Log auth data in rejectlog.

[exim.git] / src / src / smtp_in.c

diff --git a/src/src/smtp_in.c b/src/src/smtp_in.c
index 500000be446a0c0dec2333d9675a42c819e25fca..e79f0a202e233c010aaa25e11ab600f3edd0e66b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/smtp_in.c
+++ b/src/src/smtp_in.c
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/smtp_in.c,v 1.67 2010/06/12 15:21:26 jetmore Exp $ */
-
 /*************************************************
 *     Exim - an Internet mail transport agent    *
 *************************************************/
@@ -38,9 +36,14 @@ uschar *tcp_wrappers_name;
 /* Size of buffer for reading SMTP commands. We used to use 512, as defined
 by RFC 821. However, RFC 1869 specifies that this must be increased for SMTP
 commands that accept arguments, and this in particular applies to AUTH, where
-the data can be quite long. */
+the data can be quite long.  More recently this value was 2048 in Exim; 
+however, RFC 4954 (circa 2007) recommends 12288 bytes to handle AUTH.  Clients
+such as Thunderbird will send an AUTH with an initial-response for GSSAPI. 
+The maximum size of a Kerberos ticket under Windows 2003 is 12000 bytes, and 
+we need room to handle large base64-encoded AUTHs for GSSAPI.
+*/
 
-#define smtp_cmd_buffer_size  2048
+#define smtp_cmd_buffer_size  16384
 
 /* Size of buffer for reading SMTP incoming packets */
 
@@ -2197,8 +2200,13 @@ if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where == ACL_WHERE_DATA)
 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT || where == ACL_WHERE_DATA || where == ACL_WHERE_MIME)
 #endif
   {
-  sender_info = string_sprintf("F=<%s> ", (sender_address_unrewritten != NULL)?
-    sender_address_unrewritten : sender_address);
+  sender_info = string_sprintf("F=<%s>%s%s%s%s ",
+    sender_address_unrewritten ? sender_address_unrewritten : sender_address,
+    sender_host_authenticated ? US" A="                                    : US"",
+    sender_host_authenticated ? sender_host_authenticated                  : US"",
+    sender_host_authenticated && authenticated_id ? US":"                  : US"",
+    sender_host_authenticated && authenticated_id ? authenticated_id       : US""
+    );
   }
 
 /* If there's been a sender verification failure with a specific message, and
@@ -3861,6 +3869,15 @@ while (done <= 0)
       /* and if TLS is already active, tls_server_start() should fail */
       }
 
+    /* There is nothing we value in the input buffer and if TLS is succesfully
+    negotiated, we won't use this buffer again; if TLS fails, we'll just read
+    fresh content into it.  The buffer contains arbitrary content from an
+    untrusted remote source; eg: NOOP <shellcode>\r\nSTARTTLS\r\n
+    It seems safest to just wipe away the content rather than leave it as a
+    target to jump to. */
+
+    memset(smtp_inbuffer, 0, in_buffer_size);
+
     /* Attempt to start up a TLS session, and if successful, discard all
     knowledge that was obtained previously. At least, that's what the RFC says,
     and that's what happens by default. However, in order to work round YAEB,