host, dns_answer * dnsa, uschar ** errstr)
{
-dns_record * rr;
dns_scan dnss;
const char * hostnames[2] = { CS host->name, NULL };
int found = 0;
if (DANESSL_init(ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL, errstr);
-for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
- rr;
+for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr;
rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
- ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
+ ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA && rr->size > 3)
{
const uschar * p = rr->data;
uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: No usable TLSA records");
return DEFER;
}
-#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
+#endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/
+
+
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+/* On the client, get any stashed session for the given IP from hints db
+and apply it to the ssl-connection for attempted resumption. */
+
+static void
+tls_retrieve_session(tls_support * tlsp, SSL * ssl, const uschar * key)
+{
+tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_SUPPORTED;
+if (tlsp->host_resumable)
+ {
+ dbdata_tls_session * dt;
+ int len;
+ open_db dbblock, * dbm_file;
+
+ tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_REQUESTED;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("checking for resumable session for %s\n", key);
+ if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDONLY, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE)))
+ {
+ /* key for the db is the IP */
+ if ((dt = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm_file, key, &len)))
+ {
+ SSL_SESSION * ss = NULL;
+ const uschar * sess_asn1 = dt->session;
+
+ len -= sizeof(dbdata_tls_session);
+ if (!(d2i_SSL_SESSION(&ss, &sess_asn1, (long)len)))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(),
+ ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+ debug_printf("decoding session: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
+ else if ( SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(ss) + dt->time_stamp
+ < time(NULL))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session expired\n");
+ dbfn_delete(dbm_file, key);
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (!SSL_set_session(ssl, ss))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(),
+ ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+ debug_printf("applying session to ssl: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("good session\n");
+ tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_SUGGESTED;
+ tlsp->verify_override = dt->verify_override;
+ tlsp->ocsp = dt->ocsp;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no session record\n");
+ dbfn_close(dbm_file);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* On the client, save the session for later resumption */
+
+static int
+tls_save_session_cb(SSL * ssl, SSL_SESSION * ss)
+{
+tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tls_exdata_idx);
+tls_support * tlsp;
+
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_save_session_cb\n");
+
+if (!cbinfo || !(tlsp = cbinfo->tlsp)->host_resumable) return 0;
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
+if (SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ss)) /* 1.1.1 */
+# endif
+ {
+ int len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, NULL);
+ int dlen = sizeof(dbdata_tls_session) + len;
+ dbdata_tls_session * dt = store_get(dlen, TRUE);
+ uschar * s = dt->session;
+ open_db dbblock, * dbm_file;
+
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session is resumable\n");
+ tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_SERVER_TICKET; /* server gave us a ticket */
+
+ dt->verify_override = tlsp->verify_override;
+ dt->ocsp = tlsp->ocsp;
+ (void) i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, &s); /* s gets bumped to end */
+
+ if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDWR, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE)))
+ {
+ const uschar * key = cbinfo->host->address;
+ dbfn_delete(dbm_file, key);
+ dbfn_write(dbm_file, key, dt, dlen);
+ dbfn_close(dbm_file);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote session (len %u) to db\n",
+ (unsigned)dlen);
+ }
+ }
+return 1;
+}
+
+
+static void
+tls_client_ctx_resume_prehandshake(
+ exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * exim_client_ctx, tls_support * tlsp,
+ smtp_transport_options_block * ob, host_item * host)
+{
+/* Should the client request a session resumption ticket? */
+if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_resumption_hosts, host) == OK)
+ {
+ tlsp->host_resumable = TRUE;
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(exim_client_ctx->ctx,
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
+ | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(exim_client_ctx->ctx, tls_save_session_cb);
+ }
+}
+
+static BOOL
+tls_client_ssl_resume_prehandshake(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp,
+ host_item * host, uschar ** errstr)
+{
+if (tlsp->host_resumable)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("tls_resumption_hosts overrides openssl_options, enabling tickets\n");
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+
+ tls_exdata_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tls_exdata_idx, client_static_cbinfo))
+ {
+ tls_error(US"set ex_data", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ debug_printf("tls_exdata_idx %d cbinfo %p\n", tls_exdata_idx, client_static_cbinfo);
+ }
+
+tlsp->resumption = RESUME_SUPPORTED;
+/* Pick up a previous session, saved on an old ticket */
+tls_retrieve_session(tlsp, ssl, host->address);
+return TRUE;
+}
+static void
+tls_client_resume_posthandshake(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * exim_client_ctx,
+ tls_support * tlsp)
+{
+if (SSL_session_reused(exim_client_ctx->ssl))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("The session was reused\n");
+ tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_USED;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME */
/*************************************************
/* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted.
-Argument:
- fd the fd of the connection
- host connected host (for messages)
- addr the first address
- tb transport (always smtp)
- tlsa_dnsa tlsa lookup, if DANE, else null
- errstr error string pointer
-
-Returns: OK on success
- FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
- because this is not a server
+Arguments:
+ cctx connection context
+ conn_args connection details
+ cookie datum for randomness; can be NULL
+ tlsp record details of TLS channel configuration here; must be non-NULL
+ errstr error string pointer
+
+Returns: TRUE for success with TLS session context set in connection context,
+ FALSE on error
*/
-int
-tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
- transport_instance * tb,
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
- dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa,
-#endif
- uschar ** errstr)
+BOOL
+tls_client_start(client_conn_ctx * cctx, smtp_connect_args * conn_args,
+ void * cookie, tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr)
{
-smtp_transport_options_block * ob =
- (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
-static uschar peerdn[256];
+host_item * host = conn_args->host; /* for msgs and option-tests */
+transport_instance * tb = conn_args->tblock; /* always smtp or NULL */
+smtp_transport_options_block * ob = tb
+ ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block
+ : &smtp_transport_option_defaults;
+exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * exim_client_ctx;
uschar * expciphers;
int rc;
-static uschar cipherbuf[256];
+static uschar peerdn[256];
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
#endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-tls_out.tlsa_usage = 0;
+rc = store_pool;
+store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+exim_client_ctx = store_get(sizeof(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx), FALSE);
+exim_client_ctx->corked = NULL;
+store_pool = rc;
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+tlsp->tlsa_usage = 0;
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
{
-# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
- if ( tlsa_dnsa
+# ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+ if ( conn_args->dane
&& ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
&& ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
)
# endif
if ((require_ocsp =
- verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
+ verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
request_ocsp = TRUE;
else
-# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+# ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if (!request_ocsp)
# endif
request_ocsp =
- verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
}
#endif
-rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
+rc = tls_init(&exim_client_ctx->ctx, host, NULL,
ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
(void *)(long)request_ocsp,
#endif
- addr, &client_static_cbinfo, errstr);
-if (rc != OK) return rc;
+ cookie, &client_static_cbinfo, tlsp, errstr);
+if (rc != OK) return FALSE;
-tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
+tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
-if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
- &expciphers, errstr))
- return FAIL;
+expciphers = NULL;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (conn_args->dane)
+ {
+ /* We fall back to tls_require_ciphers if unset, empty or forced failure, but
+ other failures should be treated as problems. */
+ if (ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers &&
+ !expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers",
+ &expciphers, errstr))
+ return FALSE;
+ if (expciphers && *expciphers == '\0')
+ expciphers = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+if (!expciphers &&
+ !expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
+ &expciphers, errstr))
+ return FALSE;
/* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and
uschar *s = expciphers;
while (*s) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
- if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(client_ctx, CS expciphers))
- return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL, errstr);
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(exim_client_ctx->ctx, CS expciphers))
+ {
+ tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-if (tlsa_dnsa)
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (conn_args->dane)
{
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(exim_client_ctx->ctx,
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
verify_callback_client_dane);
if (!DANESSL_library_init())
- return tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL, errstr);
- if (DANESSL_CTX_init(client_ctx) <= 0)
- return tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL, errstr);
+ {
+ tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ if (DANESSL_CTX_init(exim_client_ctx->ctx) <= 0)
+ {
+ tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
}
else
#endif
- if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob,
- client_static_cbinfo, errstr)) != OK)
- return rc;
+ if (tls_client_basic_ctx_init(exim_client_ctx->ctx, host, ob,
+ client_static_cbinfo, errstr) != OK)
+ return FALSE;
+
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+tls_client_ctx_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx, tlsp, ob, host);
+#endif
-if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
- return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
-SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
-SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
-SSL_set_connect_state(client_ssl);
+
+if (!(exim_client_ctx->ssl = SSL_new(exim_client_ctx->ctx)))
+ {
+ tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+SSL_set_session_id_context(exim_client_ctx->ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
+
+SSL_set_fd(exim_client_ctx->ssl, cctx->sock);
+SSL_set_connect_state(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
if (ob->tls_sni)
{
- if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_out.sni, errstr))
- return FAIL;
- if (!tls_out.sni)
+ if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tlsp->sni, errstr))
+ return FALSE;
+ if (!tlsp->sni)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
}
- else if (!Ustrlen(tls_out.sni))
- tls_out.sni = NULL;
+ else if (!Ustrlen(tlsp->sni))
+ tlsp->sni = NULL;
else
{
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_out.sni);
- SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client_ssl, tls_out.sni);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tlsp->sni);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp->sni);
#else
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SNI unusable with this OpenSSL library version; ignoring \"%s\"\n",
- tls_out.sni);
+ tlsp->sni);
#endif
}
}
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-if (tlsa_dnsa)
- if ((rc = dane_tlsa_load(client_ssl, host, tlsa_dnsa, errstr)) != OK)
- return rc;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (conn_args->dane)
+ if (dane_tlsa_load(exim_client_ctx->ssl, host, &conn_args->tlsa_dnsa, errstr) != OK)
+ return FALSE;
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
/* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
-# ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
+# ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
if (request_ocsp)
{
const uschar * s;
{ /* Re-eval now $tls_out_tlsa_usage is populated. If
this means we avoid the OCSP request, we wasted the setup
cost in tls_init(). */
- require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
request_ocsp = require_ocsp
- || verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
+ || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
}
}
# endif
if (request_ocsp)
{
- SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(exim_client_ctx->ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+ tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
}
#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+if (!tls_client_ssl_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, host,
+ errstr))
+ return FALSE;
+#endif
+
#ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
-client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb->event_action;
+client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb ? tb->event_action : NULL;
#endif
/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
-alarm(ob->command_timeout);
-rc = SSL_connect(client_ssl);
-alarm(0);
+ALARM(ob->command_timeout);
+rc = SSL_connect(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
+ALARM_CLR(0);
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
-if (tlsa_dnsa)
- DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl);
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (conn_args->dane)
+ DANESSL_cleanup(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
#endif
if (rc <= 0)
- return tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL,
- errstr);
+ {
+ tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
+ {
+ BIO * bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ SSL_SESSION_print_keylog(bp, SSL_get_session(exim_client_ctx->ssl));
+ BIO_free(bp);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+tls_client_resume_posthandshake(exim_client_ctx, tlsp);
+#endif
-peer_cert(client_ssl, &tls_out, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
+tlsp->ext_master_secret = SSL_get_extms_support(exim_client_ctx->ssl) == 1;
+peer_cert(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
-construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
-tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
+tlsp->ver = tlsver_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
+tlsp->cipher = construct_cipher_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp->ver, &tlsp->bits);
+tlsp->cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_ssl(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
/* Record the certificate we presented */
{
- X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(client_ssl);
- tls_out.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
+ X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
+ tlsp->ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
}
-tls_out.active = fd;
-return OK;
+/*XXX will this work with continued-TLS? */
+/* Channel-binding info for authenticators */
+ {
+ uschar c, * s;
+ size_t len = SSL_get_finished(exim_client_ctx->ssl, &c, 0);
+ int old_pool = store_pool;
+
+ SSL_get_finished(exim_client_ctx->ssl, s = store_get((int)len, TRUE), len);
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ tlsp->channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS s, (int)len, TRUE);
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage %p %p\n", tlsp->channelbinding, tlsp);
+ }
+
+tlsp->active.sock = cctx->sock;
+tlsp->active.tls_ctx = exim_client_ctx;
+cctx->tls_ctx = exim_client_ctx;
+return TRUE;
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
-if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout);
inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer,
MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim));
error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
-alarm(0);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM_CLR(0);
+
+if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */
+ smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */
+if (had_command_sigterm)
+ smtp_command_sigterm_exit();
+if (had_data_timeout)
+ smtp_data_timeout_exit();
+if (had_data_sigint)
+ smtp_data_sigint_exit();
/* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
non-SSL handling. */
-if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
+switch(error)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ break;
- receive_getc = smtp_getc;
- receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf;
- receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
- receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
- receive_feof = smtp_feof;
- receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
- receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
- SSL_free(server_ssl);
- server_ssl = NULL;
- tls_in.active = -1;
- tls_in.bits = 0;
- tls_in.cipher = NULL;
- tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
- tls_in.sni = NULL;
+ if (SSL_get_shutdown(server_ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+ SSL_shutdown(server_ssl);
- return FALSE;
- }
-
-/* Handle genuine errors */
+ tls_close(NULL, TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN);
+ return FALSE;
-else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL)
- {
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
- ssl_xfer_error = 1;
- return FALSE;
- }
+ /* Handle genuine errors */
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
+ ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
-else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
- ssl_xfer_error = 1;
- return FALSE;
+ default:
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) if (error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
+ debug_printf(" - syscall %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
+ return FALSE;
}
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
/*
Arguments:
+ ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
buff buffer of data
len size of buffer
Returns: the number of bytes read
- -1 after a failed read
+ -1 after a failed read, including EOF
Only used by the client-side TLS.
*/
int
-tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
+tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len)
{
-SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
+SSL * ssl = ct_ctx ? ((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->ssl : server_ssl;
int inbytes;
int error;
/*
Arguments:
- is_server channel specifier
+ ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
buff buffer of data
len number of bytes
more further data expected soon
Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
-1 after a failed write
-Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
+Used by both server-side and client-side TLS. Calling with len zero and more unset
+will flush buffered writes; buff can be null for this case.
*/
int
-tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
+tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar * buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
{
-int outbytes, error, left;
-SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
-static gstring * corked = NULL;
+size_t olen = len;
+int outbytes, error;
+SSL * ssl = ct_ctx
+ ? ((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->ssl : server_ssl;
+static gstring * server_corked = NULL;
+gstring ** corkedp = ct_ctx
+ ? &((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->corked : &server_corked;
+gstring * corked = *corkedp;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, %lu%s)\n", __FUNCTION__,
buff, (unsigned long)len, more ? ", more" : "");
/* Lacking a CORK or MSG_MORE facility (such as GnuTLS has) we copy data when
"more" is notified. This hack is only ok if small amounts are involved AND only
one stream does it, in one context (i.e. no store reset). Currently it is used
-for the responses to the received SMTP MAIL , RCPT, DATA sequence, only. */
-
-if (is_server && (more || corked))
+for the responses to the received SMTP MAIL , RCPT, DATA sequence, only.
+We support callouts done by the server process by using a separate client
+context for the stashed information. */
+/* + if PIPE_COMMAND, banner & ehlo-resp for smmtp-on-connect. Suspect there's
+a store reset there, so use POOL_PERM. */
+/* + if CHUNKING, cmds EHLO,MAIL,RCPT(s),BDAT */
+
+if ((more || corked))
{
+ if (!len) buff = US &error; /* dummy just so that string_catn is ok */
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_PIPE_CONNECT
+ int save_pool = store_pool;
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+#endif
+
corked = string_catn(corked, buff, len);
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_PIPE_CONNECT
+ store_pool = save_pool;
+#endif
+
if (more)
+ {
+ *corkedp = corked;
return len;
+ }
buff = CUS corked->s;
len = corked->ptr;
- corked = NULL;
+ *corkedp = NULL;
}
-for (left = len; left > 0;)
+for (int left = len; left > 0;)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %p, %d)\n", buff, left);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", ssl, buff, left);
outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
switch (error)
{
- case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* the usual case */
left -= outbytes;
buff += outbytes;
break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
+ return -1;
+
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
return -1;
return -1;
}
}
-return len;
+return olen;
}
daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
would tamper with the SSL session in the parent process).
-Arguments: TRUE if SSL_shutdown is to be called
+Arguments:
+ ct_ctx client TLS context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context
+ shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent,
+ 2 if also response to be waited for
+
Returns: nothing
Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
*/
void
-tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
+tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int shutdown)
{
-SSL **sslp = is_server ? &server_ssl : &client_ssl;
-int *fdp = is_server ? &tls_in.active : &tls_out.active;
+exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx * o_ctx = ct_ctx;
+SSL_CTX **ctxp = o_ctx ? &o_ctx->ctx : &server_ctx;
+SSL **sslp = o_ctx ? &o_ctx->ssl : &server_ssl;
+int *fdp = o_ctx ? &tls_out.active.sock : &tls_in.active.sock;
if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
if (shutdown)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down SSL\n");
- SSL_shutdown(*sslp);
+ int rc;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n",
+ shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : "");
+
+ if ( (rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp)) == 0 /* send "close notify" alert */
+ && shutdown > 1)
+ {
+ ALARM(2);
+ rc = SSL_shutdown(*sslp); /* wait for response */
+ ALARM_CLR(0);
+ }
+
+ if (rc < 0) DEBUG(D_tls)
+ {
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
+ debug_printf("SSL_shutdown: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
+ }
+ }
+
+if (!o_ctx) /* server side */
+ {
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+ sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free);
+ server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ receive_getc = smtp_getc;
+ receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf;
+ receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache;
+ receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
+ receive_feof = smtp_feof;
+ receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
+ receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
+ tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL;
+ tls_in.sni = NULL;
+ /* Leave bits, peercert, cipher, peerdn, certificate_verified set, for logging */
}
+SSL_CTX_free(*ctxp);
SSL_free(*sslp);
+*ctxp = NULL;
*sslp = NULL;
-
*fdp = -1;
}
SSL_CTX *ctx;
uschar *s, *expciphers, *err;
-/* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global
-state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */
-
-SSL_load_error_strings();
-OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
-/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
-list of available digests. */
-EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
-#endif
+tls_openssl_init();
if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
return NULL;
err = NULL;
-ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
-if (!ctx)
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
+#else
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);
}
if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
{
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring, sizeof(ssl_errstring));
err = string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed: %s",
expciphers, ssl_errstring);
}
int i, needed_len;
static pid_t pidlast = 0;
pid_t pidnow;
-uschar *p;
uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
if (max <= 1)
}
r = 0;
-for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
- {
- r *= 256;
- r += *p;
- }
+for (uschar * p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
+ r = 256 * r + *p;
/* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
Returns success or failure in parsing
*/
-struct exim_openssl_option {
- uschar *name;
- long value;
-};
-/* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
-options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
-all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
-to apply.
-
-This list is current as of:
- ==> 1.0.1b <==
-Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
-*/
-static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
-/* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
-#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
- { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
- { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
- { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
- { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
- { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
- { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
- { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
- { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
- { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
- { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
- { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
- { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
- { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
- { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
- { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
- { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
- /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
-#warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
-#else
- { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
-#endif
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
- { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
- { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
- { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
- { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
- { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
- { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
- { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
- { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
-#endif
-#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
- { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
-#endif
-};
-static int exim_openssl_options_size =
- sizeof(exim_openssl_options)/sizeof(struct exim_openssl_option);
static BOOL
tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
{
long result, item;
-uschar *s, *end;
+uschar * exp, * end;
uschar keep_c;
BOOL adding, item_parsed;
+/* Server: send no (<= TLS1.2) session tickets */
result = SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+
/* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
- * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
+from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
result |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+result |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+#endif
if (!option_spec)
{
return TRUE;
}
-for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
+if (!expand_check(option_spec, US"openssl_options", &exp, &end))
+ return FALSE;
+
+for (uschar * s = exp; *s; /**/)
{
while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
if (*s == '\0')
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
return FALSE;
}
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s from %lx: %lx (%s)\n",
- adding ? "adding" : "removing", result, item, s);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s %08lx: %08lx (%s)\n",
+ adding ? "adding to " : "removing from", result, item, s);
if (adding)
result |= item;
else
return TRUE;
}
+#endif /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/
/* vi: aw ai sw=2
*/
/* End of tls-openssl.c */
git://git.exim.org / users / jgh / exim.git / blobdiff