OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
} server;
struct {
- X509_STORE *verify_store;
+ X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
+ BOOL verify_required;
} client;
} u_ocsp;
#endif
*/
static int
-verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx, tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
+verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
+ tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
{
+X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
static uschar txt[256];
-X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509ctx->current_cert),
+X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
CS txt, sizeof(txt));
if (state == 0)
{
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
- x509ctx->error_depth,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(x509ctx->error),
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx),
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
txt);
tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
*calledp = TRUE;
if (!*optionalp)
{
- tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(x509ctx->current_cert);
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
return 0; /* reject */
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
"tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
- return 1; /* accept */
}
-if (x509ctx->error_depth != 0)
+else if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx) != 0)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d cert=%s\n",
- x509ctx->error_depth, txt);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n",
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx), txt);
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
{ /* client, wanting stapling */
for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
- x509ctx->current_cert))
+ cert))
ERR_clear_error();
}
#endif
}
else
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s peer: %s\n",
- *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
tlsp->peerdn = txt;
- tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(x509ctx->current_cert);
+ tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
+ *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
+ if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
+ *calledp = TRUE;
}
-/*XXX JGH: this looks bogus - we set "verified" first time through, which
-will be for the root CS cert (calls work down the chain). Why should it
-not be on the last call, where we're setting peerdn?
-
-To test: set up a chain anchored by a good root-CA but with a bad server cert.
-Does certificate_verified get set?
-*/
-if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
-*calledp = TRUE;
-
return 1; /* accept */
}
}
supply_response:
-cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
return;
bad:
-if (running_in_test_harness)
- {
- extern char ** environ;
- uschar ** p;
- for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
- if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
- {
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
- goto supply_response;
- }
- }
+ if (running_in_test_harness)
+ {
+ extern char ** environ;
+ uschar ** p;
+ for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
+ if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
+ goto supply_response;
+ }
+ }
return;
}
#endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP*/
uschar *response_der;
int response_der_len;
-if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] Recieved OCSP stapling req;%s responding",
- sender_host_address, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "":" not");
-else
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.",
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.",
cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
+tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
response_der = NULL;
-response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response, &response_der);
+response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response,
+ &response_der);
if (response_der_len <= 0)
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(server_ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
+tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
if(!p)
{
- if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, null content");
+ /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
+ if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required
+ && log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
- return 0; /* This is the fail case for require-ocsp; none from server */
+ return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
}
+
if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
{
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, parse error");
else
if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
{
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, error parsing response");
else
/* We'd check the nonce here if we'd put one in the request. */
/* However that would defeat cacheability on the server so we don't. */
-
/* This section of code reworked from OpenSSL apps source;
The OpenSSL Project retains copyright:
Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*/
{
BIO * bp = NULL;
- OCSP_CERTID *id;
int status, reason;
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
/* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
/* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
- if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL, cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
+ if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL,
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
{
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
ERR_print_errors(bp);
- i = 0;
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
goto out;
}
if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
{
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling with multiple responses not handled");
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
+ "with multiple responses not handled");
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
goto out;
}
single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
- status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
+ status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
+ &thisupd, &nextupd);
}
- i = 0;
DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
- if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
+ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
+ EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
{
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
- goto out;
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
}
-
- DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n", OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
- switch(status)
+ else
{
- case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
- i = 1;
- break;
- case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
- reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "", reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
- DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
- i = 0;
- break;
- default:
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
- i = 0;
- break;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
+ OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
+ switch(status)
+ {
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
+ i = 1;
+ break;
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
+ reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
+ reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
+ i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
+ break;
+ }
}
out:
BIO_free(bp);
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
BOOL require_ocsp = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp,
NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
+BOOL request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE
+ : verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp,
+ NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
#endif
rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
- require_ocsp ? US"" : NULL,
+ (void *)(long)request_ocsp,
#endif
addr, &client_static_cbinfo);
if (rc != OK) return rc;
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_OCSP
/* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
-if (require_ocsp)
+if (request_ocsp)
+ {
SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+ client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
+ }
#endif
/* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
git://git.exim.org / exim.git / blobdiff