BOOL have_set_peerdn;
const struct host_item *host;
uschar *peerdn;
+ uschar *ciphersuite;
uschar *received_sni;
const uschar *tls_certificate;
int xfer_buffer_hwm;
int xfer_eof;
int xfer_error;
-
- uschar cipherbuf[256];
} exim_gnutls_state_st;
static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = {
NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE,
- NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- ""
};
/* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming
/* returns size in "bytes" */
tls_bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8;
-tls_cipher = state->cipherbuf;
+tls_cipher = state->ciphersuite;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", tls_cipher);
Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and state->have_set_peerdn
and we use that to detect double-calls.
+NOTE: the state blocks last while the TLS connection is up, which is fine
+for logging in the server side, but for the client side, we log after teardown
+in src/deliver.c. While the session is up, we can twist about states and
+repoint tls_* globals, but those variables used for logging or other variable
+expansion that happens _after_ delivery need to have a longer life-time.
+
+So for those, we get the data from POOL_PERM; the re-invoke guard keeps us from
+doing this more than once per generation of a state context. We set them in
+the state context, and repoint tls_* to them. After the state goes away, the
+tls_* copies of the pointers remain valid and client delivery logging is happy.
+
+tls_certificate_verified is a BOOL, so the tls_peerdn and tls_cipher issues
+don't apply.
+
Arguments:
state exim_gnutls_state_st *
static int
peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st *state)
{
+uschar cipherbuf[256];
const gnutls_datum *cert_list;
-int rc;
+int old_pool, rc;
unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
gnutls_protocol_t protocol;
gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher;
mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session);
kx = gnutls_kx_get(state->session);
-string_format(state->cipherbuf, sizeof(state->cipherbuf),
+string_format(cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf),
"%s:%s:%d",
gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol),
gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac),
/* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS
code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS
releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */
-for (p = state->cipherbuf; *p != '\0'; ++p)
+for (p = cipherbuf; *p != '\0'; ++p)
if (isspace(*p))
*p = '-';
+old_pool = store_pool;
+store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+state->ciphersuite = string_copy(cipherbuf);
+store_pool = old_pool;
+tls_cipher = state->ciphersuite;
/* tls_peerdn */
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &cert_list_size);